

## Unit 1 : Lesson 1

### ***Tattva mīmāṃsā*: Nature of reality /existence (*sat*). Vendānta, Baudha and Jain**

In this lesson, the student shall be able to study the following topics in a systematic manner.

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Nature of existence in Vedānta philosophy
- 3.0 Nature of existence in Baudha philosophy
  - 3.1 Vaibhāṣika
  - 3.2 Sautāntika
  - 3.3 Yogācāra
  - 3.3.1 Analysis of the nature of existence/ reality
  - 3.4 Mādhyamika
- 4.0 Nature of existence in Jain philosophy

#### **1.0 Introduction**

Multiplicity (varieties) of existences in this universe is visible. Seeing the expanse of this world, it is natural to be inquisitive about the source of this universe. Are the extension of this universe and its source existent (real) or non-existent (unreal)? This inquisitiveness had been a subject of deep enquiry for all philosophers. Accordingly there are differences of opinions between different philosophers about the existences or realities of the same visible world.

Due to differences in different philosophies analysing the existences of the universe, it is but natural that their conclusions about the universe will also be different. Basically there are two viewpoints prevailing to analyse a concept (*tattvas*), namely the one, which looks at the identical features in all the existences (*abheda*) and the other, which looks at the differences in various existences (*bheda*). *Abhedadr̥ṣṭi* or universal viewpoint looks at the oneness in different entities. Therefore it concerns itself about the identical nature of all entities. This viewpoint first looks at the common features in all the entities in the universe and while slowly starting to look at the differences between them accepts a single source of origin for all of them. Thus the *Abhedadr̥ṣṭi* while starting from the identity of all beings accepts and confirms later that in fact, all these entities looking different are originating from one single entity. It is only due to our lack of knowledge and tainted vision that they appear to be different.

Due to its being *Abhedadr̥ṣṭi*, it either ignores the differences or it calls as non-transcendental (transitory) or for convenience to live i.e. practical viewpoint only. It considers differences as false or imaginary only. Identity or one source is the only and transcendental truth. Basis of this viewpoint is only reconciliation. This viewpoint, which accepts only universality of existence i.e., all pervasive unique and only one existence at all places and times. This viewpoint, also called *Bṛhmadvaitvāda*, says that all reasons validating differences or the differences themselves are pervert/ false. Existence is one (called *Bṛhma*) and is not a subject of speech or logic. It can only be experienced.

Another viewpoint to look at the universe focuses on the specifics or differences (*bhedadr̥ṣṭi*) in the entities existing in the universe. In their metaphysical discussions, difference is the only real or existent. According to them there is nothing like universality or identity in the universe. They only see and experience differences or particular entity as different from others only. This in its quest for finding differences between entities, it finally settles on differences or particular-ness of each entity only. They do not experience universality amongst entities at all but end up concluding universality as false /pervert and non-existent. As per this viewpoint, all entities in this universe are not only different from each other but this universe itself is an amalgam of all different entities. Universality or identity is not a transcendental existence. Due to delusion we impose identity in them. According to this viewpoint, existences are not only different from time and place perspective only but are different by nature also. For example the flame of the earthen lamp is a stream of new flames continuously emerging but due to our inadequacies we feel it is only one flame.

The monistic view of *Abhedadr̥ṣṭi* formed the basis of Vedānta and the monistic viewpoint of *bhedadr̥ṣṭi* gave birth to Buddhist theory of transitory-ness (*Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda*). Both these viewpoints are based on monistic view of existence and hence become opponent of each other's doctrines.

Another viewpoint, in the philosophical arena, called *Anekānta* or multiplicity of viewpoints came into being to analyse the source and constituents of the universe. According to this viewpoint, identity and differences of all visible and cognizable entities in this world are existent and real from specific viewpoints. Both viewpoints i.e. identity and difference in existences are true as per their own viewpoints and both have at least a part of truth depicted by them. Both *Abhedadr̥ṣṭi* and *bhedadr̥ṣṭi* are real but only when they are considered as relative to each other and not in isolation. If they consider themselves as the only real and other as false, then each becomes invalid in isolation.

Feelings of either universal or particular for their subjects are not completely valid but partially valid. The true nature of an entity is both universal and particular (*bhedabhātmaka*). It is neither just universality nor particularity but evolutionary (*ubhayātmaka*) in nature. An entity is an amalgam of many opposing attributes. It has many pairs of opposing attributes like eternal-non-eternal, one-many, universal-particular co-existing all the time. This is just the nature of the entity. *Abhedadr̥ṣṭi* using the Class viewpoint can consider existence as universal but the view of *bhedadr̥ṣṭi* as per Linear or Straight thread viewpoint, which considers only the differences as real, is also true at the same time. Hence as per *Anekānta*, both identity and differences are real. Feelings of water as both an ocean as well as in the last drop are true. One is true as it keeps all the differences aside and sees all different parts as identical and hence together as one same. Similarly the feeling of a tiny part as true from the other viewpoint (which separates entities based on time, place etc and adopts the viewpoint of differences) is also true.

Feeling of identity or of universality increases the scope of the word existent to such a large extent that nothing is left out and everything appears to be the same. But when we analyze the universe based on its nature, attributes etc., then the universe no longer exists as one entity but its existences appear to be manifold. The slogan '*viśvamekaṃ satoh viśeṣāt*' is true as is the multiplicity existences of the universe. *Anekānta* thus tries to reconcile the opposing viewpoints and establishes the true nature of the entity. This is the viewpoint of Jains. As per this viewpoint an entity is both eternal-temporary, universal-particular at the same time. Jainācāryas have used the Nay doctrine to reconcile the different and at times opposing viewpoints of other philosophies to establish the true nature of existence.

When we analyse the other philosophies, we find that they first define the existence and then analyze its nature. Vedānta first accepts existence of *Bṛhma* and then describes its nature as inert and eternal. Similarly Baudha using *Bhedadr̥ṣṭi* first define nature of existence as momentary. Based on *Anekānta* viewpoint, Jains define existence as with origination-destruction and permanence. In this lesson we shall discuss the nature of the existence based on Vedānta, Baudha and Jain philosophies.

## 2.0 Nature of existence in Vedānta philosophy.

All Indian philosophies have analysed the nature of existence, its number etc. Even though there is no agreement between them about the nature and number of existences, yet they have all tried to explain the nature of existence to satisfy their own philosophical beliefs.

By Vedānta philosophy, we refer to Śāṅkara's monistic existence (*Advait*) Vedānta. According to this philosophy, the entire universe is just *Bṛhma*. In this universe, there are no different existences but in reality there is only one existence. '*sarva khalivadaṃ bṛhma neha nānāsti kiṃcana bṛhma*' i.e. existence of *Bṛhma* is only real and existence of the world is only for practical purposes (*vyāvahārika*). '*Bṛhma satyaṃ jaganmithyā jīvo bṛhmaiva nāpara*' i.e. *Bṛhma* is real/existent, the world is false/imaginary, soul is the nature of *Bṛhma* only and it has no existence other than *Bṛhma*. This is the main doctrine of Vedānta.

According to this philosophy, *Bṛhma* is the transcendental existence. The real and supreme existence is just *Bṛhma* only. *Bṛhma* is the basic element of the world. While describing *Bṛhma*, that it is an entity from which all other constituents of the world originate, acquire life and at death merge again in it. As all entities in the world keep on changing their forms, so they cannot be described as existences. In this universe with entities continuously changing names and forms, the only entity, which is static/inert permanent and never changes is called *Bṛhma* and is transcendental truth. According to Śāṅkara, *Bṛhma* is purest, without any attributes, has all the qualities, inexplicable, indescribable, one, infinite and inert, just of the nature of soul and unique. Thus there is no other existence like him.

As per this philosophy, Bṛhma is the transcendental existence. All souls and other entities existing in this world are only due to one unique element Bṛhma. All these entities have no independent existence. Every soul is a part of Bṛhma. On destruction of delusion (*avidhyā*), these souls merge in Bṛhma.

According to Śāṅkarācārya, Bṛhma is only one unique element; however due to existence of delusion from eternity, Bṛhma appears in the form of different living and non-living beings. Like we feel a rope as a snake due to the false knowledge; even though the rope is neither rope nor creates rope, still due to wrong knowledge it appears like a snake. Similarly Bṛhma even though it not of different forms, nor creates different forms yet it appears to us in different forms. This feeling of different existences is due to illusion (*māyā*). Manifold appearance of living beings is false or illusory. If the ignorance of the living beings is removed then they can experience Bṛhma. The philosophy of Śāṅkara is called (*kevalādvaitavāda*) only-monist. This is because only accepts the existence of just one Bṛhma and all other existences as false or apparent. Because he considers the world as illusory, therefore his philosophy is also called *Māyāvāda* or *Vivartavāda*.

From the above discussions, it become apparent that Bṛhma is the only transcendental existence and all other existences are either unreal (*pratibhāsika*) or apparent (*vyāvahārika*) existences. Thus Vedānta philosophy considers three types of existences namely

i. Transcendental, ii. Apparent (*vyāvahārika*), iii. Unreal (*pratibhāsika*)

1. Transcendental existence: One, all pervasive, inactive or non-changing, inert, eternal Bṛhma is only the transcendental existence.
2. Apparent existence: The entire visible world is just a mode or manifestation of Bṛhma. It has no transcendental existence. It is only an apparent existence. Entities like pitcher, cloths etc have only apparent existence.
3. Unreal existence: Entities, which appear in dreams etc, have neither transcendental nor apparent existence. They are only imaginary and they have unreal existence.

Vedānta is a knowledge based (*pratyavādi*) philosophy. According to this doctrine, the visible world is not real existence as transcendental existence can neither be cognized by senses nor described in speech. *‘yato vācā nivartante aprāpya manasā saha’*. Bṛhma, which is a subject of pure consciousness, is the real existence or transcendental truth and the gross world does not have transcendental existence.

### 3.0 Doctrine of existence in Baudha philosophy.

According to Baudha philosophy, this entire world is momentary only. Transitory-ness (*Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*) is the fundamental doctrine of Baudha philosophy. All entities in this world are momentary. They are changing every moment. This moment the entity is different from the next moment as in the next moment, the old entity is completely destroyed and a new entity is created. The entity in the second moment is completely different from the entity in the previous moment. However due to delusion and ignorance we see generality /universality in different entities. Actually it is not so. Every living and non-living entity in this world is capable of changing every moment. Every entity is naturally destroyed every moment and hence Baudha philosophy considers destruction as natural and without any cause /reason. In the language of logic the same is expressed as *‘naśvameva tad vastu svahetorupajātamāṅgikarttavvyam, tasmādutpannamātra- meva vinaśyanti, utpattikṣaṇa eva sattvāt’*. As per Baudha philosophy, all existences are momentary. No existence can cross the boundaries their momentary nature.

*‘sarva kṣaṇikaṁ sattvāt, yat sat tat sarva kṣaṇikam, yathā ‘ghata’* All entities with existence are momentary in nature. It is meaningless to think of transcendental existence, which is not momentary. An inert entity cannot be purposively active either in serial or simultaneous manner. An entity, which does not act purposely cannot be existent. Existence is only which can be purposively active. *‘arthakriyā sāmārhya lakṣaṇatvādvastuna’* Nyāyabindu-P-1. According to Baudha philosophy, only those entities, which have momentary existence, can perform purposive activity. Hence only those entities, which are momentary in nature, can be existent.

Vaiśāṅhika, Sautāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika are the four different sub sects of Baudha philosophy. All these sub sects of Baudha philosophy came into existence only because of their differences concerning the nature of existence only. As per Baudha philosophy, all objects of knowledge are momentary but there are serious differences

amongst these four sub sects concerning the nature of the objects of knowledge. The views of three sub sects of Bauddha concerning the nature of existence shall be briefly discussed now.

### 3.1 Vaibhāṣika

As per Vaibhāṣika philosophers, each different entity of this universe has real existence. External and internal attributes of these entities have independent existences. We are continuously cognizing the external entities by direct knowledge of our senses e.g. through our eyes we cognize a pitcher. After cognizing the pitcher we know the entity pitcher and its use for carrying and keeping water etc. Due to these purposive activities of the pitcher, the pitcher has real existence and we cognize this reality through our sense organs directly. Hence the independent existence of the universe is cognizable directly. According to Vaibhāṣikas, this world can also be divided in two categories namely external and internal and both types have independent existences.

Broadly speaking this world is (*nāmarūpātma*). *Nāma* denotes the mind and its tendencies and is further classified as feeling (*vednā*), name (*saññā*), memory (*saṅskāra*) and intellect (*viññāna*) giving rise to four molecules (*skandha*). *Rūpa* denotes form and is the representation of insentient objects. In this way *nāmarūpa* denotes the doctrine of five molecules forming the universe and its entities. Briefly as per Vaibhāṣikas, existence is evolutionary and momentary and is of two types namely external and internal. '*tatra te sarvāstivādino bāhyamantataraṇ ca vastu abhyupagacchati bhutaṇ ca bhautikaṇ cittaṇ caittaṇ ca*' Thus the main doctrine of this sub sect is the acceptance of real existence of external and internal universes and the external world can be cognized directly by the senses.

### 3.2 Sautāntika

Sautāntikas also accept the external and internal worlds as real existences. However they do not accept the real existence of intellect even though the external world has real existence. Like Vaibhāṣikas, they also say that the external world is cognizable but through inference only and not directly as proposed by Vaibhāṣikas. They opine that external world cannot be cognized directly as it is momentary in nature. Hence we cannot cognize directly the nature of any entity. The moment an entity gets in contact with our sense organs, the same moment it extinguishes in the past after originating in the previous moment. Only the sensation generated by it remains. As soon as it comes in contact with the senses directly, the blue, yellow etc pictures of the entity are drawn on the intellect, we can infer the object like seeing the image of an entity in the mirror makes us infer the object of image. This doctrine is explained in their text *Sarvasiddhantaśāṅgraha* as follows:

*Nīlapūtātibhiscitraibūrdyākārairihāntrai',  
Sautāntrikamate nityaṇ bāhyārthastvanūmīyate.*

To conclude we can say that this sub sect also accept the real existence of external world and their cognition being only through inference.

### 3.3 Yogācāra

Yogācāra, on the other hand accepts only intellect as the real existence. The external world in fact has no real existence. Besides intellect, all other entities are like mirage and without any nature of their own and are like objects of dream only as they can not be cognized. The entities, which are said as external objects of the world, when analyzed deeply, then we find existence of attributes like colours seen by the eyes and smooth or rough as experienced by touch. Besides these attributes no other object is cognized. Thus only intellect is real. In *Laṅkāvatāra* it is said:

*Cittaṇ vartate cittaṇ cittameva vimūcyate,  
Cittaṇ hi jāyate cittaṇ nānyācittamevanirūdhyate.*

It is the intellect (*citta*) which is active and gets engaged and liberated. Besides intellect, there is nothing, which is either created or destroyed. Intellect is the only basic element of the universe. There is neither existence nor lack of it of psyche (thought entity). Besides intellect there is no other entity existent. There is no existence of external world. Intellect is only one and it is seen and experienced in different forms.

*Drśyate na vighate bāhhyāṇ, cittaṇ citraṇ hi drśyate;  
Dehayogapratīṣṭhānaṇ cittamātraṇ vadāmyaham.*

It is the intellect only, which manifests itself sometimes as a body (external world) and sometimes as the things of use to us. Hence only intellect has real existence. They consider the entire universe as cognizable. Therefore they are known as monist *Vijñāna-dvaitavādi*.

### 3.3.1 Discussions about nature of existence

*Vijñāna-dvaitavādi* Baudha consider duality of existence namely transcendental and practical. Further the practical existence is divided in two groups namely imaginary existence and dependent existence. They call transcendental existence as real. Thus they consider existence of three types namely

- i. Transcendental
- ii. Imaginary (*parikalpita*)
- iii. Dependent (*Vyāvahārika*)

*Vyāvahārika* existence is also called *saṁvṛiti sattā*. According to them, we impose (*āropa*) or accept by implication (*upcāra*) various manifestations to the worldly entities. Assigning a non-entity to an entity is called *adhyāropa*, e.g. to consider a rope as snake. From this example we realize that assignment of snake to the rope is false, because the moment wrong conclusion is removed, the existence of rope as rope will become clear. Here the knowledge of snake is imaginary. Existence of the rope is dependent on the word used. The element, which is used to make the rope in fact has transcendental existence.

*Vyāvahārika* existence is dependent and relative to external worldly objects. Dependent in act means to rely on others for existence. Hence we conclude that *Vyāvahārika* existence does not originate itself but is created by the knowledge of its cause.

In imaginary existence we experience the relation between subject and object but this imagination of the difference is untenable. Both subject and object are imaginary as intellect is just one and it has neither subject nor object. Due to delusion, such imaginations take place. As long as the world exists, such bipolar imaginations continue. When these two imaginations are eliminated, the state of transcendental reality / existence arises. Dependent existence always presents itself along with imaginary existence. The moment their mixture is terminated, the resultant state is of transcendental existence.

Thus the existence is of three types as per Yogācāra as stated by Maitreya Nātha.

*Kalpita 'parītantraśca pariniṣpanna eva ca,  
Athārabhūtakalpācca dvayābhāvācyā kathyate.*

### 3.4 Mādhyamika (*Śūnya-dvaita-vāda*)

As per Mādhyamika philosophers, only indescribable (*śūnya*) is transcendental existence. Prominent Mādhyamika philosopher, Nāgārjuna says that the world is illusive like a mirage. Like the existence of the entities in dream, all entities in this world are only imaginary. From practical viewpoint, this world is existent but from transcendental viewpoint, it is indescribable or *śūnya*. Here *śūnya* does not mean void but it implies that the basic element or source of this world is indescribable. *Śūnya* is neither existent, nor non-existent, evolutionary nor inert. It is free of all these four states as said in Mādhyamika Kārikā.

*Na san nāsan na sadasanna cāpyanūbhayātmakam,  
Catuṣkotinirmūktattaṁ tattvaṁ mādhyamikā 'vidū'.*

Mādhyamika philosophers talk of two types of existences namely *saṁvṛitti* or practical (due to delusion) and transcendental (due to intellect or wisdom). Nāgārjuna feels that Buddha gave his sermons based on these two types of existences.

*Dve satye samūpāsṛitya būddhanaṁ dharmadeśanā,  
Lokaśaṁvṛittisatyan ca satyaṁ ca parmārthata'.*

*Saṁvṛiti satya* or perverted truth is established due to delusion as delusion (*avidhyā*) is one of the meanings assigned to *saṁvṛiti* and *avidhyā* itself is defined as insulation of truth. '*saṁvṛiyata āvṛiyaet yathābutaparijñānaṁ svabhāvāvaraṇād āvratprakāśanāccānayaati saṁvṛiti*'. *Avidhyā*, *Moha* and *Viparyāsa* are the synonyms of *saṁvṛiti*.

Perverted truth established due to delusion and wrong (to accept unreal as real) knowledge is said to be of two types, namely i. *lokasañvṛiti* and ii. *alokasañvṛiti* i. *Lokasañvṛiti* is defined as the one which common people use and accept perverted truth as real and behaves accordingly e.g. like pitcher, cloth etc. Very few people use *Alokasañvṛiti* and they accept the perverted truth, e.g. yellow colour of conch-shell. Prajñākāramati has called *lokasañvṛiti* as *tathyañvṛiti* and *alokasañvṛiti* as *mithyāsañvṛiti*. From practical or general viewpoint, the first type of *sañvṛiti* is right and the second type of *sañvṛiti* is right but from transcendental viewpoint both are wrong. Transcendental existence is totally different from perverted truth. Pure nature of an entity is only transcendental truth or existence. By knowing transcendental truth, all pains (*kleśas*) are eliminated. Transcendental existence is indescribable. *Śūnyatā*, *tathatā*, *bhūtakoti* and *dharmadhātū* are its synonyms.

Transcendental existence is inexplicable. It is neither subject of speech nor of intellect. Speech and mind cannot access it. Hence it is indescribable and un-cognizable. It can also be experienced. Hence it is experiential based on its knowledge i.e. '*pratyātma vedniya*'. While describing the transcendental and perverted truth, it is said:

‘*Yatra bhinne na tad buddhiranyāpohe gñiyā ca tat;*  
*Ghatambuvat sañvṛiti sat parmārthasādanyathā*’.

#### 4.0 Nature of existence in Jain philosophy.

Different Indian philosophies have different views about the nature of existence. Vedānta philosophy considers it as inert and eternal. Bauddha consider existence as momentary i.e. is with origination and decay and there is nothing like eternal existence. Sāṅkhya considers sentient entities called *pūrūṣa* as inert and eternal, insentient elements called *prakṛiti* as evolutionary (*pariṇāmi nitya*) or with origination-decay and permanence, while gross entities like pitcher, cloth etc as with origination and decay only.

As per Jain philosophy, existence / reality has evolutionary nature i.e. *nitya-anitya-ubhaya (pariṇāmi nitya)*. An entity is neither just with origination and decay nor just eternal and inert. They are also not like Sāṅkhya who considers one type of elements as eternal and inert and other type as evolutionary. Also they are not like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who consider some elements like soul as eternal and others like pitcher, cloth etc as momentary. As per Jain philosophy, all entities whether sentient or insentient, concrete or non-concrete, gross or subtle having existence are with origination-decay and permanence. Entire universe is with three attributes of origination-decay and permanence. Umā Svāti in TattvārthaSūtra has aptly said this as follows:

‘*Utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaḥ sat*’.

Advaita Vedānta accepts existence (defined as substance in Jain philosophy) as eternal and rejects existence of modes of substances. On the other hand Bauddha accepts modes of the substance as existent while the substance itself as non-existent. As per Jain philosophy, both substances and their modes have transcendental existent and hence real. When our cognition becomes global and looks at past and future also, then substance presents itself as existent and the modes become secondary, while when our cognition becomes analytical, then the modes become existent and the substance becomes secondary. Hema Candra has expressed this fact as follows:

‘*Aparyayaḥ vastū samasyamānamadravyametaccha vivicyamānaḥ*’

As per Jain philosophy, an entity is with both substance and mode and universal-particular attributes as its nature. Universal and particular have a universal relationship and they cannot exist without each other i.e. in the absence of one, the other cannot exist. This implies that a substance without mode or a mode without substance is non-existent.

‘*Dravyaḥ paryāyaviyūtaḥ paryāyā dravyavarjitā;*  
*kva kadā kena kiṁrūpā dṛṣṭā mānena kena va*’

As per Jain philosophy, an entity has infinite attributes. Infinite attributes with many opposing each other exist simultaneously and at all times in an entity. Origination-decay and permanence co-exist in an entity all the times. Only such an entity with origination-decay and permanence can be purposively active. We cannot substantiate existence of an entity based on only on the doctrine of existence of substance (*dravyavāda*) or just modes (*paryāyavāda*) or the unrelated existence of both substance and mode. Purposive activity is the dominant characteristic of an entity and the

same cannot exist if the entity is just eternal or momentary or unrelated eternity and momentary-ness. Purposive activity (*arthakriyākāritva*) in an entity is possible only if it is an amalgam of both substance and modes and is of evolutionary nature. Hence an entity with evolutionary nature only has a real existence.

In Jain philosophy, the words *sat*, *tattva*, *tattvārtha* and *padārtha* have been used interchangeably. An entity which has real existence is also metaphysical (*tāttvika*) and substance (*dravya*). In the philosophical text of Jains, all discussions about the universe start with the philosophy of self. In Vaiśeṣika texts discuss substance etc six types of entities with existence / reality being associated with *dravya* (substance), *gūṇa* (attribute) and *karma* (activity). In Nyāya texts, commentators have associated existence / reality with *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge or organs of knowledge) and other fifteen types of elements. In Vedānta philosophy Brhman is the only real/existent entity. In Jain texts, two types of substance namely *jīva* (sentient) and *ajīva* (insentient) are described as brief version or nine types of entities (*padārtha*) are described in extended version of reality.

A prominent Jainācārya Umā Svāti has described the kernel of reality, which was a part of Bhagavāna Mahāvīra's sermons. In their canonical literature, foundation of both types of modes i.e. with extension (*tiryaṇa*) and vertical or hereditary (*urghva*) is substance (*dravya*) and these are an integral part of all types of substances. '*avisesiye davve visesiye jīva davve ajīva davve*'. But in the canonical literature, substance has not been used as a term for existence. When all other philosophies started the usage of the term existence '*sat*', then Jain philosophers also faced the problem of defining crisply '*sat*' or existence.

Umā Svāti said that substance is *sat* or existent. While defining '*sad dravyalakṣaṇam*' he said, '*Utpādavyayadhrauvayayuktāṇ sat*'. In so doing he put forth the definition of *sat* in accordance with Jain philosophy and distinct from other philosophies. He further said that existent is eternal but then defined eternity as per Jain principles and hence removed the monistic views about it. '*Tadbhāvyaṇ nityam*' i.e. eternity (*nitya*) implies even with origination and decay the permanence is not destroyed. Changes in the mode do not result in the extinction of substance and stays in the past and present and future modes.

Umā Svāti evolved a four pronged definition of existence namely i. Substance (*dravyāstika*); ii. Evolutionary (*mātrapadāstika*); iii. Origination (*utapannāstika*) and iv. Modal (*pariyāyāstika*). This four-pronged classification of *sat* is unique in Jain philosophy itself and not found anywhere else. He has also not made specific statement about this classification. This classification has been made based on gross and subtle analysis of the implied knowledge in the texts. Commentator Siddha Sena Gaṇi has provided some clarification to his concept as follows. First two types of existences are based on the substance view while the last two are based on the modal viewpoint.

By this unique four-pronged definition of *sat* Umā Svāti has tried to present a comprehensive Jain view about reality. It appears that Umā Svāti has made the four-pronged classification of *sat* in *dravyāstika* based on the substance; of *mātrapadāstika* based on further analysis of the nature of substance itself, of *utapannāstika* on the basis of the present mode and the last *pariyāyāstika* on the past and future modes. '*asannāma nāstyeva dravyāstikasya*' i.e. there is nothing like unreal as it accepts only real /existent. '*sarvavastū sallakṣattvādasatpratiṣedhena sarva saṅgrādeśo dravyāstikam*'.

*Dravyāstika sat* implies the class viewpoint '*sarvamekaṇ sadviśeṣāt*' and it implies the first sentence '*syāt asti*' of Saptabhaṅgī. *Mātrapadāstika sat* is based on further analysis of the substance depicts existent and non-existent states of substance and hence refers to the sentence '*asti-nasti*'. It is important for the day to day understanding of existence as just saying that all entities exist as per *Dravyāstika sat* classification. We cannot perform our daily activities without differentiating between entities. Even though dharmāstikāya and adharmāstikāya are similar from substance viewpoint yet they are different in nature. Thus dharmāstikāya cannot be adharmāstikāya is the statement as per *mātrapadāstika sat*. Because of its being differential in nature, *mātrapada* is of use in our day-to-day life.

'*sthulakatipayavyahārayogyavisesapradhānamātrakāpadāstikam*'.

As *utapannāstika sat* refers to only present mode, it does not recognize the past and future modes. Hence it belongs to '*nāsti*' sentence of Saptabhaṅgī but is also accepts the present and so belongs to '*asti*' also and thus imply '*avaktavya*' or inexplicable sentence. Its focus is on differences in entities. Every entity in our day-to-day life is with origination and decay and nothing is permanent. *utapannāstika sat* is based on origination of the entity. '*utpannāstikamūtanne astimati*' i.e. it rejects the unborn state of the entity.



