

Anekānta-Naya, Nikṣepa, Syādvāda

Unit – 1 Lesson – 1 : Ācārya Siddha Sena's Contributions to the Jain Philosophy

In this lesson, we shall study the following topics:

- 1.0 Introduction
- 1.1 Two primary view points (*nayas*)
- 1.2 Seven view points
- 1.3 *Naya* and *Nikṣepa*
- 1.4 *Naya* and Relativity
- 1.5 Origination, destruction and permanence
- 1.6 Contribution of Siddha Sena Diwākara

1.0 Introduction

There are many *ācāryas* by the name Siddha Sena in the philosophical literature of *Jainas*. However the title Diwākara associated with Siddha Sena, the author of *Sanmati Prakaraṇa* gives a special significance / identity to him. Pt. Kailash Chandra Śāstri calls him as the shining star in the *Jaina* literary annals. He was the foremost amongst the philosophers propagating reconciliation amongst various philosophies. *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*, authored by him, is considered as a masterpiece philosophical *granth*. One finds in it, abundant use of Bhagwāna Mahāvira's doctrine of *Anekānta* to explain important principles of *Jaina* philosophy. Even though the author supports and explains the *Jaina* principles as enshrined in the canonical literature, yet he is able to bring out a number of unique explanations and corollaries to these principles which are considered as his own and original views.

According to the multiplicity of viewpoints doctrine (*Anekānta*), many sets mutually opposing attributes exit in every substance all the times. However at any given point of time, only one attribute can be expressed and the remaining attributes become secondary and are thus not expressed. This is called the *Naya* (stand-point or view-point) doctrine that requires us to accept one attribute at a time and express the same as relative to others, i.e. accepting existence of other attributes also. This doctrine of *Naya* and its analysis from different angles is discussed in details in *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*.

There are two important viewpoints to know an entity, namely substance viewpoint (*Dravyārthika naya*) and Mode viewpoint (*Paryāyārthika naya*). Substance viewpoint looks at an entity from its generic part while the Mode view-point looks at the specific component/ part of the entity. In *Bhagwati* and other canonical literature we find mention of these two viewpoints. Siddha Sena begins *Sanmati Prakaraṇa* with these two *nayas* and later on describes them in great details.

*Tithyiravayaṇasaṅgaha-visesapathāramulavāgaraṇi,
Dāvvyatthio ya pajjavaṇao ya sesā viyappā sih.*

1.1 Two primary view points (*nayas*)

Sermons of *Tīrathalīkaraṇas* have two parts namely generic and specific. These two parts are described by substance viewpoint (*Dravyārthika naya*) and mode viewpoint (*Paryāyārthika naya*). The remaining parts are the extensions of these two *nayas*.

The subject of Substance viewpoint is not in exclusion of the subject of Mode viewpoint and vice versa. All entities, except the omnipresent substance and its last part as mode, are all evolutionary with substance and modes both existing.

These two *nayas*, when used as relative to each other are each called *sunaya* (Right viewpoint). Empirical existence (*saṁsāra*), bondage (*bandha*), liberation (*Mokṣa*), pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥka*) can all be explained on the basis of relativity. There is no third *naya*, known as *gūṇārthika naya* except the two known as *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*. Siddha Sena argues, "If there was independent existence of *gūṇa* or attributes from the substance and mode, then the sermons of Bhagavāna Mahāvira would have talked of the three *nayas* i.e. *gūṇārthika*, *dravyārthika*

and *paryāyārthika naya*. Even though Siddha Sena accepts the existence of two *nayas* only i.e. *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*, yet the concept of *gūṇārthika naya* came to his mind only.

1.2 Seven view points

Concerning further classification and types of *nayas* also, Siddha Sena had his original thinking. We find discussions concerning seven types of *nayas* in Sthāna, Samvāya, Bhagwati, Anuyogadārāi and other canonical literature. However Siddha Sena evolved for the first time, the concept of six types of *naya* only. According to him, the two components of Figurative viewpoint (*Naigama naya*), i.e. the first part which looks at an entity from the identity viewpoint (*Abhedagrāhi*) is contained in Class viewpoint (*Saṅgraha naya*) and the second part which looks at an entity from the differences view point (*Bhedagrāhi*) is contained in the Distributive viewpoint (*Vyavahāra naya*). Therefore both Digambara and Śvetāmbara Jain scholars accepted the reasoning for the six *nayas* doctrine of Siddha Sena which demonstrates the sound basis of his reasoning. Seven *nayas* can be summarily grouped into two *nayas*. This is the common belief amongst most of the philosophers; however there is no agreement about the constituents of each group. According to the old tradition, *Dravyārthika naya* was contained *Naigama naya* to Linear viewpoint (*Ājūsutra naya*) as its constituents. However he limited *Dravyārthika naya* to *Vyavahāra naya* only and excluded *Ājūsutra naya* from it. Siddha Sena does not subscribe to the independent existence of *Naigama naya* and hence considers substance viewpoint to contain *Saṅgraha naya* and *Vyavahāra naya* only while *Ājūsutra naya* and other three types of *naya* were clubbed under *Paryāyārthika naya*. Both explanations by him i.e. grouping of *nayas* in two main categories and the six types of *nayas* instead of seven appear logical. Canonical literature keeps the substance viewpoint in the background while the logical tradition keeps the mode viewpoint as primary. Hence the regrouping of the *nayas* i.e. *Saṅgraha naya* and *Vyavahāra naya* in *Dravyārthika naya* and the remaining four i.e. Linear (*Ājūsutra*), Literal (*Śabda*), Etymological (*Saṅkīrṇa*) and Determinant (*Evambhūta*) *nayas* in *Paryāyārthika naya* is indicates clearly the original thinking of Siddha Sena.

Presentation or analysis methods or *Nikṣepa* is an important step in gaining knowledge about an object. Ārya Rakṣita has detailed these in Anūyogadwāra. He has indicated four types of *Nikṣepa* namely Name (*nāma*), Symbol (*sthāpnā*), Potentiality (*dravya*) and Actuality (*bhāva*). Siddha Sena while discussing these four types has related them to the two main *nayas*:

*Nāmaṅ śhavaṇā daviye tī es dāvvaṭṭhiyassa nikhevo,
Bhāvo u pajjavatṭhiyassa paruvaṇā es paramattho.*

1.3 *Naya* and *Nikṣepa*

As there is some sort of identity in the three presentation methods i.e. name, symbol and potentiality, these are therefore the subjects of substance viewpoint. The last presentation method i.e. Actuality emphasizes differences and hence relates to the mode viewpoint. Relationship between *naya* and *nikṣepa* had been minutely discussed in the later Jain philosophical literature. However when we look at the origin of this discussion, we find it in Sanmati Prakaraṇa. Siddha Sena had therefore been the pioneer in establishing the relationship between the two types of *naya* and the four types of *nikṣepa*.

Naya is a method of contemplating / analysis. It is a thought. And thoughts have no limits / boundaries. Siddha Sena therefore clearly said that Anekanta is a collection of infinite *nayas*. There are as many *nayas* as the ways of expression, and hence there are as many philosophical doctrines as the number of *nayas*.

*Jāvaiyā vavaṇapakā tāvaeya ceva hoṅṅi ṇayavāyā,
Jāvaiyā ṇayavāyā tāvaeya ceva parasamaya.*

Besides these, the commentaries he has given about different philosophies based on the *naya* doctrine are clear indications of his original thinking and attempt to bring reconciliation, rather confrontation amongst them. Every thought represents partial truth. When we try to emphasize our thought as the only truth and other's thought as false, then every thought becomes untrue / false (*mithyā*). Hence Siddha Sena says that every philosopher is right based on relativity his views to a particular view point. According to him, as per Jain doctrine, Sāṅkīya philosophy is right as per the substance viewpoint as they talk of soul and other substances as eternal. On the other hand, Buddhist philosophy

is right from the mode viewpoint as they talk of everything as temporary, originating and destroying every moment. Vaiśeṣika, though talk of both eternal and temporary substances, but they are also at fault when they say that some substances like soul, *parmāṇu* etc. are eternal only and the others like pitcher etc. are / momentary / temporary only.

According to Jain doctrine, whenever we talk of independent viewpoint (i.e. not consider relativity), our thoughts become untrue (*mithyā*). Similarly when we try to condemn the views of others, our own thoughts and expressions become questionable. Citing the example of a necklace, he says that only those precious stones attain the same value as the necklace when they leave their independent existence and are threaded together as a necklace. Similarly adherence to the *Anekāṅta* doctrine is possible for those *nayas* only which analyse the truth as relative to other *nayas* only and not independent of them.

1.4 Naya and Relativity

This doctrine of multiplicity of viewpoints (*Anekāṅta*) of Jains is based on the concept of Relativity. On the basis of relativity only, we can reject the monistic viewpoint and subscribe to *Anekāṅta*. Siddha Sena has highlighted the importance of this concept in the beginning itself in Sanmati Prakaraṇa. In the first verse (*gāthā*) of Sanmati Prakaraṇa itself, he had used an adjective '*kusamayaviṇāsanāṅ*' for Jain doctrine, meaning that it is the cause of eliminating the monistic views as false (*mithyā*) knowledge. Similarly the last verse of the same *grantha*, he has used another adjective for Jain doctrine i.e. *micchādaḥsaṅsasamuhamaeyassa* meaning that sermons of the *Jina* / *Tīrathankara* is a collection of all monistic philosophies. The idea behind all these discussions is that sermons of *Jina* are collectivization of different monistic philosophies. Insisting on monistic viewpoint tends to focus on condemning the others viewpoint. Jain philosophy tries to project these monistic philosophies appropriately in relative terms and thus enhances their usefulness. This is the significance of *Anekāṅta*.

1.5 Origination, destruction and permanence

There are three fundamental words / alphabets of *Anekāṅta* namely origination, destruction and permanence. Being the foundation of the entire Jain metaphysics, these are also called the alphabets (*mātrakāpada*). Umāswāti has presented these three as the primary attributes of existence. Siddha Sena's analysis of origination and destruction of the entity using the *naya* doctrine is his original and unique thinking. He says:

*Uppajaṅti viyaṅti ya bhāvā niyameṇa pajjavanassa,
Davvatthiyassa savvaṅ sayā aṇuppannamaviṇatthaṅ.*

From mode viewpoint, all substances, as a rule, originate and decay continuously. From the substance viewpoint, all substances are eternal and without origination and decay. One-viewpoint talks of the origination and decay attributes of the substance while the other talks of the permanent attribute of the same substance. Similarly he talks of identity and differentiality relationship of the origination, decay and permanence:

1.6 Contribution of Siddha Sena Diwākara

Siddha Sena Diwākara is called as the father of the Jain Nyaya doctrine. His famous text is called Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa. In this text he has not only analyzed origination-destruction-permanence from the viewpoint doctrine but has also analyzed them from the identity-difference (*bheda-abheda*) angle also.

*Tiṅṅi vi uppāyae abhiṅṅakālā ya bhīṅṅakālā ya
Atthaṅtaraṅ aṅatthaṅtaraṅ daviyāhi ṅāyavvā.*

According to Siddha Sena, origination, decay and permanence are all occurring at the same time as well as at different times also. When we talk of two simultaneous modes, then we see the identity or all the three occurring at the same time. Time of the origination of one mode can be the same as the destruction and permanence of some other mode. But when we talk of one mode only, then the time of occurrence of origination and decay are different. Origination and decay time of the same mode cannot be the same and this has to be, as a rule different. We have to thus conclusively say that identity and differentiality are relative.

The co-existent state of origination, decay and permanence is real and that is the substance. While defining the substance as with origination, decay and permanence, Umā Swāti has also discussed attributes and modes also.

Umā Swāti describes real as an entity, which is with origination, decay and permanence; and that real is substance. Similarly the second definition of substance by him is given as *gūṇaparyayabad dravyam*. Siddha Sena talks of mode only when he talks of substance and not of attribute (*gūṇa*). He has clearly stated, “A substance is known by all the *vyanjana* and *artha paryāyas* it had / has and will have in past, present and future”. According to him, *guna* and *paryaya* are really one. If there were separate existence of attributes from modes, then the canonical literature would have had *Gūṇārthika naya* along with *Dravyārthika* and *Paryāyārthika nayas*. Since such discussion does not exist there, therefore it is logical to consider mode and attribute as identical. The effect of Siddha Sena’s explanation can be seen on the thinking of philosophers from both Digambara and Śwetāmbara schools in the following period.

In Sanmati Prakaraṇa, he discusses the views of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers who consider substance and attributes different as per his own thinking stated earlier i.e. attributes and modes are same. Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider substance and attributes different based on the differences in their indicators and the organs of knowledge used to know them. Contrary to Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Vedānti and other philosophers believing in the identity of all substances consider substance and attributes as generic and identical. As per these philosophers, if we consider the specific attributes different from the specific part of the substance, then in reality, they are generic only and generic is real. Siddha Sena while talking of philosophers propagating identity and differentiability doctrines of substance and modes / attributes, considers attributes and modes as identical.

Every substance is a collection of infinite mode. Eternal existence of infinite attributes is called the substance. Origination and destruction of substance can be termed as creation and destruction of the universe also. The process of origination and destruction of the substance is explained differently by different philosophers. Sāṅkhya believes in transformation. According to them, cause is converted into effect only. The serial transformation of *prakṛiti* into the five *mahābhoots* is the transformation of the cause into effect and the creation of the universe. Creation of the universe is due to the imbalance in the constituent three attributes (*satva, tamasa and rajasa*) while their equilibrium is the cause of its destruction. Buddhists talk of the substance as an amalgam of subtle parts. Siddha Sena has primarily analysed the thinking of Vaiśeṣika philosophers. As per them, creation of the universe is due to fusion only while Jains talk of both fusion and fission as the causes. According to Siddha Sena, “Those philosophers who talk of just fusion only, are ignorant of the process of origination”.

As the two *parmāṇūs* combine to give an entity with two attributes and many such entities with two attributes combine to give an entity with three attributes; similarly when an entity with three attributes break, it results in many entities with two attributes and when an entity with two attributes breaks, it results in *parmāṇūs* with one attribute. Thus Siddha Sena Diwākara has defined the nature of the substance; inter relationships of substance, modes and attributes, identical nature of modes and attributes, relationship of substance and its modes as both identical and different, process of origination and decay of the substance. His analysis and presentation of different Jain principles in relation to other philosophies speak of the high level of his intellect and thorough knowledge of the Jain canonical literature. His thorough knowledge and not insistence on his viewpoint raised the concept of reconciliation in the philosophical arena. Before him, all philosophers were busy condemning their counter parts only. Siddha Sena saw reconciliation even in condemnation. This is the reason why his name started being mentioned as one of the forefront *ācāryas* who established *Anekānta* doctrine of Jains. In *Anekānta* doctrine both identity and differentiability have relative importance. In Sanmati Prakaraṇa, he establishes reconciliation with many philosophical doctrines appearing as opposing to the Jain doctrine. Cause and effect are both inter related and hence they are both different as well as same. As per Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika schools, effect is invariably absent from the cause before it takes place. Hence cause and effect are entirely different. On the other Sāṅkhya philosophers believe that effect is invariably present in the cause and so they are both identical. Jain doctrine says that relative to the energy, effect is always present in the cause while relative to origination and its expression, effect is always absent from the cause. So in conclusion, they are identical as well as different and evolving.

Principles of reason (*Hetū*) and faith or lack of reason (*Ahetū*) are two important doctrines in the philosophical discussions. Those believing in *Hetū* feel that reason or logic is essential for valid knowledge of an object while the other philosophical school does not think so and consider the sermons of canonical literature as non-debatable. They say that before the sermons of canonical literature, logic becomes like a mole before a mountain. Siddha Sena

resolved both these conflicting beliefs on the basis of *Anekāṅta*. He says, “In our canonical literature, there are some facts which can be understood by reasoning and logic but it is difficult to say that everything said in them can be understood by reasoning or logic. There are certain facts which can be proved neither by direct means nor by inference and there the sermons of the omniscient becomes the basis of our understanding. Hence reason and belief both have relative importance”.

What is the cause of this perceptible world? This is an important and debatable matter. In *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*, while discussing cause and effect, he promotes the reconciliatory nature of the six doctrines (*vāda*) namely *Kālavāda*, *Svabhāvavāda*, *Nyativāda*, *Karmavāda*, *Pūrūṣārthavāda* and *Īśvaravāda*. *Anekāṅta* emphasizes the collection of all these *vādas* while discussing the origination of any thing.

Similarly *Jñānavāda* and *Kriyāvāda* are two different philosophical doctrines. Whereas *Jñānavādis* emphasize the importance of knowledge only and condemn action; the *Kriyāvādis* consider only the action / effort is required / essential. To achieve liberation / emancipation, action without knowledge is as ineffective as knowledge without action is. Besides the above discussions, relation of *Jīva* and *pūdgala*, existent and non-existent, generic and specific, eternal and temporary, unity and diversity, explicable and inexplicable appear to be opposing each other in common philosophical discussions. But *Anekāṅta* doctrine brings forth their relativity to each other. In the first and third parts of *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*, he emphasizes the reconciliation between these and other opposing states. In the second chapter of this *grāṅtha*, he analyses intuition (*darśana*) and knowledge (*Jñāna*), the two important parts of *Anekāṅta*. As had been said before, there are two basic viewpoints namely substance and mode viewpoints.

Substance viewpoint determines the generic and the mode viewpoint determines the specifics of an entity. These determinations of the generic and specifics of an entity can also be called intuition (*darśana*) and knowledge (*Jñāna*) respectively. Intuition determines the generic attributes of the entity while knowledge determines the specific attributes of the entity. Siddha Sena, by saying *sāmañṣaggahanaṅ*, defines intuition as determination of the generic attributes of the entity. Though the generic and specific attributes do not exist separately in an entity, yet while expressing, one becomes the primary and the other secondary. In intuition, the generic existence of the entity is expressed and the specific existences remain secondary and not expressed.

In Jain philosophical literature we find intuition to be of four kinds and knowledge of five kinds. While reviewing the nature of intuition and knowledge, he looks at the components of both for comparative analysis. As per this analysis, he says that the first stage of knowledge i.e. apperception or out-linear grasp (*avagraha*) is just intuition only. Besides *avagraha*, the other stages of sensuous knowledge (*matijñāna*) like discrimination (*īhā*) etc. all fall in the category of knowledge. While analyzing this further he says, “If we consider *avagraha* based on vision based intuition (*caḅṣūdarśana*), then we have to accept *avagraha* based on other sense organs, such as smell sense based *avagraha* as *ghrānadarśana* and so on.”

Siddha Sena was recognized as the proponent of identity (*abhedavāda*). He propagated the identity of intuition and knowledge. *Jñāna* and *darśana* are different forms of manifestation of consciousness. Like intuition and knowledge, he further goes on to say that there is no difference between sensuous knowledge (*matijñāna*) and verbal knowledge (*śrutajñāna*); Telepathy (*Avadhijñāna*) and Mind based knowledge (*Manahparyaya-jñāna*); *Kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna*. These were all his original contributions in the philosophical arena.

Sensual perception is related to *caḅṣūdarśana* and *acāḅṣūdarśana*. Like sensual intuition, *caḅṣūdarśana* and *acāḅṣūdarśana* are associated with senses and mind. Verbal knowledge is related directly to mind. Verbal knowledge generally focuses on specific attributes and not the generic. Hence there is no independent intuition associated with it. In *Sanmati Prakaraṇa*, he therefore rejects independent identity of verbal knowledge. Concept of *Avadhidarśana* is unanimously and without doubt accepted by all. There is no independent intuition associated with mind based knowledge and this had been discussed by both Digamabara and Śvetāmbara philosophers.

Siddha Sena has predominantly and based on logic discussed the concepts of *Kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna*. Both of these are direct manifestations of the soul. He further asks, “Whether they occur serially or simultaneously and whether both of them are identical or different?”. Three alternative scenarios emerge in this discussion namely:

- Those believing in their serial occurrence '*Kramavādi*'
- Those believing in their simultaneous occurrence '*Yugapatavādi*'
- Those believing in their identity i.e. they are same only. '*Abhedavādi*'

Kramavādsi believe that both these manifestations occur serially. *Yugapatavādis* believe that both these manifestations are independent and occur simultaneously. In contrast to both these viewpoints, *Abhedavādis* believe that both these manifestations are in fact same. Siddha Sena accepts the last hypothesis i.e. both these manifestations are same due to the following reasons.

1. An omniscient is cognizing the evolutionary state of each object (i.e. their generic and specific attributes) of all objects in the entire universe, hence that is the *Kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna*.
2. Use of *jāṇae-pāsae* together in the canonical literature symbolizes only one type of manifestation of the omniscient.
3. An omniscient is all visualizing and knowing and this state can only be supported by the *Abhedavād* belief i.e. identity of intuition and knowledge for them.
4. Knowledge and intuition of an omniscient are with a beginning but without an end. This is an indication of identity of both intuition and knowledge.
5. The other four kinds of knowledge i.e. sensuous knowledge etc., are all due to subsidence cum destruction of karmas and cognize an object partially. Hence intuition and knowledge of an object are different in them. On the other hand, knowledge of an omniscient is due to destruction of karmas only and is all knowing of all the objects. Hence there is no question of serial occurrence or independent of these (i.e. intuition and knowledge) for him. Really that cognition is just one only.

Thus we see that Siddha Sena has a very important place in the philosophical annals of his times. Sanmati Prakaraṇa is one of the most important *grāh̄thas* written by him and it contains a number of original and unique thoughts.

Exercises

Essay type question:

1. Based on Sanmati Tarka Prakrṇa, analyze the contributions of Siddha Sena.

Short notes type questions:

1. Short critique on the principles of reason (*Hetuvāda*) and lack of it (*Ahetuvāda*).
2. Enunciate the identity of intuition (*darśana*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) as per Siddha Sena.

Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. _____ attributes are intuited by Intuition (*darśana*) while the _____ attributes are cognized by knowledge.
2. *Ācārya* Siddha Sena is known as the proponent of _____ in Jain philosophical tradition.
3. Discussions about the substance and mode view points are found in _____ and other old Jain canonical literature.
4. _____ is considered as a prestigious philosophical text of Jains.
5. Siddha Sena has a _____ place in the annals of Jain philosophers.
6. Siddha Sena was the first philosopher to present and propagate the doctrine of _____.
7. By stating '*Jaiṅ sāmāṅgaggaṇaṅ daṅsaṅa*', _____ defined intuition (*darśana*) as knowledge of the generic attributes of an entity.
8. The all pervasive vision and lack of rigidity about his view point enabled Siddha Sena to propagate the principle of _____ in the philosophical discussions.
9. Only the time of origination of a mode can be the destruction time of or the _____ another mode.
10. Siddha Sena called other philosophies as _____ based on the principle of relativity.

Answers to the fill in the blanks questions.

1. Generic, specific. 2. *Abhedavāda*. 3. Bhagawati 4. Sanmati Prakaraṇa 5. prestigious 6. *ṣaṭṇayavāda*
7. Siddha Sena 8. Reconciliation 9. Permanence time 10. right / true.

References : Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa

Author : Dr. Sādhvi Muditayaśā

Anekānta-Naya, Nikṣepa, Syādvāda

Unit – 1 Lesson – 2 : Dravya, Kṣetra, Kāla aur Bhāva

We shall focus our discussions in this lesson on the following topics:

- 0.0 Introduction⁰⁷
- 1.0 Four view points of knowing an entity.
 - 1.1 Substance
 - 1.2 Place
 - 1.3 Time
 - 1.4 Mode (*Bhāva*)
- 2.0 Eternity and infinite nature of the cosmos
- 3.0 Eternity and infinite ness of *jīva*
- 4.0 *Syādvāda* or conditional dialectic

0.0 Introduction

Truth / real are infinite and it cannot be expressed from one viewpoint only. Similarly every entity also has infinite attributes and it cannot be expressed from one viewpoint only. So for expression, a number of viewpoints are expected to be used. Omniscient or the Kevali Bhagwāna can know the entire truth but even he cannot express it all simultaneously. To do so is therefore impossible. Some wise / intelligent person can express 20-30 modes, but he cannot express the complete truth. There are limits to expression. Entities and their modes are infinite. To express some of the modes of some of the entities and consider that the remaining modes and entities do not exist is beyond the definition of truth. *Anekānta* says, "Do not look at the truth from one viewpoint. If you look at the truth from existent viewpoint then look at it from the non existent viewpoint also".

1.0 Four viewpoints of knowing an entity.

There are many angles or objectives to cognize an entity. Tattvārathasutra (1/7-8) talks of 14 *margaṅās* (angles) to cognize an entity. These are Description (*Nirdeśa*), Ownership (*Swāmitva*), Means (*Sādhana*), Source or the basis of origin (*Adhikaraṇa*), Duration (*Stūti*), Types (*Vidhāna*), Existence (*Sat*) Number (*Sankhyā*), Space (*Kṣetra*), Period (*Antara*), Mode (*Bhāva*), Body (*Sparśa*), Time (*Kāla*), Comparison (*Alpbahutva*). Anuyogadwāra (181) talks of nine ways of knowing the entity (*Anūgama*) namely *Satpadaprārūpaṇā*, *Pramāṇa*, Space (*Kṣetra*), Body (*Sparśa*), Time (*Kāla*), Period (*Antara*), Language (*Bhāṣā*), Mode (*Bhāva*), Comparison (*Alpbahutva*), Mode (*Bhāva*), Comparison (*Alpbahutva*). In this paper, we are describing the four angles / viewpoints used by Bhagwāna Mahāvira for knowing an entity. These are Substance (*Dravya*), Space (*Kṣetra*), Time (*Kāla*) and Mode (*Bhāva*). Without cognizing an entity from these our angles, we cannot acquire its right knowledge. As per the scientific analysis methods, we cannot describe / express an entity completely without knowing it from space and time viewpoints. As per analysis by scientists, as the time gets stretched as it passes/ spent, time and space are relative; so along with time, space is also getting stretched. Hence both space and time are the two attributes of an entity and so they are both important to express an entity truly. As per Bhagwāna Mahāvira, along with space and time, substance and mode viewpoints are also very important; all our activities (*vyavahāra*) are relative and so all our decisions are relative to space, time, substance and mode.

Substance (*dravya*)

Substance is an entity which while transforming continuously in different states maintains its nature and capabilities without losing or decreasing them. In philosophical parlance, substance is an entity with modes and attributes. '*adīvat, dravati, drauṣyati, tāhstān paryāyān eti dravya*' indicates the origin of the word *dravya*. It means, 'That which had, is and will acquire different modes is substance'. Umā Swāti in Tattvārathasutra-adhigama says '*utpādavyayadhrauvyayukttaḥ sat*' i.e. an entity which has originations, destruction and permanence is real (*sat*) and that *sat* is *dravya*.

Decision about existence is relative to substance and not to mode. Every entity has its own independent existence. Other entities cannot interfere in the existence of a particular entity. Sentient and insentient entities are all

independent from existence viewpoint. Soul has independent existence and so is the subtlest part of matter (*paramānū*). Thus all entities are independent is a conclusion relative to the substance viewpoint.

Every substance has two types of attributes, namely co-existent (*sadabhāvi*) called *gūṇa* and serially occurring (*kramabhāvi*) called modes which are continuously transforming.

Space – Kṣetra

To understand the space which forms the basis of an entity? There are two types of space namely *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*. As per Jain philosophy, this bifurcation of space is eternal and natural and not the creations of some super natural entity like God. This hypothesis of bifurcation of space into *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa* is a unique contribution of Jain philosophy. This hypothesis can be compared to the hypothesis of Albert Einstein.

Cognition of an entity relative to space can be both independent and dependent on other entities. A *paramānū* will exist in a specific space is its independent. After sometime it will move this specific space to some other space is its dependence.

Time - Kāla

To understand the time (existence and duration) which forms the basis of the entity? As per Śvetāmbara school, there are two types of Kāla namely absolute (*Naiścānika*) and practical (*Vyavahārika*). *Naiścānika kāla* is related to the existence of each entity while the *Vyavahārika kāla* is related to the movement of the sun¹. On the other hand Digambara *ācāryas* consider *kāla* in the form of a *paramānū*². Vaidika philosophers also consider Kāla of two types namely absolute (*Naiścānika*) and practical (*Vyavahārika*). Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣikas consider *kāla* as an independent substance³, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and others do not consider *kāla* as an independent substance⁴.

Cognition of an entity relative to time helps in all day to day activities and thinking (i.e. assists in our practical life and thinking). We face lots of difficulties when our conclusions are not related to time. A person becomes unhappy for not being successful. He thinks that he did not achieve anything even after so many efforts and thus makes himself unhappy. The reason for his unhappiness is because he is not familiar with the *Anekānta* doctrine. He will therefore think like this Making an effort is the mode of the present. A man makes efforts with his mental and physical activities, still if he does not succeed then there is definitely some cause (deterrent) for this failure. Those deterring causes are past modes, subtle modes and inexpressible modes, we cannot express the present by ignoring the past. Present is the time for the result, making efforts, creation etc. Present is affected by the past and affects the future. Present is the link between past and future. Hence our decisions / knowledge relative to present are relative to time. Dharmkīrti, the great Bauddha *ācārya* ridiculing the *Syādvāda* doctrine of Jains said, “*Syādvāda* cannot lead you to any conclusion. It says- this is possible, this is also possible, existence is possible and so is inexistence. Then why we should not accept that curd can be camel and camel can be curd. “. If we express this in a reconciliatory language, then we see that an entity is not always dependent on others. Therefore if the entity is not totally dependent, i.e. it has its own independent existence then who can stop camel from becoming curd and vice versa. The *paramānūs* which constitute curd today the same *paramānūs* can over a period of time can become camel also. Hence a cognitive decision independent of time can never be true.

Mode (*Bhāva*)

To understand the modes, like *aupaśamika*, *audāyika*, *kṣyopasamika* or *kṣayika*, of an entity. For example, a living being after getting born as human being is born as a hellish or sub-human being or heavenly being. Thus the cycle of modes keep on going. In this respect, every entity has its own state (*sva-bhāva*) and own mode (*sva-paryāya*).

2.0 Eternity (*nityata*), temporariness (*anityatā*), with an end (*sāntatā*) and infiniteness (*anantatā*) of the universe (*loka*).

The question of eternity, temporariness, and limit or with an end and its infiniteness (without limits) are not new. These were the issues of discussion during canonical period and all religions have expressed their views which are slightly different from each other. These questions were also put to Gautama Buddha and Mahāvira. Gautama Buddha did not reply this question by calling it as inexplicable. The main reason for doing so was the controversy by

his either accepting the Upaniṣad view of its eternity or the Uccēdāvāda's view of its temporary character. Therefore Gautama Buddha kept these issues concerning the universe in the category of inexplicable.

The same question which was kept in the category of inexplicable were explained by Mahāvira Bhagvāna to Skandaka Parivrājaka satisfying his inquisitiveness by expressing the universe with reference to *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva* satisfactorily. The dialogue between Mahāvira Bhagvāna and Skandaka Parivrājaka as described in Bhagwati (*sutra* 2/44-45) is as follows:

Je vi ya khaṇḍya ! ayameyāruve ajjhatthie cintie patthie manogae saṅkappe samūppjittā – kiṅ sante loye? Aṇāṅte loye?- tassa vi ya ṇa ayamattṭhe – avaṅ khalū mae khandayā ! cavvihe loye paṇṇatte , taṅ jahā – davvo, khettao, kālao, bhāvao.

Davvao ṇaṅ ege loye saaṅte.

Khetto ṇaṅ loye asankhejjāo joyaṇakodākodi āyāma

Vikkhameṇaṅ asankhejjāo joyaṇakodākodi parikkheveṇaṅ paṇṇatte, atthi pūṇa se aṅte .

Kālao ṇaṅ loye na kayāe na āsi, na kayāe na bhavae, na kavāe na bhavvissae-bhaviṅsū ya, bhavati ya bhavissae ya dhūve niyae sāsae akkhae avvae niccae, natthi pūṇa se aṅte.

Bhāvao ṇaṅ loye aṅāntā vaṇṇapajjvā, aṅāntā gaṇḍhapajjvā, aṅāntā rassapajjvā, aṅāntā fāsapajjvā, aṅāntā saṅṭhāṇapajjvā, aṅāntā garūyalaḥūyapajjvā, aṅāntā agarūyalaḥūyapajjvā, natthi pūṇa se aṅte.

Setaṅ khaṇḍagā ! davvo loye saaṅte, khettao loye saaṅte, kālao loye aṅāṅte , bhāvao loye aṅāṅte.

Skandaka! Your spiritual, inquisitive and mental query concerning universe as to whether it is with limits or infinite; I have told that this universe is of four types namely substance (*dravya*), space, time and mode (*Bhāva*).

The universe as a substance is one and with limits.

The spatial universe is of countless length and breadth and circumference and is with limits.

It is wrong to say that temporal universe was never there, is never there and will never be there. It was and will always be there. It is eternal, indestructible, fixed, and without end i.e. it is infinite.

The modal universe has infinite colours, infinite smells / odours, infinite bodies / touches, infinite spatial modes, infinite fixed sized modes and infinite elastic modes existing in it. There is no end to it and it is infinite. Skandaka! Therefore this universe as substance is with limits, with limited space, infinite time and modes.

Like this method of replying from four angles of Mahāvira Bhagvāna, we find existence of four types / methods of expression used by *Syādvāda* to eliminate doubt and opposition⁵. Replying to Jamālī, Mahāvira Bhagvāna said,⁶ “ *Sāsae loye Jamālī! jaṅ kayāe nāsi, na kayāe na bhavae, na ayāe na bhaviṅssae bhūviṅ ca, bhavae ya, bhavissae ya - dhūve, nitie, sātīe, akkhae, avvae, avatiṭṭhe nicce. asāsae loye Jamālī! jaṅ osappiṇṭi bhavitta ussappiṇṭi bhavae, ussappiṇṭi bhavitta osappiṇṭi bhavae,* “

Jamālī! The universe is eternal, real. It is wrong to say that it was not there. It is also wrong to say that it will not be there. It was, it is and it will always be there. And so it is eternal, real, indestructible and existent. Similarly Jamālī loka is not eternal as it changes from *avasarpini* (descending) to *utasarpini* (ascending) and from *utasarpini* to *avasarpini* time cycles. This description is made from the substance and modal view points. Both these attributes always existent in the substance but the expressed attribute becomes primary and the unexpressed becomes secondary.

Universe (*Loka*) is eternal. Here the eternal attribute is primary and the temporary is secondary.

Loka is temporary. Here the temporary attribute is primary and the eternal is secondary.

This duality of existence and non existence is the proven natural attribute of the entity. Temporal differences or mono-vision arises from our speech. In time perspective eternal and temporary are not different. Still we call an entity as eternal or temporary.

3.0 *Jīva*, its infinite and finite characteristics.

Mahāvira Bhagvāna classified all entities from four viewpoints namely substance, space, time and mode. Thus an observer observes all entities from these four viewpoints or observes the entity in relation to each of these four

methods. Thus the true expression of an entity is possible and partially existent in any one of these viewpoints. Thus an observer cognizing an entity from one of these viewpoints finds the entity contained in that viewpoint.

Like the question about the universe was kept as inexplicable by Gautama Buddha, he also kept the question of soul (*Jīva*) in the same category. If from the time viewpoint, we can say that soul is both with infinite and finite attributes, then his statement of its being inexpressible is obvious. From the substance and space viewpoints, it is not possible to know his views. Hence this question about soul being eternal or temporary and infinite of with limits is kept as inexpressible by him.

On the other hand, Mahāvira Bhagvāna is very clear and specific about this question. Using the four viewpoints i.e. substance, space, time and mode, he satisfied the inquisitiveness of Skandaka as follows⁷:

Skandaka! I have said this soul is of four types namely substance, space, time and mode.

Substance view: Soul is one and with limits.

Space view: Soul is with innumerable space points, existing in the innumerable space points of space (*ākāśa*) and is with limits i.e. has finite space.

Time view: *Jīva* was not there, is not there and will not be there are wrong. Soul was, is and will be there forever. It is eternal, existent, indestructible, and inexpressible. It has no end and is infinite.

Mod view: *Jīva* has infinite modes of knowledge, intuition, conduct, elastic and inelastic/fixed attributes. It has no limits of these and these are infinite.

Therefore skandaka, *Jīva* from substance view is one and with limits, from space view it is with limits, from time view it is infinite and from mode view it is infinite. In this way Mahāvira Bhagvāna provided clarifications to a number of many complicated questions with opposing meanings.

4.0 Syādvāda or conditional dialectic

Every substance is a combination of the opposing modes like expressible inexpressible, cognizable non-cognizable, different and same, existent and non-existent, real and unreal. No substance is neither expressible nor non-expressible all the times or always the same or different all the times.

Whatever is a substance, it is both expressible and non-expressible, existent and non-existent and so on. The method of expressing clearly these opposing attributes in a substance is called *Anekānta* or multiplicity of viewpoints. Expression of this method i.e. *Anekānta* is called conditional dialectic or *Syādvāda* i.e. *Anekānta* is the principle / doctrine and *Syādvāda* is its philosophy.

The word '*Syāt*' originates from *Tidd- kṭta*. Praise, existent, debate, contemplation, *Anekānta*, doubt are some of the many meanings assigned to it. In Jain philosophy, *Syāt* has been used to represent relativity and *Anekānta* also. The word '*Syāt*' is representative of relativity, without it we cannot cognize the truth and the same cannot be expressed. Mahāvira Bhagvāna had resolved a number of conflicting issues using the conditional dialectic method. This can be said as the *Syādvāda* an *Anekānta* of the canonical time. In the philosophical the same were extended without any differences. Mahāvira Bhagvāna had resolved a number of conflicting issues using the conditional dialectic method and asked his monks / followers to use the same to explain his philosophy to others. Sutrakṛatāṅga (1/14, 1/22) describes the type of language to be used by a monk as ' if the monk has doubts about an entity, even then he should be humble and use *Vibhajjavāda* to express his understanding. The commentator on this canonical *grantha* provides three meanings of *Vibhajjavāda* as follows:⁸

1. Doctrine of cognizing an entity by its parts separately.

2. *Syādvāda*

3. Doctrine of dividing and object correctly for cognition like from substance view use of eternalism and from mode view use temporariness; existence of all objects with reference to substance, space, time and mode and not relative to other entity's substance, space, time and modes views. For example two fluids like milk and water combine together as one but they do not leave their individual identity. Like this every substance from its own viewpoint is *sva-dravya*.

Two substances, even though existing in the same space points, maintain their individual identity. Thus every

1. *Syāt Ratnaprabhā prithvi* is like soul (existent)
2. *Syāt Ratnaprabhā prithvi* is not like soul (existent)
3. *Syāt Ratnaprabhā prithvi* is inexplicable.

On hearing these replies, Gautam ask again, "In what context is this being said?" Mahāvira Bhagvāna says to clear the doubts of Gautam, "*Ratnaprabhā prithvi* is existent from it own (*sva*) perspective; is not existent from other's (*para*) perspective; inexplicable from the perspective both self and others because the truth about an entity is established by substance, space, time and mode perspectives". In jain philosophy this is called *catuṣṭaya*. This *catuṣṭaya* with reference to self (*sva*) results in affirmative cognition of existence while the same gives negation cognition of existence when used with respect to others (*para*). These two *catuṣṭayas* describe the truth about an entity. Similarly when Gautam asked Mahāvira Bhagvāna about other lands / places (*prathvis*), heavenly places etc, Mahāvira Bhagvāna replied in the same fashion. It therefore becomes evident that these three *bhaṅgas* are basic i.e. Is, Is not and inexplicable. On their basis only the sevenfold predication has been formulated. Even though every entity has infinite attributes and these infinite attributes can have infinite *bhaṅgas*, yet all these *bhaṅgas* can be grouped into seven *bhaṅgas* namely:

1. *Syāt asti*: exists in some respect.
2. *Syāt nāsti*: does not exist in some respect.
3. *Syāt asti, Syāt nāsti* : exist in some respect and does not exist in some respect.
4. *Syāt avaktavya*: is inexplicable.
5. *Syāt asti avaktavya* : exists in some respect and is inexplicable.
6. *Syāt nāsti avaktavya*: Does not exist in some respect and is inexplicable.
7. *Syāt asti Syāt nāsti avaktavya*: exists in some respect, does not exist in some respect and is inexplicable.

Basic *bhaṅgas* are three only *asti, nāsti* and *avaktavya*. Mathematically also, three numbers can have a maximum of seven combinations and not more. Like *Ratnaprabhā prithvi* example provides three basic *bhaṅgas*, similarly *pudgala* paramanu can give a lump of three space points, a lump of two space points can give lumps of six types, lump of three space points can give lumps of thirteen types and so on.

An analysis will show a three space point lump will give only seven (and not thirteen) different types of lumps as the remaining types are redundant and can be lumped in these mutually exclusive seven *bhaṅgas* only.¹¹

The above description shows that doctrine of expressing the truth based on substance, space, time and mode is the doctrine of relativity. Without considering relativity, we cannot express existence. Cognition which is based on these four views is not the right cognition, it is false. Therefore Mahāvira Bhagvāna said, "Do not conclude anything without its relativity to substance, space, time and mode"

Footnotes

- ¹ – Bhagwati 2/122-123 ;
- ² - Dravya Saṅgraha 22 ;
- ³ . a. Nyāyakārikāvali 45, b. Vaiśeṣika Darśana 2/2/6-10 ;
- ⁴ – Sāṅkhya Kaumūdi 33.
- ⁵ – Sthānañ 10 /46
- ⁶ - Bhagawati 9/ 233
- ⁷ Bhagwati 2/ 46;
- ⁸ – Sutratkāṅga vritti patra 256-257;
- ⁹ – Early Buddhist theory of knowledge, K.N. Jayatilleke Page 280,293.
- ¹⁰ – Bhagawatisutra 12/10/211-212
- ¹¹ - Bhgawatisutra 12/217-224

Exercises

Essay type questions

1. Write a detailed essay on substance, mode, place and time.

Short notes type questions

1. Clarify the four viewpoints to cognize an entity.
2. Explain the finite and infinite characteristics of *jīva*.

Fill in the blanks type questions:

1. *Anekānta* says, " Do not see / cognize the reality / truth from———".
2. All our conduct / practice / cognition is ——.
3. Philosophical definition of substance is an entity which has ——.
4. As per Jain philosophy, division between *loka* and *aloka* is natural and ——.
5. From substance view, *jīva* is one and ——.
6. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra explained many questions even with opposing/ contradictory nature with ease using —— method.
7. The method to explain these rules is called ——.
8. The method of expressing these rules i.e. to state / explain them is called ——.
9. Buddhist monks used —— to answer questions worthy of being answered.
10. Saptbhaṅgi is a doctrine which is able to present —— of the entity.

Answers to the fill in the blanks.