*Paryāyāstika sat* accepts only decay, as whatever originates has to decay as per their nature. 'vināśe astimatiparyāyāstikam'; however some philosophers consider *paryāyāstika sat* as implying only destruction or the modes which had been destroyed only as sated in 'utpaddhamānā' *paryāyā'paryāyāstimūcyate*'. By bringing reconciliation between these two views, we conclude that *paryāyāstika* viewpoint accepts both past and present and rejects the present. Hence it refers to 'astināsti' i.e. *asti* with reference to past and future and *nāsti* with reference to the present. Therefore this also implies *avaktavya* or inexplicable sentence of Saptabhaṅgī as *asti* and *nāsti* cannot be expressed simultaneously. In brief therefore we can say that *Dravyāstika*, like the class viewpoint, refer to past and real substance; *mātrapadāstika* refers to the practical real existence by differentiating between them like Dharma and Adharma *astikāyas*; origination of new modes in every moment refers to *utapannāstika sat* while destruction every moment of the present belong to *paryāyāstika sat*. Thus the three attributes i.e. origination, decay and permanence are integrated in this three-pronged definition of *sat*.

Jain philosophy accepts real existence of all entities. It accepts the existence of this universe as real. Both gross and subtle forms of this universe are conceptual realities or basic elements of reality. Therefore *sat* cannot be classified just as External, Internal, Transcendental, Imaginary (*parikalpita*), Dependent (*Vyāvahārika*) etc in isolation. All entities which come under the purview of valid knowledge are real / existent. All objects of knowledge which can be cognized by sensual perception, mind or directly by soul are real / existent. It is possible that crispness in their cognition can be less or more but they are all real and hence they cannot be classified as transcendental or perverted truths. Substance and mode, eternality and momentary-ness are all nature of the real. Ignoring any one of them in our understanding the real is ignoring the very reality / existence itself. Hence existence or substance is both universal and particular in nature.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Please analyze the nature of reality/existence as per Jain philosophy.

Or

Analyze the nature of existence as per Bauddha philosophy

### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain the three-pronged classification of Vedānta?
2. Why do different philosophers differ on the nature of existence?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. Existence is inert and eternal. Which philosophy propagates this principle?
2. Which philosophy has classified *saṁvṛitti* or perverted existence in two categories?  
a. Vedānta. B. Bauddha. C. Sāṅkhya. D. Jains.
3. How many types of existence / *sat* is accepted by Vedānta philosophers?  
a. two. b. five. c. three. d. eight.
4. In how many classes has Uṁā Svāti classified existence?  
a. five. b. six. c. two. d. four.
5. *Paryāyāstika sat* accepts \_\_\_\_\_ ?
6. As per *Mātrapadāstika sat*, existence can be represented in \_\_\_\_\_?
7. Jain philosophy accepts the \_\_\_\_\_ existence of the universe.
8. As per Jain philosophy all entities, which can be cognized as per valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are termed as-?
9. As per Vedānta this world is \_\_\_\_\_?
10. Bauddha philosophy considers decay as \_\_\_\_\_ ?

### Answers to the fill in the blanks questions.

1. Vedānta. 2. b. 3. c. 4. d. 5. Decay. 6. Class/division. 7. Real. 8. Real/ existent. 9. False/ *mithyā*. 10. without universal relationship or as nature of existence.

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## Unit 1 : Lesson 2 : Nature of the soul / self (*ātmā*).

In this lesson, the student shall be able to study the following topics in a systematic manner.

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Nature of soul in Jain philosophy
  - 2.1 Nature of *Jīva* or living being, without a beginning and infinite, eternal and non-eternal
  - 2.2 Similarity between empirical soul and body.
  - 2.3 Transformations (*pariṇāma*) of living beings
  - 2.4 Comparison of soul and time (*kāla*)
  - 2.5 Comparison of soul and space
  - 2.6 Relation between soul and knowledge, foundation and dependence or co-existence.
  - 2.7 Comparison between soul and space, from eternity viewpoint
  - 2.8 Comparison of living being and gold from eternal and non-eternal viewpoint.
  - 2.9 Comparison between living being and worker, from doer and enjoyer viewpoint.
  - 2.10 Comparison between living being and sun, existent and non-existent viewpoint
  - 2.11 Actions of living beings from a specific viewpoint.
- 3.0 Nature of soul in Baudha philosophy
- 4.0 Nature of soul in Upniṣad
- 5.0 Comparison of soul from Jain and Upniṣad viewpoints
- 6.0 Comparison of soul from Advait Vedānta
- 7.0 Soul in Sāṅkhya philosophy
- 8.0 Comparison between Jain and Sāṅkhya philosophies
- 9.0 Soul in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy
- 10.0 Comparison between Jain and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika
- 11.0 Transformation of soul
- 12.0 Summary and review.

### 1.0 Introduction

Philosophers all over the world were involved in the nature of non-concrete and invisible entities like the discussions for concrete and visible entities. It is not possible that all philosophers will have a single opinion about non-concrete and invisible entities. When they do not have a unified view on visible and concrete entities, how can one expect unanimity about non-concrete objects?

Discussions about the existence or non-existence of soul had been going on for thousands of years. Some acaryas in both Brahmin and Śramaṇa traditions consider soul as matter. Cārvāka and Bṛhaspati had been most notorious in India to refute the existence of soul. Study of Sutrakṛtāṅga reveals the existence of many cults propagating materialism. AjitKeśakāribli was an *ācārya* of Śramaṇa tradition. All these *ācāryas* have been vocal in refuting the existence of soul. Soul is a difficult issue in Buddhist philosophy. Thus we see that we cannot, without any reservation, support soul's existence or non-existence. Jain philosophy, on the other hand, is very clear on the subject of soul.

### 2.0 Nature of soul in Jain philosophy

According to Jain philosophy, soul is an entity with consciousness, capable of transforming continuously and so transforming into different states, doer and enjoyer, accumulator and enjoyer of karmas as per its own good or bad deeds, of the same size as the body it owns, neither subtle of all pervasive but is of limited size.

#### 2.1 Nature of *Jīva* or living being, without a beginning and infinite, eternal and non-eternal

*Jīva* is without a beginning or an end i.e. it is indestructible and eternal. From viewpoint, however, it transforms into different bodies continuously and is thus non-eternal.

## 2.2 Similarity between empirical soul and body.

Like a bird in the cage, a fruit in the pitcher and a man in his underwear are not different or separable from each other; so is the empirical soul from the body. Like milk and water, oil from its see, odour from the flower cannot be differentiated; an empirical soul also looks like the body it owns.

## 2.3 Transformations (*pariṇāma*) of living beings

*Jīva* continues to expand and contract according to the body it owns. The soul, which exists in an elephant, can also exist in an ant. In both states of expansion and contraction, the number of space points or the parts stays the same.

## 2.4 Comparison of soul and time (*kāla*)

Like time is without a beginning or an end and indestructible; similarly the soul is without a beginning or an end i.e. indestructible.

## 2.5 Comparison of soul and space

Like the space is non-concrete but still its nature is to provide space all living beings; similarly soul is non-concrete but its known or recognized by its knowledge attribute.

## 2.6 Relation between soul and knowledge, foundation and dependence or co-existence.

Like the earth is the foundation / support of all substances, similarly the soul is the foundation of attributes like knowledge etc.

## 2.7 Comparison between soul and space, from eternity viewpoint

Like the space exists at all times past, present and future, is indestructible, eternal and beyond comparison, similarly *Jīva* also exists and is indestructible all the times past present and future.

## 2.8 Comparison of living being and gold from eternal and non-eternal viewpoint.

Like necklace, ear rings, bangles etc are different modes / forms of gold and still it continues to be gold, similarly *jīva* keeps on transforming into different forms in the four destinies, changes its names and forms and yet it continues to be *Jīva*.

## 2.9 Comparison between living being and worker, from doer and enjoyer viewpoint

Like a worker / craftsman works and enjoys the fruits of his work, similarly the soul acts by itself and enjoys the fruits of its own actions.

## 2.10 Comparison between living being and sun, existent and non-existent viewpoint

Like sun shines brightly during the day and is visible then while at night it goes elsewhere and shines there but becomes invisible at the first place, similarly the soul present in a body makes it active and is seen through body actions but when it leaves the body and goes to some other body, then it makes the new body active and seen in it while the previous body is considered as lifeless.

## 2.11 Understanding of living beings from a specific activity.

Like an evil spirit enters the body of some living beings, still the spirit is not visible still from its forms and activities we can say that evil spirit has entered its body. Similarly the *Jīva* in a body is seen and experienced by its activities of laughter, crying, dance, expressions of pains and pleasures, speaking and walking etc.

*Āyaro* is an old canonical text of Jains. There the nature of soul had been discussed. 'That which is soul, is the knower. Distinguishing characteristic of soul is knowledge or consciousness due to which it knows that is soul. Soul is the knower is the definition based on the substance viewpoint. Here the coexistent nature of consciousness and its manifestation are discussed'. Its different form is that knowledge is from which it knows and the entity, which is cognized, is soul. From modal viewpoint this characteristic of soul is indicated.

'*taṃ padūcca padisaṅkhāe*' Due to this knowledge the soul is identified and we say that knowledge exists. From *Bhedadr̥ṣṣgi* we say that soul is the object of knowledge while knowledge is the means of cognizing it. From *Abhedadr̥ṣṣgi* there is a concomitance of knowledge and soul i.e. concomitance of object and means of knowledge.

This is the oldest definition of the nature of soul. 'Caitnayo lakṣaṇo jīva' and 'upyoga lakṣaṇo jīva', all these sutras are its indications. Here the meaning of cognition is manifestation (*upyoga*). Manifestation is of consciousness. Consciousness is a force and manifestation is its nature. 'yaśca vijñātā padārthānāṃ paricchedaka' *upyoga* i.e. the state of cognition is the state of manifestation. This description of soul implies the empirical soul.

Nature of pure soul is completely different from this. Pure soul is said to be free from reincarnation or beyond the cycle of birth-death. The doctrine of unknown (*ajñeyavāda*) had daunted Indian philosophers for a long time. Whatever cannot be cognized is said to unknown. Upniṣads call Br̥ham as beyond cognition. The description of pure soul in Jain philosophy can be said on similar lines as beyond cognition.

While talking of the nature of pure soul, Ācāraṅga says 'sabbe sarā ṇiyattaṇṭi' i.e. from where all the sounds return back or are reflected back. Corresponding sutra in Upniṣad is 'yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha' i.e. Br̥ham is beyond the sphere of mind and speech. Similarly soul is beyond the sphere of mind and speech. Soul is beyond words, logic and mind. This is the doctrine of unknown described in Ācāraṅga. There are two types of entities in this world namely those having universal relations and those not having universal relationship with other known entities. Soul is in the category of without universal relationship and is thus beyond cognition. It can neither be cognized by words nor with logic or mind.

Bhagavāna Mahāvīra, while describing the nature of soul said, 'nature of pure soul is like light 'oja'. Here the word *oja* can have two meanings i.e. alone or free from attachment and aversion. 'pūṭhosattā' the statement in Daśavaikālika supports this statement. Every soul has independent and distinct existence. According to Vedānta all souls are not independent. They all merge into Br̥ham. Jains and Sāṅkhya accept independent existence of each soul. The word 'oye' is an indicator of independence of each soul.

Pure soul does not have a physical existence, i.e. no supporting body. Empirical soul's have a body for their existence. Soul occupies space and is just consciousness and its manifestation.

Nature of pure soul had been described from another viewpoint i.e. a negative or rejecting every attribute assigned to it. This doctrine of *Netivāda* was prevalent in Upniṣads. *Netivāda* literally means rejecting every thing i.e. not this, not that. Soul is neither this nor that. 'arthāt ādeḥo neti neti' is the famous sutra of Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upniṣad. The nature of soul had also been described similar to Br̥ham.

Soul is neither long nor short; neither spherical nor elliptical; neither triangular nor rectangular; it has neither body nor form. It is neither black nor blue; neither red nor yellow; neither white nor green. It is neither with fragrance nor with foul smell; neither sweet nor sour; neither bitter nor spicy; neither hard nor soft; neither smooth nor rough; neither hot nor cold and is neither heavy nor light. It is without taste, colour, touch or odour, which are the distinguishing attributes of matter (*pudgala*). Thus soul is not matter and is thus beyond the cognition by five senses. Whatever we see is matter. Pure soul is totally different from matter. Thus it has been described using the doctrine of negativism or *Netivāda*.

Pure soul does not have a body. It also does not have birth and death cycles. There is no form of bondage possible with it. On the other hand empirical soul has continuous bondage of material karmas to it. Thus pure soul is just pure and smooth to which no bondage of any type is possible. It is neither male nor female or neutral in gender.

Soul is neither this nor that. Then what is soul after soul? What are its attributes and nature? What are its activities? In this context it has been systematically described as just knower with consciousness and its manifestation on its own nature. Both knowing and manifestation of consciousness are conceptual descriptions. How can we see them? Its negative view is also unknown and its known form is also not cognizable? Then what are the means to know it? To answer these questions succinctly, Āyaro has given an important sutra i.e. 'upmā ṇa vijjai' i.e. there are no similes to describe soul. Without similes how and what can be said about soul? Logical texts have two type of universal relationships (*vyāpti*) i.e. internal and external. Internal universal relationship is when the object of knowledge has a unique relationship with the means of knowledge and with nothing else. Consciousness is an attribute of soul is the internal universal relationship, as consciousness exists only in the soul and nowhere else, i.e. wherever the consciousness is, there is soul. This universal relationship encompasses the entire subject and there is no other comparison. Hence no examples of similarities can be given.

On the other hand for external relationship, the object of knowledge can have relationships with entities other than with which it has universal relationship. For example wherever there is smoke, there is fire; we can cite an example for this i.e. kitchen. All those places where fire exists assist us in our understanding the existence of fire.

Space is infinite. It encompasses its entire subject in itself. There is no other element like the space, which can be used to explain space. Like space, soul also cannot be explained using an example or simile. Soul is a non-concrete existence and so it cannot become a subject of eyes also. '*apayassa payaṇṇaṃ natthi*' i.e. the soul is beyond words and there is no word for it.

### 3.0 Nature of soul in Baudha philosophy

Buddhists call themselves as non-believers in the existence of soul.

They do not accept the real existence of soul. Rather they call its existence as *nāma* (*cetanā* or *viññāna*), which is an imaginary existence only. Consciousness (*cetanā* or *viññāna*), which is created new and destroyed every moment and *rūpa*, the material entity are enough to understand the universe and its existence. Even though they do not believe in the existence of soul, yet they do believe in rebirth, karma and liberation. On being asked questions about soul, Lord Buddha kept quiet. When further probed for the reasons for his silence, he said 'If I say that soul exists then people will become believers of eternity and if I say that soul does not exist, they will become materialistic. Therefore to negate both I keep quiet'.

Nāgārjuna writes, 'Buddha had said that soul exists and He has also said that soul does not exist. And he has not given any sermons about soul or its existence or otherwise.'

In reply to questions like what is soul, from where it come or where will it go after death; He called these questions as indescribable and always delivered sermons concerning pain and ways to get relief from pain. Buddha said 'we should think of giving relief to a person hit by an arrow rather than talk of from where the arrow has come or who has shot the arrow as they are useless?'

This path prescribed by Buddha is called the Middle Path (*Madhyama mārga*). Some followers of Buddha consider mind as different from material elements.

### 4.0 Nature of soul in Upniṣad

According to Upniṣad and Gītā, soul is different from body, different from mind, all pervading and inert i.e. without any transformation. It is beyond speech. It can be described only by the doctrine of negativism i.e. *Neti-Neti*. It is neither gross nor subtle; neither small nor large; neither a substance nor shadow or darkness; neither air nor space; neither taste nor touch or smell; neither tongue nor ear; neither an energy nor life; neither mouth nor inner or external.

### 5.0 Comparison of soul from Jain and Upniṣad viewpoints

While describing the universe in Upniṣads, soul occupies the first place. The word, *Ātmā* or soul is said to emerge as follows: From Br̥ham space (*akāśa*) was created; from space emerged air, air to fire, fire to water, earth from water, herbs (medicines) from earth; food from medicines and from food emerged soul (*pūrūṣa*). This *pūrūṣa* is with food and chemicals i.e. the deformation of food and chemicals. This *pūrūṣa* can be compare with the physical body (*audārika śarīra*) of Jains. Head etc are considered as its limbs and subsidiary systems. This body of *pūrūṣa* with life is of the form of man but does not have limbs etc like the body has. The first shell is filled to the brim with the second shell i.e. *pūrūṣa*. This body with life can be compared with force of inhale and exhale of breathe (*svāsochhāvāsa paryāpti*) in Jains. Like the soul with life lives inside physical body, similarly the soul with mind (*manomaya ātmā*) stays inside the soul with life (*prāṇa ātmā*). This soul with mind can be compared to *mana' paryāpti* or force of mind of Jains. Inside the mind with soul is the shell with consciousness. The intellect, which assists or actually discriminates and makes judgments, is in fact *viññāna*. This is the function of *anta'karaṇa* or mind and is its manifestation attribute. It can be compared to conscious mind in Jains. Inside the consciousness resides soul with bliss. This can be compared to the state of bliss of soul in Jain philosophy.

### 6.0 Comparison of soul from Advait Vedānta

1. In Jain philosophy, there is no difference between soul and jiva. Both words are indicators of one existence. But in Vedānta philosophy *ātmā* or soul known as Br̥ham is different from *Jīva*. The soul or *ātmā* in Jain

philosophy is similar to *Jīva* in Vedānta philosophy. Similarly the description of the nature of *ātmā* in Vedānta is similar to the description of soul from substance viewpoint in Jain philosophy.

2. Like Jains and Sāṅkhya, Vedānta also accepts soul as sentient or with consciousness. Consciousness of soul exists in its waking, sleeping and deluded states. But unlike Nyāya Vaiśeṣika who consider consciousness as an acquired attribute of soul, Jains and Vedānta consider consciousness as a coexistent attribute or the nature of soul.
3. Vedānta considers the nature of soul as with *sat* (existent), *citta* (consciousness) and *ānanda* (bliss) with manifestation of consciousness as knowledge. In Jain philosophy, they talk of *sat*, *citta*, *ānanda* along with infinite intuition and infinite energy also.
4. Śāṅkarācārya, like Sāṅkhya does not consider soul, as the real doer and enjoyer of its karmas but due to its associations become so. But Jain philosophers like Mīmāṃsakas and Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider soul as real doer and enjoyer of its karmas.
5. Śāṅkarācārya considers *ātmā* as one and *Jīva* as many but Jains consider *ātmā* as many.
6. Vedānta like Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas considers soul as inert but Jains consider soul as active.
7. Jains consider soul as with many space points and of limited size. Vedānta considers soul as with no parts and all pervading.
8. As per Vedānta, the soul attains liberation as a result of acquiring pure knowledge while in Jain philosophy soul attains liberation with right knowledge-intuition and conduct.

## 7.0 Soul in Sāṅkhya philosophy

Soul in Sāṅkhya philosophy is said to be same as *pūrūṣa*. Soul-*pūrūṣa* is different from 24 other elements like *prakṛti*. Soul is not the doer of meritorious acts and hence is inert. Soul is not capable of even moving a speck of straw while *prakṛti* is the doer and active. To transform and engage is the nature of *prakṛti*.

Soul is totally devoid of attributes like *sattva* etc. *Sattva* and other attributes belong to *prakṛti* and they cannot be attributes of soul. Soul is the enjoyer, it experiences but these activities are not really of soul itself as these are mere reflections as pain and pleasures in mirror of intellect emanating from *prakṛti*. Intellect itself is evolutionary and the pains and pleasures reflect in it from both sides. Shadow of pain and pleasure in intellect are cast on inert *pūrūṣa*. This casting of shadow of pain and pleasure in the soul is its experience or activity. Due to this activity, *pūrūṣa* can be said as enjoyer of pains etc.

Nature of *pūrūṣa* is consciousness but not its manifestation as knowledge. Knowledge is the nature of intellect. Pains and pleasure are experienced by intellect through the medium of sense organs. Intellect is like a transparent lens. Thus from side of the lens, shadows of pains and pleasures are cast on soul and from soul's side consciousness of soul is cast on intellect. As casting of shadows of consciousness and the object of knowledge are simultaneous on the intellect, this results in *pūrūṣa* considering itself as the knower and enjoyer. It can be said in brief as follows:

*Amurtaścetano bhogi nitya'sarvagatoakriya',  
Akartā nirguṇa'sukṣama ātmā kapildarśane.*

In Sāṅkhya philosophy, soul is considered as non-concrete, consciousness, enjoyer, can go anywhere, inert, inactive, without any attributes and is subtle.

## 8.0 Comparison between Jain and Sāṅkhya philosophies.

1. Jain philosophy considers soul as eternal and with consciousness. Sāṅkhya also agrees with this view.
2. Jain philosophy considers soul as different from body and innumerable in number. Sāṅkhya also agrees with this view.
3. Jain consider soul as of the same size as body and hence it is capable of extension and contraction, transforming continuously but eternal at the same time. Sāṅkhya on the other hand considers soul as inert and eternal and capable of movement anywhere. They do not agree with its attributes of contraction and extension or transformation.

4. Jains considers existence of many attributes in soul, like knowledge, energy etc while Sāṅkhya does not consider so except consciousness all such attributes exist in intellect, which is physical in nature.
5. Jains consider that efforts and efficient causes can enhance the knowledge capabilities of different souls. Sāṅkhya imparts these developments in intellect that is physical in nature and distinct from soul.

## 9.0 Soul in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy

Nyāyasutra talks of twelve types of objects of knowledge. They consider soul as one of the objects of knowledge. Soul is both meritorious and un-meritorious in different states. When the soul is the enjoyer of pains and pleasures then its state is considered as un-meritorious. When it becomes indifferent to pains and pleasures and becomes free of all such attachments or engagements then it becomes meritorious. Soul is the foundation or basis of pain, pleasure, desire, attachment, aversion, efforts and knowledge etc. Soul is identified or recognized by attributes like consciousness, active or doer and capability to go everywhere. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider soul as eternal, non-concrete and all pervading but still as many in number.

## 10.0 Comparison between Jain and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika

1. Jain philosophy considers knowledge as the nature of the soul while Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider knowledge as an acquired attribute of soul.
2. Jain philosophy considers soul in liberated state as just consciousness while Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider soul as insentient in the liberated state.
3. Jain philosophy considers soul as eternal and with transformation. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider soul as not capable of transformation.
4. Jain philosophy considers soul as eternal from substance point of view and as non-eternal from the mode viewpoint. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider soul as inert and eternal.
5. Jain philosophy considers soul as of the same size as the body. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider soul as all pervading.
6. Jain philosophy considers attributes of soul as an integral part of soul. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider these attributes as separate from soul.

## 11. Transformation of soul

*Jīvas* are infinite in number. Every *Jīva* has numerable parts and space points which cannot be separated from each other. Hence from the point of view of its pervading, it can pervade the entire space of this universe. During the state of *kevali samudhaghāta*, it becomes all pervading for a few moments. At the time of death also, it can partially pervade for a few moments.

From the perspective of the number of space points, *ākāśa* (space), *dharma* and *adharma* and *Jīva* are all having innumerable space points and so similar but they are different from the viewpoint of their occupying the space. *Dharma*, *adharma* and space are devoid of any acceptable activity-inactivity. Therefore there is no change in them during their transformations. On the other hand in empirical soul, accepting the matter karmas and their actions and reactions are all existing. Therefore their transformations are not always similar or same. It contracts or expands continuously. Still it never contracts like an atom or expands like the entire space or *lokākāśa*. Therefore *Jīvas* are of middle category of transformation.

Expansion and contraction are not the nature of *Jīvas*, they are relative to *karmanā* body. In the state of bondage with karmas, the soul is bound by the limits of the body in which it exists. Therefore its transformation is not independent. Size of the *karmanā* body is relative to the four destinies it wanders. In liberated state, the soul does not expand or contract. In this state the size of its last body stays its size forever.

Expansion and contraction of the soul can be compared to the flame of an earthen lamp. In the open space, the dispersion of light is all pervading while the light gets limited to the room when the lamp is placed inside a room. If we put the lamp in a pitcher, then its light is limited to the pitcher and when placed under a bowl the light dispersion gets limited to the bowl only. Similarly the cover of *karmanā* body affects the expansion and contraction of the soul.

The soul, which exists in a child's body, the same soul exists in the body of the young man and the old man also. Thus the same soul, which pervades a gross body, then pervades a smaller body or a slimmer body.

A doubt can arise in our mind. When the soul is accepted as the of the same size as body, then we have to accept its having parts and if it has parts then it will become non-eternal or momentary. For example the pitcher is with parts and hence it is non-eternal. However there is no such rule that an entity with parts is also destructible. For example, the space occupied by pitcher or cloth stays same even though the pitcher or the cloth are destroyed or broken in parts. Similarly the soul even though is with parts can be eternal also and the parts which have assembled together due to some reasons can also be separated. Besides this the parts, which are indivisible in parts cannot be separated from their owner also.

No entity in the world can be just eternal or non-eternal only, but they are all eternal and non-eternal at the same time. The consciousness can never exist without the soul and so the soul is eternal. Space points of the soul are some time expanded and sometimes contracted. They are sometimes in pain and sometimes in pleasure; some times different modes in one destiny and at other times in different destiny. Hence the statement that soul is with parts does not become a hindrance in its being eternal or being of the size of the body also.

We find different imaginations for the size of the soul in Upanishads. This soul is like the kernel of rice or barley and at other times we find its size as so small like from the tip of the nail to the tip of the toe.

This soul is of the size of the body.

This soul is all pervading.

This soul residing in my heart is bigger than the entire ear or space or even the entire cosmos.

## 12.0 Summary and review

All philosophies have conclusively agreed that consciousness is the nature of the soul. Cārvāka also consider soul as with consciousness. Still they say that soul is not eternal as it is a creation of the five basic elements. Buddhists say that consciousness is created but the series of consciousness is eternal. Cārvāka consider each created consciousness as different totally. On the other hand Buddhists refute created consciousness as different and similar from its previous created consciousness. Hence they consider the series of created consciousness as eternal. Sāṅkhya, Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas, both Mīmāṃsakas and Jains all consider soul as eternal.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Please discuss the nature of soul in Jain philosophy?  
Or

#### Short notes type questions:

2. Explain briefly the nature of pure soul?
3. Please explain the sutra ' *Jo ātmā heṇ vaha vijñātā heṇ* '?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

4. Soul in Cārvāka philosophy is \_\_\_\_\_ ?
5. Sāṅkhya philosophy considers *pūrūṣa* as \_\_\_\_\_?
6. Jain philosophy considers \_\_\_\_\_ as the nature of the soul?
7. Old text of Jains is \_\_\_\_\_?
8. Jain philosophy considers soul as \_\_\_\_\_ ?
9. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas considers soul in the form of one \_\_\_\_\_ ?
10. In Vedānta philosophy, soul, which is said as \_\_\_\_\_ that is different from *jīva*?
11. In Vedānta philosophy, soul is said as *sat citta ānanda* and \_\_\_\_\_?
12. Within the conscious soul lives \_\_\_\_\_ soul ?
13. *Manomaya śarira* can be compared with \_\_\_\_\_ ?

Author : Sādhvi Vīśrūtibhā



## Unit 1: Lesson 3 : Matter (*pudgala*) Jain, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya

In this lesson, the student shall be able to study the following topics in a systematic manner.

- 1.0 Introduction
- 2.0 Nature of matter (*pudgala*) in Jain philosophy
- 3.0 Nature of *Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya philosophy
- 4.0 Comparison between Jain and Sāṅkhya views
- 5.0 *Paramāṇu* (atom) in Nyāya philosophy.
- 6.0 Comparison between Jain and Nyāya views.

### 1.0 Introduction

Historically there have been intellectual attempts in India to resolve the issues concerning the perceptible world, its composition, existence and beginning. Based on the differences in opinion, a number of philosophical schools / systems emerged. In India's philosophical context, Jainism, Sāṅkhya, Buddhist, Nyāya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsaka, Cārvāka etc are the prominent ones. All these philosophies presented their doctrines concerning the causes and constituents of the universe. Based on their analysis, we find that Jains consider *pudgala* and *jīva* (souls) as the main constituents of this perceptible world; Buddhist consider *Nāma* (consciousness) and *Rūpa* (concrete forms) as the main constituents, Sāṅkhya talk of *Prakṛti*, Nyāya talk of sentient and insentient elements as the material cause of this universe and Vedānta *Prakṛti* talks of the intellect consider as both material and efficient causes of the universe. In this lesson, we shall discuss and compare the insentient constituents (*Pudgala*, *Prakṛti* and *Paramāṇu*) of Jain, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya philosophies.

### 2.0 Nature of matter (*pudgala*) in Jain philosophy.

As per Jain philosophy, the main or primary cause of this perceptible world is *pudgala* or matter. Matter is associated with attributes like colour, taste, touch and smell. The word *pudgala* consists of an amalgam of *pud* i.e. to combine + *gala* or to disintegrate. Thus fusion and fission are the primary attributes of *pudgala*. The indicative characteristics of *pudgala*, i.e. taste, touch, smell and colour make it concrete (*murta*). *Pudgala* is concrete means that the five sense organs can cognize it i.e. *pudgala* can be touched, it can be tasted, it can be smelt and it can be seen by the eyes. Every material entity is an amalgam of many parts or components and it occupies space.

Jain philosophy considers *pudgala* as existent or real. Because it is existent, hence it is capable of transformation as well as being eternal. Due to transformation being its nature and the contact with other external entities, change keeps on taking place in *pudgala*. Even with continuous change taking place, its existence is eternal. From time perspective, matter was existent in the past, is present and will always be present. The number of *Paramāṇus* remains constant even though they may disintegrate from one type of entity and combine with another entities. Transformation of *pudgala* into other type of *pudgala* is possible and accepted but *pudgala* cannot change to another form of substance like living beings etc.

*Pudgala* is defined as of two types namely atom (*paramāṇu*) and lump (*skandha*). Atom is subtle and not further indivisible in parts. Combination of atoms forms a lump. Thus a lump can be formed with two or more (from innumerable to infinite) atoms. Each *paramāṇu* has one type of colour, one type of odour, one type of taste and two types of touch. These two types of touch are either hot or cold and smooth or rough. On the other a lump can have four or all eight types of touches. The eight touches are cold - hot, smooth - rough, fine - heavy and hard - soft.

Lumps with four types of touch are called subtle lumps. Such subtle lumps and atoms cannot be perceived by the senses. Lumps with all eight types of touch are called gross lumps and are perceptible by senses.

To understand how matter can become useful to living beings, we have to understand the different types of matter particles (*vargaṇās*). By *vargaṇās*, we imply classes or material particles with similar uses. These are of eight types as follows:

- i. *Audārika vargaṇās* i.e. matter particles which can be converted to form the body. All visible bodies of different types of living beings are called *audārika* bodies.
- ii. *Vaikrayika vargaṇās* i.e. material particles, which are capable of being converted to celestial bodies. Celestial bodies belong to denizens of hell and heavens. Ascetics also acquire capabilities to transform their bodies to different types and forms and as such their bodies can also be classified as celestial bodies.
- iii. *Āhāraka vargaṇās* i.e. the matter particles, which combine to form bodies for thought activities.
- iv. *Tejas vargaṇās* i.e. matter particles capable of transformation into electric body.
- v. *Kārmaṇa vargaṇās* i.e. matter particles capable of transformation as *kārmaṇa* bodies.
- vi. *Bhāṣā vargaṇās* i.e. matter particles capable of transportation as sounds.
- vii. *Mano vargaṇās* i.e. matter particles which are capable of transformation as mind.
- viii. *Svāsocchāsa vargaṇās* i.e. matter particles which are capable of transformation as inhale and exhale of breathe.

These *vargaṇās* pervade the entire cosmos. But their use is only possible where are in contact with living beings. Without the assistance of these matter particles, the empirical living beings cannot perform any activity. Every living is continuously taking new particles, transforming them and eliminating some particles of matter all the time. All visible entities of the entire universe are either used or eliminated /destroyed by the living beings.

The word *pudgala* as used in Jain philosophy, has no synonym in other philosophies. However there are words similar to it in other Indian philosophies like *Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya and *Paramāṇu* (atom) in Nyāya philosophies.

### 3.0 Nature of *Prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Sāṅkhya philosophy considers *Prakṛti* as the basic element or cause of the visible world. Its origin is as '*prakarṣeṇa kriyante yasyā'sā prakṛti*' i.e. it is the source or originator of *mahat* (the great or intellect), *ahaṅkāra* (principle of individuation) etc 23 subordinate types of basic elements. The names of these 2 types of elements are given table later on. The fundamental *Prakṛti* is also said to be indescribable. It is only the manifestations (*vikāra*) of *Prakṛti*, which are termed as concrete. Indescribable or subtle *Prakṛti* is not a subject of sensual perception but its existence can be inferred. *Prakṛti* has three types of attributes namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Due to the inequilibrium of these three attributes, *Prakṛti* becomes concrete and can be perceived by senses. So it becomes describable. This describable (*vyakta*) *Prakṛti* is further sub-classified in twenty-three sub types. *Vyakta* i.e. describable state of *Prakṛti* is due to different proportions of the three attributes (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). Sometimes the *sattva* (cause of all goodness or happiness) attribute is in higher proportion while at other times *tamas* (cause of inactivity, apathy and indifference) is so or *rajas* (cause of all pains and leads to a life of feverish enjoyment and restless effort) is so. Even though one attribute is dominant in an entity, yet the other two also co-exist in different ratios all the times. In the end all the three attributes submerge in each other and lead to *Prakṛti* again. The state of equal proportion of all three attributes is said to catastrophe/ calamity (*pralaya*) and the state of different proportions of the three attributes is called the world. '*Satvarajastamasāṇ sāmāyāvasthā prakṛti*'

The fundamental *prakṛti* is eternal and is not created by anything. It is existent and eternal but is constantly going through transformation. Hence it is called active and eternal (*pariṇāmī nitya*). The sequence of transformation from *prakṛti* is to *mahat* (the great or intellect or *buddhi*) - *ahaṅkāra* (principle of individuation or self-sense) - five *tanmātras* (sound, touch, taste, form or colour and taste) - five *mahābhūtas* (five gross elements of ether, air, water, earth and light), mind and ten types of sense organs (five senses and five organs of action). Out of these only fundamental *prakṛti* while *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra*, *tanmātras* etc are both *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. *Mahat* is the transformation of *prakṛti*, while it being the producer of *ahaṅkāra* is also *prakṛti* with reference to it. Similarly as *ahaṅkāra* is produced from *mahat* and is therefore a transformation while as it creates *tanmātras* so is *prakṛti* also relative to them. However mind, ten sense organs and the five gross elements are just transformations and not *prakṛti* but just manifestations only. Therefore these sixteen elements are just called transformations only. *Prakṛti* is just one and the perceptible world comes into existence just as its transformations / manifestations.

Prakṛti——mahat—— ahaṅkāra—— five tanmātras —— five mahābhūtas Mind (manasa)

Five sense organs (*jñānendriyas*) ears, eyes, nose, skin, tongue/taste

Five organs of action (*karmendriyas*)

Five *tanmātras* (sound, touch, taste, form or colour and odour)

Five *mahābhūtas* (gross elements of ether/space, air, water, earth and light)

#### 4.0 Comparison between Jain and Sāṅkhya views

Jain philosophy considers pudgala as active and eternal (*pariṇāmī nitya*). In this respect both Jain and Sāṅkhya philosophies are almost similar. Pudgala of Jains and *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya are both eternal and active. There is transformation of *prakṛti* resulting in *mahat* and other elements and becoming the cause of the existence of the universe. All visible entities are manifestations of *prakṛti* only. In spite of all these, *prakṛti* continues to be existent in its nature all the time. Similarly *paramāṇū* of Jains, also going through the continuous process of transformations and manifesting in different forms and entities, never leaves its nature. Like the Jains talk of infinite *paramāṇūs* which according to its nature of going through the cycle of fusion and fission and giving rise to various types of lumps and thus varieties of existences in this universe. Similarly Sāṅkhya, based on the continuous change in the ratios of various attributes and their transformations accepts the origin and existence of multifaceted universe emanating from one basic element called *prakṛti*.

Sāṅkhya philosophy is the follower of the doctrine of continuous transformation (*pariṇāmī*) of *prakṛti*. According to this philosophy of transformation, the fundamental cause of the entity being transformed is always existent i.e. even after transformation of basic entity into its manifestation, the basic entity continues to exist. Transformation of *prakṛti* only results in *mahat* etc. *Prakṛti* always exist in its manifestations like *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* etc and never becomes non-existent. On the other hand, Jain philosophy is not the supporter of this doctrine of manifestation of just one type of entity. It accepts relative transformation. Jains accept transformation or manifestations of the modes (Like one mode of *pudgala* is *paramāṇū* and the other is lump). Fusion of *paramāṇūs* result in lumps and fusion of many lumps result in this universe. In all these manifestations, *paramāṇū* is always existent. However Jains do not believe in the transformation of substance (unlike Sāṅkhya) i.e. one type of substance cannot transform into another type of substance.

Sāṅkhya believe that *paramāṇūs* of earth is created by the five *tanmātras* (sound, touch, taste, form or colour and odour) in which the odour is primary. Similarly element water consists of four *tanmātras* (sound, touch, taste, form or colour) leaving the odour and with taste as the primary attribute. In *Taijas* only three attributes (sound, touch and form) exist, air has just two and space has only one attribute as shown below.

Earth:	sound + touch + form + taste + odour
Water:	sound + touch + form + taste
Taijas:	sound + touch + form
Air:	sound + touch
Space/ether:	sound

This implies that, as per Sāṅkhya philosophy, different elements have different *tanmātras* like earth with all the five, space with just one etc. Jain philosophy on the other hand does not accept this. According to them every *paramāṇū* has taste, touch, odour and form as primary attributes. Existence of just taste or odour in some and not in others is not acceptable to Jains.

According to Jain philosophy, *paramāṇū* is a solid element, which is no further divisible into parts. It is not a particle like *prakṛti* in Sāṅkhya philosophy. In its manifestation it has a solid form. The three attributes namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are like waves, their proportional existence is the cause of solid entities. This is the basic difference between Jains and Sāṅkhya about the existence of the universe itself.

Jain philosophy accepts that insentient particles insulate the knowledge and other attribute of sentient beings and this is the empirical state of living beings. Removing this cover of insentient elements completely from its existence results in the existence of its pure state and the same is said to liberation or *Mokṣa*. On the other hand Sāṅkhya does not accept this. Liberation or *Mokṣa* is not achieved by sentient beings (self or *puruṣa*) but it is of *prakṛti*. Manifestation of *prakṛti* is its empirical state (universe) and its state of equilibrium state i.e. equal proportion of the three attributes) is its liberation. Knowledge etc are also attributes of insentient *prakṛti* only and not living being. On the contrary

Jains believe that knowledge is distinguishing characteristic of self/soul. This is the fundamental difference between sentient beings and insentient matter. Consciousness is the attribute of sentient beings and not of insentient *prakṛti*.

Are the fundamental elements of the world momentary or eternal? If they are eternal then what is the cause of their eternity and if they are momentary then what is the cause of their momentary state? In reply to these questions, both Jains and Sāṅkhya regard them as eternal and momentary at the same time. Since they are cause of the universe so they have to be momentarily existent and hence must be active or going through transformations continuously. Sāṅkhya believe that eternal existence of *prakṛti* is due to *tamas* attribute as *tamas* is the cause of stability while *rajas* attribute is the cause of activity and hence momentary-ness.

*Sattavaṅ laghū prakāśakamiṣṭamūpaṣṭambhakaṅ caraṇaḥ,  
Gūrū varaṇakameva tamaḥ pradīpavaccārthato vṛttiḥ*

On the other hand Jain philosophy believes that the stability or permanence and activity or manifestations are the nature of *pudgala* i.e. both activity and eternity are existent due to the nature of *pudgala* and due to an attribute.

### 5.0 *Paramāṇū* (atom) in Nyāya philosophy.

Nyāya philosophy believes in the doctrine of existence of four types of basic elements or *Paramāṇūs*, which are the cause of the existence of this universe. These are earth (*pṛthvī*), water (*apa*), fire (*tejas*) and air (*marūta*). In these atoms attributes of substantiality (*dravamāna*), weight (*bhāra*), fluidity (*taralatā*) or solidity (*kathoratā*), stickiness, speed, specific colour, taste, odour and touch exist in differing grades and states. In the state of the empirical existence of the universe, *Paramāṇūs* cannot exist in independent states in general; however at the time of catastrophe or calamity, they can exist in independent states. During the time of catastrophe, their unions are broken and so they exist as independent entities also.

Union of two *paramāṇūs* results in an entity (*dvayaṇūka*) with two *paramāṇūs*. Similarly unions of three, four or five atoms result in lumps of three (*trayaṇūka*), four (*caturaṇūka*) etc atoms respectively. By nature atoms tend to unite together continuously and the cause of this nature is considered as an unknown entity. Due to this unknown entity, atoms continue to be active and they form unions.

From our own observations in the physical world, we see changes taking place in an entity with the application of heat. It is likely that application of heat results in disintegration of entities but it is not essential. Only atoms can have change in their attributes. This principle is called as *Pithara-pāka* by Naiyāyikas. According to *Pithara-pāka*, changes in colour for example, take place both in the entity and the atoms. On the other hand Vaiśeṣikas accept the principle of *Pīlū-pāka*, which states that the entity first disintegrates in atoms and then atoms combine together in a new fashion resulting in a new entity.

Atoms of earth, water etc are different. Air has touch as the primary attribute, fire has colour as the primary attribute while water and earth have taste and odour as primary attributes respectively.

### 6.0 Comparison between Jain and Nyāya philosophies.

Jains call the smallest and indivisible part of *pudgala* as *paramāṇū*. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas also call *paramāṇū* as further indivisible. There are infinite *paramāṇūs*. Both philosophies agree till this stage. Even with these agreements, Jains do not accept any fundamental differences in the *paramāṇūs* of water and earth etc. All *paramāṇūs* can transform into any other forms of *paramāṇūs* as per the circumstances i.e. water *paramāṇū* can become air *paramāṇū* and so on. Only their nature and state as *paramāṇū* do not change. However as per Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas, this is not so as water *paramāṇūs* will always remain as water *paramāṇūs* and not become air or earth *paramāṇūs*.

As per Jain philosophy, *paramāṇūs* have an extra ordinary power of transformation due to which many *paramāṇūs* combine together to form a lump. This lump so formed is not a new entity but only a unique formation of the *paramāṇūs*. On the other hand Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas say that *paramāṇūs* exist till they are *paramāṇūs* and on their union to form an entity, a new entity is created and the existence of *paramāṇūs* is gone. In this way combining different types of atoms creates new entities.

Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas consider *paramāṇūs* as eternal and inert at the same time. They do not support transformation in *paramāṇūs* taking place. But Jains support transformation in *paramāṇūs* taking place also. The fundamental cause

for the variety of existences in the universe is due to the transformations of both jiva and pudgala and transformation of *pudgala* is especially important. Attributes like taste, touch, colour and odour can change in *pudgala* but *pudgala* is never without them as a result of fusion and fission taking place in them. On the other hand Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas do not accept existence of all attributes like taste, touch, colour etc together in all atoms. Some types of atoms have four while others may have three or two or five such attributes. As they accept independent existence of the five basic elements (*pañcābhūtas*) while Jains think of them as manifestations of *pudgala* and not independent existences.

Jains consider *paramāṇū* so subtle that its further sub divisions cannot be done. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas on the other hand do not consider *paramāṇū* as so subtle but is gross.

*Jalāntaragate bhānau yatsukṣmaṇ dṛśyate raja',  
tasya ṣaṣṭhatamo bhāga 'paramāṇū' sa uccyate.*

According to them the ultimate *paramāṇū* is one sixth of the shadow of a dust particle seen as the shadow under the sun in water. On the other hand Jains consider this as a lump of infinite *paramāṇūs*. *Paramāṇū* is not an object of knowledge for the sense organs and is indivisible. Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas also consider *paramāṇū* as indivisible. They talk of as spherical in shape and is not further divisible in parts. They say that further division of *paramāṇū* is just experiential and not real. *Paramāṇū* is without any space points i.e. do not occupy any space like Jains and yet it occupies the minimal space also.

Nyāya Vaiśeṣika scholars consider paramanu as inert by nature and its movements are due to external causes. In this context, Praśasta Pāda says that we cannot establish any basis, neither directly nor by inference, in the activities of the five basic elements. Still all beneficial or useless activities we find in them can only be assigned to unknown causes /forces. In these unknown causes, they believe in God being the fundamental reason for all these activities. As per the desire of the God to create the entire universe is created or transformed. On the other hand, Jains consider activity of *pudgala* due to its own nature. *Pudgala* does have the external causes in the form of *dharmāstikāya* and *adhamāstikāya* for supporting their nature of movement and rest.

Jains believe sound (*śabda*), Bondage (*bāndha*), subtle-ness (*sukṣmatā*), gross-ness (*sthulatā*), form (*saṁsthana*), differences (*bheda*), darkness, shadow, heat, light and *prabhā*. Nyāya talks of sound as an attribute of space '*śabda-guṇamākāśam*'. Jains raise an issue that *śabda* which is concrete (as it is the subject of hearing sense organs) cannot be an attribute of non-concrete space. They thus establish *śabda* as *pudgala*.

Jains believe darkness (*tamasa*) also as a mode of *pudgala* i.e. even darkness is *pudgala*. Here the *pudgalas* with black colour are predominant and so black colour pervades all over. On the other hand Nyāya do not consider darkness as a substance type as it is without any attributes. It is a form of non-existence and is just a negation of light. So Nyāya consider darkness as non-existent while Jains consider it as existent.

Nyāya philosophy is the proponent of creation. Hence they say that all resulting entities are different from their creator entities. For example earth atoms create earth and both are totally different from each other. Atom is eternal while earth is momentary. Jain philosophy does not support doctrine of creation. As per them earth resulting from transformation of earth *paramāṇūs* is not totally different from earth *paramāṇūs*.

The above analysis shows that all three philosophies have established, based on their own philosophical doctrines, the existence of fundamental conceptual elements which are form this many faceted universe. We find some similarities and some differences in all three philosophies, still they all tried to reach closer to the reality.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

- 1.0 What is the physical element of the existence of this multi faceted universe? Compare the Jain view with reference to Sāṅkhya and Nyāya views?

### Short notes type questions:

1. What is Parīṇāmavāda (doctrine of transformation)? Does Jain philosophy support it?
2. Explain the doctrine of *paramāṇu* in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. As per Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy, *paramāṇu* is ——— in shape?  
a. spherical b. triangular and c. egg or elliptical
2. The cause for activity or transformation in Prakṛti is ——— ?  
a. *tamogūṇa* b. *rajogūṇa* c. *sattvagūṇa*.
3. Jain philosophy considers— types of *pudgala*?  
a. four. b. three. c. two.
4. Uniform existence of attributes (*sāmyavasthā*) is called ——— ?  
a. primary or *pradhāna* b. catastrophe or *pralaya* c. two
5. Philosophy which accepts transformation in *paramāṇu* is ——— ?  
a. Jain b. Sāṅkhya c. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika
6. ——— philosophy considers *paramāṇu* as eternal and inert?
7. Five ——— generate five basic elements (*mahābhūtas*) ?
8. *Pudgala* is ——— even though it is continuously transforming?
9. As per Sāṅkhya, space is created by ——— ?
10. Vedānta considers ——— as the material and efficient cause of this universe?

### Answers to the fill in the blanks questions.

2. a. 2. b. 3. c. 4. b. 5. a. 6. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. 7. *tanmātras*. 8. eternal 9. *śabda tanmātrā* 10. *citattva* universal relationship or as nature of existence.

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### Author

Samajī Śārdā Prajñā

## Unit 1 : Lesson 4 : Nature of liberation / *Mokṣa kā svarūpa*

In this lesson, the student shall be able to study the following topics in a systematic manner connected with liberation and its nature.

### 0.0 Introduction

#### 1.0 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Indian philosophical systems.

- 1.1 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Cārvāka philosophy.
- 1.2 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Nyāya philosophy.
- 1.3 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Vaiśeṣika philosophy.
- 1.4 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophy.
- 1.5 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Mīmāṃsaka philosophy.
- 1.6 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Advait Vedānta philosophy.
- 1.7 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Bauddha philosophy
- 1.8 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Jain philosophy.

### 0.0 Introduction

Discussions and analysis of liberations is that distinguishing aspect of Indian philosophical systems, which separate them from western philosophies. According to western philosophies, the only objective of philosophy is to discuss and investigate the constituents of world and problems faced by the world. On the other hand the Indian philosophical systems try not only to investigate the world, its constituents and problems but go further to find the define reality (sat) and the path to realize is to relieve us from all the pains associated with us. The hard fact of life is pain, be it physical or mental or intellectual. All engagements of the mankind are to get rid of the pains.

Whereas the western philosophers keep themselves engaged till logic, morality and humanitarian deeds, the pinnacle of thinking for Indian philosophers is *Mokṣa* or liberation. Indian philosophers were ascetics first and thinkers later. Hence logic, morality and humanitarian deeds were their means and not the end. The pinnacle of their thinking was *Mokṣa*, which is beyond logic and logical explanations. Knowledge of *Mokṣa* is not bound by the limits of society or humanism. Hence it is beyond the reach of society, morality and humanism. General meaning of *Mokṣa* in Indian philosophical systems is relief from pains completely i.e. liberation from the cycle of birth and death.

Indian philosophies are value based. Indian philosophers have identified values as *pūrūṣārtha* or efforts. They have identified four types of *pūrūṣārtha* namely:

1. *artha* i.e. based on economic values.
2. *kāma* i.e. based on mental values.
3. *dharma* based on moral values and
4. *Mokṣa* i.e. based spiritual values.

Every person has two choices or pursuits to select namely 1. Worldly or sensual pleasures i.e. *laukika*. 2. Welfare or happiness beyond world i.e. bliss. In other words these can also be said as paths of *preya* and *śreya*. In the above four types of *pūrūṣārtha*, *artha* and *dharma* are the means based i.e. they are the means to attain *kāma* and *Mokṣa* respectively. *kāma* and *Mokṣa* are the values to be achieved i.e. usage or benefits of *artha* and *dharma* respectively. We find discussions on *Mokṣa* in all Indian philosophical systems, be they believers in God or not i.e. atheist or otherwise; Vedic or non-Vedic. In this lesson we shall analyze the nature of *Mokṣa* briefly with detailed discussions on *Mokṣa* as discussed in Jain philosophy because *Mokṣa* had been discussed in greatest details here.

#### 1.0 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Indian philosophical systems.

##### 1.1 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Cārvāka philosophy

Cārvāka philosophy is the philosophy of modern day human beings. This philosophy believes only in existences, which can be seen or experienced. Hence they do not believe in the objects of knowledge like soul, karma, reincarnation, heaven and hell, which are based on indirect knowledge. They do not believe in *Mokṣa* after death i.e. leaving the body but discussions on *Mokṣa* in the present life is also available even in this philosophy. In Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha, nature of *Mokṣa* in Cārvāka is given as follows:



*‘pārtantrayaṅ bandha’ svātantrayaṅ Mokṣa’*

i.e. Wherever there is independence there is *Mokṣa*. Dependence is pain and so it is bondage. Whatever a person does, the ultimate objective of all his actions is to be happy i.e. attaining independence.

### 1.2 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Nyāya philosophy.

According to Nyāya philosophy, elimination of all pains of the soul is *Mokṣa* ‘*tadatyantavimokṣo pavarga*’ i.e. elimination of all pains from their roots so that the possibility of their cropping up again in future is eliminated. According to them when the wrong knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) is eliminated and the right knowledge about the reality of existence arise resulting in elimination of all flaws. When the laws are totally removed, they result in the elimination of engagement in life or desire. When the desires are eliminated then the cycle of births is eliminated. End of wrong knowledge also results in the elimination of all bonded karmas ultimately resulting in *Mokṣa*. In fact no happiness attained in this world is true happiness; it is ultimately unhappiness. Therefore intelligent people abdicate these happy moments as temporary in the same way as we give up eating poisoned sweets. In this way *Mokṣa* literally means destruction of all worldly experiences, be they painful or pleasurable.

### 1.3 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Vaiśeṣika philosophy is similar to Nyāya philosophy. Hence both have similar views about *Mokṣa* in general. According to Mahārṣi Kanād destruction of all concepts result in the termination of relationship between soul and body. In the state of *Mokṣa*, the cycle of birth and death is eliminated. According to them knowledge or consciousness is not the nature of soul. Substance is basically without any attributes. Intellect, pleasure and pain, desire, aversion, effort, *dharma*, *adharma* and *saṁskāra* are all acquired attributes of soul. These attributes exist with the soul due to an associative element *saṁvāya*. Hence when all these attributes are eliminated from soul, we say that the soul has attained *Mokṣa*. ‘*taddbhāve saṁyogābhāvo prādubhāvo asca mokṣa*’ i.e. mind, karma etc existing with the body causes the destruction of body and hence the soul does not acquire any new body. Malliṣeṇa while describing the nature of *Mokṣa* in Vaiśeṣika philosophy says:

*‘tadevaṅ dhiṣaṇādināḥ, navānāmapī muata’  
guṇānāmātmano dhvaṁsa’, soa pavarga’ sa pratiṣṭhita’*

In this way, as per Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy, pain, pleasure, desire etc are all conspicuous by their absence in the state of *Mokṣa*. According to them all these attributes are relative to the body only. When the soul eliminates its relationship with the body with sense organs, then all these attributes are also eliminated. The state of soul in this condition i.e. *Mokṣa* is same as it becomes without existence in the state of deep slumber. According to Vātsyāna, on attaining the right and valid knowledge, attachment with worldly objects is destroyed resulting in elimination of any expectations for the use of mind, speech and body, which are the causes of the next birth. Karmas already accumulated are also destroyed slowly thereby eliminating the need of additional births. This state of soul is *Mokṣa*.

### 1.4 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophy

Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophy both believe in the duality of existence. According to them, the basic elements of this universe are two namely *prakṛti* (insentient) and *pūrūṣa* (sentient). *Prakṛti* is a union of three attributes namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṁas*. *Pūrūṣa* is without or beyond these three attributes. Pain and pleasure, enjoyment and action are all attributes of *prakṛti*. *Pūrūṣa* on the other hand is inert and eternal. Pain and pleasure, enjoyment and action etc are not his attributes but due to ignorance and delusion (*avidhyā*), it thinks that these belong to it. It feels that the pains and pleasures reflected in the intellect are its own resulting in the development of ego. This is the bondage of *pūrūṣa*. When *pūrūṣa* acquires the knowledge of the reality (*sat*) then *avidhyā* is destroyed and *pūrūṣa* understands the difference / distinction between the object and its image i.e. it attains the discrimination knowledge. It then realizes that it is *pūrūṣa* and not *prakṛti* or its manifestation. Actually its discrimination knowledge itself is its *Mokṣa*. Thus according to Sāṅkhya philosophy:

*‘prakṛtipūrūṣanyatvakhyātau prakṛtyūparame pūrūṣasya svarupeṇāvasthānaḥ mokṣa’*

On attaining the discriminatory knowledge, *pūrūṣa* realizes that it was eternal and free. Meaning of the development of *prakṛti* is *Mokṣa* of *pūrūṣa*. On attaining the discriminatory knowledge, the function of *prakṛti* for that *pūrūṣa* ends in a similar way as the dancer after giving pleasure to the viewers goes away from the stage. The



Hence at the time of liberation, both body and soul are to be let or eliminated. According to Mādhyaṃika Śūnyavāda, elimination of soul itself is *Mokṣa*. 'ātmocchedo mokṣa' Vijnānavādi Buddhists on the other hand believe *Mokṣa* as with consciousness. According to them, owner of consciousness soul when separates from it, then pure knowledge emerges and that is *Mokṣa*.