1. a view /angle 2. Relative 3. Attribute / mode or *gūṇa*, *pariyāya*. 4. eternal /without a beginning.
5. with an end 6. Reconciliatory. 7. *Anekānta* 8. *Syādvāda* 9. *Vibhajyavāda* 10. Right nature

Reference texts:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Bhagwatisutra and Bhagawatibhāṣya | Ācārya Tulsi |
| 2. Āgamayuga ka Jain Darśana | Pt. dalsukha Mālvanīā |
| 3. Jaindarśana Manana aur mīmāṃsā | Ācārya Mahāprajña |
| 4. Ankānta hein tistrā netra | do |
| 5. Anekanta ke āloka mein | do |

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Anekānta-Naya, Nikṣepa, Syādvāda

Unit – 1 Lesson – 3: Examples of Naya (Viewpoint)

In this lesson we shall discuss and learn the following topics.

- 0.1 Introduction
- 0.0 *Naya* types as per Ācārya Siddha Sena
- 1.0 Seven *nayas*
- 2.0 *Prasthaka* / Wooden measure example.
 - 2.1 Distributive (*Vyavahāra*) view point.
 - 2.2 Class (*Saṅgraha*) viewpoint.
 - 2.3 Straight thread or Linear (*Rjusutra*).
 - 2.4 Literal or word (*Śabda*) viewpoint
- 3.0 *Vasati* / Place of abode example.
 - 3.1 Distributive (*Vyavahāra*) view point.
 - 3.2 Class (*Saṅgraha*) viewpoint.
 - 3.3 Straight thread or Linear (*Rjusutra*) viewpoint.
 - 3.4 Literal or word (*Śabda*) viewpoint.
- 4.0 *Pradeśa* or space point view.
 - 4.1 Figurative (*Naigama*) viewpoint.
 - 4.2 Class (*Saṅgraha*) viewpoint.
 - 4.3 Distributive (*Vyavahāra*) viewpoint.
 - 4.4 Straight thread or Linear (*Rjusutra*) viewpoint.
 - 4.5 Literal or word (*Śabda*) viewpoint.
 - 4.6 Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) viewpoint
 - 4.7 Determinant (*Evañbhuta*) viewpoint
- 5.0 *Naya aur Sāmāyika*.

0.1 Introduction

Nature and the colloquial meaning of *Naya* shall be explained in the lesson *Naya Vicāra*. All methods of thinking / contemplating, expression, analyzing an entity are called viewpoints / standpoint (*Naya*). Basically *nayas* can be classified in two broad categories:

1. *Nīścaya Naya* or absolute viewpoint. This is transcendental and realistic.
2. *Vyavahāra naya* or practical viewpoint. This is practical and tradition.

Can we say a moving object the mover and an object in action as an actor? When Gaṇḍhara Gautam asked this question, Bhagavāna Mahāvīra replied, "Yes, we can say so. This is justified from absolute viewpoint." The time of activity and the time of ownership are not different but same. The time of activity (*prārabdha kṣaṇa*) can also be considered as the fulfillment time. An entity which is capable of consumption can also be called a consumer. From absolute viewpoint, man is one and alone but he cannot live alone. Therefore he interacts with others and becomes a part of others. This is the practical viewpoint. I am one is the absolute viewpoint. I am a student, a soul, knowledge, etc i.e. I have many states/ modes is the practical viewpoint.

0.0 *Naya* types as per Ācārya Siddha Sena

In Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa by Ācārya Siddha Sena, we find two fundamental viewpoints namely Substance viewpoint (*Dravyāstika naya*) and Mode viewpoint (*Paryāyāstika naya*). Other *nayas* are components of these two *nayas*. We can find the basis for these two *nayas* in the seventh chapter of Bhagawati Sutra. Gautam asked, "Lord! Is *Jīva* eternal or temporary?" Bhagwāna Mahāvīra replied, "From substance viewpoint *Jīva* is eternal and from mode viewpoint, it is temporary".

Substance viewpoint has three types namely Figurative (*Naigama*), Class (*Saṅgraha*) and Distributive (*Vyavahāra*). Mode viewpoint has four types namely Straight thread or Linear (*Rjūsutra*), Literal or word (*Śabda*), Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) and Determinant (*Evañbhuta*). Thus there are seven *nayas*.

1.0 The seven viewpoints (*sāta naya*)

1. Figurative (*Naigama*): This viewpoint analyses both the generic and specific attributes.
2. Class (*Saṅgraha*) : This viewpoint looks for generic attributes in the entities.
3. Distributive (*Vyavahāra*): This viewpoint looks for the specific / particular attributes in the entities.
4. Straight thread or Linear (*Rjūsutra*): This viewpoint looks at the present state of the entity.
5. Literal or word (*Śabda*): this viewpoint rejects the name, positioning (*sthāpna*) and substance and accepts the differences in the gender and speech/words.
6. Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) : This viewpoint rejects the single meaning of a word.
7. Determinant (*Evañbhuta*): This viewpoint accepts the unison of the word and its object.

The following verses by *Ācārya* Tulsī in *ArhatVāṇī* crisply define the seven viewpoints and are worth memorizing.

1. *Sabse vy āpaka sat-asat bhedābheda pradhāna;*
nahī eka gama-krama, prathama naigama naya kā sthāna.
2. *Is sañkṣepīkaraṇa meñ, usī aura prasthāna;*
pāe pada adwaita kā, naya saṅgraha abhidhāna.
3. *Binā bheda vistāra ke, caltā kaba sañsāra;*
Isiliye hai tistrā, bhedaka naya vyavahāra
4. *Vartamāna paryāya hi, hai hita atra amutra;*
Rjutā se swikārta kare, cauthā naya rjūsutra.
5. *Kāla liṅga vacanādi se, vācaka hai bhinnārtha;*
Sābdika sañyojana sūdhadha, bane sabda naya sārtha.
6. *Artha bheda paryāya se swikāre sañveda;*
Samabhirūṭha naya se niyata, bhikṣu śramana mūni bheda.
7. *Vācaka ki vāstavikta men parinata upyukta;*
Bhikṣārta hi bhikṣū hai, evañbhuta prayukta.

In *Anūyogadwāra*, the author (*sutrakāra*) has presented three examples to explain *naya* doctrine namely:

1. *Prasthaka* (wooden measure)
2. *Vasati* (place where the entity exists)
3. *Pradeśa* (space points)

2.0 *Prasthaka* – wooden measure:

A person is going to the forest with an axe. Some passer by asks him, "Where are you going?" He says, "I am going to make wooden measure (for measuring grains). When he is cutting the tree, someone asks him, "what are you doing?" He says, "I am cutting the wooden measure". When is shaving the wood and making the measure and writing on it, someone asks him, "What are you doing?" and he again says, "I am making the wooden measure, shaving it and writing on it".

In this example, Figurative (*Naigama*) and the Distributive (*Vyavahāra*) *naya* considers all the above states of wood as wooden measure; Class (*Saṅgraha*) *naya* considers the wood as wooden measure only when it is full of grain to be measured; Literal or word (*Śabda*), Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) and Determinant (*Evañbhuta*) *nayas* all consider the person who knows the meaning of the wooden measure or the person who built the wooden measure as *prasthaka*.

Analysis of the example:

The author talks of three states of figurative viewpoint namely impure, pure and purer.

- Wood is the cause and wooden measure is the work or result. Therefore traditionally speaking, the person going for achieving the result says he is going or achieving the result. This indicates the impure state of the figurative viewpoint.
- While cutting the wood for the wooden measure, he says that he is making the wooden measure indicates the pure state of the figurative viewpoint.
- Shaving the wood, writing on it etc. are the essential activities of making the wooden measure. Therefore when the person is performing these activities and he says that he is making the wooden measure describes a purer state of the figurative viewpoint.
- Basis of the above analysis is the proximity and state of activity in completing the wooden measure. In the first one, he has decided (*sañkalpa*) to make a wooden measure, in the second he is getting the material cause of the wooden measure and in third he is actually making it. Thus as the activities proceed towards completion of the work, the viewpoint gets clearer and clearer.

This example of the wooden measure is also used in Kaṣāyapāhuda (page 224). Jinendrabhadraṅgī (in Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya *gāthā* 2187,2188) has mentioned three examples, namely *nilayan*, wooden measure and village to explain the figurative viewpoint. Vidhyānandswāmi (Tattvārathaslokavārtika śloka 18, 19) says that the decision of the wooden measure to make the wooden measure is the subject of figurative viewpoint. Māilladhawala (Nayacakra 205) says that the one who says wood as wooden measure is the subject of future figurative viewpoint.

2.1 Distributive (*Vyavahāra*) *naya*

Distributive viewpoint adheres to the tradition and hence its analysis is similar to the figurative viewpoint.

2.2 Class (*Sañgraha*) *naya*

It is a purer / clearer viewpoint than the first two namely figurative and distributive viewpoints. It does not recognize the particulars / specifics and hence considers the wood as wooden measure only at the time when it is full of grain to be measured.

2.3 Straight thread or Linear (*Rjusutra*) *naya*.

Since it looks at the present only, its perception is clearer than the class viewpoint. Therefore it considers even the grain measured by the *prasthaka* after its completion also as *prasthaka*. As per Kaṣāyapāhuda (page 224), only at the time when the grain is being measured, the *prasthaka* is called a *prasthaka*.

2.4 Literal or word (*Śabda*) *naya*.

The three *nayas* i.e. Literal or word (*Śabda*), Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) and Determinant (*Evañbhuta*) *nayas*, being focused at the conceptual state of the knower about the subject, does not recognize the object (*artha*). According to these all entities exist in themselves only and not in the external world, e.g. *jīva* has consciousness, the knower of the wooden measure is the *prasthaka* only when he is busy with the wooden measure. The wooden measure (i.e. the wood) cannot be the *prasthaka* is the conclusion of these three *nayas*. These three *nayas* can be compared to the Vijnānādwaitvāda of Buddhists and the Vedant duality of Brahma and the parts (Brahmādwaitvāda and Pratyaya vāda).

The genesis of the *prasthaka* example is that the knower / one who cognizes in one state is different from the object of the knowledge and in the other state it becomes identical with the object of knowledge.

3.0 Vasati (where the entity exists)

This example can be explained by the conversation / dialogue between two persons as follows:

- Where do you live?
- I live in the universe.
- There are three parts of the universe namely *urghava* (upper), *adho* (lower) and *tiryaka* (middle). In which *loka* do you live?

- b. I live in the *tiryaka loka*.
- a. *Tiryakaloka* has innumerable continents and ocean. In which continent do you live?
- b. I live in Jamboodweepa.
- a. Jamboodweep has many territories. In which territory do you live?
- b. I live in Bharat *kṣetra*.
- a. Do you live in northern or southern part of Bharat *kṣetra*?
- b. I live in southern Bharat.
- a. Southern Bharat has many villages, cities etc. Where do you live?
- b. I live in Pātaliputra.
- a. Pātaliputra has many houses. Do you live in all houses?
- b. I live In Deva Dutta's house.
- a. Deva Dutta's house has many rooms. In which room do you live?
- b. I live in the basement.
- a. Do you live in the entire basement?
- b. I live on the carpet.
- a. Do you live on the entire carpet?
- b. I live in those space points where I exist. I live in my body.
- a. Do you live in the entire body?
- b. I live in my own nature (*ātmapradeśa*).

This example explores the relationship between the basis/ foundation and the entity on which it is based/ founded. As per figurative viewpoint, the relation between the foundation and the entity on which it is founded is essential. Therefore eight alternatives of this relationship are presented:

I live in the *loka*. This expression is true as the respondent's house is located in it. But this is very far away from the real place where he lives and so it is the case of impure viewpoint.

I live in the middle *loka* is nearer to the reality and hence is closer to the pure viewpoint.

Similarly the purity levels of the viewpoint advances as he moves from Bharat *Kṣetra* to southern part of Deva Dutta's house to the carpet in the basement and finally in his own soul's space points.

3.1 Distributive (*Vyavahāra*) *naya* : Its explanation is similar to the figurative viewpoint.

3.2 Class (*Sañgraha*) *naya* : This *naya* is indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*). Hence the respondent says that he lives on the carpet.

3.3 Straight thread or Linear (*Rjusutra*) *naya* : As per this viewpoint, the respondent says that he lives in the space points.

3.4 Literal or word (*Sabda*) *naya* : The three *nayas* i.e. Literal or word (*Śabda*), Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) and Determinant (*Evāñbhuta*) *nayas*, being focused at the conceptual state of the *vasati*, the respondent says that he lives the nature of his soul and hence As per these three *nayas*, all entities exist in their own nature and any other entity is not required for them to exist. In fact the respondent lives in his own nature (*svabhāva*) and hence in the space points of his soul.

4.0 *Pradeśa* or space point

The smallest part of space is called *pradeśa* or the space point. It is the tiniest and indivisible part of the space which cannot be further broken into parts. *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *ākāśa* (space) and one *Jīva* are lumps of innumerable and inseparable space points. Space (*deśa*) point is an imaginary part of these and space point is the tiniest part of this space. In this example of Pradesa, an analysis of the relationship between the whole and its parts is made.

4.1 Figurative (*Naigama*) *naya* : Says space of all the six substance types namely *aharma*'s space point, *adharma*'s space point, *ākāśa*'s space point, *jīva*'s space point, lump's space point and space's space point. It

accepts the space points of all the six because the figurative viewpoint accepts existence of both generic and specific attributes.

4.2 Class (sañgraha) naya : *Sañgraha naya* says, “Your statement of space point of all six is not acceptable to me. Space point of the space (*deśa*) is also the space point of the substance. Hence please say space point of the remaining five. An example will clarify this. My servant bought an ass, the servant belongs to me as well as the ass.”

As per this *naya*, *deśa* is not an independent substance and hence it does not accept the space point of *deśa*. Space point related to *dharmāstikāya* and other substances are their own as their *deśa* is not different from them.

4.3 Distributive (Vyavahāra) naya : *Vyavahāra naya* says, “Your statement of the space point of the five substances is not acceptable to me. It is valid only when one space point belongs to all the five substances, like the gold, house, garden of the five brothers. Here the space points of all the five substances are different. Therefore based on the substances and their indications, you should say ‘five types of space points’; e.g. space point of *dharma*, space point of *adharmā* etc.”

4.4 Straight thread or Linear (Rjusutra) naya : Straight thread viewpoint refutes the statement of distributive viewpoint. It says, “If we accept five types of space points, then there will be 25 types of space point obtained by multiplying five types of space points into five types of substances. Therefore do not say ‘five types of space point’ but say ‘Space point can be imagined in five types like *dharma*, *adharmā* etc., *syāt dharma*’s space point, *syāt adharmā*’s space point, *syāt jīva*’s space point and so on. This way we have five types of space points.’

4.5 Literal or word (Śabda) naya : Differing (i.e. expressing its disagreement) from the linear viewpoint, literal viewpoint says, “According to you, space point is imaginary (and so divisible). Thus space point of *dharmāstikāya* can be of *adharmā* or of *ākāśa* etc. Similarly space point of *adharmāstikāya* can be of *dharma*, *ākāśa* etc., space point of *ākāśa* can be of *jīva*. Like a person can be a servant of the king at one time and at other time he can be an *amātya*. Without a definite rule / administration, the same can happen to space point also causing chaos.

Therefore you should not say that space point is divisible. On the other hand say that the space point where *dharma* exists is different from *dharmāstikāya* is the *dharma* space point. The space point where *adharmā* exists is the *adharmā* space point, the space point where *ākāśa* exists is the space point of *ākāśa*, the space point where *jīva* exists is the *nojīva* space point and the space point where lump (*skandha*) of matter exists is the *noskandha* (non lump) space point. Here the word ‘no’ is representative of one space point only. *Jīva* and lump are of infinite in number. Since their space points are identical with *jīva* and *skandha* respectively, space point of *jīva* is *nojīva* and of lump is *noskandha*. One space of a *jīva* is not existent in the entire *jīva* and hence is only in that particular part of *jīva* i.e. it is one part of the *jīva*.”

4.6 Etymological (Samabhirūḥa) naya : On this statement of literal viewpoint, etymological viewpoint says, “Your statement that space point in which *dharma* exists is the space point of *dharma* is incorrect. Because here two *samāsa* are present namely *tatpurūṣa* and *karmadhārya*. Which *samāsa* do you use while making this statement? If you use *tatpurūṣa samāsa* then it is incorrect. If you use the *karmadhārya samāsa*, then use an adjective with it e.g. space point where *dharma* exists is the space point of *dharma*. (In the word *dharma-pradeśa*, there are two possible *samāsas*. *Dharma pradeśa*: in this *tatpurūṣa samāsa* is present. *Dharmaścāsau pradeśāśca*- in this *karmadhārya samāsa* is present, *tatpurūṣa samāsa* exists both in identical and different words e.g. ‘*kūnde badrāṇi*’, ‘*rājña pūrūṣa*’ is *samāsa* indicating difference.’ *Ghate rūpama*, ‘*rājña śariram*’ represents identity. ‘*dharma pradeśa*’ *tatpurūṣa samāsa*’s presence can create doubt in different and identity. Therefore etymological viewpoint accepts *karmadhārya* with an adjective.)”

4.7 Determinant (Evañbhuta) naya : Determinant viewpoint while disagreeing with the etymological viewpoint says that, “In my view both place of existence of one part (*deśa*) and space point are not real (i.e. imaginary only).” (Determinant viewpoint says that a substance is indivisible i.e. cannot be broken in parts. It is useless to imagine the *deśa* and *pradeśa* in it. Hence both are imaginary). Figurative viewpoint accepts the relationship between part and the whole while determinant viewpoint rejects the concept of parts of a substance. Author of *Anuyogadwāra* has presented the three examples. Similarly a number of other examples can be presented. Figurative viewpoint enables us

to cognize an entity using many organs of knowledge. Class viewpoint enables us to cognize a lump or a class/ group of entities. Distributive viewpoint enables us to cognize definite/ particular entities. Linear viewpoint enables us to cognize the present mode of an entity while etymological viewpoint is more specific than linear viewpoint. As per etymological viewpoint, transferring the meaning of an entity from one word to another synonymous word makes it nonentity. Determinant viewpoint specifies the word and the object clearly e.g. a pitcher is a pitcher only when it is full of water. In conclusion we can say that *naya* is the doctrine/method of knowing the different attributes of an entity relative to different rules. SiddhaSena Diwākara using the example of *ratnāvali* and Jinbhadra Gaṇikṣmāśaraṇa using the example of elephant and the blind and normal men tried to explain the doctrine of *naya*. (Please see paper unit 2 lesson 4 ‘Nayavicāra’ and Viśeṣāvaśayakbhāṣya *gāthā* 2269-2271)

5.0 *Naya* and *Sāmāyika* (equanimity)

In the commentaries of canonical literature, the subject of equanimity had been explained using different viewpoints. Equanimity is of three types namely:

1. *Samyaktva Sāmāyika*- Belief in the existents.
2. *Śrūta sāmāyika* i.e knowledge of soul etc.
3. *Cāritra sāmāyika* i.e. giving up activities with attachment.

From the knowledge viewpoint, the first two types are acceptable while from the Activity (*kriyā*) viewpoint, the third one is acceptable as it is the primary reason for liberation. From substance viewpoint, *jīva* with the three above attributes is *sāmāyika* while from mode viewpoint, *samyaktava*, *śrūta* and *cāritra* are *sāmāyika*.

As per the figurative viewpoint, a student eager to study *sāmāyika*, even if not studying the same now is *sāmāyika*. He is the subject of future figurative viewpoint. From class and distributive viewpoints, a disciple sitting near the *gurū* to learn *sāmāyika* is *sāmāyika*. Linear viewpoint considers even a student not paying attention to *sāmāyika* while studying the same as *sāmāyika*. Literal and the other two viewpoints consider a disciple studying the *sāmāyika* as *sāmāyika* since these three *nayas* look at the pure form only.

Exercises

Essay type questions:

1. Explain the space point example (*pradeśa* example).

Short notes type questions:

1. Explain the three sub types of Figurative viewpoint using the example of wooden measure.
2. Indicate the alternatives shown in the example of *vasati* (place of abode).

Fill in the blank type questions.

1. As per _____ view point, we can call an active entity as an actor.
2. The three sub types of substance view point are 1____, 2____, 3_____.
3. ‘I live on the carpet’ is valid as per _____ viewpoint.
4. Analysis of _____ and _____ is done through the example of *vasati* (place of abode).
5. Determinant viewpoint rejects _____ of the substance.
6. As per the trio of Literal viewpoints, every substance exists in its own _____.
7. Jina Bhadra Gaṇi has cited three examples, namely 1____, 2____, 3____ with reference to the figurative viewpoint.
8. _____ and _____ have cited the example of the necklace of precious stones (*ratnāvali*).
9. As per determinant viewpoint, a disciple _____ in equanimity/ *sāmāyika* is equanimity.
10. _____ accepts the tradition or common practice.

Reference texts

1. Anuyogadārāi (edited and commentary by Mahāprajña 1996).
2. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇam.
3. Viśeṣāvaśayakbhāṣya
4. Śri Bhikṣu āgama Viśayakośa.

Author : Sadhvi Siddhaprajñā

Anekānta-Naya, Nikṣepa, Syādvāda

Unit – 2 Lesson – 4: Naya Vicāra

Objective

Naya or viewpoint is a definitive and distinctive word used in Jain philosophical literature. We shall try to acquire detailed knowledge about it in this lesson with reference to the following topics concerning it.

- 0.0 Introduction
- 1.0 *Naya* /viewpoint, discussion on its nature.
- 2.0 Types of *naya*
 - 2.1 *Naigam naya* or figurative viewpoint.
 - 2.2 *Saṅgraha naya* or Class viewpoint.
 - 2.3 Distributive viewpoint or vyavahara naya.
 - 2.4 Straight thread or Linear (*Rjusutra*) viewpoint.
 - 2.5 Literal or word (*Śabda*) viewpoint.
 - 2.6 Etymological (*Samabhirūṭha*) viewpoint
 - 2.7 Determinant (*Evañbhuta*) viewpoint.
- 3.0 Importance of *naya vicāra*.
- 4.0 *naya*: limits / boundaries of the subject.

0.0 Introduction

Every entity has infinite attributes. An ordinary person cannot know them all at a time. An omniscient can know them all at the same time but is not probable for him to express these infinite attributes simultaneously. This is due to the limited expression which can be made by the word of mouth at a time. Expression of complete knowledge about an entity can be done in the following two manners.

- Using the tradition of similarity / identical (*abhedopacāra*), express one attribute along with the word *syāt*.
- Keeping the relativity of the infinite attributes of the entity in mind; express one attribute at a time without rejecting the other attributes.

In Jain philosophy, the first method is known as Conditional dialectic (*syādvāda* or *pramāṇavākya*) and the second method as *sadvāda* or *nayavākya*. Doctrine of viewpoints (*Nayvāda*) is the foundation of multiplicity of viewpoints (*Anekānta*) like the alphabets are the foundation of writing any literary work, or right faith (*samyaka darāśana*) is the foundation of emancipation or the use of mercury is the foundation of purifying the metals.

Opposing attributes can coexist or live together in harmony (*sahavasthāna*), in an entity by leaving their opposing characteristic. But pairs of opposing attributes like explicability – inexplicability, generic – specific, existent – nonexistent etc. can be analyze without debating their simultaneous existence. But their expression on the basis of their relativity of existence, after the aforesaid analysis, is possible only using the doctrine of viewpoints. For acquiring complete knowledge about an entity it is essential to know and understand various aspects of the entity, and then to express it properly in a particular situation and with respect to substance, time, place and mode expressing one attribute at a time by not rejecting the existence of other attributes is an important feature of doctrine of viewpoints (*naya vicāra*). Cognition of one attribute and then its expression are called viewpoint (*naya*) and *naya*-sentence (*nayavākya*) respectively.

1.0 *Naya*: Discussions about its nature

Doctrine of viewpoint is an extraordinary contribution of Jain philosophy. We find ample discussions about *naya* in Jain canonical literature. There is hardly any Jain canonical *grantha* which does not talk of the doctrine of viewpoints. Anuīyogadwāra, which is the key to understand the old canonical literature, talks of four gates (*dwāra*) of entering the great metropolis of commenting (*amuyoga*) namely *upkrama*, *nikṣepa*, *anugama* and *naya*. During

the canonical era, a number of other methods of expressing the intentions or analysis of the speaker but the method of defining the words first was less prevalent. This is the reason that we do not find the definitions of terms like *naya*, *jñāna*, *Anekānta*, *tattva* etc in the canonical literature.

Literally the word *naya* originated by the combination of the basic alphabet *nā* and the part *ac*. Based on this construct of the word *naya*, it means- o acquire, to explain to others i.e. which helps others acquire or to impart knowledge to others. Vācaka Umā Swāti defines *naya* as a special effort. Hari Bhadra also defines *naya* as the effort to acquire knowledge about an entity. It is to be noted that there can be many viewpoints or intentions about the knowledge acquisition of an entity or a subject. Hence *naya* can be seen as cognizing an entity relative to the intentions of the cognizer.

Jinbhadraganīkṣmāśaraṇa analysed the construct of the word *naya* from the angles of actor (*kartā*), act (*karma*), thought (*bhāva*), relation (*sambandha*), *adhikaraṇa* etc. According to him, “*Naya* is method by which the speaker expresses his knowledge about an entity using some possible modes or by provides knowledge about one mode keeping the possibility of existence of other modes”. According to VeerSena, author of Dhawalā, “Intention of the knowledge seeker is a special *naya* which enables him to cognize an entity correctly.” According to Akalaṅka, “Intention of the knowledge seeker to cognize one part of the entity using valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) is *naya*.”

According to Ācārya Tulsī, “*anirākrate taraṅśo vastvaṅśagrāhi pratipattū abhāprāyo naya*”; i.e. intention of the knowledge seeker to know a part of an entity without rejecting the existence of other parts of the entity is *naya* or viewpoint. Thus there are two main indications of cognition using *naya* doctrine, namely:

- Expression of the intended attribute.
- Non rejection of the unintended attributes.

When an intention does not accept the existence (or rejects) the existence of other attributes, then the *naya* becomes pseudo-viewpoint or wrong viewpoint i.e. *nayābhāsa* or *durnaya*.

Siddha Sena explained this concept of *naya* through the example of a necklace (*ratnāvalī*) as, “A jeweler has many types of precious stones like emeralds, onyx, diamonds etc. Some of these precious stones have the power to heal the effect of poison, some have the power to make the owner prosperous etc. etc. Every stone has its own value, but their individual values increase manifold when they are all threaded together as a necklace. Similarly when different viewpoints are threaded together with relativity then each one is called a right viewpoint (*sunaya*), else independently each one is called a wrong viewpoint. Viśeṣāvasayakabhāṣya present the example of an elephant being cognized by blind persons and a person with normal eye sight. The valid knowledge of an entity by a person, who knows only a part of the entity and considers his knowledge to be complete, becomes false and creates arguments. Like a person with normal sight, a wise *nayavādi* also tries to reconcile the anomalies created by the blind persons. His knowledge is the right viewpoint. Jinbhadraganīkṣmāśaraṇa also explains the concept of *nayavāda* through the example of a king and the servant (*bhratyā*).

2.0 Types of *naya*

Every object in this world is a collection of infinite opposing attributes. Through omniscience, they can all be cognized simultaneously but the faculty of speech has limitations. Therefore all expressions of this knowledge are relative to the intentions of the speaker. There are infinite persons and each person has infinite intentions and visions. Hence there can be infinite ways of expressing these. On this basis, Jain *ācāryas* claim that there can be infinite *nayas jāvaeyā vāyaṇapaka tāvaeyā ceva hoṅti ‘nayaṇvāyā’* i.e. there are as many *nayas* as there are right ways of expression. Even then briefly *naya* is of two types –

- *Dravārthika naya* or substance viewpoint – vision of similarity / identical (*abhedgrāhi dṛṣṭikoṇa*)
- *Paryāyārthika naya* or mode viewpoint (*abhedgrāhi dṛṣṭikoṇa*).

Ācārya Siddha Sena has analysed and presented the doctrine of viewpoint with reference to the expression of *Anekānta*. He writes in Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa as follows:

‘Sermons of *tirathaṅkaras* consist of both generic and specific parts. Substance and mode viewpoints

express these two parts (generic and specific) respectively. Hence there are only these two types of viewpoints basically; all other viewpoints are only corollaries of these two. “

According to Jain philosophy, the nature of real / truth is origination, decay and permanence. No origination and decay is without permanence and no permanence is without origination and decay. Origination and decay are the representative attributes of the mode while permanence is the representative attribute of substance. Mode viewpoint considers mode as primary while substance viewpoint considers permanence as primary and the other (i.e. substance and mode attributes respectively) as secondary. There are infinite modes of a substance and there are differences amongst different modes of a substance, e.g. human / sub human / heavenly and hellish state of soul and in each of these the mode changes continuously. Hence the subject of Mode viewpoint is to differentiate Substance is generic and as per the generic attributes, there is no difference between two entities. So the subject of substance viewpoint is similarity / commonality/ identity. This viewpoint, by focusing on similarities enables us to see the existence of humanness in a child and an old man, of *jīva* in human and subhuman beings and of substantiality in *jīva* and *ajīva*. But there is no entity which has just substance and no modes or it has generic attributes only and no specific attributes. Every real / substance is an amalgam of substance and modes or generic and specifics or eternal and temporary.

Hence both substance and mode viewpoints in isolation are not the methods of knowing the truth. To know the truth, it is essential that we look at both of them in relative and reconciliatory manner.

In brief, we can say that an object of knowledge (entity) has basically two parts- substance and modes. Based on this premise, we cognize the substance of the entity from substance viewpoint and its modes from the mode viewpoint. Truth has two types namely: Real or absolute truth and the empirical (*upcāra*) truth.

- *Niscayanaya* or absolute viewpoint considers the real truth as primary.
- *Vyavahāranaya* or practical viewpoint considers the empirical truth as primary.

Similarly to express the truth there are two ways namely object and the words/ literals. On this basis there are two viewpoints namely *śabdānaya*/ literal viewpoint and *arthanaya* / object viewpoint. In this way, we can find different types of viewpoint on the basis of different ways of analysis but in Jain philosophy, seven types of *nayas* are most famous or widely used. There are: figurative, class, distributive, linear thread, literal, etymological and distinctive viewpoints. Anuyogadwāra has defined each one of them through a separate *gāthā* verse.

2.1 Figurative viewpoint – *Naigama naya*

Āryarakṣita writes about figurative viewpoint as, “*ṇegehiñ māṇehiñ miṇaetti ṇegamassa ya nīrūtti*”, meaning figurative viewpoint cognizes an object from many angles / viewpoints / cognitions. This means that figurative viewpoint cognizes the generic, specific and evolutionary states of the entity. Accordingly in Bhikṣūnyāyākārikā, figurative viewpoint has been defined as, “*bhedābhedagrāhi naigama*”. By figurative viewpoint, we cognize the combined states of both generic and specific parts as well as the identical and the differential parts of the entity. Hence it is different from Nyāya & Vaiśeṣika philosophy which considers independence of generic and specific parts of an entity. Figurative viewpoint accepts only one part of an entity as primary and not both. Therefore its difference from *pramāṇa* doctrine is very clear. *Pramāṇa* is complete cognition (*saklādeśa*) and encompasses all attributes of the entity as primary, while figurative viewpoint is partial (*vikalādeśa*) as it keeps one part (say generic) as primary by keeping the other part (specific). ‘*Cetana meñ ānanda haiñ*’; here bliss (*ānanda*) which is mode is primary, while ‘*ānandi jīva ki bāta hi chodiye*’; here *jīva* or the substance is primary. Similarly figurative is the expression of the relationships between attribute and its owner, part and whole, act and actor etc. Second basis of the figurative viewpoint is the imagination or determination of the knower. It accepts both existence and non existence. Imagination means assignment; past is gone and future is yet to come but it assigns those attributes to the present. If it was not then how today we can celebrate the birthday of either Bhagwāna Mahāvira or Tulsi. Similarly talking of the future, the cook is preparing the kitchen and yet he says that he has cooked the food. Similarly on the basis of capabilities or potential, a person is called a doctor, a lawyer and so on even though they are not yet so. Using the example of the wooden measure in Anuyogadwāra, the author describes the impure, pure and purer states of figurative viewpoint beautifully. Siddha Sena Diwākara does not accept the independent existence of this viewpoint and started propagating the doctrine of the remaining six types of viewpoints.

2.2 Class view point *Saṅgraha naya*

The intention of the knower (*Jñata*) which groups many existent attributes in the entity by making the differences in them as secondary (and thus establishes the identity view of entities) is the class viewpoint. While defining the class viewpoint, *ācārya* Tulsī says '*Abhedagrahi saṅgraha*'. Many men and women are standing, using the identity or class view, we can say that human beings are standing. At other place human beings, animals and birds etc. are standing, using this viewpoint we can say that *jīva* are standing.

The attribute, existence, is there in all types of substances and so we can them as real (*sat*) with the class viewpoint. Thus from the *para-saṅgraha naya* (*para*-class viewpoint), we can say that the world is one as to the attribute existence is present in all types of substances and so they are all alike, '*viśvamekaṅ satoaviśeṣat*'. Actually *para*-class viewpoint is the true representation of substance viewpoint. With the truth about generic attributes in mind, *aparsaṅgraha naya* also became known as *saṅgraha naya* later on. *Aparasāṅgraha naya* accepts the existence of substances, modes, attributes, *jīva* etc. Thus *saṅgraha naya* considers all modes and particulars without differentiating them as one (by ignoring category they belong and without reference to their class). The sentence '*ege āyā, ege daṇḍe*' in the canonical literature is representative of the class viewpoint.

Using the class viewpoint, we appreciate the doctrine of the *adwaitavādi* philosophers when they talk of identity or oneness of all entities. However the difference is that the class viewpoint while accepting the identity does not reject the differences amongst the constituents of the world and *Adwaitavādi* rejects the differences. They (*adwaitavād*) thus have the wrong viewpoint or *saṅgraha nayābhāsa*. Existence of similarity / identical is endangered without the existence of particulars and then we cannot cognize the entities correctly.

2.3 Distributive viewpoint - *Vyavahāra naya*

Basis of distributive viewpoint is the existence of particular attributes in an entity. This viewpoint thus identifies differences. While class viewpoint groups *jīva* etc; this viewpoint tries to find differences even within *jīvas* etc. Class view keeps on converging (grouping together) and the distributive viewpoint diverges (keep on identifying particulars/details) e.g. in *jīva*, it looks at pure (*mukta*) souls and empirical souls (*saṅsari*), moving and stationary etc. Thus distributive viewpoint tries to distinguish individual entities grouped together by the class viewpoint. *Ācārya* Tulsī defines distributive viewpoint as '*bhedagrāhi vyavahāra*' i.e. intent to look for the differences is distributive viewpoint, e.g. real is of two types substance and mode; substance is of six types namely *jīva*, *puḍgala*, *dharma*, *adharmā*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*.

Class and distributive viewpoints are each like two parallel lines but their movement is in different directions. In class viewpoint these lines keep on converging till they become one while in distributive point, they keep on diverging till they go very far apart and becomes infinite. Jain darśana manana aur mīmāṃsā by *Ācārya* Tulsī explains this beautifully through the example of *jīva* (chart on page 385).

In fact where we wish to cognize the existence only, there we can do with the class viewpoint. But in this world, we cannot live just with existence and have to talk of the utility of an entity also. For utilization, it is essential to indulge in differentiation. Just to talk of real (*sat*) we cannot decide about soul (*jīva*) and non-soul (*ajīva*) or jive cannot progress further to achieve its objective. Distributive viewpoint considers particulars as primary without rejecting the existence of generalities; else it will be called pseudo-distributive viewpoint (*vyavahāra nayābhāsa*).

2.4 Linear viewpoint or *Rjusūtra naya*

It visualizes the present. It does not accept existence of the past and future. Activities of the past have been destroyed while those of future have yet to take place; therefore neither the past can perform any activity nor the future is capable of assisting us in performing any activity. Therefore it aims at the activities of the present only. In *Bhikṣu nyāyakārikā*, it is defined as, '*Vartamānaparyāyagrāhi rjusūtra*'.

Intention of the *jñātā* which accepts only the mode of the present time is linear viewpoint; e.g. comfort is in the present time. In this existence of comfort is primary while the existence of *jīva* is secondary. As against the class viewpoint, linear viewpoint provides cognition which is clearer and of momentary state of entity. Siddha Sena calls it as a more refined type of mode viewpoint. Even though the distributive viewpoint focuses on particulars primarily, yet

the particulars also (secondary) indicate similarity / identical to some extent. In linear viewpoint, the particular becomes primary as it does not accept the differences due to the effect of time. From distributive viewpoint, a weighing balance was a weighing balance in the past and will also be a weighing balance in the near future but the linear viewpoint calls it a weighing balance when it is being used as a weighing balance. In common language we say that wood is burning, but from the linear viewpoint it is not so as wood is not fire and when it is burning then it is not wood. Thus linear viewpoint proves the doctrine of momentary state of the entity (*kṣaṇakṣayavādi*) i.e. comparable to Buddhist philosophy) with the only difference that Buddhists reject the presence of substance in that entity while the linear viewpoint focuses on the mode without rejecting the presence of the substance associated. To prove the existence of the moment, Buddhist philosophy rejects the existence of permanence in the entity and so it is perceived or pseudo-linear viewpoint (*ḡjusutranayābhāsa*). Linear viewpoint is of two types namely pure-linear-viewpoint and impure-linear-viewpoint. According to pure-linear-viewpoint, one *artha paryāya* is real and so the characteristic of the substance is origination and decay only. Impure linear-viewpoint accepts *vyanjana paryāya* also and hence looks at long term series of momentary modes.

2.5 Śabda naya or the literal viewpoint.

Literals or (*śabda*) are the foundation of the daily routines of our life. On the basis of literals, the object is cognizer (*jñātā*) as per the intent of the cognizer. It cognizes different meanings of a literal based on its association with time, gender, number sentence etc. It recognizes the literal, form and its meaning (object), as explained in the following verse:

*Kāla liṅga vacanādi se vācaka haiṅ bhinnārtha;
śābdika saṅyojana sudhata, bane śābdanaya sārtha.*

Misuse of the rules of grammar, like gender, tense and numbers, is not acceptable to this viewpoint. This means:

1. Literal for a masculine entity cannot be the literal for a feminine entity. Literal in Hindi *pahāda* (mountain) and *pahādi* (hill) are different and not the same. Similarly the literal in Hindi *nada* (ocean) and *nadi* (river) cannot be the same; as existence of gender difference in the literal changes the meaning of the object indicated by it like *putra* (son) and *putri* (daughter).
2. Literal for a singular cannot be the literal for plural entities. If this was not so, then for the sentence in Hindi 'Meenā chātra haiṅ', the sentence 'Meenā chātrāe haiṅ' will also be considered correct.

This viewpoint helps us in finding the historical usage of the literal. In any time period, construction of gender, quantity etc. is associated with the literal as per its usage. Later on it becomes the tradition. Generally we use the words *stūti* and *stotra* interchangeably but their meanings are different. *Stūti* means devotional poem of one verse (*śloka*) while *stotra* stands for devotional poem with many verses (*ślokas*). Mode cognized through literal viewpoint is more definitive than done so by the linear viewpoint. Literal viewpoint differentiates an entity based on the usage of time/ gender /number etc. associated its literal representation but when this difference is accepted for ever (i.e. in all situations), then it becomes perceived or pseudo-literal-viewpoint (*śabda nayābhāsa*). Literal viewpoint accepts such differences in relative terms only.

2.6 Etymological viewpoint (*Samahirūṭha naya*)

paryāye nirūktibhedanārthabhedakrat sambhirudha'.

Synonymous words generally convey the same meaning or represent the same entity. However etymological viewpoint accepts a specific meaning of each word which is different from others, e.g. in Hindi, *bhikṣāśīla* means one who is begging, one who controls his vocal faculty is called *vāncayam* and who performs penance is called *tapasvi* even though in dictionary they all convey the same meaning. Even after recognizing the different meaning of the word, this viewpoint does not reject the other tributes of the entity. Cognition of the entity by this viewpoint is clearer than by the literal viewpoint.

An entity cannot exist in another entity. Every entity exists in its own nature. In gross terms, we accept mixture or coexistence of entities as representing one; still in this state every constituent entity exist in their own nature. As per scientific studies also, oxygen, carbon dioxide, nitrogen and other gases exist together in space but do they combine

and become one? Hence we should use an entity where it exists; thus this viewpoint is very important from scientific analysis method.

Literal and the entity it represents have a deep rooted relationship. Thus cognition of the entity should be as per the use of a word; hence the word should also be used as per the meaning of the entity. This is an important yardstick of right knowledge. When a literal gets associated to an entity by leaving its other meanings, then we say it as etymological viewpoint; e.g. the Hindi word *gay* means earth, cow, speech etc. but traditionally it denotes cow only. Similarly this viewpoint uses different words (like Hindi words *ghata*, *kuta*, *kumbha*) to indicate the same entity by accepting the existence of differences of time, activity, gender etc in them.

2.7 Determinant viewpoint (*Evañbhuta naya*)

This is the subtlest viewpoint. It accepts an entity on the basis of its activity at any point of time. It gives special meaning to an entity by representing it with a special word/ literal and vice versa. *Ācārya* Tulsī defines determinant viewpoint as, “*kriyāpariṇatamartha tacchāvdavācyāñ swikūvartravañbhuta*”.

Use of a literal as per the activity of the entity can be said as the determinant viewpoint. Only when a monk goes for begging can he be called a *bhikṣu*. Only when he is observing silence can he be called *vāncayam* and when he is performing penance he is called a *tapasvi*.

The etymological viewpoint first identifies the entity, then accepts the differences in the meanings conveyed by the word / literal and does not consider it essential that the use of the word is associated with the activity, while the determinant viewpoint considers the entity associated with the activity to be represented by the literal. Hence the determinant viewpoint is more specific than the etymological viewpoint and different.

Swāmi Pujyapāda while describing the determinant viewpoint writes, “The determinant viewpoint accepts an entity as the mode in which is active. Hence we should use a literal to represent an entity only during the time when it is active as per the meaning of the literal and not in other time periods; like the king of heavenly beings (*indra*) is called an *indra* only when he is using his authority and the wealth. If he is worshipping the God, then at that time we should not call him an *indra*.”

A person is called a teacher only when he is teaching. He should not be called a teacher or a *gūrū* when he is taking his food at home. The determinant viewpoint thus analyzes in a subtle manner the difference between the literal and the activity.

3.0 Importance of the doctrine of *naya*.

A person cannot know the whole truth till his knowledge becomes absolutely/ crystal clear. There are infinite angles to know an entity, a subject or an event. A person according to his intelligence knows some of them. In this condition if he does not realize the relativity of his knowledge or if he does not accept the intention of the other person and his knowledge; then he then he accept the partial truth as the whole truth. As a result his knowledge becomes very limited and creates problems, difference of opinions and insistence on his views with others. To eliminate these suspicions, it is essential to use the doctrine of the viewpoint. At times we find in the same *grāṇtha* different meanings of the same subject in different contexts. If the reader does not know the contexts behind these explanations, then he becomes suspicious and unable to realize the truth.

A person familiar with the doctrine of viewpoint maintains a relative vision to others knowledge while knowing the truth of his own knowledge. Hence he does not become obsessed with the object of knowledge and does not criticize the principles. Hence the knowledge about the doctrine of viewpoints is the way to purifying *samyaktva*.

According to Māilladhawala, knowledge of *naya* is the medium to acquire right knowledge.

4.0 Boundaries/ limits of the subject -*naya*

All seven *nayas* are methods of visualization relative to each other. In these, we visualize different states of an entity from different angles. Analysis from these (i.e. from figurative to the distinctive viewpoints) progresses from the gross knowledge to its subtlest level. Hence the coverage of the subject also keeps on getting reduced.

The figurative viewpoint accepts the imagination of the knower. Imagination can be of both real and unreal. Hence existence and non existence both becomes its subject.

Class viewpoint accepts just the existence. Therefore its domain of cognition is less than the figurative viewpoint.

Distributive viewpoint accepts particulars or differences. It does not recognize sameness of entities. Hence it cognizes a smaller part of existence compared to the class viewpoint. Linear viewpoint cognizes only a part of the subject compared to the distributive viewpoint (i.e. the mode of the present only). Hence its subject or its cognition becomes more subtle.

Linear viewpoint accepts identity in different entities based on factors like time, number, gender etc while literal viewpoint accepts such differences. Hence the literal viewpoint's cognition becomes more subtle. Literal viewpoint accepts identity in synonyms while the etymological viewpoint does not accept such identity. Hence its subject and its cognition become subtler than the literal viewpoint.

Etymological viewpoint accepts identity in entities with different activities while discriminative viewpoint accepts the meaning of an entity based on its activity. Hence this provides the subtlest cognition.

In this way we see that subjects of different viewpoints move from subtle to subtler levels. In them we can plan the cause-effect relationship.

Exercises

Essay type questions:

1. While discussing the nature of *naya*, explain the different types of *naya*.

Short notes type questions

1. Briefly explain the importance of *naya*.
2. Explain briefly the subject of each type of *naya*.

Fill in the blank type questions.

1. To describe the whole truth about an object, there are two methods 1———, 2———.
2. As per Jain philosophy, each entity has —— attributes.
3. To explain the nature of *naya*, Siddha Sena used the example of———.
4. Briefly there are —— types of *naya*.
5. As per Jain philosophy, indications /characteristics of real are———.
6. The *naya* which accepts the tradition or practical aspects is called —— viewpoint.
7. —— and —— viewpoints move like parallel lines.
8. Of all types of viewpoints, —— viewpoint is the most subtle /momentary type.
9. As per ——, knowledge of *naya* doctrine is the medium of acquiring the right knowledge.
10. The viewpoint which eliminates the non-intended attributes is called———.

Answers to the fill in the blank questions

1. 1. Using the identity view concerning the infinite attributes of an entity, express one attribute using the word *Syāt*; and 2. With relativity of the infinite attributes of an entity in mind, express one attribute at a time without negating the others. 2. infinite 3. necklace of precious stones 4. two 5. origination-destruction-permanence 6. distributive or practical 7. Class viewpoint 8. Determinant viewpoint 9. Mālla Dhawala.

Reference texts

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Unit–2 Lesson–5: *Vyñajana paryāya evañ arthaparyāya* ; Contact-mode and Object-mode.

Objective:

In this lesson we shall explain clearly the two types of modes namely the contact mode and the object mode on the basis of the following topics:

- 0.0 Introduction
- 1.0 Nature and general description of mode.
 - 1.1 Horizontal generic / generalities.
 - 1.2 Vertical generic / generalities.
 - 1.3 Characteristics / indications of mode
 - 1.4 Types of modes
 - 1.4.1 Contact mode
 - 1.4.2 Object mode

0.0 Introduction

Every person sees this perceptible world. He sees events happening everyday e.g. a child is born, grows up to be a boy or girl, becomes a youth, gets old and then dies. He is known as a human being from birth till death. He is also assigned names like Rāma, Śyāma etc. Along with all these, we see significant changes in his physique, intelligence etc. The man sees the universe and in it he sees natural things like the plants, trees, sky, mountains etc. A common man sees them and knows what they are but nothing beyond that. When persons with scientific and philosophical temper see them, they move to WHY? They are there. They analyze, “What is the reason for birth? what is the reason for death?, who makes the mountains?, and so on. Is there a creator of the clouds?” Scientists believe in experimentation and testing. Material instruments can analyze only material objects and entities. Hence their domain is the material world only. Philosophers believe in logic (cause-effect), they use experience and intellect to decide on the basis of reason and its effect. Hence their domain is both material - spiritual and concrete – non concrete entities.

Analysis and determination of the basic elements and their activities is the foundation of exploring the universe-construct. What is this world? What is its basis? What is called real (*sat*) and substance (*dravya*)? What is their nature? Is change real or is permanence real? Are some of the questions which are the foundations of analysis and determination of the basic elements (*tattva mīmāṃsā*).

Based on *tattva mīmāṃsā*, there are three main streams of Indian philosophy, namely:

1. *Nityavāda*: Fatalism or determinism: Some philosophers think only eternal is the realm. Basis of the existence of an object is permanence. As per Vedānta and other mono-theist *nityavādi* philosophers substance is real and mode is unreal. Sāṅkhya philosophers also consider *pūrūṣa* as inert and eternal. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers also consider *parmāṇu*, space, soul and some other substances are eternal and inert only.
2. *Anityavāda*: According to these philosophers, there is nothing like permanent in this world as what is real is momentary. ‘*yat sat tatkṣaṇikaṅ yatha jaladhara*’, hence Buddhist philosophers along with mono-theist *anityavādīs* mode i.e. origination and destruction is real and permanence is false.
3. *Nityānityavādi*: According to them, there is no object with origination and destruction, i.e. without transformation. Real (*sat*) is that which is with origination and destruction accompanied by permanence. This doctrine of Jain philosophy is called *pariṇāmīnityavāda*. Like alphabets are the basis of all scriptures, origination, destruction and permanence are the alphabets of the substance i.e. real. Hence these are also called *mātrakāpada*.

If the object is considered as inert and eternal, then it cannot be active i.e. cannot perform any activity. So the object stays as it is forever. No change whatsoever takes place. Hence when an object is just eternal, then no serial or random activity can take place in it. In the absent of transformation in the object, it ceases to be real and hence its

non existence is established. Same is the story of momentary real doctrine. If there is no *parmāṇū*, then how lumps of two or more attribute existing. Therefore neither just *nityatā* nor just *anityatā* is capable of supporting transformation.

Origination, destruction and permanence are relative to each other. Skin of the tortoise does not get originated or destroyed or is permanent. Flower in the sky is neither existent nor can be destroyed and its creation is impossible. Meaning of origination and destruction is change or transformation. Change or transformation is the synonym for mode (*pariyāya*). Synonym for permanence is substance (*dravya*). Therefore substance and mode are concomitant. Therefore it is said:

Dravya pariyāya rahitaṅ, pariyāyā dravyavarjitā’;
Kva kadā kena kiṅ rupā draṣṭā mānena kena vā.

In this lesson, we intend to focus on the discussion concerning mode.

Umā Swāti, while defining the substance, says, ‘*Guṇapariyāyavad dravyam*’. He bases the definition of the real (*sat*) on origination, destruction and permanence. Those characteristics which get sequentially destroyed can be defined as mode or modification. Those characteristics which are coexistent with the substance are called attributes (*guṇa*). This classification of mode as sequential and attribute as coexistence is the later thinking of Jain *ācāryas*. Such a classification does not exist in the canonical literature except in *Anuyogadwāra* and *Uttarādhyayana*.

1.0 Nature of the mode - *pariyāya kā swarūpa*.

While describing the nature of the mode in *Uttarādhyayan*, it is said ‘*lakṣhaṇaṅ pajjavāṇaṅ tu, ubhao assiya bhava*’ meaning that mode is an entity which is base on both substance and attribute. As the essential (*anvaya*) part of the substance is called attribute (*gūna*); similarly the changing (*vyatireka*) part of the substance is called mode (*pariyāya*). Domain of the substance is limited while that of mode is infinite. Generally we cognize a substance based on its modes. Substance represents identity in differences while mode represents differences in identical entities. Hence the indeterminate cognition of the substance can be intuition. Determinate cognition on the other hand produces knowledge of a particular mode of a substance and hence it leads to conclusive knowledge.

Describing the origination of the word *pariyāya*, *Dhavalākāra* Veer Sena says, ‘*parisamantāt āya ‘pariyāya’*’ - what accepts differences from all angles is mode or that which has transformation by its own nature as well as due to effect of others is mode. Puṅjapāda considers *pariyāya*, *apavāda*, *vyāvritti*, *viśeṣa* as synonyms of mode. Resultant (*pariṇāma*) is also used as a representation of mode. Generally vertical-generality type substance’s modes are known as resultant. In this context we should remember that there are two types of generics:

1.1 *Tirayaga sāmānya* or horizontal-generality:

Appearance / feeling of similarities in different objects in different place at the same time is called horizontal generic; e.g. feeling of being earthen pot in a number of pitchers at different places or feeling of being human beings in different persons at the same time.

1.2 *Urghava sāmānya* or vertical generality:

Every substance has different states in different time periods and still they (states) all appear to be the same their cognition to belong to the same entity is called vertical generality, Rāma was earlier a small child, then he grew up to be boy, a young man and then an old man; all through he was and appeared to be the same person. This feeling of being Rāma is vertical generality. The word resultant (*pariṇāma*) is associated with these different states of Rāma; it helps us in feeling the existence of same-ness (i.e. Rāma) in different modes.

Umā Swāti has used resultant to mean the mode. Origination of a state of an attribute (which is permanent) as a result of destruction of its old state of the substance’ mode is called the resultant. Even though the substance does not leave its substantiality still it experiences natural as well as enforced changes continuously. These changes are called the resultants. Thus resultant is the origination of the new mode of the substance by destruction of its old mode without the substance leaving its own nature.

As per Jain philosophy, there are six types of basic substances constituting this universe; these are - *dharmāstikāya*, *adhamāstikāya*, *ākāśāstikāya*, *kāla*, *puḍgalāstikāya* and *jīvāstikāya*. Out of these *puḍgala*

and *jīva* are capable of movement and rest. When they are moving, then *dharmāstikāya* assists them passively in so doing without. When they are free from movement than *dharmāstikāya* becomes non-existent. This way *dharmāstikāya* develops association and separation from *jīva* and *pudgala* based on their intention of and actual movement. Mode of *dharmāstikāya* is changing every moment.

Like in movement even in the case of rest or the intention thereof of *jīva* and *pudgala*; modes of *adharmāstikāya* keep on changing. *Jīva* and *pudgala* move from one place to other. At first one *jīva* or *pudgala* when at rest at place 'A'; then each one of them is associated with *ākāśāstikāya* of that place. When that *jīva* or *pudgala* move from place 'A' to place 'B'; then *ākāśāstikāya* of place 'A' gets separated from each one of them at first and then *ākāśāstikāya* of place 'B' gets associated with each one of them. This way modes of *dharmāstikāya* and other similar substances which do not move, keep on changing based on the movements of *jīva* and *pudgala*.

Pudgala is a concrete (*mūrtika*) substance and its nature is fusion and fission. Its one lump of infinite space points breaks into many smaller lumps and a number of its smaller lumps bind together to give a bigger lump. Origination and destruction of pot, cloth etc. keeps on taking place. This way transformation of *pudgalāstikāya* keeps on taking place every moment. One *jīva* is born sometime a human being, other times as hellish or heavenly or sub-human being. Thus transformation in *jīva* also takes place at every moment. In this Jain philosophy consider every substance in this universe is transforming continuously. Existence of substance is impossible in the absence of transformation.

1.3 Paryāya ke lakṣaṇa Indications of mode.

There are six indicators of mode in Uttarādhyayana as follows:

*egattañ ca puhattñ ca sañkhā sañathāṇameva ca;
sañjogā ya vibhāgā ya pajjavāṇaṇ ca lakṣaṇaṇ*

1. Solitary-ness (*ekatva*): One of the indications of mode is the feeling of existence of different units of substance forming a lump; One pitcher is an amalgam of infinite *parmāṇus* and still we see them as a pitcher. This feeling of one unit of the substance is due to the mode called pitcher.
2. Separateness (*prathaktva*): Development of discriminating knowledge is also due to the modes only, e.g. it is different from that.
3. Number (*Saṅkhyā*): Mode is the only cause of numbers like one, two, eight, ten etc.
4. Form/ figure (*Saṅsthāna*): Transformation of the substance only is cause of its acquiring circular, triangular or elliptical etc forms
5. Unison (*sañyoga*): Feeling of union of two, three, countless etc. due to the transformation of the substance only.
6. Division (*vibhāga*): The feeling 'That is divisible by this or that is a part of this' is due to the mode.

It is to be noted here that separateness denotes differences between two entities while division denotes existence of one before and divisions of the same thing later. Hence these two are considered separately.

Concerning the indications of the mode, *ācārya* Tulsī has written the following sutra:

Ekatva - prathaktva-saṅkhyā-saṅsthāna-sañyoga-vibhāgātallakṣaṇam

1.4 Paryāya ke prakāra Types of modes

Based on the reason (*hetu*), Kunda Kunda has identified two types of modes namely relative (to self and others) and independent modes. The mode which is relative to self or others as the cause is called relative mode or *vibhāva paryāya*. This type of mode generally belongs to concrete substances. Hence its domain is *pudgalāstikāya*. *Saṅsāri jīvas* or empirical souls are associated with karmas and hence they are slightly concrete. Hence in them also we see *vibhāvika paryāyas*. *Jīva*'s modes as human being, heavenly beings etc and pitcher, cloth etc. of *pudgalāstikāya* are examples of this type of modes of *pudgala*.

Modes which are independent of external/ efficient causes are called *svabhāva paryāya* or natural modes. *Dharmāstikāya*, *adharmāstikāya*, *ākāśāstikāya* and *kāla* are the four types of substance which have only natural transformation and hence natural modes. As per Jain philosophy, every substance has an attribute called *agurūlaghutva*

due to which even after transformation the substance does not leave its nature. Ācārya Tulsi in Jain Sidhānta Dipikā has defined *agurūlaghva* as, 'svaswarūpāvicālantvam- agurūlaghutva'. This transformation the attribute 'agurūlaghutva' is the best example of natural transformation. There are two other main types of modes namely object (*artha*) and contact (*vyañjana*) modes.

1.4.1 *Artha paryāya* object mode or instantaneous mode.

Sūkṣamo vartamānavatritthapariṇāma' arthaparyāya'.

Present and subtle transformation taking place in the substance is called object mode. This is the internal transformation of the substance. This cannot refer to the past and future of the substance. It is of one moment only and free of any relationship between name and owner of the name.

Object mode exists in all types of substances, be they concrete or non concrete or subtle or gross. If the substance not transform even for a moment, then for a long time it may not have any transformation. A child is five feet tall today and a year ago he was four feet tall. This does not mean that grew one foot tall in a day only but he was growing continuously every moment / second / minute / hour etc but this continuous transformation is so subtle that we cannot measure it in inches etc. The same explanation stands for other substances also.

1.4.2 *Vyañjana paryāya* Contact mode

That transformation of the substance which can be expressed is called contact mode. Compared to object mode it is gross and of longer time duration. As per Jain philosophy, the smallest time of contact mode is *antarmuhūrta* and the maximum time is countless. With respect to countless time, this mode can also be said as without a beginning and end, e.g. *pudgalas* transformed as Merūparvata, shelters in the hells and heavens etc. Ācārya Tulsi in Jain Sidhānta Dipikā has defined contact mode as, 'sthūla'kālāntarasthāyī'śo'bdānāñ sañketaviṣayo vyañjanaparyāya'. That mode which is gross and stays for some time and is explicable in words is called contact mode.

Domain of contact mode is only concrete substances *Dharmāstikāya*, *adharmāstikāya*, *ākāśāstikāya* and *kāla* are only non concrete and hence do not have contact modes. Hence in general terms we say, 'yāñ cyārāñ kīparyāya palte nahīñ'. Empirical souls and matter (*pudgala*) have contact modes, e.g. human- subhuman-heavenly and hellish states (*gati*); their life spans like childhood, adolescent, youth, and old are the contact modes of empirical souls. Their long term existence in a specific gross mode becomes explicable. Similarly modes of matter like pitcher, cloth etc are contact modes.

Siddha Sena Diwākara had described contact mode as relative to word and of fixed contact/ duration while the object mode is of independent of word and inherent in the object.

Jo uṇa samāsao eciya vañjanānīao ya atthāñīao ya;

Atthagao ya abhīṇo bhaeyavvo vañjanaviyappa. 'Sanmatitarka prakaraṇa- 1/30.

Every object is evolutionary with similarities and differences. When we minutely analyze their similarities and imagine the differences in them due to time, place etc and then those differences due to their subtleness keeps on increasing over a period of time. This sequence of countless imaginary differences of the similarities which can be expressed by one word is called contact mode and those different modes in this series of transformations which cannot be expressed by one word are called object modes. As an example, transformation of sentient substance i.e. *jīva* as human, subhuman, heavenly and hellish modes is called contact mode and the momentary transformations taking place in each of these contact modes of *jīva* are called object modes.

Contact mode appears as identical due to continuous transformation / flow; yet we can break it in many small and big different parts; e.g. childhood is one contact mode yet it can be broken into immediate birth, breast fed etc many sub contact modes. On the other hand object mode cannot be divided into parts as it is the last indivisible part of these contact modes. While explaining the contact mode through an example, Siddha Sena said:

Purisammi purisasaddo jammāi maraṇakālapajjanto;

Tassa u bālāyīya pajjavajjōyā bahuviyappā

Sanmatitarka Prakaraṇa 1/32

The word man is used for the man from his birth till death and childhood etc. many modes of this common entity (i.e. man) and are parts of the same determinate. Considering childhood, youth etc modes as independent will result in falsehood of even the existence of these i.e. childhood, youth etc. this is so as childhood is unison of birth, breast fed period etc. many different contact modes. If we consider only identical then we eliminate the parts and when parts are lost than how can the whole i.e. their owner exist. Through the example of human mode, the following explanation is given:

Atthitti ñivviyappañ purisañ jo bahñai purisakālammi;

So bālāiviyappañ na lahai tullañ va pāvejjā. Sanmatitarka Prakaraṇa 1/33

According to Siddha Sena, ever human being has both determinate and indeterminate intellect. When his intellect is of indeterminate type, then his object i.e. mode of man is one and the same contact mode and when he in this state of intellect sees different modes like childhood, youth etc as parts of the one contact mode these parts become the object modes of the contact mode man. This way every substance has infinite object modes and infinite contact modes i.e. one substance become infinite from the mode point of view. Clarifying this author of Dipikā says 'pūrvotrākārāṇāmānanttyāt paryāyā api anantā eva' i.e. modes only the cause of the cognition of the substance and hence the infinity of modes become the cause of infiniteness of the substance.

Exercises

Essay type questions

1. Clarify the views of Siddha Sena Diwākara while defining the contact and object modes.

Short notes type questions

1. Clarify the horizontal and vertical generalities.
2. Analyse the nature of the mode.

Fill in the blanks type questions

1. Domain of the philosopher's analysis is _____ and _____ objects.
2. Foundation of the material world is _____.
3. As per Buddhist philosophy, _____ is the only real.
4. As per Vedānta philosophers, object is only _____.
5. Origination –destruction and permanent are _____ to each other.
6. There are two āgamas to discuss mode and attributes in different contexts namely _____ and _____.
7. Umā Swāti has used _____ as a synonym for the mode.
8. _____ mode is gross.
9. Pitcher, cloth etc are the _____ mode of _____.
10. Mode of the nature means _____.

Reference texts

1. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa Part I, verses 30-35.
2. Jain Sīdhānta dipikā First edition
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Unit – 2 Lesson – 6 :

***Jiva-pudgala kā bhaedābhedyā* - Identical cum different; soul and matter.**

Objective:

We shall make an attempt to learn and understand the lesson heading with special reference to the following topics.

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Review of the relationship between soul and matter in Jain literature.

3.0 Analyses of the relationship between soul and matter by intellectuals cum philosophers.

1.0 Introduction

Jain philosophy believes in the doctrine of duality of existence (*dwaitvādi*). According to *dwaitvādi*, all objects in this universe can be divided in two categories namely sentient and insentient basic elements. While describing the seven basic elements (*seven tattvas*) Sthānañ sutra classifies all the basic elements in two broad categories. Sentient and insentient are both independent, without any base and self supportive types of elements. Any power, occult or normal or super human, *mantrās* or effort etc can change sentient into insentient or vice versa.

Jain cosmology talks of five types of existents (*pañcāstikāya*), out of which four types are insentient and only *jīvcāstikāya* is sentient. Out of the four insentient types, *pudgalcāstikāya* is the only one which is the most sense perceptible and concrete element. Considering just the existence, both *jīva* and insentient are of totally different nature. Due to its association with matter (*pudgala*), *jīva* appears and is perceived like matter also. Earth bodied and water bodied *jīvas* have such a heavy insulation of their consciousness with matter karmas that most of non Jain philosophers and intellectuals consider a matter only. Similarly close proximity of matter with *jīva*, makes them active and over riding like *jīva*, and start influencing them also. This way we cannot reject their being mutually beneficial and relative to.

Basically *jīva* can be classified in two main categories namely pure soul or just soul (*mukta jīva*) and tainted or empirical soul (*saṁsāri jīvas*). *Siddhas* are free of matter body, karma relations and have no relation with / association worldly activities. Empirical souls are with *karmas* and hence are involved in worldly activities also. To enjoy the results of karmas, they acquire physical or celestial bodies. Empirical souls cannot exist even for a moment without a matter body. All elements used for mind, speech and body are matter. Therefore it can be said that there is not even a moment when an empirical soul can exist without the support, consumption or excretion of matter. Similarly it can be said that empirical soul and matter are so much intermixed with each other like milk and water. Accordingly it is said:

Aṅoṅāṅugayāṅaṅ emaṅ va taṅ va tti vibhayaṅamajuttaṅ;

Jaha duddhpāṅiyāṅaṅ jāvaṅta visesapajjāyā. Tarka Saṁmati Prakaraṇa 1/47

As both *jīva* and *pudgala* are so intermixed; it becomes impossible to differentiate as to which part it is body (*pudgala*) and which is soul (*jīva*) an whether childhood, youth, old age and colour smell, touch etc are all attributes of body i.e. *pudgala* only or that the *jīva* has no effect on them. Similarly it also becomes difficult to say as to those modes associated with *jīva* are effected or not by *pudgala*. Knowledge, memory, pain and pleasure etc are all modes of *jīva*, but we can also see their effect on matter. Actually in an empirical soul all modes whether of body or soul are neither pure modes of *jīva* nor of *pudgala* or matter but are modes of the union of both i.e. they are collective modes. This is the reason why Siddha Sena has cited the example of childhood, youth etc. modes to prove identity cum difference of *jīva* and *pudgala*.

2.0 Review of the relationship between soul and matter in Jain literature.

To prove the inter mingling of *jīva* and *pudgala*, Siddha Sena has borrowed a number of examples from canonical literature and the sentences 'ege daṅde', 'ege āyā' from Sthānañsutra.

*evañ ege āyā ege daṇḍe ya hoe kiriyā ya;
karaṇavisesseṇa ya vivhajossiddhi vi aviruddhā .*

We find in Sthānañ and other canonical literature at some places descriptions like *jīva* is one, violence is one, activity is one etc. and at places description like four types of *jīva*, three types of violence and activity etc. If we consider soul and matter very different than speech, mind and body are matter only and on that basis how can we consider one activity of many types. On the contrary if we consider activities of mind, body and speech of many types then how can we make the statement '*evañ ege āyā ege daṇḍe*'. Basis of an activity is energy (*vīrya*) and if it is considered only the nature of soul, then we can say of one type or infinite types but why talk of three types only?

There is no point in discussing the above if we accept that soul and matter are different. Mental, speech and physical are many modes of soul still they are related to one soul and hence they are one. Similarly even though methods of activity are different, yet being associated with one soul, the sentence '*evañ ege āyā ege daṇḍe*' appears logical. Similarly there are three methods of expression of energy – mind, body and speech and on this basis energy can be said to be of three types.

Generally the soul element which experiences pain and pleasure is considered as internal and the other element *pudgala* which acquires colour / taste / smell etc is considered as external. Here a doubt can creep in if *jīva* and *pudgala* are considered identical; then either the soul should be external like matter or the matter should be considered as internal due to its association with soul. Siddha Sena provides an explanation on this subject as follows:

*Ṇa ya bāhirayo bh āvo abbhaṅtarao ya atthi samayammi;
ṇoeñḍiyañ pu ṇa padduca hoi abbhaṅtara viseso.* Sanmatitarka Prakaraṇa 1/50

Actually in Jain canonical literature we do not find any fixed classification that this particular object is external or that is internal. Those objects which cannot be experienced by the external senses and which are subjects of mind only are called internal. Those objects, due to their being gross and experienced by external senses only can be called external only, e.g. karma particles (*kārmaṇa vargāṇas*) cannot be experienced by senses and hence are called internal. Similarly activities like movement etc of empirical soul are the subjects of senses and hence in a way *jīva* also can be considered as external.

Haribhadra in Śāstravārtāsamuccaya while proving identity cum difference in one human being only has used the logic of Sanmatitarka Prakaraṇa. Yaśovijaya in commentary on Śāstravārtāsamuccaya in this context has also rejected absolutism doctrine (*ekāntvāda*). Hence he rejected the views of Nyāya philosophers that modes like childhood, youth etc are those of body as the soul is inert. Whereas the feeling 'I am a child' shows the identity of soul and body, the states of body like earlier a child and now old' shows the difference of 'I' the soul from body (was child and now old).

On the subject of identity cum difference of soul and matter, we find a dialogue between Bhagavāna Mahāvira and Gautam wherein Gautam asks, 'O lord! Is body the soul or different than soul?' Bhagavāna replied, 'Gautam! Body is the soul and different from different also.' Then Gautam further asks, 'O Lord! Is body concrete or non-concrete?' Bhagavāna replied, 'Gautam! Body is both concrete and non-concrete.'

If we consider soul and body are just one only on the basis of their being identical; then how can we make statements like 'body is concrete' etc. If we consider that body and soul are just different than what can be the basis for making statements like 'body is soul and body is non concrete' etc. These can be proven only after accepting the doctrine of soul and matter being identical. Similarly calling body as insentient, concrete or *ajīva* etc. proves its being different from soul.

From the point of their nature *jīva* and *pudgala* are totally different. *Jīva* is non concrete and free from attributes like colour, taste, and smell etc. *Pudgala* is concrete and attributes like taste, smell and colour etc are its nature. *Jīva* is sentient and *pudgala* is insentient still how can both interact? What is the cause due to which both of them interact with each other and get attracted towards each other? In Vyākhyā Prajñyapti sutra, the five words have been used for this subject namely '*anyonyabaddha, anyonyaspraṣṭa, anyonya avagāṭha, snehapratibaddha and anyonya-ekībhūta*'.

Out of these the word 'snehapratibaddha' is very important. Both *jīva* and *pudgala* encourage each other to be attracted to them. *Sneha* of *jīva* is called influx (*āsrava*) and of *pudgala* is its quality of being attracted towards *jīva*. This attraction towards each other only cause their establishing a relationship and getting bonded to each other. When *jīva* is without this attraction, then influx is stopped and *pudgala* cannot be associated with *jīva* and it becomes free (*siddha*).

Every philosophy believing in duality of existence (*dwaitavādi*) from ancient times contemplated on the subject of the relationship between *jīva* and *pudgala*. In Buddha's time the question about identity cum difference of body and soul became a prominent issue.

In Buddhist canonical literature called *piṭakas*, we find the description concerning five lumps namely *rūpa*, *vedna*, *sañjñā*, *saṅskāra* and *vijñāna*. As per these *piṭakas*, these cannot be considered as identical or different than soul. If we say that if we bifurcate or separate these lumps then also the soul does not get bifurcated, then the question of eternity arises. On the other hand if we consider soul and lumps identical, then the question of *ucchedavāda* arises. Hence can neither said to different nor identical with them and is inexplicable.

Cārvāka philosophy does not consider independent existence of soul as an element. According to them when the five *māhābhūtas* unite then the form of the body is created and an entity called *jīva* also gets created. Sūtrakṛtāṅga does not talk of Cārvāka or Lokāyata but does refer to *pañcāmāhābhūtavāda*. According to these philosophers, union of the five *māhābhūtas* result in an element called *jīva* and their destruction results in that element/body is destroyed. In canonical era, they were known as *Tajjīvatcchrāvāda* and we can find their references in both parts of Sūtrakṛtāṅga. Buddhist literature describes Ajitkeśakambal as its founder. In this philosophy soul and body are considered as one and not different elements as the soul lives as long as the body lives; soul dies as soon as the body dies; *jīva* is neither different from body nor can it be experienced without the body. Like we can see and experience separately a sword from its housing, oil from the oilseed, juice from the sugar cane, wood from the fire and meat from the bones; nobody can show or explain a soul separately from the body. In Rājprāsniya, Rājā Pradeśi also supported this philosophy and he tries to explain this doctrine using a number of examples of identity of soul and body; hence it is useless to talk of heaven, hell etc. On the other hand Kūṣāna Śramaṇa Keśi tried to prove the differences between body and soul by many examples and counter examples and so they cannot be considered as same. Similarly Upniśada and many other philosophies also who refute existence of soul without body.

In the canonical era, this discussion on body and soul's identity cum difference was based on the explanation of the interaction between the soul and the body and the analysis of the effect of the one on the other. In other post canonical era literature like Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, relationship between soul and body started becoming clearer.

3.0 Analyses of the relationship between soul and matter by intellectuals cum philosophers.

Western philosophers consider soul and mind as one and hence talk of the relationship between mind and body. Logic era philosophers gave the following doctrines of this relationship.

i. Interactionism : René Des Cartes talked about the relativity of body and mind. Mind has an attribute called sentient / conscious while the body is an extension of material attributes; hence from attributes point of view they are both totally different. Still how they affect each other? According to Des Cartes, the bridge for the two i.e. body and mind to interact is called pineal gland. This doctrine to prove interaction between body and mind through pineal gland is called Interactionism.

ii. Parallelism : According to Spinoza, proponent of this doctrine, body and mind are not two different and independent entities but are the two aspects of the same element. These two entities like parallel lines interact and affect each other but never meet. Basically the cause of their interaction is God. Being part of the same God, they interact with each other.

3. Pre established harmony

According to Leibnitz, neither the mind affects the body nor does the body affect the mind. They act independently and both have their own rules and systems. Still God has established an understanding / harmony between them that they interact with each other so that appears to be affecting each other. He cited the example of

watchmaker and two watched in which he watch maker sets their times and mechanism so that they always give eh same time. This doctrine of arrangement between mind and body is called pre-established harmony between them.

4. New doctrine (*navyotkrāntivāda*)

According to some modern philosophers, mind is an element which has been created by the body. The mind acts on the body (and the body becomes secondary) like a new thing overshadows the old one. This way the western philosophers did not analyze the identity cum difference of *jīva* and *pudgala* but they definitely focus their analysis on mind and body. The concept of *jīva* is non-existent in western philosophy and mind is considered *jīva*. On this basis their analysis of mind and body can be compared to the analysis of *jīva* and *pudgala*. From canonical literature like Bhagwati and Sthānañ times to the logic era, Jain scholars have done deep analysis of this subject. Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya has significant discussions on this subject. Actually Jain philosophy propagated doctrine of manifold aspect (*Anekānta*) and hence they accept differences in their existence due to their attributes and identity in them due to co-existent in same space and their nature to attract and be attracted to each other.

Exercises

Essay type questions

1. Explain the analysis of Siddha Sena Diwākara concerning identity cum differences between soul and matter.

Short notes type questions

1. Enunciate the views of western philosophers concerning the relationship between body and mind.
2. Please clarify the new doctrine of the western philosophers concerning mind and body relationship.

Questions concerning the topic, short answers.

1. Based on the doctrine of duality of existence, in how many categories can we divide the universe?
2. What is the feature missing between *jīva* and *ajīva* and why?
3. Which philosopher used the example of watches and the watch maker to explain the relationship between mind and body?
4. From which canonical literature has the sutra '*Aego āyā*' indicated in it?
5. Rājaprasānīya Sutra contains the dialogue between which personalities?
6. Which five *skandhas* are described in Buddhist Piṭaka sutras?
7. In the word *snehapratibaddha*, attraction between *jīva* and matter is indicated for whom?
8. Which example did Siddha Sena used to describe the identity between empirical soul and matter?
9. The name of which cult/ doctrine has been used in Sutra Krātāṅga for Cārvākas?
10. Which doctrine is used by Des Cartes to explain the relation between mind and body?

Answers to the questions concerning the topics.

1. Two categories. 2. *atyāntābhāva* 3. Leibnitz 4. Sthānañ 5. Rājā Pradesī, Kumāra Śramaṇa Keśī
6. *Rūpa, Vednā, Sañjñā, Saṅskara, Vijñāna*. 7. Influx for *jīva* and to be attracted for matter. 8. Sthānañ.
9. Pancamahābhūtavāda 10. Interactionism.

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1. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa: eka samikṣtmaka adhyayana Sādhvi Mudita Yaśā
2. Pāścātya Darśana kā samasyātmaka vivecana Kedār Nāth Rāma Nātha
3. Sūya Gado Bhāga I Prathama Adhyayana ke tippana
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Unit – 2 Lesson – 7

Universal and particular-ness of the object; *Vastu kī sāmānya viśeṣātmakā*

Objective:

Jain philosophy use the doctrine of *Anekānta* to understand the nature and essence of reality (*sat*). Monism or single minded analysis cannot describe the reality completely. Using the doctrine of *Anekānta*, we realize that an entity is not only it has universal attributes but it also has specific attributes. The entity is both universal and specific and to understand this in details we shall analyze it with reference to the following topics.

- 1.0 Background.
- 1.1 Basis of *Anekānta*
- 1.2 Nature of the universal in Sāṅkhya philosophy and its review.
- 1.3 Nature of the universal in Vedānta philosophy and its review.
- 1.4 Nature of the universal in Buddhist philosophy and its review.
- 1.5 Nature of universal in Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika philosophy and its review.
- 1.6 Kinds of existent in Jain philosophy
 - 1.6.1 *Svarūpāstitva* (existence in its own nature) and *Saṅtāna*
 - 1.6.2 Non sustainability of the concept of *Saṅtāna*.
 - 1.6.3 *Ucchedātmaka nirvāṇa* cannot be accepted.
- 1.7 *Sādṛśyāstitva* (existence like similar objects)
 - 1.7.1 Two types of specifics.
- 1.8 Universal-specific and substance-mode are synonymous.

1.0 Background:

Philosophy is born due to our inquisitiveness about the existence. Jain philosophy supports duality of existence (*dvaitvāda*). According to it sentient (*cetana*) and insentient (*jad*) are the two basic elements / substance types which explain / control the administration of the world. The nature and existence of both is independent but still they are related to each other. Jain philosophy supports the relativity of both the substance and the mode. There are different concepts of the object in different branches of Indian philosophy. Substance is inert is the view of Vedantīs who consider only Brahma as real and He is one; differences in this world are unreal. Sāṅkhyayoga considers two basic types of elements namely *purūṣa* and *prakṛtī*, *purūṣa* is inert and does not go through transformation and *prakṛtī* goes through transformation continuously and it does so for *purūṣa*. Buddhists on the other hand do not believe in the existence of soul; according to them only change/ transformation is real. They do not believe in the existence anything called substance and consider it imaginary. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika consider the object as with universal and specific attributes but they consider them both as independent when Jain philosophy believes in the universal and specific-ness both of the every object. In this philosophy, substance and mode have been described on the basis of *Anekānta*. It accepts the existence of both the substance and the mode. We shall study the administration of the basic elements as per the doctrine of *Anekānta* and compare the same to other philosophies.

1.1 Basis of *Anekānta*:

Four pairs of opposing attributes are cited as the basis of the doctrine of *Anekānta* namely:

1. Eternal and temporary
2. Existent and non existent
3. General and specific / particular
4. Explicable and inexplicable.

These four opposing pairs of attributes lead us to accept that infinite such opposing pairs of attributes can be present in the substance. On this basis the doctrine of *Anekānta* was established. We know the truth and its expression is done by the trio of object (*artha*), words (*śabda*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). Different philosophers have viewed this (truth) in different ways; e.g. Vedānta has identified its three states as transcendental, practical and imaginary (*pratibhāsika*) with Brahma as transcendental truth, sensual perception as practical and mirage and dreams as imaginary truths; Buddhist consist truth in two ways namely transcendental and practical (*saṅvṛtti*) truth with the

momentary state of an object as transcendental truth and the general perception due to our judgment of the object as practical truth. Different philosophers have presented different views of the truth based on determinate (*savikalpa*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) knowledge. In the indeterminate experience we just come in contact with the object without knowing any specifics about it (i.e. something is there) while determinate experience being based on sensual perception results in perception of different details of the object. Vedānta accepts the substance as transcendental truth and then consider mode as imaginary while Buddhists consider mode as transcendental truth and the substance as imaginary. According to Jain *Nyāya*, both substance and mode are truth. When we are unable to visualize the substance hidden under the waves of modes, then we consider modes as primary and the substance as secondary. Similarly when in the tranquil ocean of the substance, the modes i.e. waves are quite then substance becomes primary and modes as secondary. Vedant's alternative is the second state of tranquil ocean while of Buddhists is the ocean with lots of waves. Both of them are contained in the doctrine of *Anekānta*.

*Aparyayaṅ vastu samasyamānadravyametacca vivicyamānaṅ;
ādeśabhedoditasaptabhaṅga madīdyaśastvaṅ budhrūpavaidham.
“Anyayogavyavacchededwātriṅśikā”*

When our cognitive alternative tends to be unifying then we find the substance and mode gets lost in the background; and when the same is discriminative then the mode appears and the substance disappears in the background. During the period when *Anekānta* doctrine was being established on a firm footing, certain rules of concomitance were firmed resulting in the acceptance of the fact 'that substance without mode and mode without substance cannot exist' as explained below:

*Pijayvijudaṅ davvaṅ davvavijuttā ya piyayā ṇatthi;
Doṅhaṅ aṅaṅabhūdaṅ bhāvaṅ samaṅā parūviṅti Pacāstikāya gāthā 12.*

There is not much distance between true. There is no bifurcation like one alternative is true and other is false; and that both are false if we accept that universal is independent of particular and particular is independent of universal. Both become true when they are both considered relative to each other. Similarly both become false when they start rejecting each other and become true when each starts talking of its subject/ domain.

1.2 Nature of universal in Sāṅkhya philosophy and its review:

Sāṅkhya philosophy talks of 25 basic elements constituting this universe. 23 basic elements are created from *prakṛtī* - *mahat* - *ahaṅkāra* (ego) - sixteen (five *karmaindris*, 5 *jñānedris*, mind and 5 *tanmātrās*) and from five *tanmātrās*- five *bhūtas* totaling 24 along with *purūsa* as the 25th basic element. Further *purūsa* is inert, void of knowledge, eternal, all pervasive but sentient. This *purūsa* element is many in number and independent of each other and other types of basic elements. *Prakṛtī* is active i.e. transforming continuously and eternal. In this i.e. *prakṛtī* one state is transformed and contained into other. This *prakṛtī* is one and with three main attributes, universal, object and transforms into *mahat* etc as its deformations (*vikāra*) as indicated in Sāṅkhyakārikā:

*Triguṅātmka viśaya 's sāmānyamacetanaṅ prasadharmi;
Vyaktta tathā pradhānaṅ tadviparītastathā ca pumān.*

Sāṅkhya has emphasized more on *prakṛtī* which is universal in nature. They recognize *purūsa* but they consider it like *puṣkara palāsa* and cannot be bonded or mixed with anything nor can it achieve *mokṣa*. Bondage and liberation both take place only of *prakṛtī*.

Attributes, whether explicable or not are of three types namely *satva*, *raja* and *tama* and they have no knowledge of either *purūsa* or *prakṛtī*. These attributes are universal, enjoyed by *purūsa* and are insentient. Their nature is creation. Characteristics of *purūsa* are different from these. *Purūsa* does not have these three attributes, has the power to discriminate and is not enjoyed by anything, is sentient and particular; its nature is not to create anything. *Purūsa* is without parts, eternal, inert, independent and all pervasive. Specifying these differences between the two basic elements, Sāṅkhya philosophers cannot explain the logic of administration of basic elements and the world. Sāṅkhya philosopher's thinking can be justified if they consider:

- lack of similarity (*anyonyābhāva* like differences in wheat and gram) between explicable and inexplicable as the nature of explicable and inexplicable;

- ii. irreversible lack of similarity (*atyantābhāva* like the difference in *jīva* and *ajīva* or sentient and insentient) between *prakṛtī* and *purūṣa* as the nature of *prakṛtī* and *purūṣa*;
- iii. intellect as the cause of development of intellect (*prāgābhāva* like the difference in cotton plant and cotton) and
- iv. *pancamāhābhūta* as past form of *tanmātrā* (*pradhvansābhāva* like milk of curd).

This is so as non-existence (*abhāva*) is not an independent object as considered by Naiyāyika. But to consider absence of one object as the nature of another object (like absence of pitcher in the sand) by Sāṅkhya is not tenable. Similarly if we consider substance as just without modes, then one objects will become omnipresent (all pervasive) and hence there will be no difference between *purūṣa* and *prakṛtī* due to their commonality from existence view.

1.3 Nature of Universal in Vedānta and its review : According to Vedānta philosophers Bṛhma is the sole existent. They do not reject pitcher, cloth etc from any organ of knowledge; however they say that the means used, by those believing in differences in existence (*bhedvādi*) in the universe, are full of flaws and hence the particulars get rejected themselves. *Bhedvādi* consider multiplicity of causes is the basis of multiplicity of effects but Vedānta philosophers do not think so. They say that those who believe in multiplicity of objects on the basis of different types of cognition/ knowledge are not right as start imagining differences in one object only due to our own intentions/ thinking. This is explained as follows:

*Yathā viśudhamākāśaṁ timiropapluto nara'
 Saṅkirṇamiva mātṛābhibhirnnārābhimanyate
 Tathedamamalaṁ bṛham nirvikalpamavidhyaya
 Kaluṣatvamivāpannaṁ bhedarūpaṁ prapaśyati. Vṛhadā bhā vā 3/5/43-44*

A person suffering from cataract sees many types of coloured lines in the sky even if it is pure and clear. Similarly an ignorant person sees Bṛham, which is without any differences and is just pure, in many and tainted forms.