‘dharminivṛtau nirmalajñānodayo mahodaya’

Buddhist philosophers predominantly use the word *nirvāṇa* for *Mokṣa*. Literally *nirvāṇa* means to extinguish, to leave the path of rebirth, relief from all karmika traces which are the cause of pains; relief from the five *skandhas* and three flames i.e. desire/lust, aversion and ignorance. Actually we do not have any positive or negative opinion about *Mokṣa* in Buddhist philosophy. Hence we can say that we do not find description of the nature of *Mokṣa* in Buddhist literature.

### 1.8 Nature of liberation *Mokṣa* in Jain philosophy.

Doctrine of *Mokṣa* in Jain philosophy is different from the discussions so far. It neither believes in the complete independence of soul nor the activities of God. Jains are neither absolute believers in duality of existence nor in the monistic existence of universe like Śaṅkarācārya and calls the universe as false or non-existent. According to them this universe is divided in two types of existences namely *jīva* and *ajīva*. *Jīva* is transforming continuously from the endless times and will continue to do so till it gets itself completely free from the bondages of *kārmika* matter. In Jain philosophy, *jīva* by nature is pure, owner of four infinities i.e. intuition, knowledge, bliss and energy, doer and enjoyer of its own acts and karmas. Upward movement is its nature. In its empirical state it acquires the same size and form as the body it owns i.e. when the *jīva* exists in the body of an elephant, then it assumes the size of the elephant and when the same *jīva* exists in the body of an ant, then it assumes the size and form of the ant. Karmas are not just mental or physical activities but are real existences. Karmas are the lumps of infinite matter particles called *pudgala*. Due to our mental, physical and speech activities they continuously get bonded with our soul. Hence in the state of liberation changes take place in both physical and conceptual entities. He with his pure activities causes dissociation of his karmika bondage i.e. separates them from his soul and eliminating the conceptual influx of attachments and involvement simultaneously, it becomes all knowing and with infinite energy. By eliminating the cycle of birth and death, it becomes free of cyclical changes. This state of soul is called *Mokṣa*. Ācārya Umā Svāti accordingly says ‘*kṛtsnakarmakṣayo mokṣa*’ i.e. Annihilation of incomplete and of all parts of karma is *Mokṣa*. The question arises, ‘when the soul by nature is pure then how does it get bonded?’ According to Jain philosophy, the causes of bondage are wrong belief-knowledge and conduct. As against this, right belief-knowledge and conduct together is the path of liberation. ‘*saṃyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣamārga*’.

This tri-polar path of spiritual purification is a unique psychological contribution of Jains as mental consciousness has three aspects namely knowledge, concept / thought and intention / determination (*saṃkalpa*). To direct the thoughts properly, right belief is essential. To acquire the knowledge properly right knowledge is essential and to practice the right conducts evoking determination is essential. In Buddhist philosophy these are called *samādhi*, *prajñā* and *śīla* respectively. In the words of Gītā, these are called *bhaktimārga*, *jñānamārga* and *karmamārga* respectively. In Hindu philosophy, the supreme existence has three forms namely *satyaṃ* (truth), *śivaṃ* and *sundaram*. The three jewels of Jains can be compared to these also. In Upaniṣads these are referred as hearing (*śravaṇa*), contemplation (*manana*) and experience (*nididhyāsana*). In Jain philosophy the pure state of soul is called *siddha*. *Siddha* means a person who has extinguished all his karmas by the fire called *śūkladhīyāna* or pure meditation and has thus achieved (*siddha*) his objective. In Bhagavatisutra, *siddha* has been given eight synonyms namely *siddha*, *buddha*, *pāragata*, *paramparāgata*, *antakṛat* and *sarvaduḥkḥaprahāṇa*. Abhayadevasuri in his commentary on Bhagavatisutra has described these in depth. Aupapātikasutra also gives eight synonyms, out of which four are *unmūkta karmakavaca*, *ajara*, *amara* and *asaṅga*.

‘*Siddha tti buddha tti ya pāragayati ya paraṅparagayati,  
Unmūkkakammakavayā ajarā amarā asaṅgā ya.*’ta’

*Siddhas* are free from all types of karmas. Hence their attributes do not go through transformation and so are not different since karmas causing these are destroyed. Hence they are all blessed with infinite intuition (*ananta darśana*), infinite knowledge (*ananta jñāna*), bliss (*asaṃvedan* or devoid of the experience of comfort or pain), infinite energy (*ananta śakti*), same or constant size (*agūrūlaghū*), non-concrete (*amurtika* i.e. devoid of body,

intellect and mind), free from the feelings of high or low (discrimination between high and low) and contemplation on the self (*ātmaramaṇa*). It is thus clear that Jain path of spiritual purification does not support just knowledge only or just *bhaktiyoga* of Rāmānujam only as the means to achieve liberation. Complete development of consciousness is possible only when knowledge is full of or based on devotion and conducts both. Buddhist philosophy considers extinction of soul in the state of liberation while Jains say that the impure mode of soul that is the cause of his worldly existence is extinguished resulting in its pure state. If we accept complete extinction of soul then where will consciousness exist? Complete manifestation of consciousness is possible only when its owner soul has existence.

As per Jain philosophy, in the free state of omniscience is capable of cognizing all the objects of all the times i.e. past, present and future. In that state the soul contemplates on its own nature resulting in the infinite bliss, which is also its nature. Canonical texts of Jain describe bliss of *Mokṣa* as follows:

*‘jaṇ devāṇaṇ sokkhaṇ sarvadhā piṇḍiyaṇ anantaḡuṇaṇ  
ṇa ya pāvai muttisuhaṇ ṇatahiṇ vagguihiṇ’*

The heavenly gods are blessed with all the comforts of the worldly existence and are thus supreme empirical souls is the perception of all Indian philosophies. Jain philosophy on the other hand says that all the past, present and future comforts when put together will still not be an infinitely small part of the bliss experienced in *Mokṣa* state. This aspect of Jain philosophy gives it supremacy in the description of the state of *Mokṣa* over Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies. Who will try to achieve the liberation, which is insentient like a rock and devoid of knowledge and bliss? Sāṅkhya considers knowledge as a manifestation of intellect and bliss of *sattva* and *pūrūṣa* as eternal, pure and free only i.e. devoid of all the three attributes. Hence there is no knowledge and bliss in the liberated state. Jains do not accept this contention of Sāṅkhya. As per Jains, the cause of life and death cycle is the karmika bondage. In the liberated state the soul is completely free of these karmika bondages. Hence it does not need rebirth as its manifestation. *‘dagdhe bṛje yathātyantaṇ na rohiṭi bhavaṇkura’*. Some philosophical tradition believe that when the religion is in danger and inauspicious forces are at their pinnacle then the God is born to finish the inauspicious forces and reestablish religion. Jains do not support this doctrine of reincarnation of God.

Bṛhamvādi philosophers consider soul as a part of Bṛham. Hence in liberation, it merges into Bṛham again. Jains do not support this concept of pure soul merging in some supreme existence. The soul even if it is non-concrete is still with parts and not without parts or space points. It is an inseparable lump of innumerable space points with a form. In its empirical state the soul has the form and size of the body in which it exists and so expands and contracts accordingly. The question about its form and size in liberated state is explained in a sutra in Utrādhyaṇa.

*‘usseho jassa jo hoi bhavmmi caramammi u,  
tibhāgaṇiṇā vatto ya siddhāṇogāhaṇā bhavē’*

i.e. the size of pure soul after liberation becomes 2/3 of its liberated body. The question arises why 2/3 only and why not it becomes all pervading throughout the space? To clarify this, it is said that our body has some empty space in it also which is estimated as 1/3 its size. In the liberated state this empty state or space of the soul get eliminate and the pure soul becomes 2/3 of its empirical size. It is devoid of *nāmakarma*, which is the cause of its acquiring different types of bodies and hence it becomes free from expansion and contractions. This is its indestructible size and state. Another concept of Jains is the existence of infinite *siddhas* and still they retain their independent existences even though they occupy the same space at the summit of *loka*. This concept is explained by the example of hundreds of lamps lighting the same room and still maintaining their independent existences.

As had been told earlier, soul has the natural tendency to move upwards. Due to its association with karmas, it has to move down and sideways. Therefore when it attains its pure state, it tends to move vertically upwards. This pure soul in a small fraction of second goes to the summit of this *loka* i.e. universe. This pure soul is not able to cross the *loka* as the supporting entities for motion and rest i.e. *dharamāstikāya* and *adharmāstikāya* are not existent beyond *loka* i.e. in *aloka*. There is a place at the summit of *loka* called *siddhālaya* in Jain philosophy where the pure souls reside forever.

The last or the uppermost layer of *Urghavaloka*, called *sarvārthasiddhi* is just below *siddhālaya*. This *siddhālaya* is in the form of a huge rock or *śilā* is clean, without any impurities and golden. This can be called

*siddhaśilā, siddhālaya or muktaloka*. Unlike other philosophies where we do not find description of *Baīkūṇṭhadhāma, goloka or viṣṇuloka*, in Jain philosophy we find detailed information about *siddhālaya*. This is the place devoid of birth, death, illnesses, pains, and old age. Here one is free from all pains, is liberated in all senses and indestructible.

Pure soul is beyond words, logic and is non-concrete consciousness. It is free from colour, taste, touch, odour and gender as these are all attributes of matter (*pudgala*). Pure soul has neither gross nor subtle body. Thus it has no attributes of the body. Pure soul itself is neither subtle nor gross, neither solid nor liquid, neither shadow nor darkness. We find description of pure soul in details in Ācāraṅgasūtra's *paramātmopada*. We can compare the description of pure soul in Jain philosophy with the description in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. According to Upaniṣad, pure soul is without taste, odour, speech, eyes, mind, physical energy, mouth and inner or external bodies. For cognition it does not need eyes, ears or other sensual organs. It is also free from breath, life forces (*prāṇa*) and physical energy. It does not discriminate between internal or external also. In Bṛhamsūtra, pure soul is described as follows:

*'Edaṁ tū pārmārthikaṁ kuṭasthānityaṁ vyomavat sarvavyāpi sarvakriyā virahitaṁ nityatraptāṁ, Nirvayaṁ, svayaṁ jyotisvabhāvaṁ yatra dharmādharmau saha kāryeṇa kālatrayaṁ nāparvate te'*

Thus we find that the description of pure soul Bṛhamsūtra is same as of Bṛham because Vedānta does not discriminate between pure soul and Bṛham. In Jain philosophy they do not object to this description of pure soul except its being all pervading and being without any parts.

According to Utradhyayansūtra, pure soul is non-concrete, accompanied with infinite intuition, knowledge, and bliss, beyond comparison, out of the ocean like world, out of the cycle of birth and death and attained the supreme state. Hence the nature of pure soul itself is *Mokṣa*.

In this way we find in Jain philosophy detailed, systematic and useful description of *Mokṣa* even though the nature of *Mokṣa* is beyond logic, speech or perception. We do not find such detailed description of *Mokṣa* in other Indian philosophies. Hence we can surmise that doctrine of *Mokṣa* in Jain philosophy is indeed unique.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Please discuss the nature of *Mokṣa* in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy and compare its nature in Jain philosophy Jain philosophy?

Or

#### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain briefly the nature of *Mokṣa* in Buddhist philosophy?
2. What are the synonyms of *Mokṣa* or pure soul?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. Basically Śramaṇa philosophies are two 1. ———— 2. ———— ?
2. ———— philosophy considers just direct knowledge as valid knowledge?
3. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the ———— attributes of soul are eliminated in *Mokṣa*?
4. According to Vedānta philosophy the only means of acquiring *Mokṣa* is ———— ?
5. Jain philosophy considers pure souls to reside at ———— ?
6. The right acquisition of consciousness and its manifestation as knowledge is ———— ?
7. Siddhaśilā is at ———— place of cosmos?
8. According to Sāṅkhya philosophy *Mokṣa* is of ———— and not of ———— ?
9. According to Cārvāka philosophy *Mokṣa* means ———— ?
10. Cause of expansion and contraction of soul is ———— ?

#### Answers

1. Jain/ Buddhists 2. Cārvāka 3. nine 4. Knowledge 5. Siddhaśilā 6. Right knowledge 7. upper /agra 8. *prakṛti, pūrūṣa* 9. independence 10. *nāmakarma*.

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## Unit 2: Lesson 5:

# Relationship between cause and effect in Jain, Baudha , Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Nyāya philosophies

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study cause and effect relationship based on the following topics.

- 0.0 Introduction
- 1.0 Types of changes / transformations
  - 1.1 Foundation of relationship between cause and effect.
  - 1.2 Four philosophical traditions based on four examples of cause and effect relationships
  - 1.3 Satkāryavāda of Sāṅkhya
  - 1.4 Asatkāryavāda of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy
  - 1.5 Vivartavāda of Vedānta
  - 1.6 Pratityasamudāya of Baudha.
  - 1.7 Satsatkaryavada of Jains
  - 1.8 Reconciliatory form of Jain viewpoint.
- 2.0 Comparison of Jain and other than Jain philosophies
- 2.3 Limits /boundaries of cause and effect doctrine
- 2.4 Utility of cause and effect relationship in areas other than philosophy

### 0.0. Introduction

This incidence relates to 2500 years ago. A *Bhikṣū* went to the house of a prostitute to beg alms. *Bhikṣū* is very handsome. The prostitute gets intensely attracted towards the *Bhikṣū* and asks him to stay with her. The following dialogues took place between them.

Prostitute: Bhadanta! This robe of does not suit your beautiful and soft body. Please live with me in my house and enjoy he bounties of his world.

*Bhikṣū*: Bhadre! May you be blessed? Your invitation is worth consideration. Because of some urgent work, I have to go somewhere for a week. On return I will definitely come back to you.

Bhadant! Please do not forget your promise. Please do return definitely after a week. Till then I will wait anxiously for you.

*Bhikṣū*: I give you my promise / word. I will return at this time after a week. But till then you have do one work for me. I have this fruit of mango, Please keep it with utmost care. After one week I will like it back exactly as it is now.

Prostitute: Bhadant! I shall take utmost care of this mango and return the same to you as it is now.

*Bhikṣū* takes a mango out of his bag and gives it to the prostitute and leaves. The prostitute hands the mango to her maids and ordered them to keep it with utmost care so that the fruit stays as it is today. Time flies. After one week the *Bhikṣū* returns. The prostitute was happy. She ordered her maids to bring the mango given by *Bhikṣū*. The maids brought he same mango. The prostitute saw that the colour, smell, taste of the mango have changed completely after a week. While returning the mango to the *Bhikṣū*, she said ‘ Bhadant! We kept your mango with highest degree of care. Still it had changed, as the rule for the nature is to change. In spite of our keen desires, things change over a period of time. They cannot stay the same for long.

*Bhikṣu* said’ Bhadre! If you could not stop this mango from changing for a week, then what makes you believe that you will not let my body, for which you are so attracted change? Do you think that I will always be like this?

These words of the *Bhikṣu* made the prostitute aware of the reality. The old & dilapidated body of *Bhikṣu* appeared dancing before her. Her delusion was destroyed within a moment. She became detached and asked the *Bhikṣu* to initiate her in the life of monk-hood. This *Bhikṣu* was none else than the world famous *Śākya Mahātmā Buddha*. The prostitute, who became his disciple, became famous as Āmarapālī due to the association of mango (called *āmra* in Hindi). The incidence is very small but the message from it is extremely important. There is a change/

transformation in every moment in this world. This change cannot be stopped by anyone. That is why the world is called *Saṁsāra* as continuous transformation (*saṁsāraṇa*) is taking place in it. It is also called *jagata* because there is *gati* or movement in it continuously.

These transformations taking place in the world are analyzed in depth in Jain canonical texts. Also these transformations have been classified in rational manner in them. Therefore it will not be out of context to see how such transformations have been analyzed in Jain texts as the relationship between cause and effect is at the heart of such transformations. Let us, therefore, have a look at the Jain canonical literature in this context.

### 1.0 Types of transformations in Jain canonical texts.

Whether we call it as *jagata* or *saṁsāra* (world or universe) both mean that continuous transformation is taking place in them. Jain thinkers have classified these transformations in two natural groups namely with efforts or induced (*Prāyogika*) and automatic (*Vaisrasika*) i.e. without external inducement.

Both these transformations types are further subdivided in two groups each as follows.

- i. Induced to split. This is the induced transformation resulting in many parts of the original entity e.g. demolition of the house results in bricks, debris etc.
- ii. Induced for new creation: Melting a golden bangle to make a golden necklace is an example. Here a new entity is created and the old is destroyed.
- iii. Natural for split. This is the natural transformation resulting in many parts of the old entity e.g. splitting of clouds into smaller formations of clouds.
- iv. Natural for new creation. Natural transformation of one entity into a new entity, e.g. melting of ice results in water or conversion of water into steam are examples of this type of transformation.

According to Jains, there is another type of transformation that takes place in the substance itself continuously as its nature. This is called '*etvika*' transformation. Transformations, which are taking place in *Dharmāstikāya*, *Adharmāstikāya*, *Ākāśastikāya* and pure souls belong to this category

### 1.1 Sequential relationships in transformations: Basis of the relationship between cause & effect.

There are certain special types of transformations taking place in the world besides normal ones when two events are related in temporal manner i.e. one event takes place only after the occurrence of another event; in such cases the first event is called the cause and the second or resulting event is called the effect. We even start believing that the second event is due to the occurrence of the first event. For example applying heat makes the water warm. In this example application of heat is the cause and water becoming hot is an effect i.e. until heat is applied water will not become hot. Here three types of relationships existing can be considered between applications of heat and water becoming hot.

- i. *Pūrvāpara* i.e. sequential: First heat is applied; this is cause. Water becomes hot later on; this is the effect / result/ work.
- ii. *Anvaya* i.e. whenever heat is applied, then water will definitely become hot.
- iii. *Vyatireka* i.e. until heat is applied water will not become hot i.e. without a cause there will be no effect. On this basis Udayanācārya in *Nyāyakūśūmañjali* has defined cause which exists definitely in the effect as '*Kāranatvam Kāyānniyata' purvabhava*'

It is to be noted here that planet *Kṛtikā* exists even before planet *Rohiṇī* shines. But shining of *Rohiṇī* cannot be considered as the effect of planet *Kṛtikā* as *Kṛtikā* has no role in the shining of *Kṛtikā*. In such a situation even sequential activities of shining cannot be considered as related. Hence *Nyāya Siddhānta Mūktāvali* defines the characteristics of cause (*Kāraṇa*) as '*Anyathā Siddhiśūnyasya niyatā purvavartikā Kāraṇatvaṇ bhavet*' i.e. cause must definitely exist before the effect but it should also not be extraneous / unrelated (*anyathāsiddha*).

### Five types of *anyathāsiddhā* or extraneous cause.

- i. A cause becomes a cause to an effect due to its association / ownership of some attributes; e.g. stick is the cause of pitcher made by a potter. But the stick used by the potter to spin the wheel has the attribute of a stick only but it cannot be considered as an effect for pitcher. Therefore stick-ness is superfluous for the pitcher.



- ii. To make the pitcher, stick is essential to spin potter's wheel & it is there in some form or the other while making the pitcher. But the form of the stick is not the cause of pitcher because a specific form of stick is not essential to make the pitcher. Hence form of stick is also superfluous.
  - iii. Space (*ākāśa*) and time (*Kāla*) being omnipresent and real are not superfluous because they exist before all effects.
  - iv. Cause of the cause is also superfluous e.g. potter is the cause for making the pitcher but father of the potter is superfluous as he is not the cause of the pitcher.
  - v. If some entity, due to their environmental association or by chance, exists, then it cannot be considered as the cause of the effect. For example if the donkey owned by the weaver, by chance comes when the weaver is weaving the cloth then the donkey cannot be considered as the cause of making the cloth.
- After understanding the nature & relationship of cause and effect, let us attempt to understand how an effect originates from its cause.

### 1.2. Four examples of effect originating from its cause.

A number of opinions emerged amongst Indian philosophers regarding the relationship between cause and effect. To understand them, let us understand the following four examples.

1. Producing oil from oil seeds. Here oil existed in the oil seed already. So no new thing is created. Here oil seed is the cause and oil is the effect.
2. Making pitcher from earth/ sand. Here the pitcher, as it is, did not exist in the sand. By mixing water with sand, the potter first gives this lump of sand the shape of a pitcher and then bakes it in fire to create pitcher. Here sand is the cause and pitcher the effect but we cannot say that the pitcher existed in sand already like oil in oil seeds.
3. Waves originating in the sea: Here sea is the cause and waves the effect but waves are not different from sea. Waves rise for a moment from the sea and then merge in it again. Here we cannot see waves as separated from the sea. It appears that cause and effect are one and same.
4. One flame of oil lamp creates another flame: when we see the flame of the oil lamp, we feel as if it just one continuous existent. But slight analysis will make it clear that one flame originates, and then dies creating another flame that originates & then dies to generate the third and origination of subsequent flame. We feel as if the entire amalgam of hundreds of flames is just one flame. After observing the above three examples here we have to conclude that one flame of oil lamp is the cause of subsequent flame (effect).

### 1.3. Four philosophies based on the above four examples.

Based on the above four examples, four different philosophies existed in India.

1. Sāṅkhya's *Satkāryavāda*
2. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika's *Asatkāryavāda*
3. Vedānta's *Vivartavāda*
4. Buddhist's *Pratīsamūtpādivāda* or law of depending origination.

These four doctrines are discussed now

### 1.4. *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṅkhya

We have seen in the first example above where oil being the effect & oil seeds its cause and oil existing in the oil seeds. Based on this, Sāṅkhya evolved their doctrine that the effect already exists in its cause i.e. the effect is invisible existent in its cause & appears later on as separated from its cause. This appearance of the effect is called origination of effect. Origination does not mean creation of a new thing altogether. Ninth verse of Sāṅkhya *Kārikā* presents a number of arguments in favor of this hypothesis.

1. All agree that new things cannot be created out of nothing. Therefore the effect i.e. new thing must exist in some form or other (cause) and it exists in the cause in an indescribable manner. For example oil exists in oil seeds.
2. If an effect can be created out of nothing then any effect could result from any cause / entity but it is not so. Pitcher is made of sand and not from cotton thread. Similarly cloth is made from threads of cotton & not from sand. Hence we have to accept that effect exists in its cause.
3. Both cause & effect have the same attributes as indicated in '*Kāraṇagūṇā' Kāryamāraṇa bhante*'. It is clear that if the effect is newer or different than its cause then the effect should have different attributes and not similar to its cause.

Basis of *satkāryavāda* of Sāṅkhya is their doctrine of the entire world being transformations of the same one element called Prakṛti. This Prakṛti has transformation as its nature. There is no other element except Prakṛti, which can create effect like this entire universe. Hence we have to accept that all effects pre-existed in Prakṛti. Besides Prakṛti nothing else can create effect/s as it is widely accepted that effects cannot be created out of nothing. In the development of Sāṅkhya philosophy, the basic element is Prakṛti but there is no cause for it. It is indescribable, subtle and the effect from its cause and the creation of something new. It should also be understood that attribute '*rajoguna*', the Prakṛti keeps on transforming itself resulting in effects from their causes. This way Prakṛti creates this universe automatically. For it there is no need of external entities like God etc.

### 1.5. *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika

Nyāya Vaiśeṣika says that the universe is made of atoms (*parmanūs*) and not Prakṛti. There are infinite atoms whilst there is just one Prakṛti. Another important feature is that Prakṛti has its nature of transformations while atom is static & stationary. Until some external influences give it motion, it cannot move or act. Hence they had to accept existence of God to give atoms capability to move i.e. act. When effects are created, there is no change in the atoms but their attributes go through transformations/changes. Main thing is that no activity can take place on its own; some one or the other has to make efforts to bring in transformation. Naiyāyikas say that combining a number of parts to give a whole creates effect. Union of parts (*avayava*) is called compound (*avayavi*) and *avayavi* is always different from its parts / components. Therefore the parts cease to exist before they combine to make *avayavi*. They call this lack of existence of *avayavi* *prāgabdhāva*. On creation of *avayavi*, its *prāgabdhāva* ceases to exist. This fact is expressed in textual language like this 'effect is the opponent of *prāgabdhāva*.' Before its creation, there was no pitcher. Hence we say *prāgabdhāva* of pitcher but when pitcher got created then its *prāgabdhāva* ceased to exist. We will therefore say that the pitcher is the opponent of *prāgabdhāvi*. To support their thesis of *Asatkāryavāda*, Naiyāyikas present a number of reasons namely.

1. If we say that pitcher is not a creation, then where in which cause did the pitcher exist prior to its creation. If we say that the pitcher existed in sand then the need for water & fire is suspect. Similarly the efforts of the potter are useless. The pitcher should come out of the sand by itself. To make a lump of sand, to put it on potter's shape to the lump by potter's hands etc. are all useless activities of the potter.
2. By accepting existence of effect in the cause itself, then both cause and effect will become one. Then why are they considered as two separate entities? Why not call them by one single name? This proves that cause and effect are two entirely different entities. Effect does not exist in its cause but it is created in a new form.
3. It is obvious that we can use the pitcher to store water, oil, ghee etc i.e. pitcher is capable of storing them. But we cannot store these things even in the lump of sand, what to talk of sand alone i.e. these cannot perform the functions of the pitcher. If the pitcher existed in the sand, then sand should have been able to perform all functions of pitcher. But in practice we do not see these as true. Hence the effect does not exist in its cause; it is as true. It is totally new.
4. We all agree of the relationship between cause and effect. Relation can exist always between two things/entities. If both cause & effect are one then how relation between them exist?

In this way Naiyāyika logically support their *Asatkāryavāda*. Both the traditions that we discussed above are called *vastūvādi* i.e. believers of existents as real i.e. they believe existence of the universe as real. However there are certain philosophers who do not believe in the existence of entities in this world as real and their existence is just our perception e.g. one thinks of the rope as snake in dark or in spite of existence of innumerable flames of the earthen lamp they say them as one flame. Such philosophies are called *pratyavādi*. These *pratyavādi* philosophies, like *vastūvādi* are divided in two groups namely.

1. Those philosophies that believe in the existence of effect in the cause itself. Vedānta believes in *satkāryavāda* and their hypothesis of cause-effect is called *vivartavāda*.
2. Those philosophies that believe in the creation of new effect, which was not existent in its cause. Bauddha believes in *asatkāryavāda*, and their hypothesis of cause-effect is called *Pratisamūtpāda*.

It is important to study these two philosophies also.

### 1.6 Vivartavāda of Vedānta.

Hypothesis of Vedānta concerning the relationship between cause and effects is called *Vivartavāda*. According to them, there is only one Br̥ham with real existence. He is the cause of the entire universe. He created this multifaceted world but this effect (i.e. the world and its constituents) is not real but only a fig of imagination. To explain this they use the example of snake and rope. In the darkness, a rope is lying on the floor. A person walks through that place. He looks at the rope and feels scared thinking of it as a snake. Then he brings a lamp. He sees the rope & realizes it so & not as snake. On acquiring the knowledge of rope, his knowledge of snake is obstructed; he now feels the rope as rope only and not as snake. Hence the knowledge of snake in the rope is not true/real.