Vedānti's statement i.e. there is only one element which is all pervasive and incomparable known as Bṛham does not appear logical. Everybody realizes the existence of pitcher, cloth etc as different objects around us. If such objects are not different from Bṛham then what is the means of proving their identity with him? Are these objects the forms or nature or creations of Bṛham? These will lead us to accept that these means (*sādhana*) are same as the object (Bṛham) otherwise we have to believe in the duality of existence (*dvaitvāda*). Further if means and the object or end are same then differentiating between means and the object being not possible will negate the theory of solitary element of existence i.e. Bṛham. The inference that all objects are contained in Bṛham because they are just like imaginations (like the forms of Bṛham) also does not prove the existence of just Bṛhma. Further if we accept that place of existence (*prakṣa*), reason (*hetū*) and example are different, and then it is essential to accept duality of existence else how can they be the means to accept the existence of Bṛham. The same is true of the validity of canonical literature (*āgama pramāṇa*). Vedānta philosophy says:

*ūrṇavābha evāñśūnāṅ candrakānta evāñbhasām;
 pārohāṅāmiva prakṣa'sa hetu'sarvajanminām.*

Like the pier is the cause of its web, *candrakāntmaṇi* is the cause of water and tree is the cause of its branches; so is Bṛham the cause of creation of all living beings. Similarly proving existence of Bṛham from the canonical literature will cause the same problem whether *āgama* is different from Bṛham or not. If we postulate that the two are different then we accept duality of existence; if we consider them as same then the concept of means and end / object cannot be justified. Thus existence of just Bṛham cannot be proved by any valid organs of knowledge (direct, inference, canonical literature etc.) and in the absence of any *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), accepting existence of any object is not possible. However if we accept the self proving of sole existence of Bṛham, then the existence of objects experienced or *Anekānta* doctrine etc. will also be proven automatically. Therefore the sole existence of Bṛham is not proved by any valid organ of knowledge.

Nature of the universal in Buddhist philosophy and its review.

In Buddhist philosophy we find a special concept of the universal object i.e. it an imaginary object. They consider two types of real namely transcendental (*pārmārthika*) and imaginary (*saṁvṛtti*). Cognition of the momentary-ness is called the transcendental truth and 'this is that' type of comparisons is imaginary truth. Thus they consider

universal as imaginary or unreal truth. They do not consider cow-ness, human-ness etc as real objects. Human beings are different from non human beings; as they perform similar activities we have accepted existence of something called human-ness in them identifying their being considered as human beings. The same can be said about cows and other classes of similar objects. Thus we see that human-ness, cow-ness is something identified by them as universal. Buddhist philosophy talks of only two types of basic elements namely particular and general. Particulars are said to have their self-indications and these are called transcendental truth. They further say that except these particulars there is no other real element. This is universal and that is particular type of thinking and experience does not exist and without such thinking, differences in various objects cannot be established. Hence they say that the other indications of the universal identified by Jains; except cows, men, *khañdi*, *muñdi* etc. (i.e. classes of beings), do not exist.

Jains, on the other hand consider that the above analysis is incorrect as we cannot separate cow-ness and man-ness from cows and men as these (i.e. cow-ness and man-ness) reside only in cows and men and not anywhere else. If we consider non existence of such parts (like cow-ness in cows), then we have to accept non existence of particulars also. The feeling / experience of the form of any object in our thoughts cannot be rejected by any valid organ of knowledge. These stay at all times and places and not rejected by any valid organ of knowledge and assist (become the cause of) in our day to day life and behaviour. Hence the feelings or experiences of the forms and types of the object by our intellect prove the existence of universals in such objects.

The statement of Buddhists that 'due to non differentiation between universal and particulars by the intellect, there is no real universal except the particulars' is also not correct. Attributes like touch, taste, smell etc residing in the same object are also differentiated by the intellect only. If attributes which are the subjects of the sense organ eye only (e.g. colours like white, black, brown etc) and residing in different objects of the same type like say cows are cognized as different, with different colours are considered same as they are the subjects of cognition by the same sense organ; then we will have to accept attributes like temperature, weight, hardness etc. same as they are all the subjects of the sense organ touch / body. Hence experiencing the differences everywhere is the cause of the existence of differences / particulars.

Intuition of the similarities of the objects and experience of the particulars in them proves the independent existence of universals and specifics. Intuition of universals cannot take place without the existence of external causes like cow-ness in cows. Extra ordinary and special persons also cannot be the cause of this intuition of universal as they can make us experience the particulars only. To reject universal as not like that (*atadvyāvṛtti*) or as the other cause (*atatkāryakāraṇa*) is also not logical; as universal's transformation going on continuously like *khañdi*, *muñdi* etc in the cows will result in the rejecting the cow-ness (*agavyāvṛtti*) and as other cause (*atatkāryakāraṇa*) in them. By *atatkāryakāraṇavṛtti* is meant rejecting the living beings like horse etc as the cause of other living beings like cows; i.e. horses are neither a cause nor an effect of the cows. Buddhists consider existence of *atatkāryakāraṇavṛtti* in cows; but this cannot be so without the existence of the universal cow-ness in them. If the new part of the object can be without the universal part then we will have to reject the part without particular also. Hence it is essential for Buddhists to accept the universal of the object as the basis of experience/ feeling. Thus we tried to reject the Buddhist concept of universal as imaginary truth and accept it as their transcendental truth.

According to Jains, it is not correct to differentiate between universal and the indication of the object itself. If we analyze the construct of the word *svalakṣaṇa*, as '*svaṅ asādhāraṇaṅ lakṣaṇaṅ yasyeti salakṣaṇaṅ*', meaning 'like the particular is associated with its peculiar indication to produce the resultant differentiation, so is the universal is associated with its peculiar indication to produce the resultant similarities'. Hence there is no difference between them due to their own peculiar indications. Like rejecting the particulars the knowledge transforms; so also it transforms to accept the universals. Like in activities like milking, carrying the luggage etc by the cows is not sustainable by universal alone but is possible only when we consider cow as an amalgam of universal cum specific. Therefore from the viewpoint of transformation, there is no difference between universal and specific. Besides it is also not correct that universal and specific are existent independently as proposed by Naiyāyika. Hence particular / specific without universal is like a flower in the sky as said in the following verse;

Nirviśeṣaṅ hi sāmānyaṅ bhavecchaśaviṣṇavat;
Sāmānyarahitatvācca viśeṣastadvadeva hi. Ā. Pa. śloka

1.4 Naiyāyik- vaiśeṣika philosophers views on universal and its review:

Universal is defines as an entity due to which we develop a feeling of similarity between two objects; e.g. cow-ness, human-ness etc are called universals. Universal is eternal, one, all pervasive, inert and indivisible. In Kārikāvali it is said:

*Sāmānyaṅ dvividhaṅ prokṭtaṅ paraṅ cāparameva ca;
Dravyāditrikavratistū sattā paratyocyate;
Parabhinnā ca yā jāti' saivāparatayocyate;
Dravyatvādika jātistū parāparatyocyate*

Kārikā 8,9

Universal is of two kinds namely *para-sāmānya* and *apara-sāmānya*. Existence and existent are the *para-sāmānya* and cow-ness, human-ness, substantiality, *gūṇatva* and *karmatva* are the *apara-sāmānya*. Cow-ness is not created at the time of the birth of a cow nor is it destroyed at the time of cow's death as it is eternal. Cow-ness is just one, eternal and all pervasive and not many; and is present in all the cows and not that separate cow-ness exists in each cow separately. Because it is all pervasive, therefore it is inert and does not transform like in space (*ākāśa*). Universal is not divisible in parts i.e. it is without parts. Hence we can not imagine parts of the universal when it is considered as just one. These are the views of Naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikas.

The above views of Naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikas are not completely flawless. The above definition of universal is correct but describing it as just one, eternal and all pervasive does not appear logical. By treating universal as inert and eternal, we reject its capability of its being actively involved or being transformed in other objects/entities. An entity which is eternal can neither transform step by step sequentially nor simultaneously as a whole as an entity which does not transform itself is not called an object. If the cow-ness universal is one and all pervasive, then how is it found only in different cows and not at other places where we do not see cows? Further this universal called cow-ness whether it exists only as apart in each cow or as whole in each cow? If the cow-ness universal is just one and is found as whole in one cow, then how is it present in other cows? Similarly we cannot accept the universal to be consisting of parts and they claim that it exists in parts in different cows.

Yogo (Naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikas) consider universal and specific to separate and different i.e. cow and cow-ness are separate and another entity called *samvāya* causes the cow and cow-ness to be bonded to each other. But it is not logical to consider universal and specific to be separate. The fact is that universal and separate are not separate but are always co-existent. The views of Naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikas that universal is one, inert, eternal and all pervasive had been strongly refuted by Buddhist philosophers, especially Dharmakīrti logically and Yogo find it impossible to refute this. Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārtika* says:

*Na jāti na ca tatrāsīdasti paścānna cāsavat;
Jāti pūrvamādhāramaho vyasanasantati'*

This verse means, "From where does the universal cow-ness come when a cow is born? This cow-ness cannot come from any other place or from any other cow as they consider it inert. The logic that the universal cow-ness was already existing there is not correct as nothing can exist without a base/ foundation. The universal cow-ness can be born at the time of the birth of the cow because universal is eternal; it cannot come from another cow partially as the universal is not divisible and is one; the universal cow-ness cannot leave the first cow completely and come to this cow as the first cow will become without cow-ness. Hence it is logical to consider that similar universals, like similar specifics, are different in each cow. Hence the logic presented by Yogo that universal is one, all pervasive and eternal is not tenable and hence better be rejected."

Vaiśeṣika's consider specific as a separate substance. Due to this doctrine they are famous as vaiśeṣikas. Specific is eternal and many. Specific exists in permanent objects. Purpose of this specific in a an object is to provide unique identity to the object. All *paramāṇus* of earth are similar and yet each *paramāṇu* of the earth is different from the other *paramāṇu* as a different specific exists in each *paramāṇu*. Hence each *paramāṇu* appears different. Similarly all souls are similar but existence of different specific in each makes each one appear as different. The same is true of mind and other objects. A peculiar quality of the specific is that each specific is rejected (distinguished) from the other specific and hence they are mutually different from each other. This means that the logic that a specific is a

separate substance to prove differences in different *paramāṇus* is not necessary to prove differences in different specifics themselves as one specific is by nature different from another specific.

Vaiśeṣika's consider specific as a separate substance also is not tenable as there is no valid means of proving it. It is also not correct to say that specific exists only in permanent substances as there is no substance which is permanent. All substances are partially temporary and partially permanent. All eternal substances, like *paramāṇus* etc stay in their own nature (which is different from other substances). Due to their nature, they themselves associate or dissociate with other substances and hence there is no need to consider existence of a separate substance for distinguishing between different specifics. Vaiśeṣikas themselves have agreed it as unnecessary to consider existence of a separate substance called specific in different objects and one specific is rejected / differentiated from the other specific automatically. Hence there should be no objection in accepting that different substances like soul can, due to their own nature, associate or reject other substances themselves. Hence to imagine a separate substance like *saṃvāya* for cognizing intra class differences (like between different *paramāṇus* or different souls) is not logical. Only the existence of concurrence or co-existence can establish the differences between universal and specific. This is supported by the figurative viewpoint of Jains. This viewpoint supports evolutionary nature and contains both universal and specific as its component entities. It helps in cognizing a part of the substance which is both universal and specific. Jains do not accept Kanāda's viewpoint that universal and specific are both independent entities as universal without specific and specific without universal cannot be explained or experienced. Both of these are the attributes of an entity/ object. Similarities between two objects in some parts and dissimilarities between the other parts of the same objects are due to universal and specific attributes of these two substances. Only universal / similarities or specifics / dissimilarities is not possible. Accordingly *ācārya* Hemcandra says:

*Svatoanuvṛttivyativṛttivṛttibhāḥ bhāvāntaraneyarūpa’;
Parāmatattvādatathātmatatvād dvayaṅ vadantoakuśalā’ skhalanti.*

An object which is both universal and specific can be cognized only with a valid organ of knowledge. An indivisible object is the subject of *pramāṇa* and a part of the same object is the subject of viewpoint (*naya*). Figurative viewpoint is the way of knowing many parts of the same object but it is still not a *pramāṇa*. In *pramāṇa* all attributes of the object get the same status or consideration while in *naya*, one attribute becomes the primary and the others become secondary. Hence in this doctrine i.e. *naya* when universal is primary, specific becomes secondary and when specific becomes primary, universal becomes secondary. So universal without specific and specific without universal cannot exist in any object.

*sāmaṇa aha visese davve ṇāṇaṅ havei aviroho;
sāhae taṅ sammataṅ pahu puṇa taṅ tassa vivariyaṅ.*

Cognition of a substance, which is with universal and specific, without any doubts results in the right knowledge; any other type of cognition does not result in right knowledge.

sāmānyaviśeṣāt mā tadārtho viśaya’. Parikṣāmukha 4/1

i.e. an object which is with universal and specific attributes is the subject of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

An object which is with universal and specific attributes is the subject of valid knowledge. That is an object which has both universal and specific as its foundation. Use of both universal and specific either singly or together but independent of each other cannot be accepted (or are rejected) by valid knowledge.

1.6 Kinds of existent in Jain philosophy

Every object has two types of existences namely

- i. existence in its own nature (*swarūpāstitva*)
- ii. existence like similar objects (*sādraśyāstitva*)

Swarūpāstitva provides unique identity to the object which differentiates it from other objects belonging to similar or dissimilar classes of objects. Due to it only various modes of the object keep themselves different from the modes of other objects. Further it assists the object to maintain its identity over a period of time in all of its modes and keeps it aloof from other objects. *swarūpāstitva* is also called vertical universal or *urghavtā sāmānya*. This is called

the substance as it flows through its serial modes i.e. results in its generations. Differences between Buddhists *sañtati* (generation) and *swarūpāsītva* are enumerated below.

1.6.1 *Swarūpāsītva and santāna*

Like Jains define *swarūpāsītva* as substance or permanence; Buddhists talk of *santāna* (offspring or child) but in it no permanent part exists which is carried forward as unchanged from one momentary mode to the next mode. If we say that that some part of the object changes and some do not change from mode to mode, then all the problems associated with proposing object as either eternal or momentary will surface and not tenable. By accepting a little concomitance of changing and unchanging parts; we find that no part of the object can exist which is not transformed else concomitance theory of both parts will fail. Hence we have to find a solution i.e. either the object is eternal or it is momentary i.e. a sentient object can transform into an insentient object also. Between these two untenable extremes is the concept of substance (*dravya*) which is neither totally not transformable nor does it transforms to the extent that it loses its substantiality and transforms itself into other objects of the same or different class.

In simple words, permanence is defined by Jains as 'retention of its identity from other similar or dissimilar objects even when it is transforming continuously'. This *swarūpāsītva* is the substance, permanence or attribute (*guṇa*). Functionality of *santāna* as defined by Buddhists is also the same. *Santāna* at any fixed moment is the material cause of the object's mode the next moment and not of any other object of same or different classes. This means that due to *santāna*, a sentient momentary object/mode is the material cause of its next momentary mode or existence and not any other sentient or insentient objects. This metaphysical analysis leads us to conclude that there is no difference between the cause and effect of substance and *santāna*. The only difference is in the terminology. Buddhists call this *santāna* as a row or *mṛṣā* due to its functioning like the rows or columns in the army as indicated in *Bodhicaryāvatā*; '*santāna*' *samudātaśa padintasenādīvanmṛṣā*'.

Consider ten men standing in a row and the collection of these ten men and the horses with them is called the army. Even though no separate substance like army exists yet these collectively behave like an army. Similarly existence of *santāna* which helps transformation from one mode to the next is unreal. Thus the nature of *santāna* is different from substance as proposed by Jains which is not an imagination of some one but is real like the moment itself. Like ten persons standing in a row have each independent existence without existence of the independent and real element called row, similarly *swarūpāsītva* found in serial modes of an object is not imaginary but a transcendental reality. *Mṛṣā* cannot be the basis of practical or day to day life as without a metaphysical *swarūpāsītva* a series of modes cannot exist without their falling apart in different objects. In the doctrine of the rows in the army, a person in a row can, at his sweet will, get out of the row and behave differently but no mode, no matter how much it wishes, can leave the sequence and move to different positions even in the series.

1.6.2 Untenability of *Santāna*.

We realize the hollowness of the concept of *santāna* of Buddhists when they talk of *nirvāṇa* or emancipation. When they talk of the death or disappearance of the *santāna* of sentiency, i.e. in *nirvāṇa*, the *citta* or sentiency gets destroyed making *citta* a long term series of sentient modes but has neither identity of its own and nor is eternal. But this logic of destruction of an independent object is neither tenable nor experienced. Even though Buddha kept the subject of the nature of *nirvāṇa* as inexplicable; later *ācāryas* commented on enlightened *nirvāṇa* based on the same concept of *nirvāṇa* as enunciated before.

1.6.3 Untenability of *nirvāṇa*

When we talk of the end of *santāna* of sentiency in *nirvāṇa*, the entire logic of the working of the universe falls apart based on the concept of *santāna* and *mṛṣā*; as thinking of different stages of the results of actions, relations, bondage, *mokṣa*, memory and comparison etc. becomes baseless or is like building a house on temporary foundation. To imagine the *saṅskāra* of *karmavāsnā* in non-existent *santāna*, like imagining the colour differences in cottonseeds due to the *saṅskāra* of lac (*lākh*) in them for yielding the results cannot be accepted. By irrigating the cotton seed with the colours of *lākh*; *parmāṇus* of cottonseed have acquired new modes in the form of cotton plant and acquired the results of *saṅskāra* in the form of red colour. In this example we accept all objects / entities like cotton seed, *lākh* and modes as real and not *mṛṣā*. But *santāna* on which Buddhist wish to implant *saṅskāra* of *karmavāsnā* and make it enjoy its results (i.e. of *saṅskāra*); and considering that *santāna* as a row and then to believe its total destruction at the time of *nirvāṇa* cannot be accepted/imagined intelligently. Hence the only logical

and metaphysical nature of *nirvāṇa* is active sentience without influx of any type (*nirāśravacittotpādrupa*) as inferred in the verse of Tattvasaṅgraha (page 184):

*Cittameva hi saṁsāro rāgādikleśavāsitm;
Tadeva taivirnimurktaṁ bhavānta eti kathyate.*

i.e. *citta* soiled with attachment etc *kleśa* is the *saṁsāra* (universe) and *citta* without these *kleśas* is end of *saṁsāra* or emancipation / *nirvāṇa*. When the same soul (*citta*), in its empirical form, keeps on transforming continuously until it attains emancipation and becomes without any further influx, then its serial *santānas* cannot be said as unreal all the times. Thus transformation of the substance, existent in its own nature eternally, every moment into a mode cannot totally destroy the substance. This substance is permanent, *swarūpāstitva*. It is not imaginary but transcendental truth and is also called vertical universal (*urghva sāmānya*).

1.7 *Sādraśyāstitva* or existence of similarities.

Sādraśyāstitva causes the feeling of similarities between two different objects. This is also called *tiryaka sāmānya* (horizontal universal) or *sādraśya sāmānya*. It is not correct to imagine existence of one entity or universal like cow-ness or man-ness in a number of independently existing cows and men. They cannot be accepted as the combined modes of two dissimilar substances as two objects of extremely different spaces cannot be the material cause in one mode as the spontaneous reaction takes place only after receiving an indication. A person who develops a feeling of sameness amongst many persons after observing some common parts / features amongst them can only experience existence of man-ness amongst them (due to the existence of *sādraśya sāmānya* amongst them). Hence we should accept existence of *sādraśyāstitva* as the cause of similarities amongst different objects which is present to some extent in each object. Vertical universal or *swarūpāstitva* had been discussed earlier and so we accept two types of universal attributes.

1.7.1 Two specifics / particulars or *viśeṣa*

Similarly the part / component which cause the serial transformation from one mode to another in a substance is called particular / specific or *viśeṣa*. Specific / particular or *viśeṣa* cause the feeling of difference between two objects is called *vyatireka-viśeṣa*. This implies that the feeling of same in two modes of an object is due to vertical universal while the feeling of difference (like aging) in the same object is due to *viśeṣa* called *paryāya* or mode as indicated in Parīkṣamukha, '*Parāparavivartavyāpi dravyamūrghvatāmṛdiva sthāsādiṣu, ekasmin dravye kṛmbhāvina' pariṇāmā' paryāyā ātmani harṣaviśādādivat.*' Further the feeling of sameness in two different objects is due to vertical-universal attribute and the feeling of differences amongst them is due to *vyatireka-viśeṣa*. This is explained in Parīkṣamukha as follows:

*sadṛśpariṇāma stiyark khandamundādiṣu gotvavat;
arth āntaragūto visadṛśpariṇāmo vyatireko gomahiṣādivat.*

1.8 Universal cum specific attributes i.e. substance with modes.

Hence every object in this universe is with universal and specific attributes. This is the nature of the substance by which the part causing the feeling of sameness in an object is universal and the part which is the cause the feeling of differences in the same is called specific. These relate to the horizontal universal and *vyatireka-viśeṣa* respectively. Origination-destruction-permanence in an object relates to transformation in the object. The permanence component of the substance relates to vertical universal and the origination-destruction to *viśeṣa* called mode or *paryāya*. Past being the material cause of present and present being the material cause of future proves that the three moments are tied to the inseparable cause-effect-cause sequence. Existence of this combination of universal and specific attributes in an object is the indication of the existence of infinite attributes in the object.

Even though expression of the horizontal universal or *sādraśyāstitva* is relative to other objects, yet all objects are independent and separate. Object is neither just with universal nor just with specific attributes. If we say that the object is with just vertical universal only, then it will at all times have one effect without its changing or activity with others i.e. it will become inert. We will then not be able to explain any activity in the universe in the absence of transformation in the object. Feeling and understanding the doctrine of bondage-liberation or merit-demerit etc. will all fall apart. Hence we have to accept transformation/changes taking place in all objects. We see daily how a child grows and learns like a moon in its ascending cycle. If the object is inert and eternal and no transformation is serial or

simultaneous will be possible resulting in a question mark on its very existence. Similarly if we consider the object as just specific/particular like mode only i.e. just momentary or the part has no relation to the present moment or to future moment; then practices like teacher – disciple, give and take and logics like bondage and emancipation etc will cease. There will not be any cause-effect and activity /transformation of the object bringing all that we see and do to a standstill. Hence it is essential that we accept the object with vertical-universal and mode-specific/particular as its coexistent parts. Siddha Sena has accordingly written in Sanmati as follows:

*sāmaññammi viseso visesapakkhe ya vaya ṇaviṇveso;
dāvva pariṇāmamaññañ dāei tayañ ca vāyamāṇo;
eḡaṇṭaṇṇivvissañ eḡaṇṭavivesesiyañ ca vāyamāṇo;
dāvvaṣṣa pajjave hi dāvviyañ ṇitattei.*

i.e. using specific along with universal and universal along with specific indicates universal i.e. substance as different from the results of its transformation and relates the specific or mode to the universal or substance. Those who talk just of substance tend to separate it from its mode and those who talk of just modes tend to separate it from the substance. All our experiences are cognitive. Lack of doubts about the experience is the test of the knowledge being valid. Valid knowledge is the only way to establish the nature of the object.

Real, substance etc general experience always relate them to their particular / specific form; e.g. earth, pitcher etc are all associated with the universal (i.e. earth) and it is unquestionable. Hence we must accept along with universal there is the particular of the object also and that particular is not different from its universal i.e. universal and specific are coexistent. Thus the object appears to be of evolutionary nature with both universal and specific as its inseparable parts. If the universal exists without the particular, based on the experience of just universal, we have to forget the experience of particulars. As a result we have to call bangles, ear rings, necklace etc as just gold but such thinking or verbal expression is neither seen nor experienced. On the contrary we experience and express verbally universal and specific together like gold bangle or gold necklace and so on. This proves that universal and specific even though different are still inseparable and coexistent.

Exercises

Essay type questions:

1. Describe the universal-specific-ness of an entity as per Jain philosophy.

Short notes type questions

1. Explain the nature of reality as per Vedānta philosophy
2. Explain the Buddhist view on specifics vis a vis Jain views.

Short questions on the topic

1. What is the basis of different views on the reality?
2. Which type of basic element (*tattva*) emphasized in Sāṅkhya philosophy?
3. How many of kinds reality are discussed in Buddhist philosophy?
4. What is the nature of universal in Naiyāyik- vaiśeṣika philosophy?
5. How many types of existence are discussed in Jain philosophy?
6. What is the subject of *pramāṇa* and *naya*?
7. *Svarūpāstitva* of Jain philosophy is company with which type of existence in Buddhist philosophy?
8. What is *saṁsāra* and emancipation in Buddhist philosophy?
9. What is vertical generality?
10. What is the validity (*pramāṇa*) of knowledge?

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Anekānta-Naya, Nikṣepa, Syādvāda

Unit – 3 Lesson – 8

Origination, Destruction and Permanence; *Utpāda Vyaya Dhrauvya*

Objective:

All substances / entities which are with origination-destruction and permanence as their nature keep on going through transformation in its attributes along with the passage of time. Permanence has been given a special place in Jain thinking. Origination- destruction and permanence in Jain philosophy are called the co-existent trio in every substance. In this lesson w shall we shall study the following topics.

- 1.0 Foreword
 - 1.1 Explaining the nature of origination –destruction and permanence.
 - 1.2 Origination etc. are caused by themselves or dependent on others?
- 2.0 Analysis of *Naya* doctrine by Siddha Sena.
 - 2.1 Concomitance between origination –destruction and permanence.
 - 2.2 Logical explanation of origination etc. and its utility.
- 3.0 Summarizing the analysis
- 4.0 Identicality cum difference in origination –destruction and permanence

1.0 Foreword

Jain philosophy is the proponent of *Anekāntavāda* or the doctrine of multiple viewpoints/ poly-endism. *Anekāntavāda* is based on the co-existence of many mutually opposing attributes in all substances. Further it believes that every substance goes through transformation continuously. Transformation has three parts namely origination, destruction and permanence. Co-existence of origination-destruction and permanence is called *sat* / real. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra had the capacity to directly visualize / know the real / *sat* completely. Hence he used to give sermons of the right/ truth. He was asked, “*Bhaṛite!* What is the *tattva* /real?” Bhagavāna Mahāvīra replied, “An entity originates, is destroyed and continues to maintain its permanence.” In a logical sense it can be said that when a new mode originates in a substance, its old mode is destroyed at the same time. In spite of origination and destruction, the fundamental nature of the substance continues to exist all the time. In *Sthānaī* sutra, the trio of origination, destruction and permanence is called as the basic alphabets (*mātramuyoga pada*) of Jain metaphysics like alphabets of any language.

1.1 Explaining the nature of origination –destruction and permanence.

An entity originates as well as gets destroyed. Here origination and destruction are the indications of the change of the mode of the entity. Basic nature of the entity is permanence or eternal. This is an indication of non transformation or non changing aspect of its existence. In Bhagawati Sutra, it is stated, ‘*Athire palottai thire no palottai.*’ The temporary part of the entity goes through transformation and the permanent part does not go through the transformation. It is to be observed that no substance, be sentient or insentient, is completely destroyed. Water in a pond gets dried during summer. This does not mean that the water of the pond is completely destroyed. It only means that the matter particles of water are converted into matter particles of vapour due to intense heat. In other words it can be said that the water is destroyed and vapours are originated. Actually what we call as the origination or destruction of an entity is in fact just the change in its form. For example, when coal is burnt, it has residual ash but the coal is totally destroyed as parts of it gets mixed with oxygen in the air to yield Carbonic acid gas and some parts are left as ash. In every entity, therefore even with origination and destruction, its permanent parts always exist. Thus permanence is an indication of non change in a changing entity and of similarity in dissimilar /different entities.

Co-existence or the combined existence of origination–destruction and permanence is called substance. An entity is called substance only when it is real. Buddhist philosophers consider real as only changing / temporary while Vedānta philosophers is just permanent or eternal only. Jain philosophy considers real as evolutionary i.e. it is both permanent and temporary. Origination and destruction are the indication of temporary nature and permanence is the indication of its eternal nature. Vācaka UmāSwāti also calls the combined existence or origination – destruction-

permanence as substance. Kunda Kunda also has defined the substance accordingly. While defining origination, destruction and permanence, Pūjya Pāda says_

Sentient and insentient substances never leave their inherent nature, still acquisition of new modes by them continuously due to internal and external causes is called as origination, e.g. transformation of a lump of soil into a pitcher is the and origination of the pitcher. Disappearance of the old state is called destruction e.g. origination of the pitcher indicates the destruction of the form of the lump of soil. Permanence means the eternal and evolutionary nature. Sentiency of *jīva* and in-sentiency of *ajīva* are eternal as they can neither originate nor get destroyed. Similarly any *tattva* real which goes through two modes is permanent e.g. soil in both lump form and pitcher always exist.

1.2 Origination etc. are caused by themselves or dependent on others?

Origination etc. are considered as to be caused both by themselves as well as by others. Transformation in substances like *dharma*, *adharmā*, *ākāśa* and pure soul (of the form of *artha paryāya*) is caused by the substance itself. In gross objects, the transformation is caused by the other entities. This explains the Jain thinking that transformation is essential in all types of substances, be they in-sentient, sentient, subtle or gross. Hence the essentiality of origination – destruction-permanence coexisting in all substances is explained in Jain philosophy.

2.0 Analysis of *Naya* doctrine by Siddha Sena.

Siddha Sena Diwākara, like Kunda Kunda and Umā Swāī, accepted the nature of substance as with origination –destruction and permanence but he used the *naya* doctrine to explain this trio of existence. This explanation is not only unique but is also original in the literature. He says-

*Uppajjanti viyaṅti ya bhāvā ṇiyameṇa pajjanayussa
davvaṅṅhiyassa savvaṅ sayā aṇuppannamaviṅṅhaṅ
davvaṅ pajjaviuttā ya pajjavā ṇatthi
uppāyṅṅhī – bhaṅā haṅḍi daviyalakkhaṅṅāṅ eyaṅ*

From the mode viewpoint, all objects, as a rule, get originated and destroyed. Substance viewpoint looks at the permanence aspects of the substance. Hence from substance viewpoint, all objects are without origination and destruction. Substance does not exist modes which are with origination and destruction and no mode exists without a permanent part of the substance. Hence together origination-destruction and permanence form the indication of real (substance).

Ācārya Samant Bhadra, like Siddha Sena, has accepted specific attributes or the modes as the basis of origination and destruction. He has explained the trio of origination – destruction- permanence through the following two examples.

1. One man wants a pitcher of gold. The second person wants a crown of gold. The third person wants just gold. The goldsmith melts the pitcher to make the crown. This annoys the first person while the second person feels happy. The third person stays happy in both the situations. Here the cause of sorrow, happiness and equanimity is destruction, origination and permanence respectively. Hence all entities are with the trio as their nature.
2. A person who takes a vow to just take milk does not eat curd on that day. Another person who takes a vow not to take milk eats just on that day. The third person, who takes a vow not to take dairy product (*gorasa*), does not eat curd and not drink milk on that day. This proves that the destruction of the mode milk results in the mode curd and in both of them the dairy product (*gorasa*) exists and hence it can be considered as permanent. Conclusively so, every object is with the trio of origination-destruction-permanence as its nature.

Here we can compare the trio of origination –destruction-permanence of an object vis a vis Mīmāṅsā and Yoga philosophies. In both these philosophies, this fact has been proven by the example of gold.

Cūrṅikāra Jina Dāsa Gaṅī has explained the concept of origination, destruction and permanence on both *jīva* and *ajīva* on their modes. A heavenly being is born as human being by destroying its heavenly mode and originating into human mode. Similarly destruction of the mode of a *parmāṇu* results in the origination of a two space points lump of matter without losing its nature (i.e. being matter or *pudgala*). An entity with infinite attributes can only become the subject of a *pramāṇa*. This trio is the basis of the infinite attributes of an entity.

2.1 Concomitance between origination –destruction and permanence.

Origination, destruction and permanence are closely and tightly coupled together. Absence of any one cannot stop the influence of the remaining two. Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya while proving the mutual co-existence of the trio says, 'There is concomitance in origination, destruction and permanence. Wherever there is concomitance between attributes, possibility of opposition to each other does not arise. Like mango-ness and tree are concomitant and coexist, similarly origination-destruction and permanence co-exist concomitantly'.

2.2 Logical explanation of origination etc. and its utility.

It is important to know here that discussion of origination, destruction and permanence exists in canonical literature. But critical analysis of these does not exist in them. This analysis is a later development due to the discussions by Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna and others. In the chapter Saṅskṛta Parīkṣā of Mādhyamika Kārikā, he condemns the characteristics of origination, destruction and permanence of an entity. The same discussions are also seen in later Buddhist literature also. Keeping such criticism in mind only, Jain ācāryas while using *Anekāntavāda*, logically proved the sustainability of the doctrine of origination-destruction and permanence of all entities.

3.0 Summarizing the analysis

Conclusively as per Jain philosophy, it can be said that substance, attributes and modes are all real and are with origination, destruction and permanence i.e. with three characteristics. Two forms of energy are always active in ever substance. Energy to originate results in the specific mode and the destruction energy destroys the specific mode. In spite of continuous origination and destruction of modes, the substance does not lose its substantiality. In brief this is the nature of the entity.

The nature of the entity as propagate by Jains is different from what is described by other philosophies. Buddhist philosophers consider the entity differently also. According to them, every entity is momentary only. Thus only origination and destruction only is the real / truth. Vedānta philosophers consider substance without modes as the only real. Sāṅkhya philosophers consider *prakṛti* as evolutionary real i.e. with origination-destruction and permanence and *puruṣa* as inert and eternal. Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider some *parmāṇus*, space, soul etc. as eternal while other entities like pitcher, cloth as just temporary with origination and destruction. Hence origination – destruction and permanence is the only sustainable nature of real and all entities.

4.0 Identicality cum difference in origination –destruction and permanence

Every object in the world is capable of going through transformation. Any real substance cannot be totally destroyed. Similarly just temporary substance cannot be originated / created. Not only this, all substances are eternally existence, nothing from them get totally destroyed or added in them. All basic elements which existed from times unmemorable will continue to exist for ever.

Every real object, even though being complete in it, continues to go through transformation every moment. Even while every entity is permanent in its basic nature, yet the continuous series of origination and destruction of its modes goes on for ever.

Here the question arises as to the relationship which exists between origination, destruction and permanence. Whether all these three exist together or serially? Is the time of their existence same or different?

Umā Swāmi through its sutra '*utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktāḥ sat*' was the first to establish the nature of the real, but he also did not elaborate about the nature of the relationship existing between them. Kunda Kunda established the relationship between them on the basis of concomitance. According to him, 'Till such time a new mode is created, the old mode cannot be destroyed. Similarly without the destruction of one mode, other mode cannot originate. Hence both of them i.e. origination and destruction have concomitance of their existence. Similarly he related permanence to them by saying that origination and destruction can take place only when we accept existence as permanent.'

Siddha Sena Diwākara explained the existent relationship between them using the doctrine of viewpoint (*naya*) as indicated in the following verses/*gāthās*.

*Tiṅṅi vi uppāyāi abhinnakālā ya bhinnakālā ya
Atthaṅtaraṅ aṅatthaṅtaraṅ ca daviyāhi ṅāyavvā*

*Jo āuaṅcaṅakālo so ceva pasāriyassa v ṇa jutto
Tesiṅ puṇa paḍivatti vigame kālaṅtaraṅ ṇatthi.*

The time of existence of origination, destruction and permanence is both different and same also. If we consider two sequential modes, then we can accept the timing of origination and destruction as same. The time when the first mode is destroyed, the second mode is simultaneously originated. At that also, the generic nature of the substance continues to exist also. Hence all three are co-existent.

If we consider the above with reference to one mode of the object only, then we have to accept their existence at different times. In serial modes, where the destruction time of the one mode is same as the origination time of the succeeding mode but with respect to one mode only, the origination and destruction times are different. Destruction time of soil and origination time of pitcher can be same but the origination and destruction time of just pitcher cannot be same. Similarly permanence time or existence time of one mode, like its origination and destruction times will also be different. This is explained by considering the series of time intervals when a particular mode originates, then at other time it exists and then at the third time it is destroyed in a serial manner. Hence the time of origination, destruction and existence of one mode being serial in nature are different.

Siddha Sena explained the above analysis through the example of bending and stretching of a finger. The time of bending and stretching of the finger cannot be same as bending and stretching are both different and mutually exclusive modes of the finger. But two serial modes do not have different times of their origination and destruction. Therefore the time at which the bending mode originates is the time of the destruction of the stretch mode of the finger and the finger exists in both of them. Thus through this example concomitance of the origination destruction and permanence is proved.

In the same example, if we just consider one mode i.e. stretching of the finger only, then the difference in all the three i.e. origination, destruction and permanence is obvious and is to be accepted. In the finger it is impossible that origination and destruction of its bending take place at the same time. In conclusion therefore all three exist at different times in the same mode.

Siddha Sena also established the identity cum difference between origination, destruction and permanence on the basis of the relationship between attributes and their owners. Substance is defined as the owner of attributes also as it is with origination, destruction and permanence as attributes/ characteristics. Attributes and characteristics are different from their owners. If we consider attributes and their owners as same, then both cannot exist as two entities, only one of them can exist and not both. Similarly characteristics and their owners are not always different. Characteristics always exist in an entity. Existence of characteristics separate from entity cannot be imagined. Hence they both are identical also. In conclusion therefore we can accept identity cum differences of attributes /characteristics and their owners.

Substance with origination –destruction and permanence is eternal for all the times. He explained this through the following example while talking about their identity cum difference.

One house is in the process of being built. The part of the house already built has been created (i.e. already originated) and the balance part is yet to be built / created proving the eternity of creation and destruction. To build the house, its parts like bricks, cement and mortar etc leave their independent existence. In this respect they lose or destroy their independent existence. So these parts, which have been used in the part of the house already built, have destroyed their existence in the creation of the house. In the part of the house yet to be built, independent existence of these parts is yet to be destroyed proving their eternal nature. On the same basis we can prove the eternal existence of the house itself.

Efforts made by Siddha Sena, to prove identity cum differences of origination, destruction and permanence, is indicative of his *Anekāntika* views. Impact of his explanation and use of *Anekānta* can be clearly seen in the later philosophical literature of Jains.

Āpta Mīmāṃsā is a honoured text by Ācārya Samanta Bhadra. It also uses the *Anekānta* doctrine also in more or less the same way as Siddha Sena uses in Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa. He has used permanence without origination and destruction in place of the generic attributes and origination and destruction in place of specific attributes

of the entity. He has also said that origination, destruction and permanence are identical and different as shown in the following verse.

***Kāryotpāda' kṣayo hetoniryamāllakṣaṇāt pṛathak
Na tau jātyādhavasthānādanpekṣā' khapuṣpavat***

Origination and destruction of an activity is due to a cause / reason. There is a rule of causation in origination and destruction. Cause of the origination of an activity also becomes the cause of the destruction of substance/ base. Cause for the destruction of the soil becomes the cause for the origination of the pitcher. Similarly cause of the destruction of the pitcher becomes the cause for the origination of the broken pieces of the pitcher. Thus sameness of the cause proves the identity of origination and destruction. Here it is to be noted that Nyāya Vaiśeṣika consider the causes of origination and destruction to be different, which is contrary to Jain view.

Thus origination and destruction are just same but they are different also. With reference to their nature, origination, destruction and permanence are different as their characteristics are different also. For example in a fruit, colour, taste and form etc are experienced differently, similarly origination, destruction and permanence are experienced differently also. In conclusion we can say that origination, destruction and permanence are mutually related, different as well as same and evolutionary at the same time.

Exercises

Essay type question:

1. Write an explanatory essay on *Utpāda Vyaya Dhrauvya*

Short notes type questions:

1. Explain the *naya* doctrine of Siddha Sena.
2. Explain the similarity and differences of *Utpāda Vyaya Dhrauvya*

Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. Where do we find the mention of *matṛānuyoga* ?
2. What is the meaning of permanence (*dhrauvya*)?
3., like Sidha Sena, has accepted specific attributes or the mode as the basis of origination and destruction ?
4. In after Nāgārjuna, we find condemnation of origination etc?
5. neither accepts only permanence nor only momentariness?
6. Every object in this world is
7. The of an object from the beginning till the end?
8. One house is in the process of being built
9. Substance can be said as
10. The conclusion is that all three i.e. origination, destruction and permanence are

Answers to the fill in the blanks questions.

1. Thānan sutra. 2. eternal nature of the substance. 3. Samant Bhadra 4. Buddhist texts
5. Jain philosophy 6. with the nature of transformation 7. time 8. house 9. object with attributes 10. relative

References

Sanmati Tarka Prakarṇa by Sidha Sena
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Author

Dr. Sādhvi Muditayaśā

Application of the doctrine of multiplicity of viewpoints -*Anekānta ki vyāptā*

Objective:

Anekānta is a principle / doctrine of Jain philosophy. It enables us to understand the true nature of an entity without any doubt. Therefore its application is all-pervasive. In this lesson we shall study the clear applicability of this doctrine on the following topics.

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Analysis of an entity's monistic or pluralistic nature. *Vastu ki ekāntatā aur anekāntatā ka vivecana*

3.0 Metaphysical analysis of monism and pluralism. *Tattva mīmāṃsā mein ekāntatā aur anekāntatā sambhava vivecana.*

1.0 Introduction

Indian culture is founded on spiritualism. One of the strong foundations of this is *Anekānta*. *Anekānta* provides clarity in our thinking and analysis. The thinking that, whatever I think is the only and complete truth eludes success from a man. Only that person is successful who tries to find the good / truth and accepts the same. This way we honour the ideas of others also without considering our own thinking as the only truth. *Anekānta* doctrine is therefore useful and applicable in all areas of activities, be they spiritual, ethical, political or social. The first step of spirituality is right faith / belief. *Ācārya* Siddha Sena in *Sanmati Prakarna* has the word *samyak darśana* / right belief for *Anekānta*. Substance viewpoint looks at the substance (generic attributes or permanence component of the entity) primarily while Mode viewpoint looks at the mode (changing aspects or temporary part of the entity). Both these viewpoints, if considered independently and separately, can never analyse the whole truth of an entity. Mutual relativity of both is right belief / faith and this is *Anekānta*. As long as a viewpoint continues to be monistic, it is false / *mithyā*. Vision or viewpoint becomes right only is right when it accepts or encompasses *Anekānta*.