1. Based on the relationships between cause and effect; this universe is an imagination/ imaginary like the imagination of snake is the rope. According to Advait Vedānta, the only cause of this world is Br̥ham, who is eternal, inert omnipresent and without parts (*avayava*). He is neither created by anybody nor creates anything. The questions arise if he is neither created nor a creator then what is this multifaceted world? How was it created? According to Vedānta, this world is fake / false. It gets created exactly as the knowledge of snake in the rope. Actually the rope is not a snake but it appears to be so. Similarly this world is false / *mithyā* / illusion only being expressed due to lack of knowledge.
2. According to Vedānta, this world is a form of *Māyā* / deception (like mirage in a desert). There are two forces of *māyā* namely *Āvaraṇa* i.e. obscuring and *Vikṣepa* i.e. faking or creating feeling / knowledge of opposite or reality. Br̥ham, which is the reality, is covered by *Āvaraṇa* and the world, which is *mithyā* is shown as real by *Vikṣepa*. It is like the projector in a movie hall covers the screen and shows the hero, heroine and others on the screen who are in fact not there. Both these forces i.e. *Āvaraṇa* and *Vikṣepa* exist in our mind.
3. Vedānta uses '*Vivarta*' in their texts, literally '*Vivarta*' means to show as change/transformation to a non-transformable entity. Actually there is no change in the rope but it starts appearing as snake. Hence there was a '*vivarta*' of rope and not its transformation. In this way Vedānta considers origination of effect from its cause as *Vivarta*. On this basis only it proves its doctrine of Advait or Monism. There is one rope only but the origination of dubious knowledge of snake in it is not real. Br̥ham is one only but appearance of this multifaceted world in this not real. Hence the only one (Advait) existence of Br̥ham is the only reality.

### 1.7. Pratisamūtpāda of Buddhists

Like *Vivartavāda* of Vedānta is a *Satkāryavāda* type of *Pratyayavāda*, similarly Pratisamūtpāda of Buddhists is the *asatkāryavāda* type of *pratyavāda*. Like Nyāya, Buddhists also support the new creation of an effect but they are not ready to accept that a number of parts combine together to create an effect. In Buddhist view, only part (*avayava*) is real and the *avayavi* is a fig of our imagination. We had seen earlier the example of the flame of earthen lamp. The flame of the lamp, which appears to us as one, is in fact not one but a series of many flames. Due to illusion of our vision we see them as one only the part / component of Buddhists is not eternal like the atom of Nyāya. The part gets created and immediately it gets destroyed. Its existence is momentary only. This first part, which is born & destroyed, creates another similar component immediately. Because of this similarity we think of two or more sequential components as one. This moment (*Kṣaṇa*) of Buddhists is not real like atom of Nyāya and is different from Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya whose nature is transformation. Existence is momentary only. During the first moment, the second moment that is created is entirely different from the first moment. In this the first moment can be called as cause and the second moment as effect. Both these moments are different from each other. The second moment, which is the effect, is new. Therefore we call it *asatkāryavāda*; still this second moment even though different and new, considers the first moment as its cause. Therefore it is called *Pratisamūtpāda*.

In Sāṅkhya, the attributes and their owner are same while Nyāya considers attributes and their owners different. In Buddhists, there is nothing like owner of attributes. They only accept attributes and their existence. Series of these attributes is called '*Saṃtati*'. Because of this *Saṃtati* (like transgression of soul) we start believing the momentary existence as eternal.

This momentary nature of real by Buddhist is so vast that they do not consider even soul as eternal. The earlier moment, while getting destroyed, automatically creates a new moment. Sāṅkhya considers sentient *pūrūṣa* as inert

i.e. without transformation and prakṛti as eternal but with transformation. Nyāya views owner of attributes as inert and eternal but attributes as capable of transformation as real only. There is nothing considered eternal or permanent in Buddhism.

#### Sequence of historical development:

Paṇḍita Sukh Lāl Saṅghavi, with analyzing cause and effect, considers the following sequence of developments in thoughts concerning cause – effect relationship.

1. We see the eternity and transformation nature of insentient entities first.
2. Second stage is to consider both sentient and insentient entities as eternal and with transformation as their nature.
3. Third stage considers the eternal & transformation as nature of insentient entities & inert nature of sentient entities.
4. Fourth stage considers just transformation itself as real and rejects eternity.
5. Fifth stage considers sentient entities as inert and transformation appears suspect.

We can find details on this in the introduction of *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* by him.

After reviewing the above four philosophies we shall now review the *satsatkāryavāda* of Jainism.

#### 1.8 Satsatkāryavāda of Jains

Jains are basically believers of Anekāntavāda. Therefore they analyze all philosophical issues on the basis of Anekāntavāda. Foundation of Anekānta is that decision by an individual about any issue is not wrong. If we ask anyone if a new entity is created when pitcher is made of sand?

Invariably we will get the answer that the potter has molded the sand lump into a pitcher but the form of sand has changed while making the pitcher. Jains will call this as follows 'From substance view point sand and pitcher are one but from modal view point they are both different'. In relation to cause and effect, they will say that sand is the cause and pitcher is the effect but from substance viewpoint they both are same. Therefore we will say that pitcher is not a new entity from substance viewpoint but it is new from modal viewpoint. The result of this analysis is that Jains accept effect in the cause as substance but as mode it does not exist in the cause, as it is a new creation. This hypothesis of cause-effect of Jains is called *Paraṇāmi nitya vāda* or *satsatkāryavāda*.

#### 2.0 Conciliatory nature of Jain view

We have already studied the view of non-Jain traditions concerning cause-effect and their relationship. Being Anekāntavādi, Jains consider them all as right but from a particular viewpoint only when other traditions consider just themselves as right. Jains reconcile all these traditions i.e. *Satkārya* and *Asatkārya vādas* by saying that, from substance viewpoint the effect exists in the cause as substance and attributes but from mode view point effect is new and so does not exist in its cause. Ācārya Siddha Sena in *Sanmati Tarka* proves this identity cum difference in cause and effect.

*“Natthi pūṭhaviṇiṣiṭṭho ghaddti, Jaṇ teṇa jujjai aṇaṇ ṇo,  
Jaṇ pūṇa ghadotti pūvvaṇ, ṇa āsipaṭṭhavi tao aṇṇo”*

i.e. sand is the substance and pitcher is its one mode. Pitcher is made of sand. It cannot be made without sand. In this respect pitcher is identical to sand and exist in the same. But the sand cannot perform the activities of pitcher to store water before it is moulded as pitcher. From this view point sand is different also from the pitcher. The pitcher does not exist in the sand before moulding it as pitcher.

Jains reconcile to both *Satkāryavāda* and *Asatkāryavāda* using identity (*abheda*) and differences (*bheda*) views (*dṛṣṭis*). However being a supporter of reality of all existences, they support the *Vastuvādis*. Thus from substance viewpoint they support *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṅkhya and from mode viewpoint, the *asatkāryavāda* of Naiyātikas. Jains also bring reconciliation amongst these two traditions as like Nyāya, they believe in induced transformation and in natural transformation like Sāṅkhya also.

Concerning Vedānta & Buddhists, Jains consider them both as unitary views (i.e. one sided or *ekāntika*) only as Jains consider all entities as eternal as well as with transformation as their nature. Therefore Jains do not accept just

the unipolar view of Vedānta's inert and eternal nature of Bṛham nor just transformation only as eternal. Therefore these are the fundamental differences between Jains, Vedānta & Buddhists. Both Vedānta and Buddhism are *pratyayavādi* while Jains are *Vastuvādi*. Therefore Pandit Sukh Lāl says 'Jains being Anekāntavādi by nature, still they just support doctrine of reality of all existences only. Further the naya doctrine is so pervading that Ācārya Amrtacandra says "There is a situation where *naya*, *nikṣepa* and *prāmāṇya* are not useful and so we do not even experience duality of existence then".

*Udayati na nayaśrīrastamati prāmāṇam,  
Kva cidapi ca na vighni yāti nikṣepacakram,*

On the same basis, Ācārya Mahā Prajña says, 'Jains philosophy is the proponent of Anekāntavād. Therefore it is not believer of duality of existence (*Dvait*) but also a support of *Advait* (monism). They see both of them in relative contexts. No living being is devoid of consciousness. Hence from consciousness viewpoint all living beings are one. Similarity from insentient viewpoint all non-living beings are just one. Both living & non-living beings are not devoid of existence. Hence from existence viewpoint they are all one. So from class view point *advait* is true. But due to absence of sentiency/ consciousness in non-living beings; both living beings and non living beings are different thereby supporting Duality of existence'.

### 3.0. Compression of Jains and other philosophies.

It is now appropriate to compare and contrast Jain views with those of other traditions discussed earlier.

1. Between the doctrine of Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya and atoms of Nyāya, Jains support Nyāya's *paramāṇuvāda*. Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya is extremely subtle while *paramāṇu* of Nyāya is very gross. *Paramāṇu* of Jains is neither subtle like Prakṛti nor gross like atom of Nyāya. Whereas Nyāya consider atoms of earth, water, fire, air etc. as different, Jains consider all *paramāṇus* as exactly similar. Thus *paramāṇu* of Jains is in between Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya and *paramāṇu* of Nyāya.
2. Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya is transformable on its own, Nyāya's *paramāṇu* is static on its own and transforms as induced by others. Jain treads the middle path here also as they accept both natural and induced transformations.
3. Jains accept transformation like Sāṅkhya and Nyāya but Sāṅkhya thinking of *pūrīsa* as inert and only *prakṛti* as active is different from Jains who consider both *jiva* and *paramāṇus* as active and undergoing transformation. While discussing transformation, Sāṅkhya does not discriminate between attributes and their owner while Nyāya considers them both as different i.e. attributes are transformable and not their owner. But Jains consider identity cum difference between attributes and their owner so support transformation of all of them.
4. Vedānta & Buddhists are both *pratyayavādi*. Therefore Jains have relatively basic difference with them. Vedānta propagates inert & eternal nature of existence and Buddhist believe just momentary nature of existence. Jains are *Nityanityavadi* & hence can be termed as in between Vedānta & Buddhists.

In comparative terms we see that all other philosophies were finding faults in each other while Jains using the doctrine of Anekānta, tried to find a middle path in analyzing and propagating cause & effect doctrine.

### 5.0 Importance of the relationships cause & effect,

We have presented a brief description of the opinions of different philosophical traditions of India concerning cause-effect and their relationships. Cause and effect and their relationship had been the focal point of discussion in various philosophical texts. If we look at organs of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) then inference (*anumāna*) is based on cause and effect relationship. If we analyze from the texts qualities of various entities as to their usefulness or obstacle in performing and explaining various activities/events/modes, then we find that our daily lives, knowingly or unknowingly is based on cause- effect relationships. From our analysis, the following points emerge concerning cause and effect relationships.

1. Whether the cause itself changes while affecting creation of effect? Or does the cause stay unchanged?
2. Does the cause create effect automatically or does the cause make efforts to do so?
3. Does the cause create effect existing in it already or does it create a new effect?
4. Does the cause really create an effect or it is only imaginary/conceptual even though no new effect is created?
5. Which is eternal or temporary between cause & effect?

The utility of all these discussions is that philosophy tries to find the basic cause of the world's creation and existence. Actions and reactions between different entities in this world are resulting in many works. But the philosophers are trying to establish the identity of basic elements, which are the causes of all the causes. Every philosophy considers such elements/causes as basic elements. For example Sāṅkhya considers *Prakṛti*, Nyāya *paramāṇū*, Vedānta *Brham*, Buddhists *Nāma* and *Rūpa* moments and Jains *Jīva* and *pudgala* as the basic elements respectively. These basic elements have no cause for their existences. This way even hypothesis of cause-effect has its limitations.

### 5.1 Limits of *Kāraṇa-Kāya vāda*

Every effect/result/work has some cause/s. But in this long series of cause-effect occurrence, we reach a point where our search for the cause ends. If there is no limitation for cause-effect relations than no end to this series of cause-effect relationship will occur. For example: Some one asks, "This is cloth, what makes the cloth?"

- A. The answer one gets is that cloth is made from cotton  
 Q. From where did cotton come?  
 A. From the plant of cottonseed.  
 Q. From where did the plant of cottonseed come?  
 A. By the unions of *Jīva* with plant body and matter we get cotton seed plant.

The inquisitiveness progresses further to *Jīva* as to its origination and that of *paramāṇū* of matter. Now the inquisitiveness stops. There is no answer to these questions. We cannot give any cause for *Jīva* or *paramāṇū* and our inquisitiveness ends here.

*Jīva* and *paramāṇūs* are not effects/results for which there has to be a cause.

According to logic texts one has to find cause-effect for every thing. This is an accepted fact. We can apply this rule in practice but in subtle world, there is no cause-effect relationship. Both *Jīva* and *paramāṇū* have their own existence and they have no cause. If we do not accept this then we end up with infinite regress of cause-effects relationship. Hence cause-effect relationships have their limitations/limits/ boundaries. There is another limit of cause-effect limit i.e. the nature of every entity and this nature of the entity is the cause of its existence. The question arises as to why a particular nature assigned to a group of entities. There is no cause for it. Fire being hot and water being cold have no causes. It is therefore said '*Svabhāvo tarkagocara*'. On this basis Jainācārya Siddha Sena defined where logic does not prevail, one should not use it there. We should use logic within the boundaries of its application. Almost all other philosophers have accepted this statement and have made similar statements. For example Upaniṣad says that *Brham* or *ātma* cannot be the subject for logic. '*Naiśā mati starkerṇāpaneyā*'.

Similarly Sāṅkhya also says that *Pūrūṣa* is neither a cause nor an effect. '*Na prakṛtirna Vikṛti*' *Pūrūṣa*

### 5. Application of cause – effect relations in areas beyond philosophy

1. Science: One should not think that the subject of cause-effect relationship is restricted to philosophy only and not in the texts of other disciplines. Scientific analysis decides on the validity of occurrences of events based on cause-effect relationship. However the only difference is that science limits its quest only on the subjects of five senses and mind while philosophy accepts existence of the world beyond mind also. Leaving aside Cārvāka, all other Indian philosophies believe in the existence of super sensual entities. This is why there concern for quest is spiritual.
2. Morality: On the basis of super sensual existence only, Indian philosophies, based on their religious texts discuss and analyze auspicious (*Pūṇya*) and inauspicious (*Pāpa*) and related heaven and hell. Here also *pāpa* is the cause of getting entry in to hell and *Pūṇya* is the cause of entering heaven, even if it is based on super sensual knowledge (based on canonical texts) and not sensual or mental knowledge.
3. Mokṣa: There is a third angle to our discussion on cause-effect relation. We have seen earlier that nature of an entity is outside the limits of applying cause-effect relationships. All Indian philosophies propagate that the man should stay in his own nature forever. This state of man's nature is termed as Mokṣa. On attaining this stage, application of the series of cause-effect relationship terminates/ends.

An analysis will show that the worldly texts earning (*artha*) on science of living, enjoyment/consumption (*Kāma*)

have cause-effect relationship. Similarly discussions on *pāpa-pūnya* and hell heaven have cause-effect relationships. So beyond cause-effect relationships, we see existence of Mokṣa. Therefore it is important/essential to understand the cause-effect relationship; be it for this life or future lives or attaining liberation.

4. Modern thinking: We find extensive discussion between scientists and philosophers of the west. We shall not discuss them here as they are beyond the scope of this lesson. Philosophers like Bertrand Russel have even put a question mark on the existence of relationship between cause-effect. When two entities interact, then both affect each other. For example when we sow a seed, the seed results in a tree/plant but the plant transforms the seed itself. Therefore if seed is the cause of tree from one angle, then tree is also the cause of the seed from another angle. In this way both affect each other.

Hence science accepts the doctrine of action-reaction between two entities and not of the doctrine of cause-effect relationship. Still in our daily life we find certain definite activities resulting in certain definite results and so generally accept cause-effect relationship between them. In this way inquisitiveness of cause-effect relationship has contributed immediately in the progress of mankind in both philosophical and scientific pursuits.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. What is the relationship between cause and effect? Please clarify Jain and other than Jain views on this subject?

#### Short notes type questions:

1. What is the importance of cause-effect relationship in philosophy?
2. How cause and effect relationship is used in other activities besides philosophy?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. What is induced transformation called?  
a. *Vaisrasika* b. *Prāyogika* c. *Vibhāgakraṭa* d. *arthāntarabhāvagamana*.
2. Cause is that which is ?  
a. *anyathāsiddha* b. *anvaya sambandha* c. *vyatireta sambandha* d. *purvavartitva*.
3. Vedānta's hypothesis for cause effect relationship is called?  
a. *Satkāryavāda* b. *asatkāryavāda* c. *vivartavāda* d. *pratisamutpāda*
4. Sāṅkhya considers the basic element of the universes as ?  
a. *prakṛati* b. *brham* c. *paramānu* d. *namāksana*
5. According to Jain philosophy transformation takes place in  
a. attribute b. owner of the attribute c. both d. not in both
6. According to Naiyāyika, paramānu of earth, water, fire, air .....?
7. According to Jain philosophy *paramānu* is .....?
8. Jain philosophy is ..... Philosophy?
9. Pitcher exists ..... in the sand?
10. Transformation takes place in *dhamāstikāya*?

#### Answers

1. b. 2. a. 3. c. 4. a. 5. c. 6. separate and different 7. active i.e. moves 8. *vastuvādi* 9. exists from substance viewpoint 10. yes by itself or on its own.

Reference texts: *Causation in Indian philosophy* by Mahesh Chand Bhartiya P 1-30, 106-110, 139-148 273-275.

**Preface to *Pramana Mimāṃsā* by Pt Sukh Lal Sanghavi. P 5-11**

*Bharatiya Tattva Vidhyā* Pt Sikh Lal Sanghavi p. 23- 47

Jain Darsana Manana Mimāṃsā Acāryā Mahā Prajna p 652-657

Jain Nyaya ka Vikasa Acāryā Mahā Prajna p. 73

Jain Darsana aur Vigyāna Muni Mahendra Kumar p 226-231

Sāṅkhya Kārikā commentary by Vācaspati Misra

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**Nature of non-violence / *Ahiṃsā* Jain, Bauddha, Mīmāṃsaka and Vedānta.**

## 0.0 Introduction

### 1.1 Objective of non-violence.

### 3.0 Nature of non-violence in Mīmāṃsaka philosophy

#### 4.0 Nature of non-violence in Vedānta philosophy.

It is important to know what is the meaning of *Ahiṃsā* before delving into other inquisitive aspects about it. *Ahiṃsā* is the pinnacle of human thinking to move up the ladder of happiness. *Ahiṃsā* validates the path of happiness both for the worldly and life after. The journey of *Ahiṃsā* starts from the individual and keeps on including the entire universe i.e. it invokes the feeling of brotherhood from an individual to the family to society to the nation and then to the world. Literal meaning of *Ahiṃsā* is *A + hiṃsā* i.e. not to commit violence or absence of violence i.e. not to harm any living being by the acts of mind, speech and body. Gandhiji said that ill thoughts are just violence only. *Ahiṃsā* is of two types namely 1. Negation. 2. Affirmation. Negation here implies not allowing any thing violent to happen and Affirmation implies help, compassion, pity, forgiveness, service etc. In other words to give up undesirable acts of violence is negation. To adopt or practice the good acts on non-violence is positive non-violence.

All religions of the world have accepted *Ahiṃsā* the fundamental and essential concept for spiritual purification and uplift. For Indian philosophies in particular, *Ahiṃsā* is the heart and fundamental concept. '*Vasūdhaiḥa kūṭumbakam*' or the inhabitants of the entire earth is a family, is the result of the extreme importance of *Ahiṃsā* in Indian philosophies. Vaidic, Baudha and Jin philosophies have all discussed *Ahiṃsā* but in Jain philosophy *Ahiṃsā* had been discussed in the subtlest details. *Ahiṃsā* has been the important of a mother and the benevolent of all as non-violent thought and conduct is considered *Ahiṃsā* the only way of human development and uplift. *Ahiṃsā* is the basis of all stages of life and is the center place of all canons/ holy texts.

Praśnavyākaraṇa, the canonical text of Jains has adorned *Ahiṃsā* with many adjectives, which express the extreme importance assigned to *Ahiṃsā*. It says 'like the protection is to the scared, sky is for the birds, water is to the thirsty, food is for the hungry, sea for the ship and medicine for the sick are bases for their existence; so is *Ahiṃsā* for all the living beings'. Therefore Bhagavāna Mahāvīra has given the first place in his 18 places of code of conduct.

*'Tathimañ paṭhamañ thāṇañ mahāvīreṇa desiyañ,  
Ahiṃsā niunañ ditthā savvabhuesū sañjamo'*

The entire code of conduct for monks and laity is based on *Ahiṃsā*. All activities of life, be they for detachment or engagement, have *Ahiṃsā* at their core. It is given the first place in five major vows (*mahāvratas*) which itself is indicative of the importance assigned to it. *Ahiṃsā* encompasses all the remaining major vows in its fold.

To understand *Ahiṃsā* it is important to understand *hiṃsā* first. After knowing the nature of *hiṃsā*, the nature of *Ahiṃsā* becomes clear by itself. Tattvārthasūtra while defining *hiṃsā* says, 'pramattayogāt prāṇavyaparopanaṁ hiṃsā' i.e. to kill the life forces due to laziness / inadvertence is *hiṃsā*. Jain philosophy considers ten life forces (*prāṇa*) namely the five sense organs, mind, speech, body, breath and life span.

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body take place. Acarya Anrtacndra has expressed this in the following words, '*yatkhalūkaṣāya yogāt prāṇāṇāṇ dravya bhāvarūpāṇāṇ vyaparopanasya karaṇaṇ sūniścītā bhavati sā hiṁsā*' i.e. with the combined activities arising from passions and activities of mind body and speech, hurting or giving pain to any living being is definitely violence. Nāthu Rām Premi explains this as follows:

Activation of passions like anger when affect the mind, body or speech of a person, then first these first distort his psychic forces as passions do affect the psychic true nature of the soul. This is the first stage of violence. After he hurts his breathe (i.e. it becomes heavy and faster) and expresses his anger with his hands and feet etc thereby hurting these life forces and causes further damage to the nature of his self. This is the second stage of violence. Then his angry words or jokes etc hurt the inner-self of the other person on whom these are aimed at. This is the third stage of violence. In the end the target person is given corporal pains that is the fourth stage of violence.

In this way *hiṁsā* is defined as giving pain or hurting the psychic and material life forces of either of others or even our own. From this analysis we understand two types of *hiṁsā* namely: 1. psychic or *bhāva* and 2. material or body or *dravya*. These can be explained further as origination of passions (*kaṣāya*) in the mind is psychic *hiṁsā* and its expression by speech and body is material/body *hiṁsā*. On this basis we see four alternative scenarios of *hiṁsā* as given in Daśavaikālika sutra.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| i. Psychic and material <i>hiṁsā</i>                   | ii. Psychic <i>hiṁsā</i> and no material <i>hiṁsā</i> |
| iii. No psychic <i>hiṁsā</i> but material <i>hiṁsā</i> | iv. Neither psychic nor material <i>hiṁsā</i>         |

The use of the word '*tivikheṇa*' expresses the trio of mind, body and speech. Not only the trio of mind body and speech *hiṁsā* but the trio of committing *hiṁsā* or asking other to perform violent acts or to admire those who indulge in violence giving rise to nine types of *hiṁsā*. To practice or commit *Ahiṁsā* by not indulging in these nine types of *hiṁsā* is indeed the great paths that can be followed by the monks only who have renounced the house and the world.

#### Four types of *hiṁsā*:

A number of Jain thinkers have classified *hiṁsā* in the following four types also.

- Sanḥkalpi* or preplanned i.e. to inflict injury on the life forces of others by preplanning violent activities.
- Ārambhi* or related to the routine of daily life i.e. associated with collecting and making and consuming food and living on a daily basis.
- Udyogi* or related to professional activities like agriculture etc. or to earn livelihood.
- Virodhi* or defensive i.e. *hiṁsā* associated with protecting self and others from the unjust attacks / wars or similar violent activities.

#### Many types of *hiṁsā*:

The basic cause of origination of *hiṁsā* is passions (*kaṣāya*). Increase or activation of passionate activities only culminates in violent thoughts that are later expressed through the activities of body and speech. Passions are of four main types namely anger, pride, deceit and greed. Each of these four give rise to three stages of *hiṁsā* namely: *saṁrabha* or origination of violent thoughts, 2. *saṁāhrabha* or the sequence of steps leading to violence and 3. *āraṁbha* or execution of violent activities.

In this way four passions, multiplied by three medium i.e. mind body and speech, multiplied by three types of activities (*saṁrabha*, *saṁāhrabha*, *āraṁbha*), multiplied by three types of actions (self, asking others to do and third admiring or supporting others committing violence) gives rise to  $4 \times 3 \times 3 \times 3$  for a total of 108 types of *hiṁsā*.

After defining *hiṁsā* it has become easier to discuss the nature of *Ahiṁsā*. It can be defined as follows as per Yogaśāstra.

*Na yat pramāda yogein jīvitavyaparopāṇam,  
Trasānan sthāvaranā ca tadahiṁsāvratam matam.*

Not to commit violence or violent activities on mobile and stationary living beings under the influence of laziness is *Ahiṁsā*. According to Ācārya Bhikṣū, pity or compassion and *Ahiṁsā* is same. He defines *Ahiṁsā* as follows:

*Jīva jīve ve dayā nahi, mare te hiṁsā na jāṇa,*

*Māraṇa vālā nai hiṁsā kahī, nahī māre te dayā guṇakhāna’  
Cha kāya haṇāve nahī haṇīyā bhalo na jānai tāya,  
Man vacana kāyā karau, a dayā kahī jina rāya.*

i.e. a living being lives as per his life span and so it is not compassion; when his lifespan is completed he leaves his body i.e. dies and so it is also not *hiṁsā*. One who gives pain or kills others is *hiṁsā* and not doing so is *Ahiṁsā* or compassion. In others words not committing violent activities or asking others to do, nor to admire and support those who commit violence is *Ahiṁsā*.

Ācārya Tūlī in Jain Siddhānta Dīpikā writes “*Prāṇānāmanatipāta’ apramādo vā Ahiṁsā*”. Gandhiji also spoke on the same lines concerning *Ahiṁsā*. According to him *Ahiṁsā* means complete flawless. Complete *Ahiṁsā* means absence of all ill feelings towards all living beings. All these analyses again bring forth the two aspects of *Ahiṁsā* namely 1. Negation aspects. 2. Affirmation aspects. Not to hurt or cause pain to life forces is negation aspect of *Ahiṁsā* and the inclusion of words *apramāda* is the affirmation aspect of *Ahiṁsā*. *Dayā* is one of the sixty names of *Ahiṁsā* given in Praśnavyākaraṇa that has been used by Ācārya Bhikṣū that is a representative of the affirmation aspect only. Meaning of *apramāda* is absence of attachment and aversion and maintaining a state of equanimity. Equanimity is *Ahiṁsā* (*Ahiṁsā samaya ceva suyaḡado*), which means friendship; compassion, magnanimity etc are human virtues. Ācārya Mahāprajña in Ācāraṅga Bhāṣya has identified two types of equanimity namely self based equanimity and equanimity based on others.

By suppression of attachment and aversion, the feeling of equanimity in favourable or unfavourable conditions is self based equanimity. For self based equanimity, Bhagavāna has preached suppression of passions. All living beings desire happiness and oppose pains of any kind. Hence there is no living being suitable for imparting pain or killing. This feeling all living beings as equal is equanimity based on others. For equanimity based on others, He has preached abstaining from violence i.e. killing other living beings.

As per the transcendental viewpoint, absence of attachment etc is *Ahiṁsā*. This is so as attachment with one results in aversion for others definitely. This is the biggest obstacle in practicing *Ahiṁsā*. In the oldest Jain canonical text Ācāraṅga Bhagavāna Mahāvīra says ‘You should not kill any living being, basic elements (*bhūta*) or existents (*satva*). You should not rule over them. You should not cause hardship on them. You should not cause suppression or destruction of any life forces. This is pure and eternal dharma’.