Anekānta is an all-pervasive thought process. It is applicable on itself in a similar way as it is applied to other entities / events. While proving *Anekānta* as *anekāntamīca*, Siddha Sena writes-

*Bhayaṇā vi hu bhavivā jaha bhayaṇā bhayai savvadavvāiṅ
evaṅ bhayaṇā ṇiyamo vi hoī samayāviroheṇa.*

Anekānta establishes itself as *anekāntamīca* in a similar way as it establishes other entities *anekāntamīca*. Monism and Pluralism (*Anekānta*) are not mutually contradictory. They are evolutionary versions of *naya* and *pramāṇa* respectively. For example- *Ratnaprabhā pṛathvi* is a little bit (*syāt*) eternal and also a little bit (*syāt*) temporary represents the doctrine of *Anekānta*. From substance viewpoint, it is eternal only and from modal viewpoint, it is temporary only represent monism and hence false. By taking both these sentences as relative to each other they become mutually inclusive / associative. Hence *Anekānta* is only *anekāntamīca*. The word 'syāt' is the basic foundation of *Anekānta*. The word *syāt* is used both with *naya* and *pramāṇa*. In retrospective we can say that the word *syāt* is used both perspectives i.e. *Anekānta* and *Ekānta*. The same entity when described or thought in its completeness then it becomes an expression of *pramāṇa* or *Anekānta*; while the same object when described with a specific viewpoint only then it becomes an expression of *naya* or the *Ekānta* perspective.

Akalanika has further classified both *Anekānta* and *Ekānta* in two groups each. He wrote, 'We can think of two types of *Anekānta* relative to *pramāṇa* and *naya* i.e. i. Right *Anekānta* and ii. flawed / *mithyā Anekānta*'. Similarly *Ekānta* can be of two types namely i. Right *Ekānta* and ii. flawed / *mithyā Ekānta*. To accept multiple relative attributes in an entity based on logic and canonical literature is right *Anekānta*. Similarly to accept an entity based on independent multiple attributes on illogical or biases is flawed *Anekānta*. Talking of *Ekānta* in a similar manner, we say it right *Ekānta* if we take a *pramāṇa* view of all attributes as related to the entity and then consider just one of its attribute at a time for better understanding. To consider just one attribute of the many attributes of the entity as independent and representative of the entity completely is *mithyā Ekānta*.

2.0 Explanation of the *Anekāntatā* and *Ekāntatā* of the entity

Anekānta is itself *Anekāntica*. It is a collection of both *Anekānta* and *Ekānta*. While explaining this concept logically, it is said that considering *Anekānta* as just *Anekāntica* and no validity of *Ekānta*, then the collective existence of right *Ekāntas* than *Anekānta* as a collection of right *Ekāntas* will also get eliminated like a tree without its branches. If we consider *Anekānta* as *Ekāntica* then all the concomitant attributes of the entity will also get eliminated. Hence considering *Anekānta* in both *Anekānta* and *Ekānta* is logically correct. With reference to *Anekānta* and *Ekānta*, Akalaṅka has described the seven *bhaṅgas* as follows:

- i. Is little bit *Ekānta*
- ii. Is little bit *Anekānta*
- iii. is *Ekānta* and little bit *Anekānta*
- iv. Is little bit inexplicable
- v. Little bit *Ekānta* and little bit inexplicable
- vi. Little bit *Anekānta* and little bit inexplicable
- vii. Is little bit *Ekānta*, *Anekānta* and inexplicable as well.

The basis of the above *bhaṅgas* is basically the concept of relativity of *naya* and *pramāṇa*. Similarly the basis of *Anekāntatā* of *Anekānta* is the relativity of *naya* and *pramāṇa*. Thus all later Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara *ācāryas* have established and accepted the *Anekāntica* nature of *Anekānta* and its all-pervasive nature. We cannot ignore the impact of Siddha Sena on these *ācāryas*.

While presenting the all-pervasive nature *Anekānta*, he not only used the logic but also a number of examples. Logic is useful for linguists only while examples are good for linguists as well as common philosophers and laity.

We use *Anekānta* to understand and express the nature of an entity. There are two types of basic elements comprising the universe namely sentient and insentient. Some philosophers consider them as just different while others consider them as similar. Some say they are eternal while the others say they are momentary. Some say there is only entity while others say there are many. *Anekānta* thus considers all such options and tries to bring reconciliation amongst them and says that from generic viewpoint they are all similar permanent and one while from specific viewpoint they are also different, momentary and many. This can be considered as an example of the object of knowledge itself.

Similarly when *Anekānta* viewpoint looks at itself to explain its own nature, then it also becomes collection of many viewpoints but when viewed from a specific viewpoint it also becomes *Ekāntica*. It should be understood here that even that *Ekāntica* viewpoint should be based on the right or *pramāṇa* doctrine. Like the *Anekānta* viewpoint tries to guide us to protect ourselves from the common flawed propaganda of other *Ekāntica* views / philosophies; it also tells us to avoid using *Anekānta* viewpoint to insist on our *Ekāntica* viewpoint about Jain doctrines. Jain doctrine is *Anekāntica*; the follower of such a doctrine if used only *Ekāntica* viewpoint, then it may be grossly *Anekāntica* but becomes *Ekāntica* from metaphysical viewpoint. As a result it does not remain right or correct. As an example we can consider each and every description of knowledge and conduct as given in Jain philosophy.

3.0 Viewpoint based on metaphysical considerations about *Anekāntatā* and *Ekāntatā*

As per Jain metaphysics, we find six types of empirical souls based on their body types. From the point of view of right conduct, killing of living beings or violence is a cause of sin. Considering these two viewpoints independently will cause cessations of reality resulting in our lacking *Anekāntica* viewpoint. Living beings are of six types or there are only six types of bodies. In this discussion we lose track of the common attribute of living beings i.e. sentiency and we look at differences only. Hence earth bodied etc six types should not be considered as separate or independent we should also look at their common attribute i.e. sentiency to have completeness in our understanding of the living beings.

Similarly considering just killing of living beings as violence also causes the real doctrine getting lost as in some contexts killing of living beings is not considered as violence also. Some careless monk, even though he is cautious and tries his best to protect living beings, when unable to save a living being from dying, then the violence caused by him does not count as sin or killing also. Generally killing of living beings is violence and cannot be considered as non-violence. Hence killing of living beings in isolation is neither violence alone nor non-violence also. Violence and non-

violence, this combined form or togetherness of these viewpoints is in fact right vision or *samyagdr̥ṣṣgi*. Siddha Sena in his text Sanmati Tarka using *Anekāntica* viewpoint gives three examples as follows:

*gahaparigayaḥ gaī ceva kei ṇiyamena saviyamicchanti,
taḥ pi ya udgaīyan taha gaī annahā agāī .
gūṇaṇivvatiyasaṇṇā evaḥ dahaṇādao vi datthavvā,
jaḥ tū jahā padisiddhaḥ davvamadaṇvaḥ tahā hoī .
kūḥbho ṇa jīvadaviyaḥ jīvā vi ṇa hoi kūḥbhadaviyaḥ ti,
tamhā do vi adaviyaḥ aṇṇoṇṇavisesiyā hoṭti.*

1. When a person, who thinks with a broad or general view, sees an entity moving, then he presumes that the entity is in motion (in all directions). The same event when viewed in depth, then we realize that the above analysis is partially true. Any entity (straw in this case) does not move in all directions at the same time i.e. north, south, east, west, up and down etc. When it moves in upward direction, at that moment it cannot move in the downward direction also. It moves in one direction only at a time thus concluding that it is not in motion in other directions at that instance. Thus when we view an event in depth (details), then we say that both complete motion and rest at the same time cannot exist. Thus we see absence of the contradiction between the opposing states of motion and rest when viewed in a general (gross) state at an instance. An important basis of *Anekānta* is relativity of both motion and rest.
2. One of the synonyms (as per its nature) for fire is to burn (*dahana*) ‘*dahati eti dahana*’ i.e. the entity that burns is fire. Similarly synonym for air (*vāyu*) is *pavana*. ‘*pavati eti pavana*’ i.e. the entity that makes the bran fly and separate it from the grain is called *pavana* air. Thus the above analysis concludes that burning cannot become non-burning /cooling and motion cannot become rest/ no-motion. However detailed analysis brings forth the opposite; i.e. burning can be non-burning /cool and motion can be rest /no-motion also at the same time. Fire burns all entities and so is called a burner / *dahana*. However it is to be noted that fire can burn only combustible objects only. Substances like space, soul, *paramāṇū* etc. which are not combustible, cannot be burnt by fire. Hence fire being able to burn with respect to combustible entities, is also incapable of burning non-combustible entities at the same time. Thus burning and non-burning are both relative only. Similarly air can move general objects but cannot move a big mountain. Hence air is capable of both making things move as well as not move at the same time. Thus motion and rest are also relative.
3. *Jīva* /soul is an independent type of substance. Its existence is independent and so it is a conceptual entity. Similarly pitcher etc other matter objects have independent existences. Hence they are also conceptual objects. As per *Anekānta* doctrine all entities are both conceptual as well as physical i.e. non-conceptual at the same time. If we consider both the entities i.e. soul and pitcher, then we start asking if they are completely visible or experiential? Or are they different also? Main attribute of soul is sentiency or consciousness while those of matter are taste, touch, smell and colour. So the soul has sentiency existing in it but lacks attributes of matter i.e. taste, touch etc. Similarly pitcher has existence of attributes like taste, touch etc but lacks attribute of consciousness. Thus it is only logical to accept both existence and non-existence of attributes in any entity.

In conclusion, we have to admit that Siddha Sena has tried to present examples and logic of the all pervasive nature of *Anekānta* and put the Jain doctrine of *Anekānta* on firm footing before both Jain and non-Jain philosophers.

Exercises

Essay type questions:

1. Analyse the all-pervasive nature of *Anekānta* as per Siddha Sena Divākara?

Short notes type questions:

1. Explain briefly the types of *Anekānta* and *Ekānta*, as per Akalaṅka?
2. Explain briefly from the viewpoint of conduct, killing of living beings or violence is the casue of *adharmā* / sin

Fill in the blank type questions:

1. The first..... of spirituality is right belief.
2. *Anekānta* is an all-pervasive.....
3. *Anekānta* purifies our.....
4. The viewpoint / vision becomes right only when it includes.....
5. The word *syāt* is used both for..... and.....
6. Why is fire called burner *Idahana*?
7. When does *Anekānta* viewpoint/ vision describe its own nature?
8. As per Jain metaphysic, how many types of bodies of living beings are there?
9. In how many directions movement of an entity is possible at a time?
10. What is basis of *Anekāntmaktā* of *Anekānta*?

Answers to blank type questions

1. *Sopāna* (step),
2. Thinking method (*vicāra paddati*),
3. Thoughts;
4. *Anekānta*;
5. *naya* and *pramāṇa*
6. Fire burns entities and so it is called burner *Idahana*,
7. When it analyzes its object of knowledge (*prameya*);
8. Six;
9. Only one direction;
10. Basic difference of viewpoint (partial or total) between *naya* and *pramāṇa*

Reference texts

1. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa.
2. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa, a review study by Dr. Sadhvi Siddhaprajñā.

Author

Sadhvi Siddhaprajñā.

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Anekānta, Naya, Niksepa and syādavāda

Unit – 4 Lesson – 10

The sevenfold doctrine, its nature and parts-*Saptabhaṅgī kā Swarūpa evaṅ Bheda*

Saptabhaṅgī or sevenfold predicament is a specific doctrine of Jains to analyze, cognize and present / express the knowledge so cognized of the object. Using this doctrine, one can express any entity or its nature by using seen special types of sentences. Every sentence is relative and either affirmative or negative in nature. Shri Vimal Das in his book *Saptabhaṅgītarangiṇī* and Shri Bhikari Ram Yadav in his book *Syādavāda* and *Saptabhaṅgīnaya* have detailed this doctrine in a comparative and clear manner. We shall discuss the doctrine, nature of *Saptabhaṅgī* on the basis of these two books.

1.0 Nature of the sevenfold predicament:

Doctrines of *Anekānta* and *Syādavāda* accept the co-existence of infinite attributes of an entity. Accordingly they look at the duality of eternal-temporary like attributes coexisting in the entity and then describe them. An ordinary person will find it possible to comprehend the infinite attributes of the entity and describe them suitably. This is because his capability to cognize and then express are both limited. Therefore it becomes essential to separate out the desired attributes from the other infinite attributes of the entity. In such a situation, it becomes necessary to use a method so that the under attributes of the entity are not ignored or negated while describing the desired attributes. It is with this objective that Jain *ācāryas* have adopted the use of *Saptabhaṅgī* in their analysis and discussions of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

According to Jain *ācāryas*, *Saptabhaṅgī* is the doctrine, which is capable of expressing successfully the partial meaning (with respect to desired attribute). It is possible by using a special term 'syāt' which maintains the equanimity between the statement of an attribute and not negating the existence of other attributes at the same time. The term 'syāt' eliminates the doubt and uncertainty from the expressed relationship between an attribute and its owner and makes positive statement that a specific attribute belongs to a specific entity. It separates the desired attribute in its expression without negating the existence of other attributes in the entity. The term 'syāt' ensures that the existence of other undesired attributes are not negated in our statement.

In general, our language of expression is bound by the limits of positive/ IS (*asti*) and negative/ISNOT (*nāsti*). Any statement we make is either affirmative or negative. If we wish to cross the limits of affirmation and negation, then we have to use the term 'inexplicable (*avaktavya*)'. In this way affirmation, negation and inexplicable are the three forms used for expression. To ensure that there is no conflict in these three ways of expression, Jain *ācāryas* have devised the use of the term 'syāt' with each sentence. The permutation/combination of these three types of expression, namely affirmation-negation-inexplicability along with the use of term 'syāt' gives rise to seven types of sentences popularly known as *Saptabhaṅgī* in Jain texts.

Jain *ācāryas* have defined *Saptabhaṅgī* in different ways. *Tattvārthavārtika* describes *Saptabhaṅgī* as 'imagination of affirmation and negation in an entity without any doubt'. '*Praśnavasādekasmin vastunyahavirodhena vidhipratishedhaviḥkalpanā saptabhaṅgī*. (*Tattvārthavārtika* 1.6.5) i.e. keeping the inquisitiveness of the knowledge seeker in mind, the method of expressing (using the seven sentences) the suitable attribute of the entity without negating the existence of other attributes also is *Saptabhaṅgī*.

In *Pāncāstikāya*, it is stated that *Saptabhaṅgī* is the method of stating an entity based on one if its attribute using *Nayavākya* (sentence with individual view point) without opposing the statement of the entire entity using a *pramāṇvākya* (sentence with whole and valid statements of all attributes) '*ekasminnavirodhena pramāṇanayavākya*'. '*Sadādikālpāna yā ca Saptabhaṅgī sā matā*' (*Pāncāstikāya/ Tātparyavriti* verse 14 page 30). *Saptabhaṅgītarangiṇī* and *Nyāya Dīpikā* also call the collection of the seven sentences as *Saptabhaṅgī*. (*saptānāḥ bhaṅgānāḥ samāhāra* '*Saptabhaṅgī*' (*Saptabhaṅgītarangiṇī* page 10). *Saptabhaṅgī Naya Pradīpa Prakaraṇa* also defines *Saptabhaṅgī* similarly. It says 'using the affirmation and negation aspects of the intended meaning of the entity, collection of the sentences to express the same is *Saptabhaṅgī*. '*Vidhiniṣedhābhyāḥ svarthamabhisadhana*' '*saptabhaṅgīmanucchati*'. (*Saptabhaṅgī Naya Pradīpa Prakaraṇa* 13). Thus the followers of *Anekānta* have devised

a set of following seven sentences based on the principle of affirmation and negation as relative to described an attribute at a time of an entity (having infinite attributes).

1. *Syāt asti* imagine affirmation.
2. *Syāt nāsti* imagine negation.
3. *Syāt asti Syāt nāsti ca* imagine affirmation and negation at the same time.
4. *Syāt avaktavyaḥ* imagine inexplicability of simultaneous existence of both affirmation and negation.
5. *Syāt asti avaktavyaḥ* imagine affirmation and inexplicability of simultaneous affirmation –negation.
6. *Syāt nāsti avaktavyaḥ* imagine negation and inexplicability of simultaneous affirmation –negation.
7. *Syāt asti nāsti avaktavyaḥ* imagine inexplicability of sequentially as well as simultaneously affirmation and negation.

1.1 Nature of the first two types of sentences / predicaments

To express the existence of an entity, there are primarily two states of existence of any attribute in it, either first affirming its existence or the second negating its existence even though both states exist in relative terms. This is because when we express one specific attribute of an entity in affirmative manner then its opposite for example when we say that such an entity is red in colour, immediately it becomes clear that the entity is neither green nor yellow in colour. In this way both *asti* and *nāsti* always exist in the entity. Presence of both *asti* and *nāsti* create situation demanding their reconciliation (*samanvaya*). If both aspects do not present themselves before some one who acts as their reconciliation agent then the question of their reconciliation does not arise. Therefore it is essential for reconciliation that both aspects are present. In this way the doctrine of *Saptabhaṅgī* starts its development path based on *asti-nāsti* aspects.

1.2 Third and fourth predicaments (*bhaṅgas*) and their nature.

The first two *bhaṅgas* express an entity keeping *asti* or *nāsti* as the primary aspect of an attribute of the entity. But the third *bhaṅga* is the expression of the evolutionary (*ubhaya*) state of the entity. This implies the serial expression of both *asti* and *nāsti* of the attribute in the entity in the same entity. For example, a mango is green at a time and not yellow even though both colours exist in the mango but expressed at different times. Existence of green colour in the mango is as important as the non-existence of yellow at the same time. Only in this manner the exact colour and nature of eh mango is ascertained. Hence the third *bhaṅga* expresses consecutively the desired attribute/s of the entity. However I we wish to describe both the states of the attribute simultaneously, then the state of inexplicability (*avaktavya*) arises which is the fourth *bhaṅga*. It recognizes that simultaneous expression of both *asti* and *nāsti* is not possible. This state (of simultaneous expression of both *asti* and *nāsti*) can be realized / experienced but not expressed. It is this unlikelihood, which is indicated by the fourth predicament. The important conclusion is that both *asti* and *nāsti* states of one o many attributes of an entity cannot be expressed by one statement. Statements are always serial. Modern doctrine of logic also believes that every aspect of an objective gives rise to a specific statement and each of these statements is affirmative or negative in nature but these expressions are not simultaneous. Actually affirmative and negative statements are serial in nature and independent and they are therefore divided in two categories by modern logic doctrine. Similarly Jain philosophers also state that an entity has infinite states and attributes and hence needs infinite statements to express them. All these statements are either affirmative or negative in character. But the moment w start expressing them simultaneously, we have to immediately use he term *avaktavya* or inexplicable. Inexplicable is important as it denotes the relative expression of affirmation and non-expression of negation thereby establishing the limitations of the language and speech faculty. Inexplicability is different from the first three *bhaṅgas* as the first three *bhaṅgas* express the nature o an entity taking the relative existence of an attribute in it while inexplicability indicates the difficulty in expressing the entire entity at a time. Hence it is different from the other three *bhaṅgas* and unique.

The mono-ist Vendāntis call *avakatvya* as *anirvcaniya* or indescribable. Like the Jain view of inexplicability i.e. simultaneous expression, of an entity in its entirety, Vedāntis agree with it (as per Shankaracarya). Shankar also

agrees that the terms *sat –asat* (existent-nonexistent; with and without attributes; specific and generic; void or space and even *sat-citta-anand* etc are not describable in the supreme state of the entity in their entirety. This is because the complete state or nature of the Supreme Being is beyond the capabilities of speech, intellect etc. Therefore Upniṣada use the term *Neti –Neti* i.e. not this, not this for every statement to define the supreme state of the entity. However it does not imply that the Supreme Being / state is non-existent. It exists but its expression is beyond the capabilities of the language. Hence it is indescribable. (*anirvacaniya*).

Nāgājuna established the four-fold doctrine of *Māyā* (logic) to express the nature of existence. But Shankar refutes this four-fold doctrine and says that the ultimate Supreme Being cannot be expressed by it as it cannot be bound or expressed by mental precepts (*pratyaya*). It is not possible to describe the ultimate state by speech and hence cannot be expressed by the four-fold doctrine of Nāgārajuna. It implies that nothing can be said about or express the Supreme Being or existence. Jains refute this statement. Jains say that the Supreme Being is explicable in a sequential manner but not simultaneously.

Even though the entity is with infinite attributes and an ordinary person cannot know them all simultaneously. However and omniscient is capable of knowing them all simultaneously. But, due to limitations of the faculty of speech and language even He cannot express it simultaneously but He can and does express it sequentially. In this way, Vedanta believes that the nature of the entity as the cause of indescribability while Jains believe that the real cause of inexplicability is the limitation of speech faculty and language and not the nature of the entity. Hence indescribability and inexplicability are different and summarized below:

1. Vedānta assign indescribable to the nature of the entity as they say that the supreme Being or state of an entity is describable. Jains on the other hand assign inexplicability to the limitations of the faculty of speech and the language for simultaneous expression.
2. Indescribability assumes independence of each attribute as it believes that the entity cannot be described while inexplicability is based on relativity of *asti –nāsti*.
3. Indescribability is a negative attitude, as it says nothing about an entity except negation of everything said about it. On the other hand inexplicability is to some extent negative in nature but also talks in terms of relative affirmative terms about the entity.

Here it is important to know that even inexplicability of Jains is bifurcated in two parts namely:

1. Relative inexplicability.
2. Independent inexplicability.

The second type of inexplicability believes that the nature of the entity is indescribable and hence the language cannot express it at all. The first type on the other hand believes that the nature of the entity is describable to some extent. It just says that the sequential expression of the entity / existence in its entirety is possible but not the simultaneous expression. Different attributes of the entity can be expressed independently but in its entirety, the existence cannot be described simultaneously.

1.3 The remaining three *bhaṅgas* and their nature.

We should not take it that the entity couldn't be described completely based on the complete nature of the entity. Even though inexplicable, yet the entire nature of the entity can be described based on the relativity of *asti* and *nāsti*. Similarly based on the evolutionary states of the entity, the inexplicability of the entity in its entirety through a series of sequential statements is retained. It is this reason that even after the fourth *bhaṅga*, three more compound *bhaṅgas* have been identified after it to make the *Saptabhaṅgī*. Whatever is possible to be expressed about an entity, we use the *asti* and *nāsti* and whatever is possible to be expressed we use the inexplicability and the compound three *bhaṅgas* thereafter.

2.0 *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge)-*Saptabhaṅgī* and *Naya-Saptabhaṅgī*

Like knowledge or the knower can know an entity with many attributes at the same time, similarly one word cannot provide knowledge about many attributes at the same time. Therefore the speaker always forms one attribute as the basis of his speech or expression. If the speaker tries to make us know the entire entity by using one attribute

of the entity then his sentence is called *pramāṇavākya*. On the other hand if he tries to convey knowledge about one attribute of the entity while being indifferent for other attributes existent in the entity, then his sentence is called *nayavākya*.

Actually the entire form of speech / talking is *naya* based on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint. Accordingly Siddha Sena says that there are as many types of *nayas* as the ways of expressing an entity. Samanta Bhadra and Siddha Sena are therefore considered as the father and proponent of *syādvāda* or conditional dialectic doctrine of Jains. In their books *Āpta Mimāṃsā* and *Sanmati Tarka* both have described *naya* and *Saptabhaṅgī*. Their heir and the one who established firmly the Jain *Mūhya*, Akalanka discussed *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge)-*Saptabhaṅgī* first in his book *Tattvārthavārtika* (P 252). After establishing the infinite attributes existent in an entity, he says that that the word used to describe an entity, the word can assume one of the two paths namely consecutively and simultaneously to convey the meaning. There is no third path. When we try to express an existing attribute in an entity based on differences due to the impact of time etc., then we express them consecutively due to the inadequacy of one word to convey many meanings. Similarly when we do so but based on similarities (*abheda*) due to the impact of time etc., then one word, even though capable of conveying just one meaning, can express simultaneously the entity in its entirety due to the concomitance of all attributes with the one being expressed. When we express all the attributes simultaneously in this fashion, then it is called *pramāṇa* due to the expression of the entity in its entirety (*saklādeśa*). And when we express these attributes consecutively, then it is called *naya* due to partial (*vikalādeśa*) expression of the entity. *Saptabhaṅgī* is applicable to both *pramāṇa* and *naya* and is accordingly called *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and *naya saptabhaṅgī*.

There is very little or no basic difference in *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and *naya saptabhaṅgī* i.e. in both we use all the seven predicaments / sentences to express an entity in its entirety or in parts and then termed as *pramāṇa* and *naya* respectively. The question then arises as to how to differentiate the two? Generally the distinction between the two is based on the intention of the speaker as to whether he is trying to convey the meaning of the entity in its entirety or its part only. Let us take the sentence 'the chair exists'. From certain aspects like time and place etc., if the speaker intends to convey the complete meaning of the chair then it is *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and if he intends to express only one part of the chair, say its cost or colour or material then it is *naya saptabhaṅgī*.

2.1 *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge)-*Saptabhaṅgī*

We have seen above that the basic difference between *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and *naya saptabhaṅgī* is the intention of the speaker to use similarity/ identity in attributes or differences in the attributes existing in the entity and than each sentence he uses is called either *pramāṇavākya* or *nayavākya* accordingly. Respectively. Hence it depends completely on the intention of the speaker as to what he wishes to convey i.e. if the speaker is using the sentence with the intention of conveying the entire nature of the entity, then it is called *pramāṇavākya* or valid sentence. It is natural at this point to ask 'how is it possible for one attribute to convey the complete meaning of the entity having infinite attributes?'. Besides the opposing attributes of what is being expressed also exist in the entity. Affirmation cannot convey the existence of opposing attributes. Thus it appears that *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* is not valid.

Saptabhaṅgītarangī attempts to resolve this dichotomy based on *Abhedavritti* (belief in similarity) and *Abhedopacāra* (conceptual similarity). *Abhedavritti* states that the entity and its attributes are not different i.e. cannot be separated from each other. Hence stating one attribute can describe the entity in its entirety.

On the other hand *Abhedopacāra* believes that different attributes of the entity and the entity itself are different from each other. Because of the concomitance of attributes with the entity, we conceive them as same as entity itself. The example of an institution and the people working for it explains the difference between *Abhedavritti* and *Abhedopacāra*. An institution cannot exist without the people working for it. It is thus a collection of people like owners, workers, customers and managers etc. etc. So whenever the institution is to be represented in an event (get together of people for some activity), one or two persons associated with the institution are sent there to represent it. At such an event when it is enquired if such an institution is present, then the presence of those persons representing it is taken as the presence of that institution itself. Here it is the *Abhedavritti* between the persons and the institution which conveys the presence of the institution itself. Thus, without doubt, we can conclude that sometimes

expressing one attribute can convey the knowledge about the entity completely. On the other hand the persons working for the institution are different from each other and the institution itself. Institution is the collective form of all persons working in it while each person is the individual and different from each other and the institution. Still the existence and welfare of the individuals and the institution are inter-related. Therefore they can be considered/ conceived as same/ similar even though they are not so. This is *Abhedopacāra* i.e. presence of one person is conceived as the representation of others as well as the institution itself. Similarly expression of one attribute of an entity is conceived to represent/expression of all other attributes and even those attributes, which are present in the entity (concomitance of all attributes with the entity).

Following eight aspects / postulates are the basis of *Abhedavritti* and *Abhedopacāra*:

i.	<i>Kāla</i>	Time
ii.	<i>Ātmarūpa</i>	Nature of the attribute or entity
iii.	<i>Artha</i>	entity
iv.	<i>Sambandha</i>	Relationship
v.	<i>Upkāra</i>	Benevolence
vi.	<i>Guṇideśa</i>	Part of the entity
vii.	<i>Saṁsarga</i>	
viii.	<i>Śabda</i>	

Because of these eight postulates, one attribute, based on its concomitance with the entity, we are able to express the entire entity by just expressing this one attribute only. For example there are twin brothers. Due to similarity in their physical features, age, colour etc, describing one twin can automatically describe the other also as similar. We just say 'the other twin is also like this one'. In the same way the above eight postulates found in one attribute of an entity are found in other attributes of the entity. For example the first *bhāṅga* says '*syādastyeva ghata*' or in some aspect, the pitcher is existent or exists. In this statement we express the existence of the pitcher. From the aspect of time (first postulate above), we conclude that the attribute 'existence' of the pitcher also expresses the presence of the attribute 'existence' and other attributes of the pitcher. This is due to the concomitance of all other attributes in the pitcher based on the time aspect. This is *Abhedavritti*. '*Teṣāmekakā āvacchinnāikādhikaraṇāvrittivaś kālānābhedavriti*' or the basis of *Ātmarūpa* is explained as the existence is an attribute of the pitcher, so it the nature of existence to be an attribute of the pitcher'. Similarly we can analyse the other six postulates indicated above.

'*Ekādhāravrittivamarthenābhedavriti*' If we analyse relationship / *Sambandha* then we see that existence has concomitance with the pitcher / owner of the attribute. An attribute cannot exist except its owner and so also the owner without its attributes. Hence here is concomitance between existence and pitcher. Like existence all other attributes present in the pitcher have concomitance with it. It is thus relative to relationship as owner and attribute, base and basis, are different also and not exactly same. '*Kathāñcittātādātmyalakṣaṇo-astivasya sambandhanssa evānantadharmāṅgāṇāpityeka-sambandhapratīyogitvaś sambandhābhedavriti*'. *Upkāra* denotes enhancement of the benefits derived by the entity or adding to the specific benefits derived by the entity from the attribute. Therefore every attribute contributes a specific quality in the entity, e.g. existence makes the entity existent; existence of colour attribute gives entity colours like green, yellow etc. to the entity. Besides the attributes also imparts specific knowledge aspect about the entity. In this way the contribution of all attributes being similar denote commonality / similarity of all attributes. '*Ityekākāryajanakatvamupakāreṇābhedavriti*'. *Guṇideśa* means a part of the owner / entity, like existence found in apart of an entity, non existence etc other attributes are also same part of the entity. It is not that existence is found in one part and non existence are found in other parts of the entity. Hence based on the place also, there is similarity in them (attributes). '*Ekadeśāvacchinnāvrittivaś guṇideśenābhedavriti*'. *Saṁsarga* (relationship) is relation based difference in two entities / attributes. According to *Saṁsarga* like existence is related to the pitcher, so are the other attributes related to pitcher and so to each other. Therefore their owners and themselves are conceptually related and so similar in nature. Existence is an expression of an existent / entity and so of non-existence. Thus based

on time and other aspects relative to attributes and entity exist. This is possible only when substance viewpoint is primary and mode viewpoint is secondary. The conclusion is that keeping the differences or specifics existing between different attributes and entities in abeyance and keeping similarities as primary consideration, they appear similar (*Abhedavritti*) else there differences appear and then to consider them similar is *Abhedopacāra*.

2.2 Naya-Saptabhaṅgī

The basis of *Naya-Saptabhaṅgī* is *Bhedavritti* (belief in differences) and *Bhedopacāra* (conceptual differences). *Bhedavritti* implies differences existing in attributes and entities. *Bhedavritti* on the other hand implies keeping similarities between entities and attributes as in substance viewpoint as secondary, we give primary importance to the Mode viewpoint to experience the differences prevailing. IN this the intention or emphasis o the speaker is on differences only. Hence he just visualizes differences in the entities and their attributes. The same eight postulates discussed above which lead us to visualize similarities now make us experiences the differences in entities and the attributes in *Naya-Saptabhaṅgī*. This is the reason that each sentence or *bhaṅga* of *Naya-Saptabhaṅgī* conveys knowledge about the specific attribute intended by the speaker only and keeps other attribute on the side. For example it appears to be impossible for opposing attributes to co-exist at the same time. If we accept their co-existence then it can be concluded that there are as many entities as there are attributes. We cannot deny the differences in entities based on differences in the attributes. *Ācārya* Siddha Sena in *Sanmati* has explained differences or innumerability of entities with this doctrine in mind.

Egadaviyammi je attapajjayā vayanapajjayā vā vi

Tiyāṅgaybhuyā tāvayāñ tañ havai davvañ

Sanmati 1/31

i.e. an entity is of as many types as the number of its *artha-paryāya* (momentary states/ modes) and *vyanjana-paryāyas* (long term states/modes) in the past, present and future. In this way the substance /entity based on existence or substance viewpoint is different from the different substance states based on its other attributes. Further the opposing attributes cannot co-exist as the substance undergoing constant transformation every moment. Green and Yellow colours in mango come inexistence at two different times. Today an atom is of black colour and tomorrow it can become of white colour. Even though both the colours exist in the atom, yet they do not co-exist at the same time but at two different occasions or instants of time. Similarly we can analyze based on *Ātmanrupa* or nature of the entity as opposing modes and attributes cannot co-exist at the same time in the substance. Therefore based on substance viewpoint, the basis of their relationship becomes generic (*guṇatva*) or *dharmatva* (nature). However from mode viewpoint, even though the generic nature of the attribute exists and related, yet the fact that every attribute has specific nature and is thus unique. Because of this uniqueness of every attribute, it is not possible for them to be similar. Black and White are both colours but they are both very different. '*Svarupabhede teṣāñ parasparabhedasya virodhāt.*' Similarly from the entity point of view, it is not possible to have belief in similarity (*Abhedavritt*) between attributes, modes and substances. Accepting one substance as the basis of different attributes and modes will make it difficult to accept differences in attributes. In *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī*, since substance viewpoint is primary, it is all right to accept similarity between attributes and substance due to their concomitance. But in mode viewpoint when the emphasis is on differences, it becomes difficult, nay impossible to accept their concomitance and similarity. A man is son from his father's viewpoint but from his son's viewpoint he is the father. Hence an entity cannot be same from two different viewpoints. Similarly one entity cannot be the basis of two attributes. Relationship also does not justify similarity of the two. Because based on relationship also, the differences only become pre dominant. For example a man standing near a *rikshā* will be called *rikshā-wālā* and if he is standing near a *tongā*, he will be called a *tongāwālā*. Similarly *upkāra* or benefits also being of different types from different attributes, one attribute cannot have similarity with another. *Astitva* or existence conveys affirmative knowledge while *nāstitva* conveys negative or negation knowledge. By refuting differences in benefits of different attributes, we cannot prove differences in effects/ results. By refuting differences in effects/ results, differences in the causes are refuted. Differences in attributes automatically establish differences in *guṇīdeśas* else entities different than the entity being expressed will become one or similar. The part of the pitcher where red colour resides is different from the part of the same pitcher where white colour exists. If we do not accept this, then not only the parts of pitcher having different colours will become one but also other entities like cloth etc where these colours exist will become the same as pitcher. Hence it is essential to accept difference in

attributes and *guṇīdeśas* (or the owner of the attribute). ‘*Tadbhinnārthaguṇānamapi guṇīdeśā bhedaprasangāt.*’ Even from the *saḥsarga* aspect, differences only emerge between different attributes and modes. Relationships are also different with different relations. “*saḥsargasyāpisaḥsargibhedena bhedaṭ*’. Icy winds produce only cold environment, while hot winds (*loo*) will provide only hot environment. In both these situations, the environment cannot be the same. The word also justifies differences in attributes and modes as every word has a unique meaning conveyed by it. For example different meaning are conveyed by *astitva* and *nāstitva* for the same pitcher. As against this, if we do not accept different meanings for each word, then we don’t need different words for different entities/ attributes. As a result the need or the dictionary will be eliminated. ‘*Sarvagūṇānāmekaśabdavacyatāyān sarvārthānāmekaśabdavācyāpattiyā śabdāntarveīfalyāpatte*”.

In this way based on the modal viewpoint, we cannot convey the meaning of an entity completely simultaneously ad based on one attribute due to differences in different attributes, modes and entities. Substance viewpoint is based on similarities of generic attributes while Modal viewpoint is based n differences in attributes and modes. According to this every attribute is different from its owner i.e. the entity and other attributes of the entity. It is this independence of each attribute that results in different entities and differences in modes of attributes also. These also prove different types of transformations, effects and uses.

Questions

1. Essay type questions

Explain in details the nature and different types of seven predicament doctrine / *Saptabhaṅgī*.

2. Answer briefly the following questions

- Explain the differences between *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and *naya saptabhaṅgī*.
- What do you understand by *Abhedavritti* (belief in similarity) and *Abhedopacāra* (conceptual similarity) and *Bhedavritti* (belief in differences) and *Bhedopacāra* (conceptual differences).

3. Other questions

Answer any five questions in one word each.

- Meaning of viewpoints of similarity (*abheda*) and differences (*bheda*)?
- Give names of the eight aspects of similarities and differences?
- What is the difference between relationship (*sambandha*) and *saḥsarga*?
- Is there a basic difference between expression by *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* and *naya saptabhaṅgī*?
- Inexplicable (*avakatvya*) *bhaṅga*, is it relative or independent?
- What is the difference between substance and modal viewpoints?
- What is the meaning of owner of the attribute (*guṇīdeśa*)?
- Who discussed *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī* first?
- What is the meaning of *sakalādeśa* and *pramāṇavākya*?
- What is the meaning of *vikalādeśa* and *nayavākya*?

Reference texts:

- Saptabhaṅgītarangīnī* by Shri Vimal Das
- Syādavāda and Saptabhaṅgīnaya* by Shri Bhikari Ram Yadav.
- Jain Nyāya* by Pt. Kailash Chand Sastri

Author:

Samajī Caitanya Prajñā

Anekānta, Naya, Niksepa and syādavāda

Unit – 4 Lesson – 11: Why seven *bhaṅgas* only. *Bhaṅga sāta hi kyo?*

Jain philosophy believes in multifaceted viewpoints (*Anekānta*) to express an entity. According to it 'Every entity is an amalgam of many attributes, some of which are opposing to each other in nature / qualities'. It is true- false; one-many; eternal-temporary are some of the examples. In this way almost infinite pairs of opposing attributes exist in the entity. Conditional dialectic (*Syādavāda*) is a method / form of expressing these attributes in the entity. *Anekānta* and *Syādavāda* are not synonyms of each other. *Anekānta* is the method / way of thinking / analysing and *Syādavāda* is the method / way of expressing in words the same. *Syādavāda* is the flawless application of the language which expresses an entity with infinite attributes simultaneously. *Syādavāda* is a compound word consisting of *Syāt* and *Vāda*. *Vāda* means 'to say' or 'to express in words' while '*Syāt*' means relative to or from a particular viewpoint or also (*kathaṅcita*). *Syādavāda* expresses an entity from different perspectives / viewpoints. It refutes the doctrine of just attribute existent in an entity thereby giving equal importance to all attributes existing in the entity. The only difference is that it assigns primary role to one attribute at a time while expressing the entity keeping the other entities in the background and not refuting their existence in the entity. Ācārya Amrit Candra explains this beautifully through the following example.

*'Ek.enākarṣayanī slathayantī vastutattvamitareṇa
Antena jayati jainū nitimerntānane trāmivo gopī'*

Meaning: Like a maid while churning curd in a pitcher to take the butter out of it, she pulls one part of the string while letting the other end of the string loose causing the rotation of the stirrer in the pot to churn curd and take butter out of it; similarly *Syādavāda* also projects or focuses on one attribute only at a time while letting the other exist in the background, expresses the multifaceted entity completely.

1.0 Meaning of *Saptabhaṅgī*

Saptabhaṅgī or sevenfold predicament is the detailed application of both *Anekānta* and *Syādavāda*. *Anekānta* establishes the multifaceted existence of an entity having pairs of opposing attributes also. All such attributes can coexist in the entity but cannot be expressed so simultaneously. To be able to express them simultaneously, we have to be able to add consecutiveness and relativity to the language used for expression. According to *Syādavāda* methodology, every attribute is expressed in relation to its opposing attributes through a medium of seven sentences consisting of *asti* (is), *nāsti* (is not) and *avakāvya* (inexplicable) and their permutations.

This is so as each attribute has these states of existence. The method of expressing an entity using this set of seven sentences is called *Saptabhaṅgī*. Ācārya Akalanka explains *Saptabhaṅgī* as '*Praśnavasādekasmin vastunyavirodhena vidhiprotise dhavikaḥpanā saptabhaṅgī*'. (Tattvārthavārtika 1.6.5) i.e. keeping the inquisitiveness of the knowledge seeker in mind, the method of expressing (using the seven sentences) the suitable attribute of the entity without negating the existence of other attributes also is *Saptabhaṅgī*. Thus practitioners of *Anekānta* doctrine devised a set of seven sentences based on *asti* (affirmation) and *nāsti* (negation) of the existence of one attributes of the entity at a time i.e. one question can be answered in any one of seven possible sentences completely. All questions are answered generally either in affirmative (*asti*) or negative (*nāsti*). This is the basis of the development of *Saptabhaṅgī*. Keeping the relativity / relationships of an entity in mind, the following types of sentences form *Saptabhaṅgī*.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. <i>Syād asti eva</i> | exists relative to a viewpoint. |
| 2. <i>Syād nāstieva</i> | does not exist relative to a viewpoint. |
| 3. <i>Syād asti eva Syād nāsti eva</i> | exists relative to a viewpoint, does not exist relative to a viewpoint |
| 4. <i>Syād avaktavyaṇeva</i> | inexplicable relative to a viewpoint. |
| 5. <i>Syād asti avaktavyaṇeva</i> | exists relative to a viewpoint and inexplicable relative to a viewpoint. |
| 6. <i>Syād nāsti avaktavyaṇ eva</i> | does not exist relative to a viewpoint and inexplicable relative to a viewpoint. |
| 7. <i>Syād asti nāsti avaktavyaṇ eva</i> | exists relative to a viewpoint, does not exist relative to a viewpoint and inexplicable relative to a viewpoint imagine |

2.0 Why seven predicaments (*bhaṅgas*) only?

The origin of *Saptabhaṅgī* can be traced to Bhagavati, one of the oldest Jain canonical texts. Here Gautam enquires from Bhagavāna Mahāvīra the nature Ratnaprabhā planet. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra says '*Rayanapahā puthavī siya āyā siya no āyā siya avattavva*' i.e. Ratnaprabhā planet is perhaps soul, perhaps not soul and perhaps it is inexplicable. The discussion progress further till Bhagavāna Mahāvīra talks about an atom (*parmāṇu*) i.e. an entity with one space point only.

An entity exists relative to itself, it does not exist relative to others. Further existent - nonexistent cannot be expressed simultaneously and so become inexplicable. According to Bhagavati, if an entity has only one space point, then it can be expressed with the assistance of three sentences only. If the entity is an amalgam of two space points, it can be expressed by a maximum of 6 sentences. The number keeps on growing to 14 for three space-points entity and so on. The question then arises that Bhagavati says that *bhaṅgas* can be less than and more than seven? So how we have only seen *bhaṅgas* only now? On closer analysis of Bhagavati, we find that the *bhaṅgas*, which are more than seven are all subsets of the seven primary *bhaṅgas*. Also Bhagavati forms the space points of an entity as the basis of expressing an entity. There are only seven *bhaṅgas*, neither more nor less in number as established in *Saptabhaṅgītaranginī*.

Bhaṅgāssat vādayasapta saṅśayassaptā tadgatā'

Meaning: there can be seven types of inquisitiveness about an entity. Basis of these types of inquisitivenesses are the seven types of doubts and the basis of seven types of doubts is the seven types possible existence of the attributes in an entity.

This definition establishes that the basis of *Saptabhaṅgī* is not just linguist but based on the nature of the attributes of an entity also. Therefore it becomes essential that while we use *Saptabhaṅgī*, its every sentence should be specific to an attribute of the entity. If we wish to attribute, say the eternal attribute of the pitcher, then we should use appropriate words so that it is indicated but its temporary-ness attribute does not get eliminated. This is possible only by using *Saptabhaṅgī*. '*Prāśanika praśanjñāna prayojatve sati*' describes the nature of *Saptabhaṅgī* and says that its development is based on the query of the enquirer. We may wonder how an enquirer can have only seven types of questions to seek answers to? Why not more or less than seven? This is so as the needs of the enquirer can be of seven types. Or example the enquirer wishes to know if the soul is eternal or temporary? Based on these two types of inquisitiveness, we have two *bhaṅgas*. Similarly if the enquirer is a little more intelligent, then his questions can extend up to seven types only as the inquisitiveness is of seven types only. Here we can again question why there are only seven types of inquisitiveness only and not more? This is further explained that the enquired can have seven types of doubts about any one attribute of an entity? Clarification of seven types is given by the fact that an attribute which is being enquired has only seven types of characteristics /qualities. The first is possibility of its being existent, second is possibility of its being none existent, the third is possibility of its being existent - none existent i.e. in an evolutionary state, fourth is the possibility of being inexplicable, the fifth is the possibility of its existent slightly and so is inexplicable, the sixth is the possibility of its being none existent slightly so is inexplicable and the last is the possibility of its being evolutionary state slightly and so is inexplicable. In this way the characteristics of an attribute can be of seven types. Hence there are as many types of *bhaṅgas* as the type of doubts- inquisitiveness. Collection of these types of sentences is called *Saptabhaṅgī*.

Why there are seven *bhaṅgas* only? Another explanation for this is as follows. Out of the seven *bhaṅgas*, the first i.e. *asti*, the second i.e. *nāsti* and the fourth i.e. inexplicable /*avakatavya* are the three primary *bhaṅgas*. The third, fourth and sixth are the compound *bhaṅgas* of two basic *bhaṅgas* while the seventh is the compound of the three basic *bhaṅgas*. Third, fifth and sixth *bhaṅgas* are the compound of two basic *bhaṅgas* while seventh is of combinations of the three basic *bhaṅgas*. For example the three ingredients of spice namely salt, pepper and sour can give rise to two independent tastes plus four compound tastes off salt-pepper, salt-sour, sour-pepper and lastly salt-sour-pepper. Hence only seven types of tastes from the three ingredients are possible. Similarly *asti*, *nāsti* and *avakatavya* can produce only seven *bhaṅgas* maximum i.e. three independent *bhaṅgas* as one of each three, three *bhaṅgas* which are combinations of two *bhaṅgas* and the last a combination of all three basic *bhaṅgas*. All these seven *bhaṅgas* are based on the intention of the speaker. As per the intentions of the speaker an attribute in an entity can be said as

existent or nonexistent, or existent to some extent and nonexistent or inexplicable or existent from a viewpoint but inexplicable or nonexistent from a viewpoint but inexplicable or existent – nonexistent from a viewpoint and inexplicable. On these premises, *Saptabhaṅgī* is established. Some one asks me if I am an intelligent person? To reply this I think at least some knowledge of things and hence it is possible that I am intelligent and it will not be wrong to say so.

Because I have knowledge of the scriptures and not of maths and English, so I am unintelligent also and so I can say I am not intelligent or I have knowledge of some subjects and no knowledge of others and I am both knowledgeable and not knowledgeable. If I have to say both the states of my knowledge simultaneously then I can say I am inexplicable. Proceeding further, it is possible that I have some knowledge and I may not be able to answer his questions and so I am knowledgeable but cannot say so (inexplicable). It is also possible that I am not knowledgeable and still I may be able to answer his questions and so I cannot say. All these methods of expressions maintain their applicability and express one attribute of the entity differently and its nature entirely.

3.0 Debates /arguments about *Saptabhaṅgī*

As per Mono-ist philosophies, they accept existence of only one entity i.e. *Brahm* only. Hence as per them only one form of existence only is possible and it is fallacious to accept possibility of everything as nonexistent. Therefore *syāt asti eva* is only valid statement. Similarly *śūnyavādi* Buddhists accept only the nonexistent state of an entity and so they accept validity of *syāt nāsti eva* only. Jain philosophers say that both these views are only partial and from one viewpoint only. Their explanation is as follows. 'If we accept existent only then all entities will become one or one entity will become omnipresent. Similarly Buddhists view every entity as momentary only and hence the universe will become void (*śūnya*).'

*Sarvamāsti svarupeṇa pararupeṇa nāsti ca,
Anayathā sarvastvvañ syād svarupasvāpyasanbhava'*

Meaning: Every entity is existent relative to its own time, place, mode and substance and is nonexistent relative to other entity's time, place, mode and substance. Therefore we should accept the entity as an amalgam of both existent and nonexistent attributes. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika that all entities can be grouped in two categories only i.e. existent and nonexistent only. '*Sadasatvargāssatattavam*'. Thus according to them only sentences with *asti* and *nāsti* are only valid and the remaining types of sentences are invalid. This statement is also refuted by Jains as the moment an entity is expressed in affirmative form then the entity becomes existent only and when it is expressed in negation form then it entity becomes nonexistent. Similarly when both these forms are expressed consecutively as primarily then its evolutionary state is expressed. So it also becomes an essential form of expression. However when we wish to express both existent and nonexistent simultaneously then its inexplicability becomes essential. Hence the fourth *bhaṅga* also becomes essential. The remaining three are the compounds of these four *bhaṅgas* and hence it is only right to consider seven *bhaṅgas* and no less. *Saptabhaṅgī* enables an entity to be expressed completely as existent-nonexistent, generic-specific, eternal-temporary and explicable-inexplicable points of views.

3.1 *Bhaṅgas* can be more than seven also..

The question 'Can there be more than seven *bhaṅgas*?' has been raised in *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgī*. Like we have a compound *bhaṅga* of first and second *bhaṅga* namely *syāt asti-nāsti*, similarly we can make another *bhaṅga* with third and first *bhaṅga* as *syāt asti syāt asti-nāsti*. In this way we can have another compound *bhaṅga* with fourth and third *bhaṅgas*.

This process can be continued to create more *bhaṅgas*. *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgī* clarifies that assumptions are baseless as the combination of compound *bhaṅga* of first and third *bhaṅgas* creates an entity or attribute, which is nonexistent. Similarly other compound *bhaṅgas* establish nonexistent attributes and entities. Hence the question of more than seven *bhaṅgas* does not arise.

3.2 Possibility of infinite *bhaṅgas*

There are some thinkers who say that an entity has infinite attributes and so there can be infinite *bhaṅgas*. It is all right to say that there are infinite attributes and so there can be infinite *Saptabhaṅgīs*. However based on any one attribute only one *Saptabhaṅgī* is possible. Limit of *bhaṅgas* is seven only. *bhaṅgas*.

Another doubt raised in Saptabhaṅgītarangiṇī is there is a possibility of nine *bhaṅgas* instead of seven by changing order of *asti-nāsti* in third and seventh *bhaṅgas*. This way the emphasis changes from existent to nonexistent in the new *bhaṅgas* and hence the sequencing is changed. However we find that this difference is only cosmetic and not real as both *asti* and *nāsti* are independent and not relative. Therefore the term inexplicable is used by keeping both *asti* and *nāsti* as primary and not consecutive or one primary and the second as secondary. Therefore there is no need for establishing a relation between adjective and its specific noun for the entity and attribute. But for modes of past and future and present times, we need the application of inexplicability. Because experience proves that differences in the entity based on existent, nonexistent and evolutionary states of an attribute is possible. For example curd, sugar, black pepper, cardamom etc combined together create a new type of different drink, which is different from the taste of individual ingredients. Still it can neither be said as totally different from the ingredients nor totally similar. In this way we should understand the relationship between the seven *bhaṅgas*. Hence to prove the nature of seven different and independent attributes, we have to consider seven types of doubts, inquisitiveness etc for each. Hence there are only seven *bhaṅgas* for each attribute only.

3.3 Possibility of *bhaṅgas* being less than seven.

Another query raised in Saptabhaṅgītarangiṇī is that the *bhaṅgas* can be less than seven also. This is so as an entity, which is existent as a pitcher is nonexistent as a cloth at the same time. Hence the compound *bhaṅga syād asti eva* and *syād nāsti eva* cannot occur for the same entity at the same time as the one is consumed in the other. Hence only one out of these two *bhaṅgas* can be valid. There is no need to consider them separately.

This also is established as incorrect as existence and nonexistent are both different from each other. Whatever is existent cannot be nonexistent and vice versa. In such a situation they both have to be considered as separate, otherwise accepting existence from self-viewpoint will also become non-existent from other's viewpoint. Buddhist, consider middle term (*hetu*) as with three characteristics and Nyāya considers *hetu* as with five characteristics relative to existent and non-existent only i.e. existence of the middle term in its own form (entity) and non-existence in the other's form (entity) is based on existent and non-existent being independent and different. Hence they also accept *asti* and *nāsti* as different and independent. So by accepting either existent or nonexistent, they are not able to support the three attributes and five attributes respectively of the middle term. Hence from there doctrine also establishes independence and difference in *asti* and *nāsti*.

Even though we consider *asti* and *nāsti* as different and independent, yet there is no need to consider the third *bhaṅga* at all i.e. *asti-nāsti* depicting the evolutionary state of the attribute. Because expressing pitcher and cloth separately or together in evolutionary state conveys the same meaning. Therefore after accepting *syād asti* and *syād nāsti*, there is no need for *syād asti-nāsti*. His argument also does not appear valid as the evolutionary state for each entity /attribute is held valid from experience. For example the letters *gha* and *ta* in *ghata* are different from *ghata*. If we do not accept this then just stating *gha* should convey the meaning of *ghata* but it is not so. Similarly like a garland is different from lower in it, the evolutionary state of an attribute is different from its *asti* and *nāsti* states separately.

One can still doubt how the consecutive expression of *asti, nāsti* with reference to the evolutionary state is different with the simultaneous expression of *asti, nāsti* expressing evolutionary state. Explanation for this is that the consecutive expression of a state is different from its simultaneous expression as follows:

1. In the consecutive expression, the modes /states of an attribute or entity are expressed consecutively.
2. In the simultaneous expression, the modes /states of the attribute or entity are expressed simultaneously.

If we do not accept the difference in these two, then the problem of repetition will arise. In *Saptabhaṅgī* the third *bhaṅga* denotes serial expression while the fourth *bhaṅga* denotes simultaneous expression. The third *bhaṅga* conveys the knowledge of both existence and non-existence. The third and fourth *bhaṅgas* convey different states of the attribute or entity. Hence they are both different. In this way the Jain philosophers accept seven *bhaṅgas* only and neither more nor less. Whenever *Syādvāda* expresses an entity with many attributes, then it does so using *Saptabhaṅgī* only.

Questions

1. Essay type questions

Explain on the basis of Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgī why there are seven *bhaṅgas* only?

2. Answer briefly the following questions

- i. How more than *bhaṅgas* can be possible?
- ii. Can we develop infinite *bhaṅgas* based on infinite attributes of an entity?

3. Other questions

- i. According to Jain philosophy, an entity has
- ii. *Anekānta* and *Syādvāda* are related as
- iii. Every entity is based on its own place, time, substance and modes.
- iv. According to Brhmadvaitavāda *bhaṅga* /s is/re possible
- v. According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, types of sentences / *bhaṅgas* are possible.
- vi. How many compound *bhaṅgas* of two *bhaṅgas* present in *Saptabhaṅgī*?
- vii. What is *Saptabhaṅgī*?
- viii. What is the meaning of *Syādvāda*?
- ix. Which is the fourth *bhaṅga*?
- x. Which are the basic *bhaṅgas* in *Saptabhaṅgī*?

Reference texts:

1. Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgī by Shri Vimal Das
2. Āpta Mimāṃsā Tattva Dipikā commentary Prof U.C. Jain, Shri Digambara Jain Sansthana Varanasi.

Author:

Samāṇi Shubha Prajñā ' ū ś ṅ ṅ ā ṣ

Anekānta, Naya, Niksepa and syādavāda

Unit – 4 Lesson – 12

Self-same and non self-same nature of the object of knowledge (entity)

Prameya kas sva-rupatva aur para-rupatva.

How are object of knowledge (*prameya*), entity and object are considered in Jain philosophy? What is the nature of its self-same and non-self-same (others)? How in different situations, their concepts change as per the intentions of the speaker? We shall attempt to study these aspects in this chapter. its

Object of knowledge (*prameya*) denotes an object about whom we intend to know. In metaphysics, we find the word *jñeya* in place of *prameya*. In general talks we use the entity or object to denote *prameya*. Analysis of the nature of the entity is the primary focus of every philosophy. Determining the true nature of the *prameya* is also considered as the basis for achieving salvation and the right-conduct in life. '*tattvajñānātri śreyasādhigama*' "Every philosophy has a different view on the *prameya* and its analysis. Jain philosophy also considers the nature of *prameya* from two viewpoints. These are called absolute /real and practical /relative viewpoints. In Logic literature they can be described as *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* viewpoints or *Anekānta* as relative viewpoints.

1.0 Self-same and non-self-same nature of the entity. As per *Anekānta* doctrine.

To analyse an entity keeping its past-present and future states in mind is called *Anekāntica* viewpoint. Dr. Bhikari Lal Yadav has explained in simple terms the self-same and non-self-same nature of an entity with *Anekāntica* viewpoint as follows.

'Jain philosophy believes in **realistic** / existent nature of an entity and **pluralistic** existence of entities. Along with the pluralistic existence of entities, it also believes in the existence of infinite attributes in it and hence its being with infinite states also. Thus not only are there infinite entities but also every entity also has infinite attributes, qualities and modes. Therefore the entity is said to be with infinite qualities. Not only this, in each entity, we also find many pairs of opposing (positive and negative) attributes. This is the reason why it is called *Anekāntica*.

1.1 Infinite qualities of the entity.

Jain philosophy believes in the entity being with many properties /qualities. *Anekānta* means *Aneka + anta* i.e. many ends + views or qualities. Thus *Anekānta* means more than one i.e. many or infinite qualities of the entity. '*anantadharmātmakaṅ vastū*'

Nature of the entity is vast. It is an amalgam of infinite attributes, infinite qualities and infinite modes. The speaker picks different attributes from the infinite attributes present from time to time with the intention of speaking / expressing them even though many more attributes exist in it at that time.

But it should not be understood that he enforces these attributes on the entity but any entity by its own nature has infinite attributes. If we consider only existent attributes of the entity only, we will still find them to be innumerable. For example, the flower rose has pleasant odour, pink or a specific colour at that moment, from touch perspective, it has soft petals but its stem is hard and with thorns, its taste is very peculiar etc etc. This is the statement of existent attributes. If we look at the attributes, which are non-existent at that particular time, then we are talking of almost infinite number of them. For example the rose flower is not the flower of jasmine or marigold or any other type. It is different from all other entities except itself-same and it does not have the infinite attributes of those non-existent entities. Further if we consider the past and future modes of the same flower itself-same along with its existent and non-existent attributes of present, then we find that we are talking of infinite attributes and qualities. Definition of an entity completely is thus based on both existent and non-existent attributes i.e. on what it has and what it does not have. It is not enough for a chair to be just having the attributes of a chair but it is equally important to know how it is different from say table, stool etc. Hence the statement that an entity has infinite attributes/ qualities and modes stands valid.

Even though we experience only limited number of attributes and qualities of an entity, yet we cannot say the entity has only those attributes. Those attributes whose knowledge is beyond our perception, only an omniscient (universal observer) can perceive them. Einstein says ‘ We can only know relative truth but the real truth can be known only to the universal observer’. Actually an entity is a reality with many modes. Every statement expressing apart of the multifaceted entity is thus significant and important. It is possible two sentences related to the entity may appear to be opposing /negating each other, yet there is no contradiction between them because of the existence of both the qualities in the entity in relative terms. *Svayañbhu Stotra* says that existent and nonexistent are both desired but in relative terms they are expressed as primary and secondary.

Vidhinirṣedhasca sathanccidiṣṭau
Vivakṣayā mūkhya-gūṇa-vayavasthā *Svayañbhu Stotra 25*

The conclusion is that existent and nonexistent, even though both opposing in nature, are important to describe the nature of the entity. The nature of the entity cannot be defined in the absence of any one of them. Otherwise the entity will become omnipresent. As told before for the chair to be a chair, it is essential that the attributes of the table are missing /nonexistent in it. Hence the nonexistence is the prelude for existence.

1.2 *Anekāntica* nature of the entity.

The entity is also *Anekāntica* i.e. with many properties besides its being with many attributes. The attributes we consider as opposing, even those are in relative terms existent in the entity at the same time.

Kīdṛgāṅ vastū? Nānādharmayūktāṅ vividhasvabhāveṣu sahitaṅ kathañcit
Astitvanāstitatvaikatvāekatvanityatvānityabhinnatvapramūkhairaviṣgam
Svāmi Kārtikeya Anupreksā tīkā verse 253.

For example in our daily life we see that a man is a father, a son, a brother and a husband at the same time and still there is no conflict in all these statements. Actually the man who is the father is with reference to his son, is a son with reference to his father, is a brother with reference to brother or sister and husband with reference to his wife.

Not only this in a mango sweet and sour tastes coexist. This is so as the mango sour taste dominates when is not ripe and sweet taste dominates when it is ripe. If sweet taste were nonexistent in the mango, then it would not have been possible for it to become sweet when it ripens. If sweet taste was not present in the mango when it was raw, then how could appear when it ripens? Thus an attribute, which is not expressed in an entity at a particular time, it appears at a later stage confirming its existence.

Similarly opposing attributes coexist in an entity. As per Jain *ācāryas*, all entities not only have multiple attributes but also pairs of opposing attributes also. Thus they are real unreal, eternal-momentary and existent-nonexistent at the same time. *Ācārya Amrit Candra* says that all entities are *Anekāntica* in nature due to the existence of many attributes as well as pairs of opposing attributes in them. An entity which is concomitant with an attribute is also non concomitant with it, with one attribute only is also with many attributes, with existence is also with non existence etc. ‘ *Sa tū sarvamanekāntatmakamityanūsāsti ... tatra yadeva tattadevātata yadevaikaṅ tadevānekaṅ yadeva sattadevāsava yadeva nitayaṅ tadevānityamisyeva vastu*’ (*Samayasāra* verse 247 *Tīkā*) i.e. *Ekatva-anityatva, ekatva-aneekatva* etc opposing pairs of attributes are the two aspects of the same entity. They are all are existent in the entity in relative terms. There is no entity, which is just eternal but not temporary and vice versa. As per Dr. Sagar Mal Jain, existence is with non-existence and non-existence is with existence. Solitude is contained in multitude and vice versa. An entity, which is eternal from substance viewpoint, is momentary from the mode viewpoint. There is no creation without destruction and no destruction without creation possible. *Pañcāstikāya* also says that existence is not completely destroyed and non-existence also is not created or destroyed. The number of entities in the universe is constant and there is never any change in the number of entities existent but their modes keep on changing continuously.

Bhāvassa ṇatthi ṇāṇo natthi abhavassa caiva uppādo
Gūṇapajjayesu bhāvā uppādave pakkuvaṅti *Pañcāstikāya 15*

Further existence of permanence is also essential for creation and destruction otherwise what will be destroyed or created. Even though permanence and creation –destruction are of opposing nature yet no entity can exist without all three being present in it. Accordingly Jain *ācāryas* have defined entity or substance as permanence with change

(*pariṇāmi nitya*), *pariṇāmi nitya* being defines as the one which is changing continuously and every moment but does not leave its nature and permanence. ‘*Tad bhāvāvyañ nityaṅ*’ Every entity, without leaving its own nature and due to the external cause of others is changing in different modes. For example a goldsmith is the external cause in gold changing its form into different shapes and forms etc without its leaving being its existence as gold. Transformation of these modes is called *pariṇāman* or simply transformation.

This discussion brings forth the fact that eternal-momentary attributes are concomitant with or nature of the entity, eternal being the one, which is always and in all times existent in the entity while the other, is continuously changing. This is the basis on which Mahāvīra, during his time, tried to bring reconciliation between the two opposing philosophies, one talking of eternal nature of reality and the other talking of the momentary nature of the reality and defined the entity as with origination –destruction and permanence as per his *Anekānta* doctrine. ‘*Utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṅ sat*’ (Tattvārathasutra 5.29) i.e. in reality origination, destruction and permanence always coexist in an entity.

Permanence addresses eternal nature while origination-destruction addresses momentary nature of the entity. Even though the three attributes are different from each other yet they are not independent of each other. If we say that the three are independent, then it will become difficult to justify the existence of any one even. Without origination, there is no meaning or existence of destruction or permanence. Similarly without permanence, origination and destruction are not possible as both origination and destruction need some base or existence where they can occur /exist. It is therefore abundantly clear that all three i.e. origination, destruction and permanence are inter related. Hence all three are essential in the existence and meaning of the universe we live in. Sanmati Tarka therefore says that a substance or existent /entity, without modes having origination and destruction as there nature, is meaningless; because all three i.e. origination-destruction and permanence jointly are the indications or the nature itself-same of the existent.

Jain philosophers call these three energies / attributes (origination, destruction and permanence) as one word with constituents. While referring to this three part word Bhagavānī says ‘*Uppannei vā vigeamei vā dhuvei vā*’ According to Jain philosophy, this part word is the foundation of *Anekāntavādi* method of thought process. It is the representative of the *Anekāntica* nature of an entity. For example Gautama asks Mahāvīra, ‘whether the soul is eternal or momentary?’ Then Mahāvīra replies, ‘In relative manner, soul is both eternal and temporary.’ Again Gautama asks Bhagavāna, ‘How?’ Then Mahāvīra replies, ‘From substance viewpoint, soul is eternal and from mode viewpoint it is momentary’

Goyamā! Jīvā siyaśāsayaṅ siya asāsayā
Goyamā! Davvatthayāe sāsayā bhāvattthayāe asāsayā. Bhagavānīsutra part 3, 7.2.23

In this way He replies to Somila, ‘Somila from substance viewpoint I am one, but due to transforming states of the consciousness, I am also many’

Based on such textual and actual experiential facts that each entity is with infinite attributes and is *Anekāntica* also. But here some *ācāryas* also express doubts about the possibility of infinite and pairs of opposite attributes in one entity only. Because on this basis, every soul will have to be considered both as having consciousness and unconsciousness simultaneously while we cannot say an entity having consciousness as unconscious also. Similarly an entity, which is not having consciousness, cannot be called as having conscious also. In this we cannot call a beautiful being as ugly also and ugly being as beautiful also. In reality, it is not possible to prove the existence of opposing pairs of attributes like consciousness and unconsciousness, beautiful and ugly in one entity only. Dhavalā also says ‘If we accept coexistence of opposing attributes like consciousness and unconsciousness, auspiciousness and inauspiciousness in one entity, then we may have to accept their coexistence in one soul also. However the truth is that the attributes, which can never be found in an entity, the same can never exist in them also.’

The resolution of this doubt is as follows ‘The meaning of *Anekāntica* nature of an entity does not mean that we show every possible attribute to exist in the entity to prove its *Anekāntica* nature. Rather those opposing pairs found in an entity are many or almost infinite by themselves. Hence the non-existence of such opposing attributes, like unconsciousness in entity with consciousness, does not negate our hypothesis of *Anekāntica* nature of the entity. Entities are only *Anekāntica* in nature and hence it is possible that opposing pairs such as existent-nonexistent,

eternal-momentary, real-imaginary, generic and specific etc can co-exist in an entity. If some pairs of attributes cannot coexist in an entity, then these are the indicators of its distinguishing nature.

For example when Jain *ācāryas* eliminate the attribute unconsciousness from the soul, then they say 'nonexistence of unconsciousness' in the soul as an attribute of the soul. This statement also establishes the existence of consciousness in the soul. Actually the *Anekāntica* nature of the entity cannot thus be refuted. While talking of *Anekāntica* nature of the entity, Hema Candra in *Anyayogavyavacchedikā* says, 'All entities in the world carry the stamp of *Śyādvāda* and no entity can exist without it'. Hence all entities are with infinite attributes and *Anekāntica* in nature. Even though it is true that the *Anekāntica* nature of the entity and its having infinite attributes can confuse the reader, yet nothing can be done profoundly to eliminate this difficulty due to the very nature of the entity itself-same. Buddhist philosopher Dharamakīrti also says so. '*Yadādaṅ svayamarthebhyo rocate ke vayan'* Hence all entities are with infinite attributes and *Anekāntica* in nature. *Anekānta* analyses and assists in expressing this entity.

2.0 *Vastū kā svā-rūpa, para-rūpa* Self-same and non-self-same nature of the entity from the doctrine of viewpoints.

So far we have tried to understand the true nature of an entity based on *Anekānta* doctrine. It is clear by now that all entities are amalgams of infinite contradictory and complimentary as well as single attributes existing in it. The entity is then expressed using a language and we are familiar with the limitations of all languages. Every word conveys a meaning but the word by itself-same is not capable of conveying the exact or decisive meaning of the entity. Without knowing the intention of the speaker and the listener, it is difficult to understand the meaning being conveyed by any word. Hence it is important to know the intention of the listener/ enquirer. Siddha Sena Divākara in *Sanmati Tarka* explains this as follows.

*Suttaṅ atthanimeṇaṅ na suttamettaṅ atthapadivati
Atthagai uṅa ṇayavāyagahaṅaṅgā durbhigammā.*

The word, by itself-same, cannot carry the intention of the listener but the intention of the speaker also is needed to enable the word conveys its meaning exactly. This means that the speaker can only convey the meaning of one word towards one entity or attribute only. He will need many words to convey the meanings of different attributes or entities. Words with many meanings also point towards one entity at a time. In such a situation it becomes essential to repeat the word again to convey different meaning/s. For example the statement 'Bring the one from Sindh or a Sindhī' This sentence when used to convey the salt from the rocks cannot be used to convey the horse from Sindh even though both meanings are correct even though the word is used to convey the people or horse or any other thing from Sindh. Similarly using the word *asī* cannot be used to convey salt as it means horse only. This is the reason that *Anekānta* doctrine is based on *Śyādvāda* and *Nayavāda* for expressing an entity. Sometimes an entity with infinite attributes cannot be expressed simultaneously using a language. Hence an entity expressed in words will be relative only and not independent. It is possible to express an entity with reference to some context only and not completely. So any verbal expression will be valid only in some context. In other contexts, its invalidity cannot be ruled out. A camera will show an object located far away as small while the same camera will show a near located object as big. Hence photographing depends on nearness and farness of the object being photographed. In the present chapter this is the basis of self-same and non-self-same nature of the entity. One statement is the expression of the self-same-nature of the entity at a time while at other time the same statement can express the non-self-same nature of the entity.

In our analysis of the entity, we understood that the entity is both in affirmative (positive or Have) and Negative (Negative or Have not) states. Actually both these aspects i.e. Have and Have-not give a definite existence to the entity else it will become omnipresent and cause chaos. Its existence is limited by some boundaries. To make water, both hydrogen and oxygen have to be present in definite proportions. All other gases should be absent. If we do not accept such limitations, then it is impossible to have water. In other words we can say that the formula for water became H₂O only when breaking a molecule of water produces two molecules of hydrogen and one molecule of oxygen. All other gases were conspicuous by their absence. Every entity has affirmative (*vidhi*) and negative (*niṣedha*) states of existences. Right study and analysis of both aspects only can help in its evaluation. In the past, some *ācāryas* quoted the following verse.

Athmeveti yo eva bhāve bhavti nirṇaya'
Naiśa vastvantrābhāvasanvityanugamādgte.

We can conclude that an entity is exactly the same, as we understand without knowing the entities, which are different from it. Milk is milk only and not curd, can be said, unless we know the attributes whose existence identify it to be milk and those attributes whose absence also identify the existence of milk only. Similarly I wish to establish that an entity has consciousness, we have to ascertain that it has sense organs, the forces of breathe etc, capabilities to feel pain and pleasure and desires etc. if we see all such attributes, then we conclude that it is a living being. In this way, we can establish the nature of an entity based on the existence and nonexistence of certain attributes. Whatever is found in an entity, in logic literature we call as its self-same-nature or just self-same. For example, in a table made of wood, wood, particular form and shape and colours and utility etc of the table are called its self-same or nature of its self-same. Whatever other attributes which are not found in the entity are called its non-self-same or non-self-same nature. For example, humanity or human-ness is found in human beings and not inhumanness (i.e. animal instincts). Hence human-ness is its self-same-nature and inhuman-ness is its non-self-same nature. In the language and speech, nature of the entity is dependent on the intentions of the speaker and the listener. In such a situation, the same entity can be with self-same-nature or with non-self-same nature depending on the intentions of different speakers. For example with the intention of knowing a wooden chair, the listener asked if it was chair? He got the reply that it is not a chair as it was made of plastic and not wood. The speaker did not accept the existence of chair as the plastic was not its self-same nature but non-self-same nature (as only wood was considered as its self-same nature and not plastic), even though the chair is a chair. Hence only desired form/ existence only will become its self-same-nature and in desired will become its non-self-same nature.

We can discuss and analyse the nature of self-same and non-self-same nature of an entity from many aspects, such as name, nature, positioning, substance, modes, form, time, place, word, present existence and activity etc. In all these contexts, we shall try to understand the self-same and non-self-same nature of the entity or object of knowledge through some examples.

In the context of self-same and non-self-same nature discussions, we shall find that the common nouns such as living being and non-living being are associated with different entities due to the existence of special attributes in them. Hence these special existences shall form its self-same-nature and others will form its non-self-same nature. For example a person is called human being because we find humanness in him and non-existence of animal ness and godliness. Therefore such and such entity is a human being is established based on the existence of human ness in him and non-existence of animal ness and godliness.

The self-same-nature of an entity will be known by the method of its positioning (*nikṣepa*) using the techniques of name, assignment, space and time. Other entities being described by the same method of positioning (*nikṣepa*) will be its non-self-same nature. For example, the speaker asks for a particular person with the name Mahāvīra. The person appears before him and as per the name *nikṣepa*, he is Mahāvīra and the pictures or idols of Bhagavāna Mahāvīra presented to him are his non-self-same nature. Similarly when a speaker asks for Mahāvīra in the context of worshipping, then idols or pictures of Mahāvīra are the self-same-nature and the person with the name Mahāvīra is the non-self-same nature of the entity being enquired by the speaker. From substance method of positioning, Mahāvīra's life as a householder is its self-same-nature and in childhood his state as child is its self-same-nature. From the mode method of positioning, the omniscient Mahāvīra who established the Jain religion is the self-same-nature and his other forms as idol, picture, child and householder are all non-self-same nature. In mode *nikṣepa*, when we mention an entity then its special kind of attributes must exist in the entity. If we accept an entity being positioned with name *nikṣepa* as same being positioned in assignment, substance or mode *nikṣepas*, then utilities of all these different *nikṣepas* will vanish. These *nikṣepas* are useful only when the same entity is described differently in different *nikṣepas*.

Form (*Saṁsthāna*) assigns specific or distinctive attributes to the entity. Form helps to discriminate and identify a specific entity within a group / class of similar entities. For example we can distinguish a Japanese / African or an Indian based on the forms of their body and features even though all have the primary characteristic of human ness in them. Similarly in other entities, if a person wants a circular table, then circular shape is the self-same nature of the table for him while triangular or square et shapes of the table are its non-self-same nature. If we do not accept the

differences in different forms, then the question of all forms being the same will arise. On the contrary, if we do not accept existence of specific form as self-same-nature of the entity, then we cannot establish any form of the entity.

We can also establish self-same and non-self-same nature of the entity based on time also. In the process of making cloth, there are many stages for example ginning, spinning cotton, weaving the cloth etc. Later on we make specific dresses from the cloth manufactured. When a customer goes to a shopkeeper to buy a specific cloth, then his intention is not the earlier forms or later forms of cloth but the form of the cloth made for sale or use. Even though we use the term cloth from ginning to the last stage, yet the intention of the customer is with the cloth in salable form only and not its pre and post stages. If the shopkeeper presents him ginned cotton or spun thread etc, then they being the non-self-same nature of the cloth, the customer will reject them outright as he is looking for ready cloth only. Similarly for a customer looking for old rice or jaggery (*gūda*), newly harvested rice or jaggery is non-self-same nature and hence rejected by the customer. In this manner, based on the time we can decide about the self-same and non-self-same natures of the entity. If we do not accept differences due to time, then the distinction of old-new, past present future, early late, under construction and constructed, small and big former and later etc. will disappear making our day-to-day life and understanding impossible.

On the other hand if we do not accept differences due to time, then the evolutionary (*arthakriyā*) nature of the entity itself-same cease to exist in the entity. If in the present time, we do not accept manufactured cloth as the self-same-nature of cloth, then its utility as cloth will disappear. As a result it will not be called as cloth even though it is cloth. Hence to accept an entity as entity during the time of its transformation / activity is also the acceptance of the self-same nature of the entity.

In the present time the entity is in self-same nature. . This is its self-same nature but a moment earlier, its colour was blue and a moment later I will be of white colour are its non self-same nature. A man was an honest person in his previous life but in the present life, he is a crook, creates violence and causes terror, then the judge will declare him as a terrorist based on his present nature and the law will punish him suitably. If we do not the previous life with the present one, then he will be declared as honest and good person only and the administration of law and judiciary system to punish him will become wrong. Hence the present time is also the contributing factor in deciding the self-same nature of the entity.

The self-same and non self-same natures of the entity are also established based on the sensory perceptions. An entity can be recognized based on the eye's perception. In such entities we are basing our decision only on the form and colour attributes of the entity and not of touch taste etc. as the subject of cognition by eye is just form and colour only and not any other attributes. So the form and colour of the entity will become the self-same nature of the entity and other attributes as non self-same natures based on eye perception. If we consider taste also as self-same nature then the question of taste becoming a subject of eye will arise thereby eliminating the need for taste sense organ. One type of sense organ cognizing all attributes of an entity is contrary of our real life experience. Similarly not accepting form and colour as self-same nature of the eye is also contrary to real life experience and making cognition of concrete objects like mirror as round or square impossible.

We can also draw definition knowledge about an entity based on specific word used to denote it. As per etymological viewpoint (*Samabhirūṭha naya*), every word, used to express an entity, conveys a specific meaning. This meaning is self-same nature of the intended entity. For example, using the word house denotes a building with many rooms built of stones, bricks, cement etc. as its self-same nature while a cottage or palace shall be its non self-same nature. Using the word pitcher denotes a spherical and big object made of clay, hence using the word pitcher makes pitcher as its self-same nature and *surāhī* (pitcher with a spout) or a jug will be its non self-same nature.

Activity at the present time of the entity also conveys the self-same nature of the entity. A person is called teacher while he is teaching, is called a woman cleaning the house will be called a maid or housewife (depending on her actual status). Determinant viewpoint (*Evañbhūta naya*) will not call the same person as teacher when he is not teaching or the maid / housewife as maid while they are not cleaning the house. In such a situation saying the person as teacher, the act of teaching is his self-same nature and the student or other persons will be its non self-same nature.

Similarly on the basis on substance, mode, place and time we can establish the self-same and non self-same

natures of the entity. The basic substance of which an entity is made of can be established under the substance viewpoint analysis. For example a gold ornament has gold as its self-same and silver as its non self-same nature. Similarly for the silver ornament silver will become its self-same and gold a non self-same nature.

Saying the peppers from Gohana will indicate that the pepper was grown in Gohana establishing Gohana as its self-same nature and other places as its non self-same nature. Time has been discussed before. From the mode viewpoint, a specific state (mode) of the entity is considered. By saying black handkerchief establishes black colour as its nature and other colours as its non self-same nature. By saying a triangular stone, the triangular form becomes its nature and squares form its non self-same nature. Saying a flower with pleasant odour will make pleasant odour as its self-same nature and foul odour as its non self-same nature; saying Maruti car will make Maruti as its self-same nature and Honda, sumo etc as its non self-same nature.

Establishing nature of an entity from substance, mode, time and place is very important. From substance viewpoint, we establish the nature of cause-effect relationship also. Knowing that milk is the basic substance of curd conveys that milk is the material cause of curd and nothing else. In this cognitive world, there are two types of entities namely living and non-living beings. Knowing this we realize that different activities and combinations of these two types of entities cause this world. Similarly seed is the cause of tree and tree is the effect of seed. As against this, without the knowledge of substance, it becomes difficult to know from where and what an entity is produced. Similarly place is a very important consideration to determine the self-same nature of an entity. By knowing the different places of growing / manufacturing entities we can know where from to export and import those entities or go for tourism. Knowing that the media of motion and rest are omnipresent in the universe, we can determine / assign limitations as to the place and moment of the entities. Space, due to its infinite size is called omnipresent. Place occupied by small, medium and large entities is only parts of the same omnipresent substance space (*ākāśa*). This way place is also an important viewpoint to determine the self-same nature of the entity.

Time also affects an entity. By accepting an entity as it is in past, present and future, we accept it as eternal only and not accepting it in any time will make it non-existent. Every mode of the substance has been related to it at some time; be it past or present or future. This establishes its existence. Solid, liquid and gaseous states of water exist at different times and in those times; it is also taken as water only thereby adding to its usability. Hence time is also an important aspect to establish the self-same nature of an entity.

Mode also plays an important role in determining the self-same nature of an entity. With reference to the security of India, an Indian only will be trained in defense forces and not a Pakistani. Even though both are human beings in form. If we wish to make *lassi*, then we need curd and not milk even though curd is made from milk. When we wish to eat, we are not served wheat but bread made out of wheat even though bread is made from wheat only. While worshipping we shall worship God or some divine being only and not an ordinary human being even though both are living beings. In this way even though the substance is same or similar yet over a period of time, its perception changes considerably. By studying Jain view of self-same and non self-same nature of an entity, we appreciate the wide applicability, uniqueness and methodology of analyzing an entity as per Jain thinking. In this methodology of analysis with reference to the reality, all expressions (statements) made are validated in specific contexts. We can thus analyse most of the socio-political-scientific and practical issues and find their resolution. ‘*ū ś ñ ṛ ā ṣ ī g ṛ*

Questions

1. Essay type questions

Explain with examples the self-same and non self-same natures of an entity in different contexts. Answer briefly the following questions

- An entity is *Anekāntica* as well as having many attributes. Clarify this statement.
- Explain the self- same and non self-same natures of an entity with reference to substance, time, place and mode viewpoints.

2. Other questions-

Fill in the blanks in any five sentences.

- i. Along with having many attributes, an entity has many pairs of
- ii. Existence is And non existence is
- iii. All entities go through origination-destruction-permanence in their
- iv. Jain ācāryas call existence and entity as
- v. All existents in the universe are existences.

3. Answer in one word. How many compound *bhaṅgas* of two *bhaṅgas* present in *Saptabhaṅgī*?

- i. Meaning of evolving (transforming) eternal.
- ii. Examples of pairs of opposing attributes in an entity.
- iii. What is transformation of substance called?
- iv. Can origination, destruction and permanence exist by maintaining their independence from each other? If not why not?
- v. Indicative properties of eternal and momentary states?

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Anekānta, Naya, Niksepa and syādvāda

Unit – 5 Lesson – 13 Origin & development of *Syādvāda* (conditional dialectic) and *Anekāntavāda* (multiplicity of viewpoints)

All significant philosophies in the world have their distinct visions / characteristics. These visions / characteristics are propagated by their principal preceptors. For example Shankaracharya's vision of Mono-ism and Buddha's vision of Middle path were their respective religion's main precepts. Jain philosophy is a significant philosophy of India and is also a significant religion also. Therefore it must have a significant characteristic of its own which is nurtured by its preceptor and important persons and it is there. This characteristic of Jains is known as *Anekāntavāda* or multiplicity of viewpoints. It is the basis of Jain metaphysical discussions and validity of ethical postulates. In other word, it analyses different metaphysical and ethical postulates from different viewpoints to establish their validity. The only way to establish this validity is the *Anekānta* way of thinking. *Syādvāda* (conditional dialectic) is only an expression of *Anekānta* in language i.e. words. Hence *Syādvāda* should not be considered different from *Anekāntavāda*.

1.0 Antiquity of *Anekāntavāda* and its founder.

Mahāvīra is the proponent of present day Jain religion and philosophy. Hence according to Pt. Sukh Lal, Mahāvīra established the basic characteristics and *Anekāntavāda* of Jain philosophy. He further states that a close analysis of the thought process and other historical facts of Jain philosophy and religion will show that its characteristics were established long before Mahāvīra. Traces of *Anekāntavāda* can be found in Vedic literature, which is considered pre Mahāvīra, and Buddhist literature of the same time as Mahāvīra. Besides this Bhagavāna Pārasvanātha existed before Mahāvīra and he must have participated to a significant extent in description and establishment of *Anekāntavāda* even though his principles are not traceable in his own words. However it can be clearly established that Mahāvīra has definitely propagated *Anekāntavāda*, as it exists today, discussed and further refined in Jain texts and also discussed by different philosophies in their texts, must be at least 2500 years old. The main credit for its origin goes only to Mahāvīra as the crisp way in which *Anekāntavāda* is discussed and further refined in Jain texts is not seen in any other old religious texts.

Ācārya Śānta Rakṣita of the famous Buddhist Research Institute in Nālandā, in his book *Tattvasaṅgraha* while analyzing *Anekāntavāda* refutes it as the characteristic of Jain, Sāṅkhya, Mīmāṃsaka philosophers. This statement proves that till 7th and 8th century AD, Buddhist and other philosophers used to think of *Anekāntavāda* as not only belonging to Jains but also to Jain, Sāṅkhya, Yogadarśana and Mīmāṃsaka philosophies.

Ślokavartika of Mīmāṃsaka and *Pariṇāmavāda* related discussions in the texts of Sāṅkhya philosophies clearly establish *Anekāntavāda* as belonging to them also. Still Pt. Sukh Lal says that even though the description of *Anekāntavāda* in Sāṅkhya, Yogadarśana and Mīmāṃsaka exists yet it is not so crisp and vivid as in Jain texts. The efforts made by non Jain philosophers to establish *Anekāntavāda* is not even 1% of the extensive effort made by Jain philosophers to establish *Anekāntavāda*. This is the reason that today whenever any discussion of *Anekāntavāda* or *Syādvāda* immediately invokes its belonging to Jain philosophy. The reason for this is that Jain scholars have written very voluminous texts on *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādvāda*. They have supported *Anekāntavāda* in logical discussions and literature and overshadowed the scholars opposing it.

Conclusively two facts emerge, namely:

- Any other philosopher or proponent of other religions before or during Mahāvīra time never made such a crisp and extensive use of *Anekāntavāda* as did Mahāvīra.
- The amount of efforts made by the followers of Mahāvīra to explain and logically defend *Anekāntavāda* is beyond comparison of what other thinkers have put in.