Even though the word *Ahiṁsā* is not used in this sutra as the words ‘*esa dhamme se esa*’ is the representation for *Ahiṁsā*. Also the meaning of pure is described as free from attachment and aversion by Ācārya Mahāprajña in Ācāraṅga Bhāṣya.

One meaning of equanimity is balance of the self. ‘*samayaṇ logassa jāṇita ettha satthovarae*’ i.e. all souls are equal. By knowing this one should avoid violence against all living beings. Here equanimity with reference to *Ahiṁsā* means balance of self-soul i.e. to consider all living beings as equal to you. This equanimity is the foundation of Jainism on which the concept of *Ahiṁsā* was developed and prospered. Detailed and extensive coverage on *Ahiṁsā* towards all living beings from one sensed to six sensed is given in Jain literature that cannot be found elsewhere.

The adjectives like ‘*svayaṇbhuyakhemaṇkari*’ for *Ahiṁsā* are thus most appropriately used in Jain texts. Praśnavyākaraṇa gives eight synonyms of ‘*svayaṇbhuyakhemaṇkari*’ nature of *Ahiṁsā*. It is said there that *Ahiṁsā* is like nectar, Brahma, benevolent, forgiving, and auspicious and benefactor of all living beings. *Ahiṁsā* provides the necessary shelter. The monk is *Ahiṁsaka* towards six types of living beings. Therefore Utrādhyyana (sutra 21/13), the monk is called as with the nature of *dayā*. Here *dayā* is used in context of *Ahiṁsā*.

### 1.1 Objective of *Ahiṁsā*.

What is the objective of *Ahiṁsā*? Is it self-purification or protecting the living beings? Thinkers are not unanimous on this subject. Some thinkers call protection of living beings as the objective of *Ahiṁsā* while others emphasize self-purification. Ācārya Bhikṣū says that self-purification is the objective of *Ahiṁsā*. He has clarified this point in his verse on the sermons of Jina as follows:

*Durjā sumata cālatā sātha ne, kahā jīva taṇī huvai ghāta;*

*Te jīva muhā ropāpa sādha ne, lāge nahī asaṁmāta re;  
Jo īryā sumatapiṇa sādhu cāle kadā jīva mare nahī koya;  
To fira sādhaṭe hiṁsā cha 'kāya rī lāgī pāpa taṇo baṁdha hoye.*

A person exercising self-restraint is walking. If his feet kill a living being or other actions then he, the person walking does not become *hiṁsaka* and no bondage of karmas take place with his soul. On the other hand a person without exercising self-restraint and walking carelessly will become *hiṁsaka* even if he does not kill any living being and bind karmas with his soul. Foundation of *Ahiṁsā* and *hiṁsā* is the intent of the soul is associated with its being true to its nature or not respectively. Killing or protection of living beings is not its yardstick. This is the practical aspect of *Ahiṁsā*.

German scholar Albertswitzer also comes to the conclusion that self-restraint (*saṁyama*) is the basis of *Ahiṁsā* as per Bhagavāna Mahāvīra. Self-restraint is sacred due to its association with the purity of the soul. When we describe *Ahiṁsā* as compassion or protection of living beings, then it becomes a concept for the masses but the soul cannot stay as pure. Purification of soul means to refrain from carelessness. Refraining from carelessness and *Ahiṁsā* cannot be separated. Where there is carefulness there is *Ahiṁsā* and where there is *Ahiṁsā* there is protection from carelessness. But protecting *jīvas* and *Ahiṁsā* are not related in this manner. In *Ahiṁsā* protection of living beings can be there but it is not essential.

In concluding we can say that both aspects of *Ahiṁsā* i.e. negation and affirmation are equally emphasized in Jain philosophy. It starts from the protection of living beings and reaches the pinnacle of equanimity where the existence of all living beings is surmised as equal. With reference to the existence of soul, all living beings, be they one sensed like earth/ air/ water/ fire bodied or vegetation or human beings with five senses and mind or the animal kingdom are all equal and similar. Perhaps no other religion of the world gives such a wide coverage to *Ahiṁsā* as in Jainism. '*Esā sā bhagavati*' signifies the expression of highest veneration to it by Jains.

## 2.0 Nature of *Ahiṁsā* in Baudha philosophy.

We find discussions on *Ahiṁsā* in fundamental canonical texts of Buddhists like Sūttapiṭaka and Vinayapiṭaka. There the nature of *Ahiṁsā* is discussed in details. In Baudha philosophy, *Ahiṁsā* is defined as not giving pain to others by activities of mind body and speech. In Dhammapāda it is said that a person who is *Ahiṁsaka*, does neither causes pain to others nor encourages others to do so. Vinayapiṭaka goes a step further where it says that not only gross living beings, *Ahiṁsaka* does not even cause pain to one sensed trees and plants. To pluck the trees or to dig the earth are prohibited for monks, as there is a possibility of killing other living beings in such activities.

To practice *Ahiṁsā*, the monk is forbidden to consume water polluted with living beings. If a monk consumes such polluted water, then there is a regime of repentance given in Vinayapiṭaka. Concerning the plant, there thinking becomes clear from the following remarks 'O Bhikṣūs! I permit you to eat five types of vegetables and fruits fit for consumption by *śramaṇas* by first taking the peel off using fire or knife or by scratching by nails, without seeds or pits and infertile seeds.' In Dighanikāya, while giving sermons to monks, Buddha talks of three types of *śīlas* (vows) namely primary, middle and secondary. These *śīlas* have *Ahiṁsā*, non-stealing, celibacy, speaking the truth, non-consumption of toxicants etc. Here *Ahiṁsā* does not talk of just giving pain or killing human beings but even protecting plants and seeds from getting destroyed. Hence a *śramaṇa* or *bhikṣu* is said to be one who protects the primary seeds, compound seeds, seeds of fruits etc. Not speaking harsh words and use of affectionate and popular language is also included in *Ahiṁsā*.

In Sanyuktanikāya, while king Prasenajita, in Mallikāsuta, say that no body as dear as one himself, Buddha say 'look around in all directions. Do you not find anybody dearer than you? Similarly everyone thinks himself or herself as dearest. Therefore one who wants his or her welfare should not give pain to others'. Later on in Brāhmaṇa sutta when Brāhmaṇa Bhāradwāja declares himself to be *Ahiṁsaka*, Buddha says 'you should be like your name. You should be *Ahiṁsaka* in reality. The one who does not commit violence by mind, body and speech is in fact *Ahiṁsaka*. He also does not give pain to others.' In this way Buddha condemned the *yajñas* based on animal sacrifice and called the same without sacrifice as beneficial. When he head of King Prasenajita performing *yajñas* with sacrifice, he condemned the same and said that such activities do not result in beneficial results. Those learned people who follow the righteous

conduct, do not advise such *yajñas* involving sacrifice of sheep, goats or cows etc. In Suttanipāṭa, friendship towards all living beings is called *Brahma vihār* or the path to attain supreme state. There it is said that those who wish to attain tranquility must be with straight character and simple in nature, their words spoken should be soft, sweet and humble, should wish for the peace and prosperity of all living beings. For people indulging in violence, there is charter for repentance. If some *bhikkhū* digs the earth or have it dug by others, fell the trees or have them cut by others, knowingly hurts or kills other living beings, beats or speaks in anger to other *bhikkhūs* are all liable for punishment and there is provision for the same. To stop killing one sensed living beings, Buddha gave the following advice to his followers:

O *bhikkhū*! Do not use the sandals made of *tāda* leaves. He who uses them will earn the flaw of pain given to others. Similarly you should not use shoes made of bamboo else you will also suffer from the flaw causing pain to others. This is so as cutting the leaves of these plants cause the plant to dry and die which in turn is the death of one sensed living beings.

Inadvertence or being cautious is associated with the fundamental o Ahimsa. While delivering sermons to his disciples, He says 'A person should consider his existence as that of a speck of dust and the existence of others as that of the entire earth. And then should avoid carelessness towards them. *bhikkhūs* should walk with utmost care. The basis of all holy acts (*kusala dharma*) is this attitude of carefulness. This attitude of carefulness alone gives birth to the equanimity towards all. This has been presented in Buddhist religion as follows.

Moving or stationary, subtle or gross, medium or tiny, visible or invisible, distant or near, born or to be born living beings should all have peaceful existence. In Sutta Nipāka at one place equanimity of all living beings was established first and then the followers were advised not to kill them.

*Yathā ahañ tathā ete yathā ete tathā ahañ,  
Attāhañ upamañ ktvā na haneyya na ghātaye.*

They are like me and I am like them. In this way think of all living beings as similar to your soul and abstain from killing them. This is similar to the principle of equal souls (*ātma tulā*) of Jain philosophy even though Buddhist philosophy is silent on earth, water, air and fire bodied living beings of Jains. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra has talked of air, water, fire and earth bodied living beings also about whom Bhagavāna Buddha did not say anything. Tathāgata Buddha called *Ahiṃsaka* as *ārya*. A person who causes pain or kills other living beings cannot become a *ārya*.

*Na tena āraṇyo hoṃti yena paṇāni hiṃsati  
Ahiṃsā sabbāṃ paṇāṃ āriyati pavuccati*

By venerating *Ahiṃsā* only one can attain the position of eternity, which post is such that once acquired, the owner can never surf again. In Buddhist philosophy, practice of *Ahiṃsā* involves developing feelings of friendship, compassion, contentment and detachment are seen as the means of beings *Ahiṃsaka*.

The above analysis clearly shows that Buddhists have considered *hiṃsā* - *Ahiṃsā* upto one sensed living beings also. Even after this, due to the severity of circumstances, they have accepted *hiṃsā* also in some form, e.g. use of blood and animal fat in the form of medicine and eating meat if received as alms is considered as *Ahiṃsā*. Perhaps this has inculcated the laxity in being *Ahiṃsaka* later on.

### 3.0 Nature of *Ahiṃsā* in Mīmāṃsaka philosophy.

In both Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsaka philosophies, *Ahiṃsā* had been dealt to some extent. Sāṅkhya philosophy represents the school, which considers sacrifice of animals or living beings in *yajñas* as *hiṃsā*, and the same is with flaws as *hiṃsā* done at other times. Mīmāṃsaka are exactly opposite of Sāṅkhya and represents the school which considers animal sacrifice in *yajñas* as sacred and not *hiṃsā*. According to them '*Vediki hiṃsā na hiṃsā bhavati*' i.e. *Hiṃsā* committed in *yajñas* is not *hiṃsā*. In this regard an interesting episode is described in Sāṅkhya Tattva Kaumidī

*Du'khatrāyabhighātājñānāsā tadayaghātake hetau,  
Dr̥ṣṭe sā' pārthā cennekāntātyantato' bhāvād (Sāṅkhya Kārikā 1)*

The issue is to get relief from the trio o pains/sufferings namely spiritual, physical and mystical. There are three ways to get rid of them.

*Laukika* means: e.g. water for thirst, food for hunger, medicine for sickness, self-restraint for desire, charity for greed, compassion for anger etc are the means to eliminate respective physical pains.

Textual means: Performing *yajñas* as per Vedas.

Inquisitiveness about holy texts: This implies knowledge about *prakṛti* and *pūrūṣa*.

Out of these three means, *Laukika* means cannot relieve pain completely associated with the individual mean or total pains. The same is applicable to performing *yajñas* as per Vedas as they are associated with more or less of impure things and acts. Hence knowledge of *prakṛti* and *pūrūṣa* is the ideal and provides liberation.

Vedic *yajñas* generate both merit (*pūnya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) at the same time as they involve Hinsa in some form or the other which is the real cause of their impurity. Bhāṣyakāra says about these *yajñas* '*svalpa*' *saṅkara*' *saparihāra*' i.e. the flaw in *yajña* is small as I can be purified / removed. So if purification is needed then the act is impure. Besides this, Vedic philosophy says on one hand '*na hiṁsayāt sarvabhūtāni*' i.e. do not commit *hiṁsā* on any living beings and on the other hand it says '*agniṣomīyaṁ paśūmālabhet*' i.e. for fire and sacrifice bring the animal. Both these statements are contradictory. But Mīmāṃsaka do not see them so as '*na hiṁsayāt sarvabhūtāni*' is a general rule and '*agniṣomīyaṁ paśūmālabhet*' is a special rule. As such there is no contradiction amongst them as the general and special rules are not applicable simultaneously. If there were contradiction then special rules would have affected the general rule also. This statement does not support Mīmāṃsaka view. If we say that no contradiction is there amongst these two statements then the implication will be each statement can have two meanings e.g. '*na hiṁsayāt sarvabhūtāni*' expresses only that *hiṁsā* is a useless activity and it does not say that *hiṁsā* is a useless activity for *yajña*. Similarly '*agniṣomīyaṁ paśūmālabhet*' just says that *hiṁsā* for *yajñas* is beneficial and not a useless activity. Thus each sentence generates two meanings. Thus '*agniṣomīyaṁ paśūmālabhet*' implies 1. *hiṁsā* is useful for *yajña* and 2. *hiṁsā* is a useless activity.

However implying two meanings to each sentence will create flaws in the sentence itself and Mīmāṃsaka also support this view. Even if no flaw is accepted for the implied two meanings, still there is no difference in these two meanings namely *hiṁsā* is essential for *yajña* and *hiṁsā* results in demerit (*pāpa*). By pursuing this logic we can conclude that the essentiality of *hiṁsā* in the rituals of *yajña* is the cause of impurities in them.

#### 4.0 Nature of *Ahiṁsā* in Vedānta

Advait Vedānta believes in the existence of just one Brahman and nothing else exists. This one Brahman has many parts or manifestations. Further they say '*Brahma satan jagat mithyā*' i.e. only Brahman is real and true and everything else existing in this world is false or unreal. In such a situation the question is of *hiṁsā* does and *Ahiṁsā* does not arise. This is so as *hiṁsaka* and the *hiṁsya* (that which is being hurt or killed) is the same and parts of Brahman only. Further as only Brahman is real and everything else false then whatever *Ahiṁsā* or *hiṁsā* that take place in the world is also false. However in actual practice even Vedānta also recognizes both *hiṁsā* and *Ahiṁsā*.

While commenting in Brahman sutra (3.1.25), Śāṅkārācārya has talked about Hinsa and *yajña* rituals. He says '*asūddhamiti cetra sabbāt*' i.e. sacrifice in fire during Vedic *yajña* etc are impure as there is animal killing in them. Therefore those perform such activities will be rewarded with painful life later on. It is not correct to say so as Bhāṣyakāra Śāṅkārācārya say *yajña* 'rituals are flawed due to their association with animal killing and the results may be undesirable'. Therefore if the primary implication is undesirable life then the secondary implication is based on the premise that the knowledge of righteousness and wrongness is derived from canonical texts like Vedas. Both being righteous or wrong is psychic and conceptual only. An act, which is right in a particular time or place, can become wrong at another place or time. Therefore no one can develop knowledge of right and wrong without the aid of canonical texts. An activity, which involves *hiṁsā*, is established as sacred by the Vedas and so it cannot be said as unholy. But '*na hiṁsayāt sarvabhūtāni*' i.e. do not kill any living being and *bhūtas* in the canonical texts say that *hiṁsā* is demerit and it is true and this is the path to be followed. Thus '*agniṣomīyaṁ paśūmālabhet*' i.e. kill and animal for *yajña* and fire is contradictory to the first sentence.

Affirmation and contradiction is a well-established process. Therefore Vedic rituals are pure as they are practiced by righteous people and are not to be criticized. Therefore the unfavourable birth as stationary beings is not the result

of such rituals. Thus Śāṅkārācārya also believes that *yajña* as directed in Vedas are right and *hiṁsā* associated with them does not result in demerit (*pāpa*).

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Please discuss the nature of *Ahiṁsā* in Jain, Baudha, Mīmāṃsaka and Vedānta philosophies?

#### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain briefly the objective of *Ahiṁsā*? Is it purification of soul or protection of the living beings?
2. Foundation of all righteous conduct (*kuśala dharma*) is attentiveness (alertness or *apramāda*). Clarify in respect of Jain and Buddhist religions?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. *Hiṁsā* is of two types——— ?
2. Total number of types of *hiṁsā* are —— ?
3. Synonym for *Ahiṁsā* is —— ?
4. Two type of equanimity are —— ———?
5. Objective of *Ahiṁsā* is —— ?
6. The adjective *svayambhuyakhemkari* is used for ——?
7. Suttapiṭaka and Vinaypiṭaka are the canons of —— ?
8. Tath ā gata Buddha called *Ahiṁsaka* as —— ———?
9. Three types of *śīla* are discussed in ——?
10. Sankara is the preacher of ———philosophy?

Author

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## Unit 2: Lesson 7

### Nature of non-possession / *Aparigraha* in Jain, Baudha, Yoga and Vedānta.

In this lesson, the student shall be able to study the following topics in a systematic manner connected with non-possession and its nature.

#### 0.0 Introduction

1. Nature of non-possession in Jain philosophy.
2. Nature of non-possession in Baudha philosophy.
3. Comparison of *aparigraha* in Baudha and Jain philosophies
4. Nature of non-possession in Yoga philosophy
5. Comparison of *aparigraha* in Jain and Yoga philosophies.
6. Nature of non-possession in Vedānta philosophy
7. Comparison of *aparigraha* in Jain and Vedānta philosophies

#### 0.0 Non possession or *aparigraha*

The doctrine of non-possession as enunciated by Bhagavāna Mahāvīra is all pervasive, eternal and the whole truth. Therefore in Ācārāṅga sutra the following is said.

‘*pariggahāo appāṇaḥ avasakkejjā*’ i.e. keep the possessions away from you. Possessions destroy peace and equanimity and create turbulence and animosity. It makes the life full of uneasiness, discontent and dull. Possessions make one’s heart greedy, intellectually consumption oriented, mind of wandering nature and loose sensual controls. Even though it provides all means of external comfort yet it makes the owner always crave for happiness. Possessions keep on fanning the desire for more and more leading one to the realm of infinite pains. There is no other bondage like possessions. Prevalence of all round social ills like violence, terrorism, corruption, thefts, cruelty etc is all due to enhanced desires, expectation and tendency to hoard. All these problems can be resolved by the doctrine of non-possession. This is the reason that all religious of the world talk of non-possession in one form or the others. Jain, Buddhist and Vedic religious traditions talk of five vows to be followed by all for good and moral conduct. The first four vows i.e. non-violence, non-stealing, speaking the truth and celibacy are common to all. However the fifth vow i.e. non-possession (*aparigraha*) is different in all three traditions. In Vedic tradition the fifth vow is described as charity (*dāna*). Buddhists call the fifth vow as giving up consumption of toxic substances. The fifth vow of Jains is non-possession or *aparigraha*. Thus Jains consider non-possession (*aparigraha*) very special.

In the four fold path of Bhagavāna Pārśvanātha, the fourth vow had celibacy and non-possession combined together. However Bhagavāna Mahāvīra separated these two and talked of five-fold path. The concept of non-possession is based on the doctrine of GIVING – UP (*tyāga*). Jainism is based on giving up worldly possessions completely but other religions also give importance to giving up worldly possessions to some extent. Therefore we find discussions on *aparigraha* in Baudha, Vedānta and Yoga traditions also, besides Jainism. However the extent of detailed discussions on *aparigraha* found in Jainism cannot be matched elsewhere. Therefore to understand the nature and types of *aparigraha*, we shall first discuss its nature and other details in Jain tradition.

#### 1.0 Nature of *aparigraha* in Jainism tradition

It is important to understand possessions (*Parigraha*) before discussing *aparigraha*.

##### Origins of word *parigraha* and its meaning

*Parigraha* consists of *pari* + *graha* which means bound from all four sides i.e. *parigrahaṇaḥ parigraha*. It means to bind, to acquire or attachment.

##### Definitions of *parigraha*:

*Parigrahayate eti parigrahati* i.e. whatever is acquired is *parigraha*. ‘*parigrahyate anena eti parigraha*’ i.e. means of acquiring external objects is *parigraha*.

As per Jain canonical literature the real meaning of *parigraha* is not external possession but it is internal infatuation and obsession. In *Ācārāṅga* it is said that 'whosoever gives up the desire for possessions is really *aparigrahi*'. In *Praśnavyākaraṇa*-vṛtti it is said '*parisāmastyena grahaṇaṁ parigraha*'. Similarly definition of *parigraha* in other Jain text is given below.

Pravacana Sāra: "*parigrahyate ādiyata'smādiṭi parigraha*', *murcchā bhāvena mameti būddhyā grahyate eti parigraha*" i.e. to acquire anything in its entirety or with a feeling of attachment or it is mine or with a sense of infatuation is *parigraha*.

Daśavaikālika sūtra: "*mucchā pariggaho*" i.e. infatuation is *parigraha*.

Tattvārthasūtra: Infatuation or attachment is *parigraha*.

Rājavārtika: "*mamedāṁ vastūahamsya svāmityātmāyābhīmāna'saṅkalpa'parigraha eti ucyate*". i.e. this is mine, I am its owner or it belongs to me and such feelings resulting from attachment to things is *parigraha*.

Jain Siddhānta Dīpikā: Attachment and ego are both *parigraha*. Therefore all things associated with feeling of mine or infatuation is *parigraha*. *Parigraha* is the cause of demerit (*pāpa*).

In the second section of Bhagavati, while replying to a query by *gaṇadhara* Indrabhūti Gautam, Bhagavāna Mahāvīra says, 'Gautam! Desire, infatuation, craving and passions are all concomitant i.e. wherever there is possession there is anger, pride, deceit and greed also. *Parigraha* is the fountain of all sins. All sins originate from *parigraha*.

Praśnavyākaraṇa say "In order to acquire possessions; people commit violence, tell lies, steal, indulge in adulteration, use false weights and measures. Because of possession only one man kills another. In short there is no sin that is not related to *parigraha*.

Uttarādhyayana Sūtra: Desire or lust is the root cause of all sins. It is said that one who conquers desire attains bliss and relief from all pains.

*"Dukkha' hayaṁ jassa na hio moho,  
Moho hao jassa na hoi taṇhā"*

Sutrakṛatāṅga says: A person cannot eliminate pain as long as he retains attachment of any kind. Desire is the root cause of *parigraha*. This vow of *aparigraha* is also important from other angles. All objects in this world like gold, silver, diamonds, ruby, emerald, pearls, land, food, clothes etc. are all limited in quantity. When one person acquires more of them, than the other person is not able to have essential commodities even to live. This results in social and economic inequalities. This excessive desire for possessions therefore results in exploitation of limited natural resources. Extreme exploitation of natural resources results in serious environmental imbalance thus causing dangerous environmental pollution. To resolve all these problems, the simple way is to become *aparigrahi*.

Jain Siddhānta Dīpikā defines the vow of non-possession as '*Mamatvavisarjanaṁ aparigrahati*' i.e. to eliminate the feeling of mine or to limit the desires is *aparigraha vrata*. The one who practices *aparigraha vrata* not only exercise control over acquiring possessions or their consumption but he tries to minimize the craving and attachment to these possessions. Thus he enjoys peace & bliss in his life. Sutrakṛatāṅga goes to the extent of saying 'this vow of non-possession i.e. eliminating the infatuation & obsession towards external objects leads the practitioner to the state of liberation'. Thāṇāṅga says that possessions are the gates to hell and elimination of possession is the gate to liberation.

In upāsakadaśāṅga, all types of possessions are classified in two categories i.e. external and internal. These will be discussed in details in unit 3 lesson 9. Jain tradition asks its monks to practice 100% giving up of all possessions but a householder cannot give up totally all his possession as his life cannot go on without some possessions. Therefore he sets limits to his possessions and tries to minimize his possessions. By practicing this vow the life becomes simple, peaceful and friendly to all.

## 2.0. Nature of *aparigraha* in Baudha philosophy

The extent of importance assigned to limit possessions in Jain philosophy is not seen in Baudha philosophy even though a number of sermons by Buddha indicate importance of limiting possessions. Baudha philosophy says 'A person who desires land, food, house, cows, horses, servants, family etc. is supported by lust / ill desires (*Vāsanā*)



and so he becomes like a broken boat and sinks in the ocean of pains. What Jains call *parigraha*, Buddhists call the same as *trṣṇā* (excessive or intense desire). In Baudha tradition, infatuation is considered as the primary cause of all pains. They say that destruction of infatuations automatically results in destructions of all pains. In Dhammapada it is said that 'Even if it rains gold, yet the desires of a greedy person cannot be satisfied? In Saṅgīyukta nikāya it is said that desire is pains. Baudha traditions talks of three types of desires namely desires for the world i.e. present life, desires for the future lives and desires for enjoyment.

In Suttanipāṭa also Buddha says that infatuation is bondage. Whatever pains we have is caused by our desires, elimination of infatuation is in fact elimination of pain. Elimination of desire is *nirvāṇa* only. Accordingly to Buddha, desire and infatuation are the primary causes for possessions or cravings for possessions.

In Mahāniddeṣapāli it is said 'root of possessions is desire and infatuation. In Baudha traditions also minimizing or total renunciation of possessions is essential to be free from infatuation. Out of ten vows (*śila*) for *bhikṣus* in Buddhism, the last three are extensions of *aparigraha* only. The eighth vow *Mālyagāṇḍha dhāraṇa vilepana viramaṇa* means that putting on garlands or perfumes on the body are the causes of sensual enjoyment and desire. Extending this vow further in the ninth vow, the *bhikṣu* is advised not to sleep on soft and high beds. In Anguttaranikāya it is said 'Dancing, music, singing etc. are prohibited for the *bhikṣu*. For other essential things like clothes, begging bowls etc., their minimization as possessions is recommended. In Suttanipāṭa it is said that one who is obsessed with desires will find it extremely difficult to attain *nirvāṇa*. This way Buddhist tradition also advises *Bhikṣus* to have bare minimum possessions.

### 3.0 Comparison of Jain & Buddhist concepts of *aparigraha*.

Both traditions emphasize equally the doctrinal aspects of *aparigraha*. But there are differences in their practice. Jains says that *aparigraha* is essential to be free of infatuation while Buddhists do not consider so. In Jain philosophy to be able to achieve the highest state of pure soul, giving up completely both internal and external types of possessions is essential which is not the case in Buddhist traditions. Both traditions consider desires as the cause of pain. Jain philosophy talks of total renunciation of possessions for both householders & monks but this are not found in Buddhism. Uttarādhyayan of Jains talks of abstaining from adorning body (by massage, dresses, ornaments etc.). Buddhists also talk of it for their *bhikṣus*. Similarly Ācāraṅga of Jains talk of beds of straws, stone or wooden plank to be used by the monks for sleeping in details. Buddhist tradition also talks on similar lines.

Jains philosophy talks of total renunciation for monks and minimization of possessions for householders. However Buddhist tradition talks of giving up possessions of gold, silver wealth like that for *bhikṣus* but there is no such recommendation for householders. We thus see partial similarities in the doctrine of *aparigraha* in both traditions.

### 4.0. Nature of *aparigraha* is Yoga philosophy

Being a philosophy emphasizing renunciation, Yoga philosophy also emphasizes *aparigraha* like Jains. Here they give prime important to moral character. This is the reason that Yogasutrakāra talks first of *yama* (vows).

*Yamas* are the preliminary practices of both intervals, external conduct of man. Continuous practices of 'Yamas' result in spiritual purification. As a result one attains the states of *dhāraṇā*, *dhyaṇa* and *samādhi* i.e. super-sensual states of self/soul. There are five *yamas* namely *Ahiṃsā*, *satya* (speaking the truth), *asteya* (non stealing), celibacy (*bṛhamacarya*) and *aparigraha* (non possessions).