1.1 Historical background of *Anekāntavāda*.

To know the original contribution of Mahāvīra in the old metaphysical discussion, there is no other better means than the canonical texts. According to Dalasukhabhāi Mālvāṇiyā, the metaphysical considerations of Jain texts

are older than Mahāvīra's time. This implies that the metaphysical thinking of Bhagavāna Pārasvanātha and Bhagavāna Mahāvīra is not different. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra has definitely made some changes to the ethical postulates propagated by Bhagavāna Pārasvanātha, which can be traced to Praśnavyākaraṇa and Utrādhyaṇa canonical texts. Mahāvīra clarified the unusual and difficult philosophical questions, which arose during his time, in a unique way. They can be considered as his unique and distinguishing contribution. A living being is born and then dies were not unique things. Similarly an atom's different modes are created and destroyed in the universe was also accepted then. But what is the nature of both living and non-living being which is acceptable so that different events occurring can relate to their interaction was a new question and there were many similar more questions. Different philosophers came up with their own solutions but the way Mahāvīra answered these questions keeping the past, present and future in mind was indeed unique and latter Jain philosophers further clarified the same.

The uniqueness of metaphysical doctrines of Mahāvīra in the form of *Anekāntavāda* can also be established by canonical texts of Jains. Bhagavatisūtra talks of ten dreams of Bhagavāna Mahāvīra before he became omniscient. The third dream is as follows:

'*Egaṃ c mahāñ citta vicitta pakkhagaṃ pūhsakoelagaṃ sūviṇepasitta ṇaṃ padibuddhe*' i.e. he became wise by seeing a bird *pūhskokila* with many feathers having unusual and different colours. This dream is explained in another sentence as follows. '*samaṇe bhagavaṃ Mahāvīre viccitaṃ sasamayaparasaṃmayaeyaṃ duvālasangaṃ gaṇipidagaṃ ādhaveti pannaṇaveti paruveti.*' I.e. this dream implies that Bhagavāna Mahāvīra will deliver sermons of unique doctrine of self-same and non self-same nature of an entity through the *Dvādaśāṅgī*.

In these sentences, the words *citta vicitta* i.e. unique and different are noteworthy. Describing the feathers of the bird *pūhskokila* as big feathers and unique and with different colours implies that the canonical texts shall be based on *Anekāntavāda* with many colours. Dalasukhabhāi Mālvāṇiyā concludes from these statements that the contexts and references to unique and different colours of the feathers of a large bird leads to the uniqueness of the *Anekāntica* sermons of Mahāvīra.

In the times of canonical times, *Anekāntavāda* was popular as *Vibbhajyavāda* (expression by breaking/dividing the entity) and *Syādavāda* (conditional dialectic). In Sutrakratāṅga, the question is raised to Mahāvīra as to what type of language the monk should use? The reply to this question was *Vibbhajyavāda* '*bhikkhu vibhavāyaṃ ca viyāgarejjā*' Bhagavāna Buddha also propagated *Vibbhajyavāda*. In Majjhimanikaya, Buddha while replying to the questions of Śūbhamānavaka says 'O Māṇavaka here I am *Vibbhajyavāda* and not *ekāntavādi* (mono-ist or with single viewpoint only).' He was seeking Buddha's viewpoint through his question, 'I have heard that a householder is only a devotee and not a monk' Buddha replied to him that if a householder is also with wrong belief then he cannot be devotee and a monk with wrong belief also cannot be a devoted monk but if both are with right belief then they are devotees in their own way. In this example, by using the basis/cause of devotion, he says that both a householder and monk can be a devotee and not a devotee based on their right belief i.e. rather than answered the question based on one aspect only, he divides the questions in parts and answers each part separately is important to note here that Bhagavāna Buddha did not answer all questions using *Vibbhajyavāda*, but only those questions that could only be answered using *Vibbhajyavāda*.

The above discusses clarifies the distinction and differences between *Vibbhajyavāda* and *ekāntavāda*. Jain commentators explain *Vibbhajyavāda* as *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādavāda*. The difference between *Anekāntavāda* and *ekāntavāda* is also amply clear. (Even though there is a doctrinal difference between *Vibbhajyavāda* and *Anekāntavāda* as the first considers that an entity can be separated in parts for understanding while the later does not consider this possible and considers all its parts and aspects inseparable, still for simplicity of understanding, we consider them similar here). In such a situation, Sutrakratāṅga talks of *Vibbhajyavāda* as *Anekāntavāda*, *Nayavāda*, relativity or answering a question by breaking into parts and *Syādavāda*. In canonical literature we see the use of the term *syāt* for expressing relativity. '*siya rayaṇappabhā pūthavī atthi*' etc. Similarly we find *Syādavāda* with one or more *bhaṅgas*. Hence we can say that during time period of writing canonical literature, *Vibbhajyavāda* and *Vibbhajyavāda* were used interchangeably. As per Dalasukhabhāi Mālvāṇiyā, *Vibbhajyavāda* of Buddha was used in certain instances only while Mahāvīra's *Anekāntavāda* was used more extensively in different situations. This is the reason that Jain philosophy became *Anekāntavādi* later on and Buddhist philosophy progressed as propagating monism.

1.2 Growth of *Anekāntavāda*

As per Dalasukhabhāi Mālvāṇīyā, the limited applicability of Buddha's *Vibbhajjavāda* and his negative approach towards certain aspects played an important role in the growth and development of Mahāvīra's *Anekāntavāda*. Mahāvīra using *Anekāntavāda* explained the questions, which Buddha declared as inexplicable, beautifully. In fact, the problem approach which Mahāvīra used in replying to these questions were later as discussed and developed as *Anekāntavāda* and made applicable to all situations. Accordingly latter acaryas whole heartedly accepted and adopted this *Anekāntavāda* for problem resolution.

*Ādipamāvyomasamasvabhāvaṅ syādvadamūdrānatibhedi vastū
Tannityamaivekamanityamanyaditi tvadājñādviṣatān prālapā'*

In fact there were three questions, which dominated philosophical questions during Buddha's time.

- i. Eternity and temporary-ness of the universe (*loka*) and its being with or without boundaries.
- ii. Identity and difference between body and soul.
- iii. Existence or non-existence of life/soul of Tathāgata after his death.

On these three subjects, Buddha did say anything neither affirmatively nor negatively. If he says that soul or the universe is eternal, then he had to accept the doctrines of Upaniṣad's propagating soul and universe as eternal only. On the other hand if he says that they are momentary, then he had to accept the doctrine of Cārvāka (*Ucchedavādi*) doctrine of materialism only. It is thus clear that he found both these philosophies flawed. Even with this understanding he did not assign any significance /name to his doctrine but only said that these two i.e. Upaniṣad and Cārvāka, doctrines are not right. Hence he classified these questions as inexplicable or not worth discussions. Thus he made the way for the development and growth of *Anekāntavāda* clear. On the other hand Mahāvīra tried to analyse these questions and prevailing philosophies with both affirmative and negative aspects and presented his doctrine of reconciliation, which latter became popular as *Anekāntavāda* or improvised *Vibbhajjavāda*. All those questions, which Buddha did not want to answer in affirmative way, Mahāvīra was able to answer the same using *Anekāntavāda*. He tries to explain the fundamental vision of every philosophy and their limitations along with the additional needs in their explanations. He then presented the same before all philosophers and the same formed the basis of *Anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda*.

1.3 *Anekāntavāda* during the times of canonical literature.

With reference to understanding *Anekāntavāda* Jain canonical literature, we can form the same questions that Buddha classified as not worth discussions. This will help us understand crisply the aspects where Buddha did not wish to answer in negative; Mahāvīra established *Anekāntavāda* to uniquely answer the same.

Let us take the above three questions sequentially. The first one about 'Eternity and temporary-ness of the universe (*loka*) and its being with or without boundaries' The answers of Mahāvīra to this question are given in the chapter Skandaka in Bhagavatī. From this and other chapters, it becomes abundantly clear that Mahāvīra answered this question clearly, crisply and completely.

The essence of his reply is 'the universe is with limits from substance viewpoint because it is one in number. However from mode perspective it is infinite as modes are infinite. From time perspective also it is infinite i.e. it is eternal as there was, is and will be no time when the universe does not exist. From space viewpoint, the universe is with boundaries as in the entire space, because the universe exists only in a part of the entire space.

"evaṅ khalu maē khaṅdayā! Cauvvihe loye paṅṅate, taṅ jahā davvao khettao kālao bhāvao. davvo naṅ ege sa aṅte.

Khettao naṅ loye asaṅkhejjāo joyaṅakodākodio āyāma vikkhaṅbheṅṅaṅ asaṅkhejjāo joyaṅakodakodio parikkheve naṅ pannatā atthi puṅa sa aṅte.

Kālao naṅ loye na kayāvi na āsi, ... ṅatthi pūṅa se aṅte.

Bhāvao naṅ loye anaṅtā va ṅ ṅ apajjvā ... ṅatthi pūṅa se aṅte.'

In the above example, usage of the words *sānta* i.e. with an end (or limited) and *anañta* (or infinite) has been made primarily to establish *Anekāntavāda*. Buddha kept both with limits and infinite aspects of the universe in the category of inexplicable while Mahāvīra explained limited and infinite nature of the universe.

Similarly explanations concerning 'eternal and temporary nature of the *loka*, while Buddha kept it in the category of inexplicable, Mahāvīra used his *Anekāntavāda* and said '*sāsae loye Jamālī, janna kayāvi ṇasi, ṇo kayāvi ṇa bhavati, ṇa kayāvi ṇa bhavissai bhuvin ca, bhavai ya, bhavissai ya, dhuve ṇitie sāsae akkhae avvae avatithae nicce*' '*asāsae loye Jamālī, jao osappi ṇi bhavai, ussappiṇi bhavittā osappiṇi bhavai*' i.e. Jamālī! This *loka* is both eternal and also momentary both. There was no moment in the past, when *loka* was not existent in some form. Hence it is eternal. But it is momentary also as *loka* does not stay same for even the two consecutive moments. Because of the time cycles of increasing (*utasarpiṇi*) and decreasing (*avasarpini*) intellect, there are both decay and progress in its form and content keep on taking place. An entity, which is always eternal, the same does not have any change taking place in it. Hence we should consider *loka* both as eternal and momentary also.

The second question was the identity and difference between body and soul. Buddha kept this question also in the category of inexplicable but Mahāvīra answered it. In response to Buddha's answer, He said that the body is same as soul as well as different from soul also. In so saying two questions arise further i.e. the body should be like soul non-concrete as well as conscious also. To his he replied 'the body is both concrete and non-concrete and conscious and without conscious also'. Their dialogues proceeded as follows:

*Āyā bhante! Kāye anne kāye!
Goyamā! Vi kāye annevi kāye!
ruvi bhante, vi kāye anne vi kāye!
Goyamā ! ruvin vi kāye aruvin vi kāye!
Evan ekkakke pucchā
Goyam! sacitte vi kāye acitte vi kāye!*

The third question was about the eternal and non-eternal nature of Tathāgata i.e. soul. Buddha again said that the question about the stated of soul as not of any use and kept quite concerning existence of Tathāgata after death. But Mahāvīra talked about different destinies of soul and the benefit of such discussions leading to the attainment of liberation /salvation. Hence he used the doctrine to reply to the question of soul after the death. According to him Tathagāta or *Arhat* exists even after death as he does not get destroyed but is transformed as *siddha* but the mode of human being with karma associated with it get destroyed. Hence Tathagāta or *Arhat* after their death do not exist as human being but exist as *siddha* i.e. without associated body and karmas and just as pure soul .

'kammao ṇaṅ bhante jīve no akmmao vibhattibhāvaṅ pariṇamāi kammao ṇaṅ jaye no akammao vibhattibhāvaṅpariṇamāi. Hañta Goyam' (Bhagavati 12/5)

Similarly the following dialogue proves the eternal and non-eternal nature of *jīva*. '*Jīva ṇaṅ bhante! Kiṅ sāsaya asāsaya. Goyamā! Jīva siya sāsaya siya asāsaya! Goyamā, darvagthayāe sāsaya bhāvagthayāe asāsaya'* (Bhagavati 7/2) .

It is thus clarified that soul is eternal from substance viewpoint (absolute viewpoint) and from mode viewpoint (i.e. changing forms or practical viewpoints, it is non-eternal. Here the attempt is made using *Anekāntavāda* to again bring reconciliation between both eternal-ist (mono-ist) and the *ucchedavādi* who believe in just temporary or momentary nature of existence. The substance *jīva* with consciousness is never destroyed supports the view of eternal-ist while the existence of many states /modes of the *jīva* bonded with karmas and body supports the view of those who believe existence to be of momentary nature. He has clearly agreed that childhood, youth etc are only temporary states of *jīva* and hence keep changing.

Similarly He also answered using *Anekāntavāda* about one or infinite existences of *jīva*. He says '*jīva* is one with respect to its substance, with limits with respect to its space, infinite with respect to time and modes' In this way it is both one with limits and infinite also. From time and modes viewpoint, there is no end of soul (*jīva*) but with substance viewpoint it is one and from space viewpoint it has limits/boundaries. '*aṇoraṇṇyān mahato mahāyān'*

statement of Upiṣad had been thus refuted. Mahāvīra did not accept the omnipresence of one soul only and so says that the every soul (he considers existence of infinite souls in this universe) as substance has limits to its size. He also accepts the infinite nature of soul from time perceptive as well as stated that from consciousness and knowledge perspectives/attributes and other modes, each soul has infinite existence because old modes keep on destroying and new modes keep on originating. Thus from mode viewpoint, soul can be said as infinite.

Besides the above questions, Mahāvīra used *Anekāntavāda* to clarify and explain issues concerning identity cum different existences of substance and modes, eternal and non-eternal existence of *paramāṇu* (atom), cause-effect etc. Hence we find that Jain canonical texts have explained one-many, eternal and non-eternal, *asti-nāsti*, etc opposing pairs of attributes as coexisting in an entity using *Anekāntavāda*. The latter Jain *ācāryas* have used logic extensively to refute the counter claims of other philosophies and established *Anekāntavāda* firmly to prove the validity of above and other explanations of Mahāvīra. With the explosion of philosophical discussions and the increase in the scope in the number and type of questions, the domain of *Anekāntavāda* also kept on increasing. But as per Dalasukhabhāi Mālvāṇīyā, the fundamentals of *Anekāntavāda* stayed the same and not change. If during canonical literature *Anekāntavāda* is used to explain the identity cum difference in substance and modes, soul and body etc, then in philosophical era it is used to establish the identity cum difference between generic-specific; substance and attribute, substance and activities etc. Even though the scope of such discussions appear to be growing yet the basic question being discussed is the identity and difference of substance and its modes. Similarly other present day discussions are based on identity cum difference of eternal – non-eternal, one-many etc as discussed in Jain canonical texts and hence the applicability of *Anekāntavāda* kept on increasing.

Both *Anekāntavāda* and *Vibbhajyavāda* accept existence of pairs of opposing attributes in some way or the other. Therefore both were to some extent considered as synonyms of each other. However existence of opposing attributes can be accepted only with a specific viewpoint only. With this consideration, the use of 'syāt' in each sentence was established. Hence *Anekāntavāda* also became popular as *Syādvāda*.

1.4 Period of establishing *Anekāntavāda* and the philosophical era.

Buddhist philosophers like Nāgārjūna, Asaṅga, Vasūbandhū and Dignāga gave a new direction to Indian philosophical traditions. Ā established the concept of relative nature of an entity using *Sūnyavāda* of Buddhists to all philosophers including Buddhists. He said that an entity has is without existent, non-existent, evolutionary or non-evolutionary as nature. An entity cannot be described in any manner. Ā thus established that an entity is without any nature of its own. Entity has no nature of its own. Asaṅga, Vasūbandhū, both brothers tried to establish knowledge as the nature of entities thereby denying the existence of insentient entities. Dignāga, a disciple of Vasūbandhū also supported their description of the entity thereby giving a different direction to Buddhist philosophical thinking. Therefore he is referred is the father of Buddhist logic. On the basis of logic doctrine, he also established the Buddhist doctrine of momentary nature of an entity. All other streams of Indian philosophy have so far tried their might to refute Buddhist philosophy. Naiyāyika Vātsayāyan tried to establish the existence of modes as the nature of soul and other entities and thus refuted the statements of Nāgārjūna and other Buddhist philosophers. Mīmāṃsaka Śabara tried to establish the Godly (and not human) authorship of Vedas by refuting the statements of all Buddhist philosophers. Even the statements by Mīmāṃsakas '*sarva kṣaṇikam*' were refuted and hence establishing the eternal nature of soul. Saṅkhya philosophers also tried to support their doctrines. Dignāga refuted claims of all these philosophers and re-established the Buddhist doctrine of the entity with sentience as its nature. These philosophical arguments continued till the 5th century AD and were used extensively by Jains to establish the supremacy of *Anekāntavāda*. *Nayavāda* i.e. multiplicity of nature of the entity from different viewpoints was the hallmark of Mahāvīra's doctrine all through. Based on the four angles, i.e. substance, mode, time and place, the nature of an entity was established in canonical literature. Similarly the beginning of an enquiry in the nature of any entity was made using *Nikṣepas* (positioning or presentation methods) like name, assigning to another entity (*sthāpna*), substance and mode is abundantly found in canonical literature.

Siddha Sena, after careful evaluation of canonical literature, he in his books like *Sanmati Tarka* and the *Dvātrīṅśikās* in adoration of the omniscient lords, strongly supported *Anekāntavāda*. He did this in the 5th century Vikrama. If we examine the period 1st to 5th century AD, i.e. the philosophical era in India, we will find that the existence of philosophers like Dignāga created a need for a gifted philosopher like Siddha Sena in Jain philosophy and

the same was not just a coincidence. Siddha Sena was a very strong logician. Hence he presented the Jain doctrines in a logical manner using *Anekāntavāda*. His biggest contribution was that he developed reconciliation of different philosophic doctrines in different *nayas* (viewpoints) of *Anekāntavāda* i.e. using different *nayas*, he tried to establish validity of different philosophic considerations. For example, *advaitvāda* was held valid by class view (*saṅgraha naya*) of substance viewpoint, Momentary-ness of Buddhist was held valid from mode viewpoint's linear viewpoint (*rjusutra naya*). Sāṅkhya was held valid from substance viewpoint and Vaiśeṣika in both substance and mode viewpoints. He said that the number of *nayas* is same as the number of methods of speech and all of them are a part of *Anekāntavāda*.

*Jāvaiyā vaya ṇapahā tāvaiya ceva honti ṇayavāyā
Jāvaiyā ṇayavāyā tāvaiyā ceva parasamaya.*

He also said that each philosophy is with flaw as long as they try to prove other philosophies with flaws and do not try to understand their viewpoints. '*para viyālaṇe mohā*'. Hence the philosophers are not able to understand the flaws of their philosophy and the significance of other philosophies. A person who is neutral to all these viewpoints only can see their flaws and merits. Based on *Anekāntavāda*, we shall find that *Advaitvāda* is also valid from a viewpoint, which considers the identity of a human being in its different states. When we look at the identity of a person, then its differences become secondary and immaterial to him. Their philosophy is thus valid from substance viewpoint. But another person does not consider the identity viewpoint and looks at every entity from differences in them viewpoint i.e. emphasizes mode viewpoint, then he will see differences only. In fact there are both identity and differences coexistent in the entity. Sāṅkhya considered identity only as primary while Buddhists considered differences only as primary and both were busy refuting each other. Hence they are both flawed. However according to *Anekāntavāda*, both of them are correct from different viewpoints i.e. those believing in identity and the other believing in the differences of entities. He thus establish the validity of *Anekāntavāda*. Thus we see reconciliation of the two different viewpoints in *Anekāntavāda*. In relative terms, the differences between both these philosophies disappear. Similarly Siddha Sena reconciled eternal and non-eternal, existence and non-existence etc opposing attributes of entities by bringing about reconciliation in the existence of opposing attributes in an entity.

Like Siddha Sena, Samanta Bhadra also did a yeoman's service to establish *Anekāntavāda*. He brought about the flaws of prevailing philosophies and hence the correctness or validity of *Anekāntavāda*. *Syādvāda*. His specific contribution is the application of *Saptabhāṅgi* in reconciling the existence of opposing attributes in an entity. In fact Āpta Mimāṃsā by Samanta Bhadra has proved to be an excellent text in establishing the validity of *Anekāntavāda*. Who is to be considered as Āpta (all knowing or omniscient person)? In response to this question he proved that only *Syādvāda* is flawless. Hence the preachers of this doctrine i.e. *Syādvāda* only can be flawless. By pointing to the flaws of other philosophies, he established that the proponents of those philosophies couldn't be omniscient. In Yuktanūśāsana he established these flaws in other philosophies and proved that such flaws do not exist in Jain philosophy and the special doctrines of Jains do not exist in other philosophies.

Mallavādī, commentator of Sanmati Tarka, in his text Nayacakra written in the fifth century of Vikrama era, has uniquely reestablished *Anekāntavāda*. The author has tried to establish that all viewpoints are like a wheel in which every latter doctrine appear to be more logical than the earlier doctrine. But this strength or weakness of a doctrine over the other is relative only. It cannot be said that a specific doctrine is stronger than the other. Every philosopher is able to see the strength or weakness of his philosophy himself and thus establishing the validity of *Anekāntavāda*. Sainghāṇi in seventeenth century AD wrote a commentary on Nayacakra in 18000 verses thereby detailing all the doctrines discussed in Nayacakra. Thus during this period known as philosophical era of Indian philosophies, all Jain *ācāryas* tried their best successfully to establish the validity of *Anekāntavāda*. Thus the latter *ācāryas* were required only to counter the new questions raised by latter philosophers.

1.5 *Anekāntavāda* during the era of *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) doctrine.

During this period Jain *ācāryas* defended and enhanced the doctrine of *Anekāntavāda*. Ācāryas Hari Bhadra and Akalaṅka gave a great momentum to the growth and enhancement of *Anekāntavāda* by responding logically and effectively to its refutations being made by others. Ācārya Hari Bhadra wrote Anekanta Jaya Pataka Ācārya. Akalaṅka wrote commentary on Āpta Mimāṃsā by the name Aṣṣgasati and refuted all counter arguments of Buddhist philosophers.

After this Vidhyā Nandi wrote Aṣṣasahastrī and established *Anekānta* as flawless. He considered all the arguments against *Anekānta* till then in his book Tattvārthaślokavārtika and presented their reconciliation through *Anekāntavāda*. Between 10th to 12th centuries AD after Vidhyā Nandi, Māṇikyā Nandi, Abhaya Deva, Prabhā Candra, Vādi Deva Suri and Hema Candra wrote Paṅkṣā Mukha, Commentary on Saṁmatī Tarka, Prameya Kamala Mārtanda, Laghistraya and Syādavāda Ratnākara to explain *naya* and *Anekānta* in details.

1.6 *Anekāntavāda* in the new logic era.

Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya was the pioneer of the new logic era of Indian philosophies. He was born in 1205 Vikrama. He developed the new method of Indian logic. Since then all Indian philosophers used his methodology for philosophical discussions. However none of the Jain philosophers till Yaśovijay came used his method. This resulted in isolation of Jain philosophers from 12th to 17th centuries AD from the main Indian philosophical discussions. In the beginning of 17th century AD, Yaśovijaya moved towards Kāśī and acquired expertise in all philosophical discussions and wrote a number of texts on Jain doctrines including *Anekānta*. He thus reestablished *Anekānta* by writing *Anekānta Vyavasthā*, wrote new commentaries on Aṣṣasahastrī and Śāstravārtāsamuccaya thereby presenting them in new form/ style. He also wrote Jain Tarkabhāṣā and Jñānabindu on *pramāṇa* and Nayapradeepa, Nayarahasya and nayopdeśa on *naya* doctrines. During this period, Vimala Dāsa wrote Saptabhaṅgitarāṅgī to explain *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādavāda*.

1.7 *Anekāntavāda* in modern times.

Modern scholars in Hindi and English have written a number of books on *Anekāntavāda*. It has now been established as a symbolic doctrine of Jains and used extensively for scientific, philosophical and every day life subjects. Hence the criticism, which were raised in the past are not being raised now. Still some scholars like Dr. Radhakrishnan, Shankaracarya etc equate *Syādavāda* with doubt-logy or indecisiveness etc. Satkarni Mukherjee wrote a book Non-absolutism and B.K. Matilal wrote 'The Central Philosophy of Jainism *Anekāntavāda*, to clarify some of these doubts. Ācārya Mahāprajña wrote *Anekānta hain tīsrā netra* and Satya ki khoj anekānta ke āloka mein to establish *anekānta*. Dr Bhikari Lal Yadav wrote his thesis on *Syādavāda* and Saptabhaṅgīniya. Similarly other writers have written books on *Anekāntavāda* to discuss it in light of other philosophies also. In this lesson we have thus studied development and growth of *Anekāntavāda* from canonical literature to modern times.

Questions

1. Essay type questions

Explain in details the origin, development and growth of *Anekāntavāda*?

2. Answer briefly the following questions

- Explain *Anekāntavāda* in canonical literature and philosophical era?
- Explain briefly the development of *Anekāntavāda* during new philosophical and modern times.

3. Answer in one word.

- What has been the basic doctrine of Jain philosophy?
- What was the basic doctrine of Sankaracarya for his philosophy?
- Has *Anekāntavāda* been discussed by other philosophies also?
- Which canonical text establishes Mahavira s the originator of Anekanta?
- What do you understand by *Vibhajyavāda*?
- What is the difference between *Anekāntavāda* and *Syādavāda*?
- What is the specific contribution of Siddha Sena in a *Anekāntavāda*?
- What is the specific contribution of Samanta Bhadra in *Anekāntavāda*?
- Is *loka* eternal or momentary as per *Anekāntavāda*?
- On what basis can we say body as non-concrete and sentient?

Reference texts: 1. Darśana aur Cintana Sukh Lal
2. Āgama yuga kā Jain darśana Pt. Dal Sukhbhai Malvania.

Author: Samaṇi Caintanya Prajñā

Anekānta, Naya, Niksepa and syādvāda

Unit – 5 Lesson – 14: Origin & development of *Nayavāda* (doctrine of viewpoints)

The source of origin of *Nayavāda* can be traced to Bhadrabahu's statement '*ṇaṭhi ṇaehi vihuṇaṇ sūttāṇ attho va jīṇamae kiṇci*' i.e. in Jain religious texts whether it is amorphous (*sūtra*) or its meaning (*artha*), it cannot occur with *Nayavāda*. Sermons of the omniscient (*Arhat*) and *Nayavāda* go hand in hand and cannot be separated from each other. In the present time cycle, sermons of Bhagavāna Mahāvīra are the source of origin of *Nayavāda*. As per *Āvaśyaniryukti* (734) and *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya* (3343), in the forenoon of the eleventh day of the bright fortnight of the month of Baisākha in the garden of Mahāsenavana, Bhagavāna Mahāvīra delivered his first sermons (*sāmāyika*) after attaining omniscience. Therefore his time and place can be considered as the time and place of the origin of *Nayavāda*.

1.0 *Nayavāda* of Bhagavāna Mahāvīra.

In his search for truth, Śramaṇa Mahāvīra adopted the viewpoint of relativity. Relativity is thus the foundation of *Nayavāda*. Like alphabets are the foundation of a language and Origination –destruction and permanence are the foundations of metaphysics; *Nayavāda* is the foundation / basis of *Anekāntavāda*. Mahāvīra's every statement and clarification highlighted use of *Nayavāda*. Some examples from Bhagavati are given below to support this statement.

- i. Gautama asks 'Bhaṇte! Whether soul (*jīva*) is eternal or non eternal?' Mahāvīra replied 'Goyamā! *Jīva siya sāsaya siya asāsaya . dāvvaḡṭhayaē sāsaya, bhāvvaḡṭhayaē asāsaya*' i.e. *Jīva* is possibly eternal as well as non-eternal. From substance viewpoint it is eternal and from mode viewpoint it is non-eternal. Bhagavati 7/58,59
- ii. Gautama asks 'Bhaṇte! Whether denizen of hell is eternal or non eternal?' Mahāvīra replied 'Goyamā! *Avvocchittinayadagṭhayaē sāsaya, Vvocchittinayadagṭhayaē asāsaya*' i.e. From identity (substance viewpoint), it is eternal and from differencing (mode viewpoint) it is non-eternal. Bhagavati 7/94
- iii. Bhaṇte! How many types of colour, taste touch and smell are there in a bumble bee? Mahāvīra replied 'Goyamā! *Ettha ṇaṇ do nayā bhavaṇti, taṇ jahā necchayaṇaē ya vāvahāiyanaye ya vāvahāriyanayassa kālaē bhambare, necchayaṇayassa paṇcavaṇṇe jāva sūṭhaḡṭhayaē paṇṇate*' i.e. Gautamā! This question can be replied in two ways. 1. From absolute (substance) and 2. Mode (practical or difference) viewpoints. From absolute viewpoint, it has five colour and eight touch types; and from mode viewpoint it is of black colour. Bhagavati 18/108
- iv. Bhaṇte! Is Ratna Prabhā a living being (soul)? Gautam! Ratna Prabhā is possibly living being, possibly non-living being and possibly inexplicable. How is it possible? It is a living being from its self-same nature and non-living being from the non-self-same nature. Bhagavati 12/211-212.

Skaṇḍaka asked 'Bhaṇte! Is the universe (*loka*) one or infinite? Mahāvīra replied 'Skaṇḍaka! From substance and space viewpoints it is one and from time and mode viewpoints it is infinite (Bhagavati 2/45).

Somila asked 'Bhaṇte! Are you one or many?' Mahāvīra replied 'Somila! From substance viewpoint, I am one and from substance viewpoint, I am two from the perspective of knowledge and perceptions; indestructible and existent from space viewpoint; many from the viewpoint of manifestations of consciousness. Bhagavati 18/219-220

From the above examples, it is clear that Mahāvīra's style of replying was based on relativity. He used the four angles / viewpoint i.e. space, time, substance and mode abundantly. Further he used absolute-practical viewpoints, identity-difference viewpoints, substance-mode viewpoints to answer vividly and crisply metaphysical questions. Therefore Siddha Sena said:

The words of Tirthaṅkaras are based on generic and specific attributes of the entity being inquired. These are represented by two viewpoints namely substance and mode. Substance viewpoint focuses on generic (identity) and Mode on specific (differences) attributes of the entity. Sanmati Tarka Prakaraṇa 1/3.

No substance is without modes having origination and destruction. Similarly no mode is without substance having permanence. On the basis of this attribute of all entities we have two viewpoints namely substance and mode.

Vedanta propagates identity or substance viewpoint only while Buddhists consider differences only or the mode viewpoint of reality only. Mahāvīra's doctrine saw partial truth in both these doctrines and hence proclaimed ' Every entity is with *asti-nāsti*, existence-non-existence, generic-specific, eternal - non-eternal pairs of opposing attributes. This is *Anekāntavāda*. Independently or exclusively neither substance nor the mode viewpoint is completely true, however relatively they are both true. This is *Nayavāda*. Meaning and commentary on every sutra/ amorphis was done based on *Nayavāda* otherwise misunderstanding or wrong interpretation was possible.

1.1 *Nayavāda* in canonical texts of Jains.

Nayavāda was in its developed stage while canonical texts were being written. . Ācāraṅga has a number of sutras, which can be understood based on *Nayavāda* only. For example some sutras from Ācāraṅga are given below:

- i. *je loyaṅ avbhāikkhai, se attāṇaṅ avbhāikkhai; je attāṇaṅ avbhāikkhai, se loyaṅ avbhāikkhai* 1/30.
- ii. *je ajjhatthaṅ jāṇai, se bahiyā jāṇai; je bahiyā jāṇai, se ajjhatthaṅ jāṇai* 1/147.
- iii. *je egaṅ jāṇai, se savvaṅ jāṇai; je savvaṅ jāṇai, se egaṅ jāṇai* 3/74
- iv. *je egaṅ nāme, se bahu nāme; je bahu nāme, se egaṅ nāme* 3/76

From the above examples, we see that the clear meaning of these dialogues can be understood only from different viewpoints. For this it is advised that the reader examines Ācāraṅga bhāṣya. It is clearly clarified in Ācāraṅga (2/177) that the monk should address the religious gathering keeping in mind the viewpoint of each listener (*ke yaṅ pūrise kaṅ ca naye*). Its explanatory text in Āvaśyaniryukti (731) is given below.

'asajja u soyāraṅ ṇaye ṇayavisārao buyā'

In the analysis and understanding of both metaphysics and ethics, doctrine of *naya* is useful. In Suyagado (2/5), Unitarianism is declared as flawed, impractical and wrong usage and *Anekānta* or multiplicity of viewpoints as right, practical and conduct. In seventeen pairs of opposing attributes have been identified, e.g.

- *Loka* is both eternal and non-eternal.
- Auspicious beings shall attain liberation and also shall not attain liberation.
- By killing small and big living beings, karmika bondage is both exemplary and non exemplary.
- Manifestation of *ādhākarma* results both in bondage and no bondage.

This type of analyzing and accepting conduct is right. Śīlāṅkasuri writes:

'ekanayadrasṅyāvadhāraṇātmaṅpratyayamanācāram' Vritti page 120

Contemplation and its expression done with only one viewpoint is flawed and wrong in discussions of principles. Usage in contemplation and its expression of *Nayavāda* and *Syādavāda* is right. Thāṇaṅ (3/402) has discussed hell using *Nayavāda*. Based on the first three *naya* types, planet hell is existent as a planet, while as per linear viewpoint, it is existent in space and according to the remaining three *naya* types it is resident in the soul only. On this basis we can classify *nayas* in three categories as follows:

- i. *Asuddha* the first three
- ii. *suddha* the fourth
- iii. More refined fifth to seventh.

In Thāṇaṅ (3/402), we find that a series of numbers being used as basic elements of determining *naya* types. There it is shown that one has four types and many also as one.

- i. Substance is one from substance viewpoint.
- ii. Basic element (*mātrakāpada*) of all *nayas* is one (origination, destruction and permanence).
- iii. Mode is one from mode viewpoint.
- iv. Class as one from class viewpoint as many are clubbed together as one.

Four types of many:

- i. Many substances. From an individual substance viewpoint there are many substances (like infinite living beings etc.)
- ii. Basic element of all *nayas* is one but from different *naya* viewpoints, each has a different basic element.

- iii. Mode is one but from an individual mode viewpoint, there are many modes.
- iv. Class is one but from one class viewpoint, there are many class types.

To understand the foundation of *nayavāda*, it is important to understand the above description of Thāṇaṅ. Substance, is one and many, mode is one and many etc. statements, which look opposite to each other but can be understood clearly by *nayavāda*. Substance viewpoint tries to adopt identity in different entities while mode viewpoint adopts differences in identical entities as the basis.

- Thāṇaṅ (7/36) talks of seven types of *nayas* namely Figurative viewpoint-*Naigam naya*, Linear viewpoint-*Rjusūtra naya*, Class view point-*Saṅgraha naya*, Distributive viewpoint-*Vyavahāra naya*, *Śabda naya*-the literal viewpoint, Etymological viewpoint-*(Samabhirūṭha naya)* and Determinant viewpoint-*(Evaṅbhūta naya)*
- Bhagavati talks of substance and mode viewpoints. We do not see seven types of *naya* discussed there.
- Samavāo (02-131) and Nandi (92-123) talk of 4 and 3 types of *nayas* respectively. Cūrṅikāra talks of 4 *nayas* namely class, distributive, linear and literal viewpoints.
- Ājīvaka philosophers talk of three *nayas* namely substance, mode and evolutionary (Nandi Cūrṅi pages 72,73).
- *Drīṣṭivāda* talks of different philosophies. However this text is non-existent now. Prajñāpanā is secondary canonical text (*angabāhiya*) by Śyāmācārya, which is considered as the essence of *Drīṣṭivāda*. '*Ajñayayaṇamiṇaṅ cittaṅ, suyayaṇaṅ digghivāyaṇisaṅdaṅ*' (Paṇṇavaṇā *gāthā* 3).'
- Prajñāpanā (16/46) uses the word *gati* in conjunction with *naya*, which is almost non-existent elsewhere. There *nayagati* is said to be as of seven types namely *naigama nayagati*
- Anuyogadvāra (715/2,3) uses the word *vacana* (spoken word or sentence) and also *vidhi* (many) in conjunction with or place of *naya* '*saṅghavayaṇaṅ ujjūsūyo naya vihi*'

We may thus conclude that there are as many *naya* types as the number of ways of thinking and their expression of the same. Hence *nayas* can be numerable, innumerable and infinite also.

2.0 New directions in naya development

According to Umā Svāti, there are five *nayas* namely figurative, class, distributive, linear and literal (Tattvārthasūtra 1/34). Later on in his commentary (Tattvārthasūtra bhāṣya 1/35), he has further divided literal viewpoint into literal, etymological and determinant also. Thus he also accepted seven types of *nayas*. Thāṇaṅ, Anuyogadvāra etc. say '*tiṅhaṅ saddanayaṇaṅ tina śabdanya*' has been used at many places. Hence all these three *nayas* can be clubbed together i.e. literal, etymological and determinant into literal viewpoint. Nandicūrṅi also agrees with this view.

According to Jinabhadraṅgī, the first four *nayas* focus on the object (*artha*) and hence termed as object viewpoint (*arthanaya*) while the remaining three focuses on the word and so called *śabda naya*. Umā Svāti has used the pairs of opposites like *jīva-no-jīva*; *ajīva-no-ajīva* to explain *nayavāda*. He further explains relationships of each *naya* to a specific type of knowledge.

Kunda Kunda, in *Samayasāra* and *Pravacanasāra* etc. mainly uses absolute viewpoint and practical viewpoint to explain concepts like soul, karma, and omniscient etc. He calls substance viewpoint as *bhūtārtha* and practical viewpoint as *abhūtārtha* also. In *Pañcāstikāya*, he calls *naya* as a type of verbal testimony (*śruta jñāna*).

Siddha Sena Divākara talks of six types of *nayas*. He does not agree to the independent existence of figurative viewpoint. In Nandicūrṅi (page 72,73) also, this *naya* is bifurcated as class and no-class and assigning them to class and distributive viewpoints respectively. Hence there are only four *nayas* i.e. class, distributive, linear and literal (containing the other two in it). Siddha Sena has further clubbed six *nayas* into two categories namely substance viewpoint (class and distributive) and mode viewpoint (remaining four). He says that class viewpoint is a better / purer version of substance viewpoint while distributive viewpoint is its limited version. Similarly linear viewpoint is the purer version of mode viewpoint while the remaining three are its limited versions.

3.0 Another explanation of Figurative and other viewpoints.

Jainācāryas, who were defending and establishing *Anekānta*, have analyzed figurative viewpoint in depth. Figurative viewpoint with focus on both identical and different attributes of entities uses many types of knowledge. As per MahāPrajña, it is indicative of *Anekāntavāda*. All philosophies in the world can be held as valid in this viewpoint

analysis. Umā Svāti changes *naigama* to *nigama* and translates it as civic body (municipality). Therefore figurative viewpoint tries to communicate appropriate meanings to words and related entities as used in the civic body. He has classified substance viewpoint as part (*deśa*) and whole (*sarva*).

Siddha Sena does not hold figurative viewpoint as valid for independent existence. He talks of six viewpoints. Nandicūrnīkāra also divides figurative viewpoint and clubs its parts with class and distributive viewpoints respectively. Vidya Nandi does not agree with them '*saṅgrāhe vyavhāre nānāntarabhāvah samikṣyate*' Class viewpoint is based on identical while distributive on differences in entities while figurative looks at them both.

According to Hema Candra Malladhari (Anuyogadvāra witti page 225), figurative and distributive viewpoints are mentioned in Anuyogadvāra (609) under the title explicable (*vaktavyatā*) by clubbing class viewpoint and figurative viewpoint (due to their focusing on identity in entities) or generic attributes while distributive focuses on specific. Since each entity has generic and specific attributes, therefore they are both called as *arthanaya* (object viewpoint). It is of three types namely:

- *Dravya naigama* i.e. grouping of two entities.
- *Paryāya naigama* i.e. grouping of two attributes
- *Dravya paryāya naigama* grouping of both entities and attributes.

Vidhya Nandi in Tattvārtha Ślokavārtika has further expanded these into nine types of viewpoints as follows:

- śuddha dravya naigama*
- aśuddha dravya naigama*
- arthaparyāya naigama*
- vyañjana paryāya naigama*
- ubhaya paryāya naigama*
- śuddha dravya arthaparyāya naigama*
- aśuddha dravya arthaparyāya naigama*
- śuddha dravya vyañjana paryāya naigama*
- aśuddha dravya vyañjana paryāya naigama*

One of the meanings of *nigama* is determination. Tattvārtha Ślokavārtika and Sarvārtha Siddhi talk of figurative viewpoint as one, which focuses on the determination of the speaker. In Kārtikanuprekṣā, we see the use of *vikalpa* (alternative) in place of *saṅkalpa* (determination). Because of its focus on determination, figurative viewpoint is the knowledge viewpoint. In Nayacakra and Dravyānuyoga Tarkaṇā etc, we see the use of three types namely past, present and future figurative viewpoint.

- In the example of *prasthaka* (wooden measure), in Anuyogadvāra, we see the three types namely *aviśuddha*, *viśuddha* and *viśuddhatara*.
- In Nayacakra, the one who calls *aprasthaka* as *prasasthaka* is classified as future figurative viewpoint?
- In Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya, three examples (*Nīlayana*, *Prasthaka* and *Gramā*) are given to explain *nayavāda*
- Hari Bhadra in Anuyogadvāravritti makes two types of substance viewpoint, i. *aviśuddhanaya* i.e. figurative and distributive viewpoints; and *śuddha* i.e. class viewpoint.

In this way we find that figurative viewpoint is used widely and it is of greatest use in daily life. Umā Svāti has called figurative viewpoint as the most practical one.

Class view has been further sub classified in two namely:

- parasaṅgrāha* or very general
- aparasaṅgrāha* or little general.

As per Anuyogadvāra, assigning a definitive meaning (object) to all substances is the function of distributive viewpoint. Commentator of Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya has translated definitive as specific also. '*niścayaḥ sāmānyah vigato niścaya sāmānyābhāva*'

Umā Svāti has called distributive viewpoint, which focuses primarily on differences as *laukikasama* and

lokopacāra. MahāPrajña does not agree with this definition of distributive viewpoint as assumed or gross view. All seven viewpoints are types of absolute viewpoint.