In Yoga philosophy, *aparigraha* not only means non-acquisition but they also think that elimination of infatuation, attachment and limiting worldly possession is *aparigraha*. Material wealth is an obstruction for Yoga. Majority of people go astray with material wealth & so for controlling and limiting their possession, they identified five reasons. Until one is free of these five causes, one cannot become *aparigrahi*. Nescience (*avidhyā*), *asamitā*, attachment, aversion and *abhiniveśa* push the person deep in the well of possessions. These impurities can be washed away by Yoga only. Śauṇca (cleanliness) vow cleans both internal and external impurities. Contentment (*santośa*) exercises control over possessions, Penance eliminates the feelings of attachments. *Svādhyāya* (self study) and devotion to God (*īśvara paridhana*) accelerates the paths of purifying both internal and external impurities. When one becomes *aparigrahi*, all others *Yamas* are automatically practiced. This is so as minimizing the tendency for acquisition

automatically minimizes acts of violence, aversion also; and he will speak the truth, not steal other's property & practice celibacy. Doctrine of *aparigraha* creates a feeling of love, brotherhood, equanimity, compassion and friendship etc in the society.

Maharṣi Patañjali in Yoga Darśana says '*Aparigraha sthairye Janmakathāntāsambodha*' i.e. intellect and mind free of possessions become capable of acquiring true knowledge. It enables the practitioner to know of the past and future lives i.e. to know what we were in previous births and we shall be in future births.

Today there is an absolute need of *aparigraha* in the world. This is so as improper or non-existent practice of *aparigraha* results in great economic disparities. If every one has just bare essential needs of life then no one will be poor, without a home or go hungry.

### 5.0 Comparison of *aparigraha* in Jain & Yoga philosophies.

Both traditions give *aparigraha* the fifth position in their vows. Both traditions consider infatuation, obsession & craving for possessions as *parigraha* and their elimination as *aparigraha*. Jains consider it essential to be *aparigraha* to be free of obsession that is not the case with Yogadarśana.

Jains talk of two types namely external and internal possession, which is not easily traceable in Yoga literature. Jains talk of partial or limited possession as *aṇuvrata* and total renunciation of possession as *mahāvratā*, which is exactly case in Yogadarśana also. According to them when *aparigraha* vow has limitations of time & place then it is called *aṇuvrata* & when it is free of the limitations of time & place then it is called *mahāvratā*. In this way we find significant similarities in the doctrine of *aparigraha* in the two traditions.

### 6.0. Nature of *aparigraha* in Vedānta

Vedānta considers knowledge (*Jñāna*) as the means to attain liberation. All issues concerning conduct are therefore included in the discussion on knowledge. The person who wishes to acquire knowledge of Vedānta must be free/detached from the pleasures of this world & future lives. In other words a person who is not *aparigrahi* cannot acquire knowledge.

Unlike the discussion of internal & external possession in Jainism, Vedānta talks of pleasures of this life and future life. According to them meritorious (*pūnya*) activities yield comfort of heaven in this and future life also. Therefore it is essential for the practitioner not to be obsessed about such comforts.

Second condition for acquiring knowledge of Vedānta is that the practitioners should have knowledge of eternal and momentary entities. Bliss of the soul is the only eternal thing. Comforts from other entities can never be eternal. One who expects comforts from other objects cannot get bliss of the soul. Therefore without becoming *aparigrahi* one cannot acquire *Brham* knowledge.

We also find scant mention in Vedānta about limiting one's possessions, e.g. for the monk there is a provision to keep pot for water, cloth for straining water, sandals, seat, comb etc. but keeping metal pots are forbidden for him. Manusmṛti says that begging bowl & water pot should be made of earth or wooden or bamboo without holes.

### 7.0. Comparison of *aparigraha* in Jain & Vedānta philosophies.

Jains talk of internal & external possessions while Vedānta talks of comforts of this & future life. Jains insist on giving up possessions to attain of obsession free state, which is not the case in Vedānta. But they insist or give special mention on acquiring knowledge. Jain say that the monk should give up all types of possessions while Vedānta allows possessing limited objects needed to live. Both traditions emphasize an un-obsessed state of mind. This way we can say that to some extent there is similarity in both Jain and Vedānta traditions.

While concluding we can say that Śramaṇa traditions like Jain & Buddhist and Vedic traditions like Yoga and Vedānta and other philosophies, which talk of attaining liberation (Mokṣa) give equal importance to *aparigraha*. The only difference is that some traditions insist on total renunciation of possessions while others talk of limited renunciation of external possession. This difference is also existent for the monks. No difference appears though for the householders.

॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥ श्रीगणेशाय नमः ॥

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. While defining *aparigraha*, please discuss and compare its nature in Jain, Baudha, Yoga and Vedānta philosophies?

### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain briefly the similarities and differences on *aparigraha* in Jain and Baudha traditions?
2. What is the nature of *aparigraha* in Yoga philosophy?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. How many types of *aparigraha* are there in Jain tradition?
2. a. 4. b. 6. c. 8. d. 2.
3. What is the sequence of *aparigraha* as *yama* in Yoga tradition?
4. a. third. b. second. c. fifth. d. seventh.
5. How many types of *Tṛṣṇā* are described in Baudha tradition?
6. a. one b. five c. three d. eight.
7. What is the root cause for the tendency for possessions in Baudha tradition?
8. a. *arjuna* b. stealing. C. obsession d. cruelty.
9. What is the root cause of all suffering as per Uttarādhyayan?
10. a. sins b. anger c. *Tṛṣṇā* d. bad conduct.
11. What is the fifth vow in Vedānta?
12. a. celibacy b. truth speaking c. charity d. non-violence
13. What is the fifth vow in Baudha tradition?
14. a. giving up violence b. giving up stealing c. giving up consumption of toxic substances
15. What is giving up the feeling of mine or limiting the desires called?
16. a. *satya* b. *punya* c. *brahmacarya* d. *aparigraha*
17. What causes all the sins?
- a. snatching or grabbing b. corruption c. possessions d. stealing
18. How many types of internal possessions are?
19. a. 5. b. nine c. 14 d. 6
20. Answers
1. two 2. fifth 3. three 4. infatuation/obsession 5. *Tṛṣṇā* 6. charity 7. giving up toxic substances 8. *aparigraha* 9. *parigraha* 10. 14

### Reference texts:

1. *Patanjali Yoga Pradīpa*
2. *Jainendra Sidhānta śabda Kosa*
3. *Jinavāṇī aparigraha special issue*
4. *Jain Acārya Mīmāṃsā*
5. *Jain Baudh Gītā*
6. *Prasnavyakāraṇa*
7. *Śrāvaka sanbodha*
8. *Sutta Nipāta*
9. *Vinaya Piṭaka*
10. *Vedānta Darśana*
11. *Jain Sidhānta Dīpikā*

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## Unit 2: Lesson 8:

### Nature of penance / *tapa* in Jain, Baudha and Pūrāṇa.

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study the following topics.

1. Introduction
  2. Nature of penance in Jain religion
    - a. Types of penance
    - b. Six types of external penance
    - c. Six types of internal penance
  3. Nature of penance in Buddhism
  4. Nature of penance in Pūrāṇas
  5. Comparison
- 5-1 Differences

#### 1.0. Introduction

Penance or '*tapa*' is the heart of Indian spiritual life. Even though there can be different opinions about the aim of penance in different traditions, still the concept of penance cannot be denied by any.

*'Karma kṣayārtha eti tapa', tavo viṣayaṇiggaho jattha'*

i.e. penance is where the restraint or control of sensual pleasures / desires is exercised. Definitions of penance are found in literature of all religious traditions of India. Differences in paths of performing penance in general are detailed in different Jain texts.

In ancient Jain literature we also find a four fold path of penance and the same is found in Utrādhyaṇ and Darśāna Pāhuda also. The fourth limb of this path of purification is identified as penance (*tapa*). In Gītā we find *Jñānayoga*, *Karmayoga*, *Bhaktiyoga* along with *Dhyānayoga*. On similar lines we find Right belief-knowledge-conduct along with penance in Jain canonical texts. In middle ages / era, religious texts have included *Dhyānayoga* in *Karmayoga* and *tapa* in right conduct respectively. But in olden days *tapa* in Jains, *śamādhi* in Buddhist and *Dhyāna* in Gītā had independent discussions. Therefore we are discussing penance independently in a comparative situation.

#### 2.0. Nature of penance in Jain philosophy

Life of Jain *tīrthaṅkaras*, especially Mahāvīra, is an effective and true proof and representation on penance and its place in the path of spiritual purification. During 12.5 years of Mahāvīra's penance, he spent almost 11 years without food. The entire period of his penance is filled with self-study (*Svādhyāya*), contemplating on the self (*ātmacintana*), meditation and relaxation (*Kāyotsarga*). Hence his path of spiritual purification had been primarily based on penance. Objective of Jain path of purification is attaining Mokṣa or pure soul state. For this it is essential to dissociate the matter *karmas* bound with the soul. This process of dissociating *karmas* is called Nirjāra (dissociation). This dissociation can take place in two ways namely one with efforts and the other without effort (i.e. automatically). Penance belongs to the first category i.e. dissociating *karmas* from the soul with efforts.

Objective of penance is this only i.e. dissociating matter *karmas* bonded with the soul thereby making the soul shine in its pure splendour. Author of Rāja-Vārtika also says '*Karmadahanattapa*' i.e. destroying or extinguishing the *karmas* is called *tapa* (in Hindi *tapa* means to heat at high temperature).

##### 1.1. Types of *tapa*:

Utrādhyaṇ talks of two types of *tapa* '*tavo ya dūvihovūtto, bahirabhaṅtaro tapā*' i.e. *tapa* is of two types external & internal. External penance is based on the use of external entities and others can see it. This is why it is called external penance. Internal penance does not rely on external objects. It relates to the tendencies of the mind where the activities of mind are the primary cause. Only self (i.e. *tapasvi*) can experience it. Because it relies on the mind (called *anta' karaṇa*), it is called internal penance.

### 1.1.1 Six types of external penance.

**Anśana** or fasting: This is the first type of external penance. It implies giving up food. Based on time it is further classified as i. *Itvarika* or fasting for limited period of time ranging from one day to six months.

ii. *Yāvatkathika* i.e. fasting into death. *Bhatta pratyākhāna*, *līginī* and *Prāyogaman* are its sub types.

**Avamodarikā:** *Avam* means less and *Udara* means stomach. It means to eat less than what you crave for due to hunger. *Unodarikā* is its synonym. From material & psychic viewpoints, it is of two types. When we minimize the four passions i.e. anger, pride, deceit and greed, then it is called psychic (*Bhāva*)— *unodari*.

**Vrtisañkṣepa:** *Vṛtti* means livelihood, desires. Where we reduce desires or expectation, then it is called *Vrtisañkṣepa*. *Vrtisañkhyāna* & *bhikṣācaryā* are its synonyms.

**Rasaparityāga:** *Rasa* means fluids like milk, curd, butter, ghee etc and oily foods. Giving up such foods is called *Rasaparityāga*.

**Kāyakleśa:** Literally it means giving pains to the body. It implies developing detachment towards body through maintaining certain body postures (*āsana*) thereby having control of activities body & speech.

**Pratisañlīntā:** To exercise restraint over tendencies of mind and body. Here *prati* is taken to mean soul and *līntā* means to be engrossed / busy in i.e. to be busy in the nature of the soul.

### 1.1.2 Six types of internal penance.

**Prāyaścitta:** Repentance. Literal meaning of *Prāya* is demerit (*pāpa*) and *citta* means purification thereby giving the meaning to purify the soul of sins committed earlier.

**Vinaya:** Modesty. It enhances the softness of all eight types of *karmas*. *Vinaya* is classified as penance. Performing activities such as, to stand up, to fold hands, devotion to holy teachers and serve them are different forms of *vinaya*.

**Vaiyāvṛata:** To serve selflessly. Selfless service dissociates *karmas* and so is classified as penance. To dedicate & serve spiritual leaders & monks is *vaiyāvṛata*.

**Svādhyāya:** To study religious and spiritual texts. It enhances purity of mind.

**Dhyāna:** To concentrate all the activities of mind on an object.

**Vyasarga:** i.e. to leave something in a specific manner. It implies the process of dissociating attachment. It is of two types namely material and psychic (*bhāva*). Jain religious texts give detailed description of penance.

## 2.0. Penance in Baudha philosophy

In Buddhist path of purification, penance means the process of purifying the mind continuously. In fact *tapā* is taken as efforts only and accepts *tapā* is this from only. In *Mahāmañgalasutta*, Buddha says 'penance, celibacy, faith in the four truths (*āryasatyas*) and experiencing *nirvāṇa* are supreme auspicious. Buddha himself said 'I plant the seeds of faith/beliefs based on the doctrine and performing penance & purification'. According to this performing penance & fasting enhances the *kūśala dharmas* or auspicious attributes and inauspicious attributes are reduced. Therefore one must practice penance. This is the reason I am called a *Tapasvi*.'

After his own experience and review of other traditions, Buddha adopted the path of penance. He started his penance on the banks of river Urūvelā. He performed severe penance for six long years. During this period, he conquered hunger & thirst and then experimented different types of foods e.g. to eat just one grain, eat once a day, did not care for this body, exposed his body to cold in winter and heat in summer, different types of body postures. His body had thus become almost like a skeleton. Even after such a severe penance, he could not get himself enlightened. He therefore gave up this severe regime of penance and adopted what he called the middle path (*Madhya mārga*). Buddha's life during his journey to enlightenment is representation of penance. Still we find in Buddhist literature that He condemned strenuous physical torture to attain *nirvāṇa*. The implication of this statement is just condemnation of penance without acquiring proper knowledge i.e. he believed in practice based on knowledge acquired to attain *nirvāṇa*.

### 3.0. Penance in Pūrāṇa.

Vedas are the oldest literature of India. There we find the world being created by performing penance. It

appears that penance had been described in Vedas keeping the popular social traditions in mind. In Skandha Pūrāṇa, fasting is said to be the supreme form of penance for Brāhmaṇas. Fasting for more than six hours is prohibited for *sudras* as the labor class (*sūdra*) performs physical work and if they do not eat for long hours then be may not be able to work requesting in social unrest. In Pūrāṇa's, penance is said to be a means of getting rid of calamities. In Pūrāṇas, the concept of sin (*pāpa*) is influenced by Hindu religious texts. Acts like getting drunk and going to prostitutes can be repented upon by performing penance.

‘*Sūrāpa ’paradārī ca brhmā gūrūjalpaga’*,  
*Tapasā tarate savai sarvataścha vimūcyate’* Padmapurāṇa

We also find many stories in Pūrāṇa literature about individuals acquiring super natural powers by performing penance. In Mahābhārata we find stories about semi-detached householders (*vānatrasta*) who performed penance as described in Manuśmṛti. According to Manu, penance can be performed only by ‘*dwij*’ (—). For penance activities like restraint on taste, self-study, charity, compassion are included. In summer one should expose himself to five types of fires, in rainy seasons one should stay in the open, in winter one should wear scanty clothing, to slim the body and to make the body slim, to live on root vegetables, sleep nude on the floor, begging for food, wear old & torn clothes, friendship towards all and meditation are all considered as limbs of penance.

#### 4.0 Comparison

Indians have, by traditions, been opposed to bodily comforts and mental excitements. Śramaṇa traditions have been opponent of consumption doctrine. Worldly comforts are in fact considered as type of pain only. Mahāvīra's penance period had been 12 years and 13 fortnights Buddha's period of penance was six years only. Severe penance, severe tolerance to bodily unpleasantness and prolonged meditation are observed in the penance. In the beginning Buddha led his life like Mahāvīra only. Later he chose meditation as the method to acquire true knowledge.

Method & types of penance by both had been similar also. Mahāvīra used to eat dry rice, *urad-dal* while Buddha used to eat *tila* – *tandula* etc. After penance was completed, Buddha was invited also by a number of kings but he had neither desire for worldly things nor for enjoyment/consumption. Pains inflicted on them by human beings and heavenly beings are also found in their lives. In both traditions, the objective of monk's life is to end the cycle of transgression. For this celibacy is essential in both traditions. Celibacy is considered as a great form of penance. Cause of rebirth is *karma*. We experience pain and pleasure due to *karmas*. Penance eliminates inauspicious *karmas*. In Majjhima-Nikāya, Buddha clearly gives his concurrence to *karma* doctrine of *Nirgranthas* (Jains) that penance destroys inauspicious *karmas*. In Jains & Pūrāṇa traditions there are provisions of repentance of sins committed earlier by performing penance. In both traditions, extra importance is given for penance on special days & places.

#### 4.1. Contradictions

Jains consider penance necessary for dissociation of *karmas* from soul. But in Pūrāṇas we find that penance is performed to make some gods happy so that they can bestow special powers on the *tapasvi*. In Jain literature we do not find penance being performed to have son or wealth. In Pūrāṇas we find certain limits of penance by low cast people while Jains give equal opportunity to all to perform penance. Based on their doctrine of Śatjīvanikāya, Jains do not support penance of five types of fire. However in Jain traditions only humans & sub humans (*tiṛyaṅca*) can perform penance and the heavenly beings cannot. On the other hand Pūrāṇas even describe penance by Śiva and similar gods & goddesses.

Pandit Sūkhilal, in his book ‘Samadarśi Hari Bhadra, has described the development of the path of performing penance in four stages namely 1. *Avadhūta Sādhnā*. 2. *Tāpasa Sādhnā* 3. *Tapasvi Sādhnā* and 4. *Yoga Sādhnā*. In this sequence the penance progress from physical / body based to control over tendencies of the mind. Jainism represents the balance form of 3<sup>rd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> stages of above sequence while Buddhists & Pūrāṇa represent 4<sup>th</sup> stage only. Still they all are not drifting away from their main objective.

Dhūta-adhyana of Ācāraṅga of Jains, Visuddhimagga's Dhūtaniddesa & Gītā of Hindus all point to one focal objective. Sūkhilal writes further that Buddha had practiced the severe penance as given in Avadhūta Mārga (stage 1 above). However when he could not attain the supreme state even after severe penance then he favoured meditation and rejected the essentiality of bodily penance and preached the same. Perhaps this is a reaction of serious suppression

of body needs. Even though Buddha stressed Yoga Mārga and developed meditation procedures, still he did not vehemently oppose *Tapasyā Mārga*. His *bhikṣus* used to practice *Tapasyā Mārga* in the form of Dhūtaṅgavratā'. If we analyze & compare types & sub groupings of penance, then the following conclusions emerge. Whereas Jains accept fasting, Purāṇa also accepts fasting as form of penance. Even 'Unodari' is mentioned in them. Too much eating is forbidden for Buddhists *bhikṣus* and eating once a day is recommended. Reading Buddhists literature, one comes across many types of body postures, tolerating heat and cold but these are not so severe as mentioned in Jain literature. We do not find organized discussion on penance in Buddhists literature. Buddha in Majjhima-Nikāya has classified human beings in four categories namely. 1. Those involved in meditating on the self. This group does not include *tapasvis* who perform severe penance & give pain to themselves and not others. 2. This group involves those who use animals etc. as sacrifice. 3. Those who do not perform penance themselves and not involve others. 4. Those who perform penance themselves and involve other also in it e.g. penance with sacrifice. Buddha was a proponent of middle path and preached penance on the basis of third alternative i.e. no pain for self and others. Jains recommend first and fourth types of penance as purifying one self improves the lot of others also. Hence they recommended the first group of penance and the third is the middle or soft-option. Jains do not accept II<sup>nd</sup> & III<sup>rd</sup> groups neither on moral nor spiritual grounds.

This way comparative study of penance in Jain, Buddhists and Purāṇa literature brings out the following points.

1. Buddhists are follows of middle path. They forbid excessive penance in any form.
2. Pūrāṇa talk of penance to acquire special super natural worldly powers.
3. All traditions talk of mental, physical & vocal restraints.
4. Buddhists lay maximum stress on mental penance.
5. All traditions emphasis self-restraint (*Saḥyama*) for penance.
6. *Aparigraha* and *Ahiṃsā* are the essential pre-requesting of penance.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Describe the similarities and differences in the concept of penance in Jain, Buddhist and Purāṇa traditions?

#### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain clearly and briefly the six types of external penance?
2. What is the nature of penance in Purāṇas?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

- i. What is the fourth limb of path of purification?
- ii. How long period was Mahāvīra's penance?
- iii. What is the objective of Jain path of purification?
- iv. Give the two types of penance as given in Uttarādhyayan?
- v. What is penance as per Buddhism?
- vi. what are the four auspicious (*mangala*) as per Buddhism?
- vii. For how is a *Sudra* allowed to fast /penance?
- viii. What is the objective for which Jains consider penance as right?
- ix. How does Rājavārtika define penance?
- x. Write any three names of internal dissociation (*nirjarā*)?

**Answers :** 1. Right penance 2. 12.5 years 3. Mokṣa or attaining pure soul state 4. External and internal 5. Continuous effort to purify the mind 6. *Tapa*, *bṛhamacarya*, belief in four *ārya satya* and experience *nirvāṇa* 7. six hours 8. *nirjarā* 9. *karmadahanāttapa*

#### Reference texts:

- |                                     |                        |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| i. Jain Sadhana paddati me tapoyoga | ii. Jain Acāra Mīmāṃsā |
| iii. Purana Vusayamukramanikā       | iv. Majjhima Nikaāya   |

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## Unit 3: Lesson 9

### Nature of vows /*vrata* in Jain, Baudha and Yoga.

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study the following topics.

#### 0.0 Introduction

#### 1.0 Meaning of vows /*vrata*

##### 1.1 Types of *vrata*

#### 2.0 Types of vows in Jain canonical texts

2.1 *Ahiṃsāvratā* or non-violence

2.2 *atyavratā* or speaking the truth

2.3 *Asteyavratā* or non-stealing

2.4 *Bṛhamacaryavratā* or celibacy

2.5 *Aparigrahavratā* or Non-possession.

#### 3.0 Nature of vows in Baudha philosophy

#### 4.0 Comparative analysis between Jain and Baudha philosophies.

#### 5.0 Nature of vows in Yoga philosophy.

5.1 *Ahiṃsā*

5.2 *Satya*

5.3 *Asteya*

5.4 *Bṛhamacarya*

5.5 *Aparigraha*

#### 6.0 Similarities between Jain and Yoga philosophies

#### 7.0 Conclusions

### 0.0 Introduction

Metaphysical thinkers of India have deeply analyzed the superiority, and the means to retain and improve such values, of the human existence. They to express the extreme difficulties of getting born as human beings had used 'Dullaha Khalū māṇuse bhavē'. To live and enhance the process of attaining supreme status of existence they have stressed extreme importance to the practice of vows (*Vrata*) and rules (*niyama*) Vows not only solve the spiritual problems but solves personal, social and national problem also. Today all problems of terrorism, corruption and immorality exist due to non-practice of vows by masses. A person not practicing the vows is like a river without the barrages / docks which can create catastrophe any time.

To exercise restraint on the wandering nature of mind, vows are the only effective reins. Lack of vows does not resolve problems likely to crop up in future also. Importance of vows is described equally in all religious traditions. Vows are called *vrata* by Jains; *Śīla* by Buddhists and *Yama* by Yoga philosophies respectively.

### 1.0 Meaning of Vow

*Vrata* means to accept limits in our life at our own sweet will. In other words *vrata* means restraint on desires or promising to be honest in life, i.e. mental promise / determination to perform or not perform certain activities. According to Ācārya Umā Svāti giving up the ill / wrong tendencies is *vrata*. To give up *hiṃsā*, speaking lies, stealing, adultery in sexual relations and possession are *vratas*.

#### 1.1. Types of *Vratas*

Capacity to observe spiritual purification practices can be different for different people. In such a situation we cannot lay down uniform code of practicing *vratas*. A monk, for example practices *Ahiṃsā* without any deviation / flaws but a householder practices *Ahiṃsā* with certain exceptions. Hence different classes practicing these vows have been defined for different categories of people as per their capabilities and wishes. In Jain philosophy, based on their practice, vows have been classified in two categories namely *Mahāvratā* (major vows) and *Aṇuvratas* (minor vows).



- Accepting vows without any limits / deviations are called *Mahāvratas*. Accepting the same vows with certain limits/exceptions are called *Anūvratas*.
- According to Ācārya Umā Svāti, total / complete practice of vows in *Mahāvratas*, partial practice is *Anūvrata*. Those who cannot become monks, for them the path of householders (*āgāra*) is open for practice. There are twelve vows for householders namely 1. *Ahiṃsā*, 2. *Satya* (truthfulness) 3. *Asteya* (Non stealing) 4. Celibacy (*bṛhmacarya*), non-possession (*aparigraha*), 6. *Digvrata* (directional restraints), 7. Limiting consumption & ownership of consumables and durables (*bhogopabhoga parimāṇa*), 8. Avoiding wasteful activities (*anarthadanda vrata*) 9. Equanimity (*Sāmāyika*) 10. Limiting movement to specific places (*Deśavakāśika*) 11. Fasting on specific days (*Posādhopavāsa*) 12. *Yathāsaṃ Vibhaga*. These are further grouped as *Anūvratas* (1-5) and *Śikṣāvratas* (6-12) as described in *Upasakadaśaṅga*. Elsewhere the 12 vows are grouped in three categories namely *Anūvratas* (1-5), *Gūṇāvratas* (6-8) and *Śikṣā vratas* (9-12).

Jain philosophy allows householders to practice vows like the monks but the householders practice only partially or within certain limitations /boundaries. Therefore vows accepted by them are called *anūvrata*. But the monks are not allowed partial practice only i.e. they are asked to practice completely the vows as given in Jain religious texts. Therefore their vows are called *mahāvratas*.

The name of the five vows in both categories i.e. *anūvratas* and *mahāvratas* are same i.e. 1. *Ahiṃsā*, 2. *Satya*(truthfulness) 3. *Asteya*(Non-stealing) 4. Celibacy(*bṛhmacarya*), non-possession (*aparigraha*), but there is a big difference in their practice by each category. In *anūvratas* these five vows are practiced partially as per the capabilities of the practitioner.

The types and nature of vows are described in a lucid and detailed manner in Jain literature and such description cannot be found anywhere else. Therefore we shall first review these vows in the context of Jain philosophy

## 2.1 Types vows as per Jain canonical literature.

### 2.1. *Ahiṃsāvratas* (Vow of non violence)

*Ahiṃsā* is the ultimate concept on which the entire Jain ethics and path of spiritual purification is based on. Ācāraṅga sutra says: ‘Do not cause any pain, kill any living being or existent entity. According to *Sutrakṛatāṅga* the essence of being an intellectual is not to kill or cause pain to any body. To understand *Ahiṃsā*, we must first know *hiṃsā*. In *Tattvāratha* sutra, Ācārya Umā Svāti says ‘*Pramattayogāt prāṇa vyaparopāṇaḥ hiṃsā*’ i.e. careless activities resulting in pain or killing living beings is *hiṃsā* or activities of mind, body and speech performed carelessly is *hiṃsā*. To understand the subtle nature of *hiṃsā* Jainācāryas have classified *hiṃsā* in three categories.

#### 2.1.0. Three forms / groups of *hiṃsā*

- Sanḥkalpajā* i.e. intentional or with a firm and preplanned purpose.
- Virodhajā* i.e. *hiṃsā* committed while protecting the country against wars/ attacks by enemies.
- Ārambhajā* i.e. *hiṃsā* committed during the ordinary course of life for earning livelihood, food etc.

We find extremely detailed discussion on *Ahiṃsā* in Jain religious texts. Jain religion shows the importance of *Ahiṃsā* in all activities, be they walking, speaking sleeping, eating etc.