Figurative, Class and Distributive viewpoints are part of substance viewpoint. For Linear viewpoint, there are two views. Substance viewpoint accepts all the four types of presentation (*nikṣepa*) methods. Mode viewpoint accepts only node presentation method (*bhāvanikṣepa*). Anuyogadvāra (14) has considered the word *āvaśyaka* from *naya* and *nikṣepa* doctrines. There from linear viewpoint, an unsuitable (*anūpūktta*) man is called *dravya-āvaśyaka*. Siddha Sena has placed linear viewpoint in the category of mode viewpoint. He has further classified name, assign (*sthāpna*) and substance *nikṣepas* to substance viewpoints and mode *nikṣepa* to mode viewpoint. Jinabhadragarī on the other hand linear viewpoint accepts all the types of *nikṣepas*.

How can one *naya* accept both substance and mode viewpoints? When we keep relativity in mind, we see validity of both the views. In one substance is in the forefront while in the other mode is in the forefront of expression and thinking. Dhavalā talks of two types of linear viewpoint namely definitive (*śuddha*) and general (*aśuddha*)

Definitive linear viewpoint looks at a momentary mode (*artha paryāya*) while general linear viewpoint looks at a consecutive series of momentary modes (*vyanjana paryāya*) Hence substance *nikṣepa* can also be its subject. Nayacakra, Ālāpapadati and Dravyānuyogatarakaṇā divide linear viewpoint in two categories namely gross and subtle linear viewpoints. Uttarādhyana talks of the time limit of linear viewpoint as *antaramūhurata* (up to a maximum 48 minutes). On the other hand Dhavalā assigns time of one moment (*samaya*) to definitive linear viewpoint, while general linear viewpoint can have *antaramūhurata* and six months to numerable years. This statement is based on the *vyanjana paryāya* observed by eyes. Observed-observer, specific-special etc concepts are not acceptable to linear viewpoint. According to it, colour and mode are not a part of the substance. Akalanka has cited the example of a black crow in this regard. 'A crow is a crow and crow is black'. If the black colour is accepted as crow, then bumblebee etc all black things will become crow. If black colour becomes the nature of crow then its meat, bones etc will also have to be considered as black. This viewpoint also does not accept two modes and two relationships. If we do so, then our general understanding and way of life will become difficult. PujyaPāda has supported this point '*sarvanayasamuhāsādhyo hi lokasañvyavahāra*' i.e. practical life or way of life is established by collection of all *nayas*.

4.0 New directions in *nayavāda*.

Mallavādī has made significant contributions in this development of *nayavāda*. He has analysed all the philosophies prevailing during 5th century BC from different viewpoints. He says that the views of other philosophy/s are *naya* only. He has established the all encompassing and Anekānta doctrines of Jains by dispassionately studying, analyzing and comparing the virtues and flaws of all other philosophies.

‘*vidhiniyamabhaṅgavrativyatirikttatvādanarthaskavacovat,
Jaināḍonyacchāsanamanrtaṅ bhavatīti vaidharmyarm.*’

On the basis of this verse he wrote his text and claims its origin to the *purvas*. He has explained *nayas* in the form of a wheel. A wheel has twelve spokes. Accordingly he talks of twelve nays compared to the seven types discussed and accepted so far. These twelve *nayas* in *Dvādaśāranayacakra* are as follows.

- | | |
|---|--|
| i. <i>vidhi</i> | ii. <i>vidhi-vidhi</i> |
| iii. <i>vidhi-ubhaya (vidhi-vidhi aur niyama)</i> | iv. <i>vidhi niyama</i> |
| v. <i>vidhi aur niyama</i> | vi. <i>vidhiniyama –vidhi</i> |
| vii. <i>vidhi-niyama ke vidhiniyama (ubhayobhaya)</i> | viii. <i>vidhi niyama ke niyama (ubhayaniyama)</i> |
| ix. <i>niyama</i> | x. <i>niyama-vidhi</i> |
| xi. <i>niyama kā vidhi-niyama (niyamobhaya)</i> | xii. <i>niyama-niyama.</i> |

All these *naya* like spokes are attached to the *Anekānta* like hub. The first six types are part of substance viewpoint while the last six types belong to mode viewpoint. He has also grouped these twelve as per the seven *nayas* doctrine as follows.

Twelve bhangas

1st
2nd, 3rd and 4th
5th, 6th
7th
8th, 9th
10th
11th, 12th

Seven nayas

Distributive
Class
figurative
Linear
Literal
Etymological
Definitive

5.0 *Naya* and *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge or organs of valid knowledge)

Anekānta has two strong limbs namely *naya* and *pramāṇa* (*syādavāda*). Jain logicians have defined the object of knowledge using *naya* and *pramāṇa*. The method of expressing one attribute of an entity is called *naya* and expression of the entire entity using one attribute is called *syādavāda*. *Naya* is part while *pramāṇa* is whole or complete expression of the entity.

In Canonical literature time, the five types of knowledge were considered as *pramāṇa*. *Naya* was used to denote *Anekānta* and *syādavāda*. As per the requirements of the time, the *pramāṇa* doctrine was established during the era of logic (*dārśanikayuga*). Ārya Rakṣita in *Anūyogadvāra*, the first sutra starts with the five types of knowledge and the discussions on *pramāṇa* was included in the section on *Jñānagūṇapramāṇa*. There he has used the word *pramāṇa* in general or all encompassing form. Mode is useful in acquiring knowledge about an object of knowledge. Therefore *bhāva* or mode is also called a *pramāṇa*. Further as a type of *bhāva pramāṇa*, *naya pramāṇa* is mentioned and used. As per Samavāo (Prakīrṇa Samavāo 93), in *Bhagavatī*, number of questions has been answered using *anūgama-nikṣepa-naya-pramāṇa-upkrama*. As per these and *Anūyogadvāra*, the usage of the words *naya* and *pramāṇa* therein, it can be concluded that *naya* was used as a *pramāṇa* also. Similarly in *Uttarādhyayan*, we find use of both *naya* and *pramāṇa*.

*Davvāṇa savvabhāvā savvapamāṇehi jassa ubaladdhā,
Savvāhi nayavikīhi ya vitthārarūietti nayavvo'* *Uttarādhyayan 28/24*

He, who knows all the modes of all substances using all the *pramāṇas* and *nayas*, is said to have an inclination for details. It is therefore most likely that Umā Svātī on this basis has given the *sutra pramāṇanayananyaitidhigama*. He has described both *pramāṇa* and *naya* separately. Samanta Bhadra has also said that with the aid of *pramāṇa*, we know each part of an entity having an amalgam of many parts.

In the philosophical / logic era, another problem arose, i.e. whether *naya* is *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa*? Very knowledgeable *ācāryas* clarified this point saying that with *naya* we acquire valid knowledge of a part of an entity and hence it is not *apramāṇa* but is a part of *pramāṇa*. For example water in a pitcher cannot be called an ocean but it cannot be called a non-ocean but can be called a part of the ocean.

Siddha Sena, an exponent of reconciliatory approach, has given a vivid explanation of *nayavāda* in *Sanmati Tarka*. He also started discussions on *pramāṇa* in Jain philosophy. His text *Nyāyavatāra* is considered to be one of the first texts on *pramāṇa*. Akalanka is credited as the philosopher who developed the concept of *pramāṇa*. Through his texts *Laghistraya*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Siddhiviniścaya* and *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, he put *pramāṇavāda* on firm footing and gave new directions to *nayavāda*.

6.0 *Naya* and *Syāt* words.

Naya when expressed in sentences is called *nayavākya* or *sadvāda*. In *Bhagavatī* and other texts, *syāt* had been used with *nayavākya*s. Samanta Bhadra in *Svayambhustotra* has said a *naya* associated with the word *syāt* gives the desired results in cognitive process. Malliṣeṇa and Malayagiri both said that by associating *syāt* with a *nayavākya*, it becomes a *pramāṇavākya*. Akalanka used the word *syāt* in both *pramāṇa* and *naya* sentences. Akalanka has used the word *syāt* in both *nayavākya* and *pramāṇavākya*. Examples:

Pramāṇavākya. *Syāt jīva eva.*
Nayavākya *Syāt asti jīva eva.*

Hema Candra has used the word *sat* for *naya*. ‘*Sadeva sat syāt saditi tridhārtho, mīyeta durnūtinayapramāṇai*’ i.e. *sat* is wrong viewpoint (*dūrnaya*), *sat* is *naya* and *syāt sat* is *pramāṇa*.

Siddha Sena and other *ācāryas* have assumed three parts of a *naya* i.e. *asti*, *nāsti* and inexplicable. Akalanka has accepted *saptabhaṅgī* of *naya*. Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya (227) and Tiloyapaṇṇattī (1/82) have evaluated *naya-pramāṇa* as follows: ‘He who does not examine / determine in a systematic manner of an entity using *pramāṇa* and *naya*, he is liable to consider a wrong concept/ object as right.’

An expert of *nayavāda* knows correctly the entity as per an appropriate viewpoint (*naya*). He is immune to the viewpoint used by others and so does neither support nor oppose it. Therefore he is neither attached to the object of knowledge nor refutes the doctrines / principles.

7.0 *Naya* and reconciliation

By third century BC, the text Driṣṭivāda was almost extinct. Based on whatever was available of this text, Samanta Bhandra and Siddha Sena tried to bring reconciliation of various prevailing philosophies using *nayavāda*. Samanta Bhadra in Āpta Mīmāṃsā started the process of reconciliation using *saptabhaṅgī* to explain contradictory attributes like generic-specific, existent-nonexistent, eternal and non-eternal etc.

Siddha Sena in Sanmati Tarka compared other philosophies and established reconciliation between them using relativity e.g. he used for reconciliation, substance viewpoint for Sāṅkhya and mode viewpoint for Buddhist philosophies respectively. For Jain philosophy, he identified it as a collection of all flawed philosophies. According to him all *nayas* are flawed if viewed independently or in isolation (and not in relative terms) and they become right if used in relative terms. Sanmati Tarka again opened the doors for fresh developments of *nayavāda*. There are as many *naya* types and other philosophies as the ways to speak.

Based on the above vast vision of Siddha Sena, other Jain *ācāryas* also contributed a lot towards the development of *nayavāda*. Jinabhadragaṇī even went to the extent of saying that all other philosophies are benefactors of the right philosophy i.e. Jainism. Hence they are all acceptable.

Micchattasamuhamaṇaṅ sammattaṅ jaṇ ca taduvagarammi.

Vaggatti parasiddhaṅto tassa taṇ sasiddhaṅ Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya (949)

Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya has compared Buddhist using linear viewpoint, Vedānta and Sāṅkhya using class viewpoint, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika using figurative viewpoint to establish Jain philosophy as all encompassing philosophy. Malliṣena presented Cārvāka philosophy from flawed distributive viewpoint (Syādvāda Mañjari page 317).

Most probably this reconciliatory approach gave rise to another problem i.e. some philosophers started considering Jain philosophy as a collection of all flawed doctrines i.e. different viewpoints (*nayas*) as a collection of different doctrines. This happened as they did not understand the innovative and fundamentals of Jainism. They said ‘when other philosophies are flawed, how can their collective form be right?’ Tattvārathabhāṣya and Āpta Mīmāṃsā gave apt replies to these and other such fallacious observations. ‘Different viewpoints are not a compilation of different philosophies. Other philosophies are independent and not relative and hence flawed. Also they are not a random or independent collection of biased views. These viewpoints are the ways to determine precisely different attributes of an entity having infinite attributes.’ (Tattvārathabhāṣya 1/35)

‘Compilation of flawed views will be flawed. However *nayavāda* is not flawed as they are based on relativity of expression to an attribute. Hence flawed views become true as soon as they use the doctrine of relativity in their viewpoints.’ Āpta Mīmāṃsā 108

All *nayas* when considered as a group become whole representation of an entity. This is the nature of Anekānta. Mahavira gave a doctrine free of insistence of just one viewpoint. Therefore Tulsi said ‘*Āgrahaṭṭina gahan cintana kā dvāra hameśā khulā rahe, kaṇa kaṇa mein ādarśa tūmhārā paya-miśrī jyo ghulā rahe*’ i.e. the doors of our mind should be open and without prejudices when thinking, so that every moment your ideals are submerged in truth like sugar is in water.

8.0 Functions of *naya*

There are two functions of *naya*; acquiring knowledge about the object and its expression. Vidhyā Nandī according

grouped all *nayas* in two categories namely literal viewpoint for expression and cognitive viewpoint (*jñānanaya*) for acquiring knowledge. MahāPrajña says ‘ All *nayas* are cognitive in nature. Their function is not to create an object of knowledge but to know and express the object crisply. Reality is not divisible based on different *nayas*. But different *nayas* are enumerated based on different aspects of reality. Foundation of establishing different *nayas* is the substance, its unique nature and its infinite modes. These *nayas* are neither a collection of other philosophies nor a biased approach of anyone.’ (Jain nyāya kā vikās page 63-65)

8.1 Naya ki niṣpatti

There are three objectives of *nayavāda* i.e. refuting the wrong (*heya*), accepting the acceptable /truth (*upādeya*) and oppose the objectionable. Āvaśyaniryukti and Anūyogadvāra have clarified these with examples.

‘ After knowing the object clearly and crisply, one should adopt and practice the right view and discard the wrong view. This is *jñānanaya*. One who listens to the description presented from all the *nayas* and then adopts the right conduct and forgiveness etc is a monk and he is tight from all the *nayas*’. Anūyogadvāra 715/5,6.

In Jain tradition, growth and development of *nayavāda* is a continuous process. From time to time different acaryas contributed to its growth e.g. through their texts like Tattvārathabhāṣya, Āpta Mīmāṃsā, Sanmati Tarka, Tattvārthavārtika, Tattvārthasloka-vārtika, Dhavalā, Pramānanyatattvaloka, Sarvārtha Siddhi Nayacakra, Jain Darśana Manana aur Mīmāṃsā and Jain nyāya kā vikās etc.

Questions

1. Essay type questions

Explain the new developments of *nayavāda*?

2. Answer briefly the following questions

- Explain the style / method of expressing / answering questions adopted by Mahāvīra?
- Explain the types and sub types of *nayas*?

3. Fill in the blanks.

- Place of origin of *nayavāda* is
- There are two limbs /parts of *Anekānta*
- said that other philosophies (*paradarśana*) is Jain philosophy (*svadarśana*) also?
- Naya* has two functions 1....., 2.....?
- Naya* has three benefits 1....., 2....., 3.....?
- In the era, *pramāṇa* doctrine was started ?
- The fourth *bhaṅga* in Dvādaśara nayacakra is
- The seventh *bhaṅga* is *Naya*?
- Deśa paripekṣi* or a part view of an entity is a part of *naya*?
- In nine sub types of figurative viewpoint are given?

Reference texts:

- Angasuttāni
- Anuyogadvāra
- Śrī Bhikṣu Āgama Viṣayakoṣa
- Āgama yuga kā Jain Darśana
- Jain Darśana Manana and Mīmāṃsā
- Jain nyāya kā vikāsa
- Ārhatī Drṣṭi .

Author:

Sadhavi Siddha Prajñā

‘ ū ā ñ ṇ ś ṣ ī g ā Ś Ā

Anekānta, Naya, Nikṣepa and Syādvāda

Unit – 5 Lesson – 15 Origin & Development of *Nikṣepa* (Assignment / Assumption)

An object of knowledge is cognized using *pramāṇa* and *naya*. To cognize an entity, first of all we assign (*nikṣepa*) a name or a form or a substance (past or future existence) or an active state of existence to it. By so doing, it becomes easier to start acquiring knowledge about it. We shall try to understand this fact from an example.

- The entity must have a name. We assign the name 'pitcher' to an entity. This is its name assignment (*nāma nikṣepa*).
- Assignment of the entity to some thing else based on its form / figure etc is called *sthāpnā nikṣepa*. For example picture of the pitcher is called pitcher. To assign any specific entity as some other entity which we wish to know is *sthāpnā nikṣepa*, to call a bead or a piece of wood etc as pitcher. This is of two types namely the entity which has similar form / figure as the entity to be cognized is called *sadbhāva sthāpnā nikṣepa*; and to call some other dissimilar entity like wood, stone etc as pitcher is called *asadbhāva sthāpnā nikṣepa*.
- To assign pitcher to its past or future forms/ modes is called *dravya nikṣepa* e.g. to call soil (which is used to make the pitcher) or a broken piece of pitcher as pitcher is *dravya nikṣepa*.
- To assign the name to an entity when it is performing the function of that specific entity is *bhāva nikṣepa*, e.g. an entity being used to carry water is called pitcher.

'This is a pitcher', expression of this sentence conveys four questions

- In what way is it a pitcher? I.e. some one's name is pitcher and so it is being called a pitcher.
- We are assigning the name pitcher to some other entity.
- It is an old or future mode of the entity, which is being called pitcher.
- Is it being used to carry water and so is called a pitcher.

The word pitcher is used in these conditions. In what sense is the word pitcher used in these conditions is the function of assignment (*nikṣepa*). The use of the word with an accompanying adjective conveys the reference in which the word is being used. This doctrine of *nikṣepa* is used widely in Jain philosophical texts and discussions. It is a unique concept of Jains. Why did Jain *ācāryas* introduce the doctrine of *nikṣepa*?; what were the causes which existed to make its usage essential?; how was the *nikṣepa* methodology developed?; nature, definition, types and benefits of *nikṣepa* etc shall be discussed in this chapter.

1.0 Origin of assignment methodology (*nikṣepa*)

Substance has infinite modes. To know all the infinite modes, it is important to understand the word infinite use. In the dictionary, we have limited words. As per the reference, we use one word to convey the meanings of many entities. This results in the inability of the reader or the listener to understand its intended meaning resulting in a state of indecisiveness. To avoid that state of indecisiveness, Jain *ācāryas* devised the method of assignment (*nikṣepa*) to eliminate this state of indecisiveness. *Nikṣepa* was developed to plan and implement the correct ethical and moral practices. Thus we can say that the method used to plan and implement the right conduct and ethics is *nikṣepa*. Use of *nikṣepa* is to devise a method so that the reader or the listener can adopt the intended meaning of the words being used. For this to happen, it is essential that we use a specific word with accompanying adjective for every mode of the substance. We learn many meanings of the same word in different contexts by *nikṣepa*.

Man is the knower and the entity is an object of knowledge. How can we establish the relationship between them? This is a philosophical question? This question has been resolved by Jains using *nikṣepa* methodology. Our knowledge is indirect, so we cannot know it completely directly. We have to use certain medium to know it. Through the medium, relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge is established. In the series of media, there are two important elements namely name and form /figure. To map the entity in the knowledge of the knower, it has to be assigned either a name or a form/figure.

An entity has infinite attributes. We cannot know this indestructible entity except through one of its modes.

From the time perspective, it has three modes namely past, present and future. The entity can be assigned to its past or future mode also. To know these modes correctly, we have to use some adjectives with the entity, e.g. *asarira dravya* (substance without body) or *bhāvi śarira dravya* (future bodied substance). In both these our consciousness cannot manifest, hence they are called modes of the substance or *paryāya dravya*. An activity with which consciousness is associated is called the thought (*bhāva*).

1.1 Sequence of development of *nikṣepa* methodology.

Place, time etc are many characteristics in which an entity can be assigned. Therefore there are many *nikṣepas*. They can be as many as the internal and external characteristics of the entity. Therefore commentators have said that there are innumerable *nikṣepas*. In Uttarādhyayana-niryukti, the word *uttara* has been assigned fifteen names.

*Nāmaṅ uvaṅṅ daviye khitta disā tāvakhitta paṅṅavae,
Paikālasaṅcayapahāṅṅāṅakamagaṅṅaṅao bhāve*

In Ācāraṅga niryukti and Kaṣāyapāhuda, eight assignments have been made to the word *kaṣāya* (passion)

*ṅāmaṅ thavaṅṅ daviye uppatti paccae ya āeso,
rasabhāvakasāye yā teṅṅa ya kohāiyā cauro. Ācāraṅga niryukti 190
kasāo tāva ṅikkhiviyarvo ṅāmakāsao thavaṅṅakasāo,
davvakasāo paccakasāo samutpattikasāo adesakasāo.
rasakasāo bhāvakasāo cedi Kaṣāyapāhuda pge 234*

Nikṣepa is very important to acquire knowledge about any entity. We should use as many assignments (*Nikṣepa*) as possible for this but it is essential to use at least four *nikṣepas*. We cannot recognize an entity without its name and form/figure. The initial elements to start cognition of an entity are its substance and mode. These are both the states of the entity. To know the entity, it is essential to assign it to its present mode. In this way name, form and states of the entity are the minimum requirements. These four types of *nikṣepas* have been used abundantly in the religious texts.

Jimbhadraṅgaṅi has proposed four types of modes in the entity.

Ahavā vatthubhikāṅṅaṅ ṅāmaṅ uvaṅṅ ya jo tayāṅṅāro,

Kāraṅṅayā se davvaṅṅ kajjā vannaṅṅ tayaṅṅ bhāvo. Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṅṅya (60)

Name is entity's own identity. Own form of the entity is *sthāpnā nikṣepa*. The active in which the entity is engaged is its mode *nikṣepa*. Pitcher is the name assignment of pitcher. Its bottom or middle or top has form and these are its *sthāpnā nikṣepa*. Soil is its past mode while the broken pieces of the pitcher are its future mode. Both these modes devoid of pitcher are its substance and the pitcher being used to carry water is its mode assignment.

Śāntiācāryavritti of Uttarādhyayansutra, it is said that all assignments are included in these four assignments types (*nikṣepa*). There are two purposes for which more than four types of assignments are used namely:

- To initiate the intellect of the student to learn.
- To express generic, specific and evolutionary states of the entity.

Using assignments make it easier for expression of the entity in the texts. '*bhaṅṅai ghippai ya sūhaṅṅ nikkheva payāṅṅsārao satthaṅṅ*' Dhavalā talks of benefits of *nikṣepa* from four angles.

- If the listener is predominantly having the mode viewpoint, then we should use *nikṣepa* for the non-observable states of entity.
- If the listener is predominantly with substance viewpoint, then we should use *nikṣepa* for the presented entity.
- If he is still doubtful, then also we should use *nikṣepa* to eliminate his doubts.
- If he is indecisive still we should use *nikṣepa* to have decisive knowledge.

Anūyogadvārasutra in its Sāmāyika chapter talks of four gates/doors of the methodology of study and expression (*anūyoga*) of the entity, namely *upakrama*, *nikṣepa*, *anūgama* and *naya*. The method of expressing the meaning of the sutra is *anūyoga*. There are four gates / doors of *anūyoga*. A town, which does not have gates, is not called a town. It is difficult to come in and go out from a town. It takes more time to perform an activity. With four gates it becomes easy to do our works etc., time is used efficiently. Similarly there are four gates for expression to

make its work easier. Anūyogadvārasutra, while describing the first gate i.e. *upkrama*, talks of six sub types of *upkrama* itself namely name, form/figure, substance, place, time and mode.

From the viewpoint of studying the development of assignment methodology, Anūyogadvārasutra has used four *nikṣepas* for the words essential (*āvaśyaka*), text (*śruta*) and lump (*skandha*) while in Sāmāyika chapter, it talks of six types of *upkrama*, the first gate, itself. Out of these six sub-types, the four are same as of *nikṣepa* and the two for place and time have been added. Another point of interest is that both *upkrama* and *nikṣepa* have been described in almost an identical way. An important question arises here as to the need of describing *upkrama* and *nikṣepa* as separate gate. Why then *nikṣepa* has not been sub divided into six subtypes here also.

Later on in Anūyogadvārasutra itself, *upakrama* has been further classified into six different sub types with *Ānupurvi* as the first type having ten sub types. Out of the ten sub types, *nikṣepa* is also mentioned with similar description as *nikṣepa* earlier. All these discussions lead us to believe that *nikṣepa* is a type of *upakrama* while in the text it is also mentioned as a separate gate like *upakrama*. Anūyogadvārasutra thus gives a feeling that it considers *nikṣepa* as a primary gate with its independent mention and description at different places but in the context of *upakrama*, it has been taken as its subtype. It thus appears that till the time of writing Anūyogadvārasutra *nikṣepa* was used as both an independent as well as a part of other gates. Even though in this text, *upakrama* has been sub classified in six subtypes as well as other subtypes also, *nikṣepa* is classified in four subtypes only. Also we see that *nikṣepa* has been used only to describe essentials (*āvaśyaka*) and *upakrama* had not been used for this. Further wherever *upakrama* has been used as a method of expression, there *nikṣepa* has also been included in it. In later texts, *nikṣepa* with its four subtypes has been predominantly used by all *ācāryas* and not *upakrama*. Unlike earlier texts, in the texts *niryuktis*, Anūyogadvāra and bhāṣyas etc, *nikṣepa* has been used in a very detailed way. At one time *nikṣepa* was a method of studying Jain texts but now it has been reduced to just a doctrine only. That method of studying texts is not prevalent now.

For writing commentaries on Jain canonical texts, *nikṣepa* was used extensively. Anūyogadvārasutra has used four *nikṣepas* in details for the words essential (*āvaśyaka*), text (*śruta*) and lump (*skandha*). The author crisply explains the subject under discussion using *nikṣepa* so that the reader is able to clearly understand it. This will become clear after understanding *nikṣepa*.

In our day-to-day life, use of language is essential. In the absence of language, life becomes difficult. But the language has its own limitations. Therefore the speaker experiences difficulty in expressing his knowledge clearly. Jains have tried to resolve significantly by using *nikṣepa*, these limitations of the language and the speaker.

Nature of an entity is with infinite attributes. That entity is cognized using *pramāṇa* and *naya*. In *pramāṇa* and *naya*, the objects like *jīva* etc, the decisions are made about them using the four types of *nikṣepa*. Tattvārthasutra says 'nāmasthāpanādṛavyabhāvastannyāsa'. For acquiring the right knowledge about an entity, *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa* have important place. Without them, we cannot develop the right method of knowing the objects of knowledge.

1.2 Essentiality of assignment method (*nikṣepa*).

In this real world, language has an important place. Wherever we have to interact with each other, we have to essentially use words. Due to each word having many meanings in different contexts, we are likely to have uncertainties about the meaning being conveyed by the word making their right understanding difficult. We simplify this process of understanding using *nikṣepa*. *Nikṣepa* is the flawless and simple method of using language. In the form of *nikṣepa*, Jain tradition has made significant contribution to the world of languages.

1.3 Definition of *nikṣepa*

From the historical perspective we see that *nikṣepa* has been used in the canonical texts Bhagavati, Anūyogadvāra and *niryuktis*, yet its definition was first attempted in Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya. Jinabhadraṅgi has defined *nikṣepa* as follows.

*Nikkhappai teṅa tahiñ tao va nikkhevaṅaṅ va nikkhevo,
Niyao va nicchio vā khevonā so tti jañ bhaṅṅiyaṅ . Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya. 912*

i.e. to assign a specific meaning to an expression /word i.e. such an such word for that object is the work of *nikṣepa*. This assignment is fixed and definite and so it is called right /decisive.

The science of differentiating the objects is called *nikṣepa* in Anūyogadvāracurnī. '*nikkhevo atthabhedanyāsa*' The author of Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya while clarifying the concept of *nikṣepa* says 'The entity in which name etc. correlate and associate word (expression or the one who is expressing), object (*artha*) and knowledge (intellect) is *nikṣepa*' All entities in this world are associated with definite name, form / figure, substance and mode.

*'nāmai bheyasaddtthabūddhiparinamabhāvaṃ niyayaṃ,
jaṃ vatthū matthi loye caupajjāyaṃ tayaṃ savvaṃ* Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya 73

Nikṣepa is a definitive word of Jain philosophy. Synonym of *nikṣepa* is *nyāsa* or decision / division and the same is used in Tattvārathasutra. '*nyāso nikṣepa*' Many definitions of *nikṣepa* are found in Jain texts. Vrahada Nayacakra defines as follows:

*'jūtti sūjūttamagge jaṃ caubheyena hoi khalū uvaṇaṃ,
vaje sadi ṇāmādisū taṃ nikkhevaṃ have samaye'*

Appropriate and logical usage of name etc to an entity is called assignment (*nikṣepa*). Dhavalā while defining *nikṣepa* says '*saṅśayavispariyaye anadhdhyavasāye va sthitebhyoapasārya niścāye kṣipatīti nikṣepa*' i.e. removing doubt, opposite understanding and indecisiveness about an entity and imparting definitive knowledge about it is the function of *nikṣepa*. Or *nikṣepa* expresses an entity in decisive and definite form of knowledge. Jain Siddhāntadīpikā also support this claim '*śabdeṣū viśeṣaṇabalen pratiniyatāriha pretipādanasaktte nikṣepaṇaṃ nikṣepa*' i.e. *nikṣepa* is the means /force to impart the predefined meaning to an entity using some adjectives/ assignment.

Nikṣepa is a means/ basis of using the relation between the entity and the words used to express it. It is the relation between thought and its expression or the expression and the speaker. In brief we can therefore say that it is the means of establishing a relation between the entity in its present state and the words used to express it. It is also the method of using language with adjectives and relationships to express an entity.

1.4 Benefits of assignment method (*nikṣepa*)

Every word has the power to represent thousands of entities. Even one word has many meanings. It can thus become an expression of many entities. In such a situation, it is possible to have doubts about the knowledge of the entity. Thus to remove doubts about the entity not available and to express clearly the presented entity is the benefit of *nikṣepa*. Laghistrayi also support this claim '*aprasūtūārthapakaraṇāt prasūtūārthavyākaraṇācca nikṣepa jalavān*'

2.0 Types of *nikṣepa*

An entity has infinite attributes. If we go in details, then it implies that there, as many ways to express the entities, as there are its forms and attributes. But assignment methods (*nikṣepa*) have been classified as of four types as said in Anūyogadvāra also.

*'jattha ya jaṃ jāṇejjā nikkhevaṃ nikkhive nirvasesaṃ,
jattha vi ya na jāṇejjā caukkagaṃ nikkhive tattha'*

Usage of the number of assignments at a place depends on their availability, however if not enough are known then at least the four types of assignment namely name, form/figure/substance and mode should be used.

Every entity has some name and form at least. And it has past, present and future modes / states also. Hence these assignment types result by themselves. Assignments of the entity based on its is called name assignment; based on its form is called form assignment; based on its past and future modes is called substance assignment and based on its present active mode is called mode assignment. Assignment is not imaginary but is based on the nature of the entity. The four types of assignment methods are being described here briefly.

2.1 Name assignment

A name is assigned to any entity as per the wishes of the speaker. This is name assignment. The name can be relative to or non relative to the nature of the entity. The name assigned, which is purely an indicative one and has no

relationship with the attributes of the entity is called name assignment e.g. to call an illiterate as a teacher or a poor person as millionaire. Here the names of the persons have nothing to do with the attributes of the entity they represent. This is called mere assignment (*nikṣipta*). In name assignment the representation of the meaning is not expected though. In Jain Siddhāntaḍipikā, name assignment is defined as '*tadārthnirpekṣaṅ saḥjñākarmanāma*' i.e. without bearing any semblance to the entity; assignment of a name to it is called name assignment.

For example, calling an illiterate as a teacher. Every word having a meaning assigned to is called a name. It is not necessary that the object is attached to the name. Because of its independence from the object, it has therefore no relationship to the entity / object. Name assignment of an entity is done based on some characteristic assigned to it. Therefore there is no synonym for it. In assigning name, Even though it has no relativity to the entity, yet that name is assigned to it. Jinabhadtagaṇī has therefore called name assignment as indicative of the wish of the speaker.

2.2 Form /figurative assignment (*sthāpnā nikṣepa*)

Using the form /figure of the entity for cognition and its expression thereof is called form assignment. To establish a non-existent entity with its basic meaning into another entity is called form assignment '*tadārthaśūnyasya tadabhiprāyeṇa pratishāpanaṅ sthāpnā*' i.e. an object which is not similar to the object of knowledge is considered as object of knowledge is form assignment e.g. '*upādhyāyapratikṛiti*' *sthāpanopādhyāya*'.

Form is of two types namely similar and dissimilar and so the form assignment is of two types also.

- i. Similar form assignment. A person considers the photo of his teacher as his teacher is an example of similar form assignment. '*mukhyākārasamānā sabbhāvasthāpanā*'
- ii. Dissimilar form assignment. A person considers a conch shell or any other thing as his teacher is an example of dissimilar form assignment. '*tadākāra śūnya ca sabbhāvasthāpanā*'

After assigning a name to an entity, its assignment to any other entity is form assignment. Nyayakumudacandra defines it as '*sthāpyate iti sthāpanā pratikṛiti*', *sā ca āhitanāmakaṣya adhyāropitanāmakaṣya dravyasya indrāde*' '*so-ayam*' '*ityabhisāṅghānena vyavasthāpanā*'

An entity devoid of the object of knowledge when assigned as object of knowledge is form assignment. By form assignment, the object of knowledge can be assigned to a similar or dissimilar entity. Anūyogadvāra uses the wooden forms for similar entities. Figures of men or animals made in wood are called wooden form (*kāṣṭhyakrama*). The wooden figure is made similar to the object of knowledge in appearance. This is similar form assignment. For dissimilar form assignments entities like conch shells, beads, etc have been used for assignment in Anūyogadvāra. The question arises that a representation can be made by any entity then why specifically uses conch shell or beads etc? One reason can be that from worldly perspective, conch shell and beads etc used as examples are considered as auspicious objects and by assuming them is considered as auspicious and so mentally satisfying. Therefore they are used as examples while talking about dissimilar form assignment.

Nayacakra talks of two different types of form assignment namely with form (*sākāra*) and without form (*nirākāra*) e.g. to consider an idol as an omniscient and assigning attributes like omniscience etc to represent omniscient respectively.

*'sāyar iyara uvaṇā kittima iyarā hū bhābajā pathamā,
iyarā khāiya yaṇiyā uvaṇā āsiho ya ṇāyavvo'* Nayacakra 274

Both name and form assignments are not real and so what is the difference between the two? Hari Bhadra considers the difference based on time between them. Name stays as long as the substance associated with the entity exists while form assignment is of short duration. Today a conch shell, which is used to represent a monk, can later on be used to represent something else while the name cannot be interchanged for different things. Another reason can be that is without a form while form assignment is made to some form only. It can also be said that the name can also change over a period of time then why consider is as associated with the object of knowledge for a very very long time. In the life of a person, so many things are decided based on his name and the name which changes over a period of time is called its other name (*upanāma*). Many people have more than one name assigned to them e.g. Mahāvīra had many names. However here we do not consider synonyms and other names.

Anūyogadvāra also considers name, as permanent while form can be both permanent as well as temporary. As per Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya, name is assigned as per the wishes of an individual while the form assignment is done based on the object of knowledge. As per Malladhārī Hema Candra, names like mountain, sea and island etc are dependent on the substance while names like Deva Dutta etc can be changed.

Name and form assignments are both devoid of the actual object of knowledge. Another difference between them can be a name is assigned first and then the form assignment is made to that name while it not necessary the other way around.

2.3 Substance assignment method (*dravya nikṣepa*)

Cognizing and expressing of an object of knowledge based on its past and future modes is substance assignment method. '*bhuta bhāvika rāṇasya anūpayogo vā dravyam*' The past and future existences /modes and the mode when the entity is not performing the present activity are not relevant to the present mode of the object of knowledge and hence these are sued for substance assignment.

A person who was earlier a teacher or is likely to be a teacher is the substance teacher. Similarly activities performed by the teacher when he is not teaching are also called activities of the teacher, e.g. a monk when not performing activities of a monk is still called a monk.

Anūyogadvāra talks of to types of substance assignment namely, *āgamata* 'i.e. knowledgeable of texts and *no-āgamata* ' i.e. not knowledgeable of the texts and yet called knowledgeable. *Āgamata* ' is defined as '*jīvādīpadārthajnoapi tatrānūpayūktta*' i.e. a person who is knowledgeable about living beings or other subjects but is not using his knowledge now is called as *āgamata* ', while *no-āgamata* ' is defined as 'calling the body of a person, having soul with knowledge attribute, as knowledgeable or knower'. In *āgamata* ', manifestation of knowledge attribute is not present but its capability exists but in *no-āgamata* ' both manifestation and the capability are absent.

There is three sub types of *no-āgamata* ' substance assignment namely: i. *jñāsarīra* or the body, which knows; ii. *bhavyaśarīra* and iii. *tadvyatirakṭta*. Further these many sub-sub-types also.

- i. *jñāsarīra* i.e. the body in which the soul resides and hence sees and knows e.g. the dead body of a person who knows Āvaśyakasutra is called as the knower of Āvaśyakasutra.
- ii. *Bhavyaśarīra* i.e. the body in which the soul will reside and acquire knowledge, e.g. to call a newly born baby as the knower of Āvaśyakasutra.
- iii. *Tadvyatirakṭta* i.e. the parts of an entity which are beneficial for acquiring and expression of knowledge e.g. to call the activities of his hands etc of a teacher while he is teaching. From the worldly, flawed tradition and non-worldly angles also it is of three types.

This classification of *tadvyatirakṭta* is relative. In this the person performing the essential activities has been divided in three categories. First part is social or worldly and the remaining two are for the people involved in the worship and practice of religion. In Jain philosophy preaching unitary-viewpoint (*ekānta*) is considered as flawed and so all philosophies, which propagate this are considered as flawed traditions. In non-worldly (*lokottara*) only *Anekānta* viewpoint is included.

Substance assignment is without the past substance and the present mode. Hence it is devoid of present mode and manifestation of knowledge. There are many meanings of the word *dravya* /substance. An entity, which had the past modes and the capability of acquiring the future modes is called substance. For example a pitcher had the capability of having butter in it or will have the capability to have butter in it in future but is without butter now is called a pitcher with butter.

The *āgamata* ' (i.e. *jñānātmaka*) substance assignment method has been analysed from the seven-*naya* types. Subject of figurative viewpoint is specific and generic. Therefore from this viewpoint, substance can be of one, two, many and infinite in number. All those, which are not being considered, are substances. Subject of distributive viewpoint is differences or specifics only. In this also substance can be described as in figurative viewpoint. In class viewpoint, the base is generic only. Therefore from this viewpoint substance can be enumerated. For example substance or a class o substances can be considered as one only and not many. Even if there are many substances, yet this

viewpoint will group them as one. Hence from class viewpoint there will be only one substance. Subject of linear viewpoint is mode. Hence a person who is involved in the activity can be considered as *āgamata*'. Plural words are not acceptable to it. Subject of all three literal viewpoints is word. According to this a person who knows cannot be unsuitable. Hence this viewpoint does not accept *āgamata*'.

The above subject has been discussed in Anūyogadvārasutra. There the word *āvaśyaka* has been assigned four types namely name, form /figure, substance and mode. There the *dravyāvaśyaka* in the context of *āgamata*' has been reviewed based on the seven *nayas*, which is very useful. We look at it briefly now.

Substance assignment of *āvaśyaka* is *dravyāvaśyaka*.

- i. As figurative viewpoint is based on both generic and specific attributes, therefore *dravyāvaśyaka* are many.
- ii. Distributive and so *dravyāvaśyaka* are of many.
- iii. Class viewpoint is based on generic attributes only, hence *dravyāvaśyaka* is one.
- iv. Linear viewpoint is based on present mode. Hence it does not accept plural words for *dravyāvaśyaka* and is looking for a specific entity engaged in the activity.
- v. Literal, and the two subtypes of this viewpoint say that the one who knows is suitable also. It is not possible a person who knows cannot be suitable. Hence all three do not accept the validity of *āgamata*'.

2.4 Mode assignment *Bhāva nikṣepa*

The assignment of an entity based on its activities in its present mode is mode assignment. '*vivakṣita kriyā pariṇato bhāva*' e.g. to call angels living in heaven as angels. It is also of two types namely *āgamata*' and *no-āgamata*'.

2.4.1 *āgamata*'. A teacher who knows how to teach and involved in that profession is called teacher *āgamata*'.

2.4.2 *no-āgamata*'. A person who knows teaching and is busy in teaching is called *no-āgamata*'.

Mode is the existence of a substance in its present state. Mode assignment is also analysed from two angles namely knower of texts (*āgama*) and not knower of texts (*no-āgama*). One who knows *āvaśyaka* or the substance and is busy in so doing, then that entity is mode assignment as per its cognizable mode. Similarly one who knows the meaning of the word auspicious and is busy in auspicious activities is called auspicious mode. As per this analyse, a person who knows the meaning of the word pitcher and involved in using it is called a pitcher mode. Also a person involved in getting water using the pitcher is called mode pitcher also.

All the four types of assignment methods have been described as follows:

*'nāma jñā jina nāmā uvanajñā hūnti padimāo,
dāvvaññā jina jīvā bhāva jñā samavasaraṇatthā.'*

3.0 Relation between *naya* and *nikṣepa*.

Naya and *nikṣepa* have the relationship of the object of knowledge and its knower. Siddha Sena has clarified this in the following verse

*'nāmañ uvaṇa daviye tti esa dāvvaḡghiyassa nikkhevo,
bhāvo upajjavagghiassa paruvaṇā esa paramatho'*

Name, form and substance are related to the three time spans and so they are concerned with the substance viewpoint. Mode assignment is associated with the present mode and hence is concerned with the mode viewpoint only.

4.0 Basis of *nikṣepa*

Basis of *nikṣepa* is primary non-primary, imaginary and non-imaginary. Mode is non-imaginary and so is the primary. The other three types of assignment methods are imaginary and hence not primary. Name assigns identity to the entity, figure assigns knowledge about the form of the entity but its attributes are not known. Substance is the primary form of entity having relationship with it in the past and future. Hence there is no uniqueness in them. Mode is unique. *Nikṣepa* had been the primary method of expression in the Jain texts. In the process of acquiring knowledge, it has an

important place. All our day-to-day activities of life and learning are based on this method i.e. *nikṣepa*. In its absence we draw wrong conclusions about the entity and its meanings. In conclusion is that method which eliminates indecisiveness in our knowledge of the entity.

Questions

1. Essay type questions

Define *nikṣepa* and describe its types and sub types?

2. Answer briefly the following questions

- Explain clearly the origin and development of *nikṣepa*?
- What is the purpose of assignment (*nikṣepa*)?

3. Fill in the blanks.

- In Uttarādhyayan niryukti m the number of types of *nikṣepa* for the word *uttara* are?
a. ten ; b. twelve , c. fifteen , d. eight.
- Nikṣepa methodology, we get meanings in many different contexts?
- The purpose of using more than four *nikṣepa* is to stimulate the?
- There are sub types of *upakrama*?
- Nikṣepa* is also known as?
- Name and the object of knowledge are related as?
- The method of assignment which does not maintain the relationship of the basic word and the object it represents known as *nāma nikṣepa*
- To accept the picture of the teacher as teacher is?
- In *āgamata* ' substance assignment method, manifestation of knowledge is absent while for knowledge manifestation exists.
- As per figurative viewpoint, there can be *dravyāvaśyakas*.

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LADNUN-341306 (RAJASTHAN)

DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION



M.A. JAINOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE RE- LIGION, PHILOSOPHY

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Edited By :

Dr. Poornima S. Mehta

Edition : 2017

Printed Copies : 250

Jain Vishva Bharati Institute (Deemed University) Ladnun

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