A Jain monk practices *Ahiṃsā* 100% i.e. completely. He does not commit *hiṃsā* of any living being by activities of mind, body and speech, does not ask others to do so and also does not support & admire those who commit violence. Detailed discussion on this can be found in 10<sup>th</sup> chapter of *Daśaveḷiyāṇī*. But a householder cannot observe *Ahiṃsā* completely like a monk. This is so as his familial and other worldly activities cannot be performed without *hiṃsā* of any type. Hence he gives up unnecessary *hiṃsā* i.e. he practices the path of minimizing *hiṃsā* and gives up acts of intentional killing while walking and doing other activities. He does not kill intentionally innocent animals or others types of living-beings, which is the minimum limit of *Ahiṃsā*. If we enhance the doctrine of *Ahiṃsā anūvrata* to universal coverage then the problems of terrorism will automatically disappear. This is so as killing of innocent people is just prohibited. While practicing *Ahiṃsā*, the householder has to be cautious against indulging in the five flaws of *Ahiṃsā anūvrata*.

- i. *Vadha* i.e. beating the animals with stick, leash etc.
- ii. *Bandhana* i.e. to tie the animals with a rope or to keep them in cages or not allowing them to go to their desired places.
- iii. *Aṅgabhaṅga*: i.e. take skin off or Pierce/cut nose, ear lobes etc of animals.
- iv. *Atibhāra*: i.e. to overload or make than work beyond their capacity
- v. *Bhojana pāni kā virodha*: i.e. to obstruct (or not give) availability of water, food or livelihood to dependent living beings.

## 2.2. *Satya – Vrata*:

Ācārya Umā Svāti describe *satya* or speaking the truth as '*Asadabhidhānamanṛtanam*' here *asadabhidhāna* has three meanings.

- i. *asat* i.e. to say those things that are not said.
- ii. To distort talks of other in their representation to others.
- iii. To speak to others with ill intention.

Not to say about anything as they actually are, is lie-ing (*asatya*). Exactly opposite of this is defined as *satya* in Jain Sidhānta Dīpikā '*Sadbhāvodbhavanam Satyam*' i.e. *satya* is to speak or present a thing as it is. *Satya* is of four types:

1. *Kāya ṛjūtā* i.e. bodily tendencies / activities to express the truth or an entity as it is
2. *Bhāṣā ṛjūtā* i.e. vocal/speech tendencies/activities to express the truth or an entity as it is.
3. *Bhāva ṛjūtā* i.e. mental tendencies / activities to express the truth or an entity as it is.
4. *Avisaivādanayoga*: to maintain identity in speech and action.

This vow is primarily concerned with the use of words and speech. A monk gives up completely telling lies i.e. he is required to speak the truth only. Therefore he cannot speak lies under any circumstances. Further he cannot also speak the truth which is painful to the listener or others e.g. he cannot tell a person sick when he is ill, cannot call a blind man as blind etc. seventh chapter on pure speech in Daśavaikālika details these concepts.

Unlike a monk, a householder cannot always speak the truth due to his familial, social and political responsibilities. So he cannot practice this vow of truth at the doctrinal levels; however he gives up speaking blatant lies. A householder practicing this vow will not call anybody as wrong without solid proof of his being so. He will not speak unpleasant lies about any one under the influence of anger, greed, fear or fun. He will not divulge secrets of others. Similarly he will neither misguide anyone nor be a false witness to anyone. He will neither falsify documents nor write wrong things about anyone. For many reasons, a person tells, lies. Upāsakadaśāṅga talks of five such types of reasons when a practicing householder lies. These are

1. Give wrong information about his daughter for marriage
2. Give wrong information about his cows.
3. Give wrong information about his properties.
4. Give wrong information about things pledged to him.
5. Give wrong information as witness.

### 2.2.0 Flaws in not speaking lies

Even with utmost caution, a householder is likely to make the following five mistakes while practicing this vow.

- i. *Sahasābhyākhyāna* i.e. Spontaneously blaming some one without thinking.
- ii. *Rahasyabhyākhyāna* i.e. Divulge secret of others.
- iii. *Svadāra mantrabheda* i.e. to divulge confidential conversation between him and his wife.
- iv. *Mithyā-upadeśa*: Misguide others by fair or foul means. To advice others for practicing corruption, use faulty measures, tell lies etc.
- v. *Kuṭalekha karaṇa*: Prepare forged documents or signatures.

A householder should be aware of these flaws while practicing this vow of speaking the truth.

## 2.3. *Asteya vrata* Non – stealing

To accept or take things that are not given by their owners is stealing. Opposite of this i.e. not to accept or take

things that are not given by their owners is 'asteya' or non-stealing. In Daśavaikālika it is said, 'A monk cannot take even a tree branch (twig) to clean his teeth without the permission of the gardener or owner of the tree'. This is so as the monk is required to practice total non-stealing vow. However a householder cannot practice total vow of non-stealing due to his involvement in worldly activities. Therefore under this vow he will not be involved in dacoit, breaking the lock or force enter a premises to take things, snatching or use force to take things away or property at all.

### 2.3.0. Flaws of *asteya vrata*

While practicing this vow, it is likely that at times due to carelessness or laziness he is likely to make mistakes, called *aticāras*. In Upāsakadasāṅga these are described as five flaws.

- i. *Stenāhrta*: i.e. to buy stolen goods or to have the mentality of a thief.
- ii. *Taskaraprayoga*: To hire people for stealing, smuggling or to admire and encourage others to do so.
- iii. *Virudharājyātikrama*: To misuse laws of the land or to smuggle in and out things from the country / state or not to pay taxes to government properly or do other illegal activities.
- iv. *Kuṭa-tulā –kuṭa-māpa*: Use false measures for weighing and metering. This is also a type of stealing.
- v. *Tatpratirūpaka vyavahāra*: Adulteration of commodities. To sell bad things by design as good ones. If traders do not indulge in this practice, then many ills engulfing this country can be eliminated.

### 2.4. *Bṛāhmacarya* or celibacy

Gūrudeva Tulsī has defined celibacy in Jain Sidhānta Dīpikā as follows. "*Indriyadamana' sahyamo bṛāhmacarya*" i.e. *bṛāhmacarya* is exercising restraint on the tendencies of mind and body.

*Bṛāhmacarya* is the ornament of human life; king of all vows and is described, as internal energy which when activated is so potent that all powers of the world bow to it. Further even the gods' bow to its practitioner. To practice Mokṣa Mārga, practice of celibacy is considered essential. A monk has to observe celibacy completely. But a householders living with his family will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to practice complete celibacy. Therefore for him the concept of *svadārasantoṣa* i.e. limiting (feeling contented) sex with his married wife is extremely important. This helps in channeling his entire sexual tendencies in one person only. Thus the householder takes a vow of having sex only with his wife and nobody else.

*Bṛāhmacarya vrata* is an easy method of self-purification and is the training for protection against extra marital sex related problems. The practitioner of this vow makes special effort to develop restraints over sensual indulgence. We can consider this vow as the foundation of family life. Therefore it is essential for every householder to know the five flaws associated with this vow but should not practice.

#### 2.4.0. Flaws of *Svadāra Santoṣa vrata*:

- i. *Etavarika parigrahitāgaman*: i.e. to have sex with opposite sex by paying money or with kept or maid servants. This implies considering other women, who is not your wife, as your wife and have sex with her.
- ii. *Aparigrahitāgaman*: *Aparigrahitā* means one who is not owned by anyone i.e. prostitute. Thus to have sex with prostitute. Some *ācāryas* even consider unmarried girls as *aparigrahita*.
- iii. *Anaṅgakriḍā*: To enjoy sex with organs not meant for sex e.g. hand, mouth, anus etc.
- iv. *Paravivāha Karaṇa*: to arrange marriage of own children is permitted in this 4<sup>th</sup> vow. However, thinking of doing a holy act, indulgence in arranging marriages of others is considered as a flaw of this vow.
- v. *Kāma bhoga tivra abhilāṣā*: Lust i.e. having intense urge for sex or to use medicines to enhance sexual performance are considered flaw of this vow and prohibited for the practitioner.

### 2.5. *Aparigraha Vrata*:

According to Jain canonical texts, real meaning of *pārigraha* is not possession/ ownership of worldly objects but it refers predominately to mental and physical infatuations and obsession. Tattvārtha Sutra also calls infatuation or obsession as *parigraha*. According to Gurudeva Tulsī also feeling of mine and ego are both *parigraha*. Hence all objects associated with infatuation or obsessions are *parigraha*. Defining *Aparigraha* in Jain Sidhānta Dīpikā it is said '*Mamatva visarjanaṁ aparigraha*' i.e. giving up attachment / feeling of mine or limiting the desires is *aparigraha vrata*.

Practitioner of *aparigraha vrata* not only restraints his earning, possessions and their consumption but he also limits/ protects himself from developing ego and obsession towards them.

This vow is important in and that way also. In this world gold, silver, Diamonds, emeralds, pearls, land, food, cloths etc and all other objects are limited only. When one person acquires them too much the economic imbalances result. *Aparigraha vrata* resolves this problem. It groups these in two classes namely external and internal.

### 2.5.0. External possessions

There are nine types of external possessions.

- i. *Kṣetra* or farm, fertile land
- ii. *Vāstū* or house, shop, godown, guesthouse, bungalow etc.
- iii. *Hiranya* i.e. ornaments and utensils etc. of silver
- iv. *Sūvarṇa* i.e. ornaments and utensils etc. of gold
- v. *Dhana* i.e. food, wheat, rice etc.
- vi. *Dvipada* i.e. living beings with too legs like maids, servants etc.
- vii. *Catuspāda* i.e. animals like horses, cows, donkeys etc.
- viii. *Kūpya* or *gopya* i.e. household effects other than gold & silver.

### 2.5.1. Internal possession

These are of fourteen types namely i. Perverted belief (*mithyātva*), 2. Anger 3. Pride 4. Deceit, 5. Greed, 6. Joking, 7. involvement (*rati*), 8. Laziness (*arati*), 9. fear, 10. Grief, 11. Jūgupsā, 12. female sex, 13 Male sex, 14. Neutral sex

A monk gives up completely all internal and external possessions. Daśavaikālika sutra says 'A monk has to give up all types of possessions, be they little or big, be they sentient or insentient (*Acita*). Hence the monk gives up all possessions by mind, body & speech himself, or asking others to do so or admiring those who have possessions. He puts a limit on essential things to live and gives up the ownership or consumption of the rest. Only limiting the urge to acquire can eliminate world's economic imbalances i.e. rich & poor & possession Bhagavāna Mahāvīra never said that a householder should not acquire possessions or should become *aparigrahi*. His own disciples owned possessions worth crores of rupees. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra said, 'Limit your desires and give up obsession'.

To limit the desires is the fifth vow or *anuvrata*. It resolves most of economic problems. For the householders three principles are indicated for acquiring possessions.

- i. Morality in earning. Do not use immoral means to earn
- ii. Limit the earning. To quit earning after reaching a present limit.
- iii. Restraint on the consumption of earned possessions.

### 2.5.2. Flaws of *aparigraha vrata*

Practice of *aparigraha* for householders may involve five flaws.

- i. To break the limit of owning farm, house etc.
- ii. To break the limit of owning gold, silver etc.
- iii. To break the limit of owning money & food item.
- iv. To break the limits set for owning maids, servant, animals, birds etc.
- v. To break the limits set for owning maids of householders affects

By adopting & practicing *aparigraha vrata*, life can become simple, peaceful and friendly to all.

## 3.0 Nature of vows in Baudha philosophy

Bhagavāna Buddha preached five *śīlas* instead of five *vratas*. The only difference is that his fifth *śīla* is non-consumption of toxic substance while Jains talk of *aparigraha* as the fifth vow. It appears that not enough importance is given to set limits on possessions for householders in Buddhist tradition as it is in Jainism, even though a number of sermons by Buddha point towards pains caused by desiring or acquiring possessions like land, home, gold & silver, cows, horses, maids etc.

Such a person is compared to a broken boat in a river, which is destined to be drowned. Giving up consumption of toxic substances in Buddhists tradition is also included in Jain path of purification. But there is no separate vow for it in Jainism. In fact this vow is indicated as one of the basic virtues (8 *mulagūnas*) of Jains even prior to accepting the vows. Giving up toxic substances can also be seen as included in the seventh vow of Jains (*Bhoga-upbhoga*). If we see the vows from Buddhists traditions viewpoint, then we find mention of 8 *śīla* instead of 12 vows for conduct for *bhikṣus*. These are giving up violence, stealing, adultery in sexual relation, telling lies, consumption of toxic substances, food consumption at night & unsuitable times, using garlands and perfumes, sleeping on soft or high beds and additional vows for *bhikṣus*. The second vow of Jains i.e. not telling lies is found as the fourth *śīla* in Buddhists tradition. *Bhikṣus śīla* are identified as 10 in Buddha tradition, which are comparable to *mahāvratas* of Jains. These are

1. Nonviolence, 2. Nonstealing, celibacy, speaking the truth 5. Not consuming toxic substances 6. Not eating at improper time, 7. Not singing /dancing 8. Not using garlands, body massage and perfumes, 9. Not using high and large beds and 10. *Jāta rūpa ragata grahaṇe viramaṇa*.
2. In a comparative analysis we find that the first six *śīlas* are included in five *mahāvratas* of Jains directly while the remaining four are not directly specified in them by Jains. Further there is not only textual similarity in *bhikṣuśīlas* and *mahāvratas*, but more important is the similarity in intentions. Like Jains, Buddha philosophers have delved deeply on this subject. Tathāgata Buddha had preached the regime of five *śīlas* for books householders & *bhikṣus* primarily.

### 3.1 *Prāṇātipātā viramaṇa (Ahiṃsā):*

Buddha religion forbids violence for *bhikṣus*. Not only this, Buddha religion prohibits violence by acts of mind, body & speech of self, asking others to do or supporting those who are violent. In Vinaya Piṭaka it is said 'Plucking leaves, prints etc. from trees & plants and digging earth are even forbidden for *bhikṣus* as there is a possibility of killing living beings in such acts'. Buddhists, unlike Jains, do not accept that living beings live in them. Therefore Buddha *bhikṣus* are not forbidden from drinking water (being a living being as per Jains) but they are asked to strain water before drinking.

### 3.2. *Addattādāna viramaṇa (Non stealing)*

Both Jain & Buddhists traditions accept that no one should take things without the permissions of their owners. A *bhikṣu* also begs essential things needed for his life. Not only one is forbidden to take things owned by some one, Buddha even forbids not accepting any thing in towns or forests whose owners are not well identified. According to Vinaya Piṭaka, a *bhikṣu*, who takes things on his own and not as alms, outcasts himself from the *Śramaṇa bhikṣu* 's career. Saṅgīyutta Nikāya says that even a *bhikṣu* who smells a flower is liable to be clubbed as stealing and breaking this *śīla*.

### 3.3. *Abramacarya viramaṇa:*

Buddhist ethics also enforce complete celibacy to the practiced by its male and female *bhikṣus*. Here also sex is permitted to the householder with his married wife only. Vinaya Piṭaka even forbids the touch of a woman for a *bhikṣu*.

### 3.4. *Mṛṣāvāda:*

Like Jainism, Buddhists also forbids its *bhikṣus* telling lies. A *bhikṣu* should not only tell lies himself, he should even not ask permit others to tell lies. Buddhism expects its *bhikṣus* to be speaking the truth only. He should not tell lies. Not backbite, not use deceptive language. Buddha says that a harmful truth also should not be said, but a truth which is unpleasant should be spoken in a language / manner beneficial to the listener. Dirgha – nikāya says that *bhikṣus* should not lie and he should always use proper and meaningful words. *Bhikṣus* is also forbidden from speaking the language suitable for home/ householders. *Bhikṣus* should always avoid harsh language and use sweet and humble words interact.

### 3.5. *Surāmeraya madhya viramaṇa:*

Consumption of all toxicants like alcohol etc are forbidden for *bhikṣus* as well as householders. This is so in Jain traditions also.

### 3.6. *Vikāla bhojana viramaṇa:*

For bhikṣus eating at night and non-specified times is prohibited. In Majjhima Nikāya, Buddha says” O Bhikṣu! I gave up eating at night. By doing so my body became better and a number of diseases disappeared. I felt more energetic and felt peace & tranquility. Therefore O Bhikṣus! You also practice this”. In Buddha traditions, eating after 12:00 PM in the day till sunrise the next day is prohibited for *bhikṣus* as this is considered unsuitable period to eat.

### 4.0 Comparison between Jain & Buddhist traditions

*Aparigraha* and limiting directional monuments in Jainism is not traceable in Buddhism. *Sāmāyika vrata* of Jains can be considered similar to be included in *Samādhi* of Buddhism even though it is not found as an independent *śīla*. Deśavakāsika of Jains in Uposatha of Buddhism and ban on consumption of toxicants, in Buddhism with *bhogopabbhoga vrata* of Jainism can be considered as including each other's vows. On the other hand *Vikāla bhojana* and not using garlands perfumes & beds (high & soft) being parts of Uposatha can be compared to Poṣatha of Jains. Jain thinkers talk of five *anūvratas* for householder and Buddhists talk of five *śīlas* for them. But the difference is that Buddhists make the five *śīlas* same for *bhikṣus* & householders i.e. these have not been relaxed keeping in view the needs of householders; for example in Suttanipāta, while details the duties for householders, there are forbidden to kill both mobile & immobile living beings when it is not possible for householders to abstain from killing immobile living beings.

Jain thinking therefore modified the five *śīlas* of *bhikṣus* as *anūvratas* for householders so that they can rightly & dutifully practiced. Taking the vows to practice *anūvratas* by Jains, the householders are generally expected to observe them by activities of their mind, body & speech or getting than observed by others activities of mind, body & speech i.e. in six ways only. In Buddhism, the same have to be observed through nine fold activities i.e. six indicated above plus three of supporting or admiring others not observing the *anūvrata* by activities of mind body & speech as indicated in Sutra-Nipāta for *hiṃsā*, telling lies & stealing avoidance vows. There it is just said that if it not possible to practice total celibacy then one should not have sex with women other than his wife.

From time perspective, 5 *anūvratas* & 3 *gūnavratas* are to be observed throughout the life. This is authenticated by sutras written for them. Buddhism also expects its followers to do so. The remaining three-called Uposatha *śīla*, like *Śikṣā vratas* of Jains, are observed for a special time only. We thus see lot of similarities in vows made a part of ethical practices by Jains & Buddhists.

### 5.0 Nature of *vrata* in Yoga philosophy

Jains call 5 *anūvratas* and 5 *mahāvratas* as their principle vows; Yoga Darśana calls them as *pañcā yama*. Yoga Darśana gives the same emphasis to *Yamas* as Jains give to 5 *anūvratas* and 5 *mahāvratas*. We find description of five *yamas* in Pātañjala Yoga Darśana. Mahṛṣi Pātañjala says “*Ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrāmacārya parigrahāyamā*”. i.e. *Ahiṃsā*, *Satya*, *Asteya*, *Brāmacārya* & *Aparigraha* are the five *yamas*. Meaning of *yama* is absence / nonexistence implying abstaining from violence, telling lies, stealing, adultery in sexual relations and having possessions are five *yamas*. Restraining activities of mind, body & speech is also called *yama*. It is of five types.

#### 5.1. *Ahiṃsā:*

To give / inflict mental, physical or speech pains to others by the activities of our mind, body and speech and tainted with anger, pride, greed, delusion or fear is *hiṃsā*. Opposite of *hiṃsā* is *ahiṃsā*. *Ahiṃsā* is the foundation all *yamas* & *niyamas*. Other *yamas* & *niyamas* are indicated only to make the practitioner *ahiṃsaka*.

By becoming a true *Ahiṃsāka*, the practitioner achieves many benefits ‘*Ahiṃsāpratiṣṭhāyāṇ tatsaṃnidhau vairatyagati*’ i.e. a person, whose mental tendencies become *ahiṃsaka*, has no enemies or opponents. Practice of *Ahiṃsā* vow enhances spiritual powers due to which even *hiṃsakas* become *ahiṃsakas*. The entire world becomes one i.e. *Vasudhaivakūṭūmbakam* becomes true and the practitioner has friendly, amicable, compassionate relation with all.

#### 5.2. *Satya:*

Right knowledge of an entity is the truth only. To use this truth for the body is body truth, to use speech faculty for truth is *vāṇī satya* and to use it for mental activities is *mana – satya*. Truth is to speak the right / reality of an entity

at that time. While explaining truth, Vyas Ji says 'As seen or inferred or heard, to speak exactly the same or to retain in the mind is truth & it should not be harmful or hurt anybody. Manū says '*Satyaṁ bruyāt na bruyāt satya na priyam*' i.e. speak the truth & pleasant. Do not speak the truth which is unpleasant.

### 5.2.0 Benefits of speaking the truth

Pāṇtanjala Yoga Pradīpa says '*Satya pratiṣṭhāyān kriyāfa iāśraya tvama*' i.e. one, who has complete faith in truth, will never speak untruth / lie because he has the right knowledge. Activities of his speech faculty are based on the welfare of all i.e. whatever he says become a reality. Power of truth makes his mind so pure & clean that his speech faculty only produces what is real and is going to happen i.e. it will indeed happen.

### 5.3 Asteya

To take away possessions like wealth, household effect or rights of anybody forcefully is called *Asteya* or stealing. Accepting bribes by officials, charging excessive profits or weighing less while selling and more while buying or mixing the inferior substitutes with superior things by shop keepers or taking anything without the permission of their owners is stealing. To give up all such activities is *Asteya*.

Maharṣi Patañjali says '*Asteya pratiṣṭhāyāna*' *sarvaratno paśthanam* i.e. complete practice of *Asteya* results in being blessed with all the jewels. In other words when a person develops complete faith in *Asteya*, then all types of wealth adore him by being with him. He is never short of anything. He feels contented in his own belongings & earnings.

### 5.4 Brāhmacarya:

It does not mean just exercising restraint over sexual organs but it implies restraint on all sensual organs. It is the supreme penance. It has very high prestige and importance. Nothing is impossible for a celibate person. Hence it is said '*brāhmacarya pratiṣṭhāyān vīrya lābha*' i.e. by being true *brāhmacārī*, one attains supreme energies (*Vīrya*). *Vīrya* is the foundation of all types of energies. By being celibate, the body does not become weak. Basic elements of body do not ooze out and that energy is canalized by the practitioner to achieve his objectives. All vocal, physical & mental energies are dependent on practicing *brāhmacarya*.

### 5.5 Aparigraha

Yoga Darśana does not consider *aparigraha* as just abstaining from acquiring and owning possessions only. But it considers to be without infatuation, attachment towards anything or not to possess excessive material wealth as *aparigraha*. Material wealth is an obstacle in practicing yoga. Majority of people become corrupt by having excessive possessions. Therefore it is essential to exercise restraint on them. Maharṣi Patañjali in Patañjali Yoga darśana says '*Aparigraha sthāitya janma kathanta sambodha*' i.e. an *aparigrahi* purifies his mind and is able to acquire the true knowledge of the self. He can know the past, present and future i.e. knowledge what we were in our past lives & what we will be in our future lives.

### 6.0. Similarities of vows in Jain & Yoga philosophies

Like the five *maṁhāvratas* in Jainism, the five *yamas* are accepted in Yoga darśana. Patañjali *Yoga sutra* describes these five *yamas*. *Ahiṁsā satyā steya brāhmacarya aparigraha* 'yama'. i.e. *ahiṁsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brāhmacarya* and *aparigraha* are said as *yama* and *maṁhāvratas*. As per Patañjali Yoga Sutra, a person who is free from the limitations of caste, time, and place and is able to practice these vows in all states is *maṁhāvratas* or *yama*. According to Vedic traditions, a *śaṁyāsī* should practice absolute non-violence. Both types of *hiṁsā* i.e. of mobile and immobile living beings is prohibited for a *śaṁyāsī*. Similarly telling lies, stealing, sex and possessions of any type are forbidden for him.

Both Jain & Yoga traditions prohibit *hiṁsā* of mobile & immobile living beings to be *Ahiṁsaka*. Yoga darśana has delved deeply in analyzing and describing *satya maṁhāvratas*. From Vedic view point, speaking pleasant truth is described. As per *Mahābhārata*, it is good to speak truth but it is still better to speak the truth that is beneficial to all. Jain canonical texts also make similar statements. Both traditions prohibit accepting or taking things without the permission of their owners. For *Brāhmacarya* also, the eight limbs of acceptable sexual intercourse and the nine boundaries of *brāhmacarya* in Jainism are very similar. Jain & yoga philosophies both emphasize the principle of

non-obsession equally but there is some differences in their practice. As per Jain philosophy it is essential to eliminate obsession to be *aparigrahi* but Yoga darśana does not believe so. In this way we find a lot of similarities in the descriptions of *vratas* in both Jain & Yoga philosophies.

## 7.0. Conclusion

In conclusion we can say that the doctrine of vows is not only religious tradition but is the practice to cherish and protect human and culture values.

All the vows i.e. *ahiṃsā*, *satya* etc. are not meant for specific groups of people in specific places, ages or times but they are all pervading i.e. they are not restricted to limitations of cast, creed, country, condition or age but are useful and to be practiced at all times by all at all places.

Pointing towards this, Maṅgla Patañjali says 'Jāt deśa kāla samayā navachinā' Sārvabhanmā mahāvratam'. It is because of such benefits of *vratas* that they are discussed and emphasized in all religious traditions.

In the present context we see that all the three traditions namely Jain, Baudha & Yoga emphasize *vratas*. Jains prohibit *hiṃsā* by self or asking others to do so or admire & support those who practice *hiṃsā*. Same is the case with Buddhists also. Yogācāra goes even further and makes practice of *Ahiṃsā* for all ages, times, places & people essential.

Like Jain traditions, in Buddhist and Yoga traditions also the monk is forbidden to speak lies. All traditions say 'speak the truth which is pleasant and beneficial to all, even though Baudha permit speaking both pleasant and unpleasant truths.

*Asteya* appears to be similar in all three traditions. All of them forbid taking or accepting things without the permission of their owners.

Jain and Buddhist monks are required to practice total celibacy. Similarly Yoga darśana also requires its practice at all times as it generate infinite energy (*Vīrya*) is the practitioners.

However importance to *aparigraha* given by Jains is not visible in Buddhist tradition. This is so even though many sermons of Buddha himself point towards *aparigraha*. Yoga darśana called infatuation and obsession as *parigraha* as found in Jain canonical texts also. In this way we find lot of similarities in definition & practice of *vratas* in all the three traditions.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Defining *vrata*, explain the nature of vows in Jain, Baudha and Yoga philosophies?

### Short notes type questions:

1. Define *Ahiṃsā vrata* and highlight its transgressions /flaws?
2. How many types of *śūla* (*vrata*) are identified for *bhikṣūs* in Baudha philosophy and their similarities with the five *mahāvratas*?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. How many classes of *vratas* are defined in Jain philosophy based on the capabilities of the practitioner?
2. a. four b. two c. five d. seven
3. What is the *vrata* called when practiced with limitations?
4. a. *mahāvratā* b. *vratāvrata* c. *aṅgavratā* d. *śūlavratā*
5. Number of *vratas* for householder are?
6. a. ten b. eight c. twelve d. thirteen
7. Vows accepted by monks are called?
8. a. *deśavratā* b. *sarvavratā* c. *mahāvratā* d. *gūṇavratā*



9. In which text do we find detailed discussion on non-violence?
10. a. Bhagavati b. Jñātādharma-kathā c. Utrādhyaṇa d. Daśaveliyā
11. How many types of truth are there?
12. a. four b. five c. seven d. eight
13. What is the restraint of mind and body called?
14. a. aparigraha b. brhamcarya c. Ahiṃsā d. satya
15. What are flaws due of non-observation of vratas due to laziness or ignorance called?
16. a. sūvrat b. aticāra c. dharmādharma d. vrata
17. Types of external parigraha are?
18. a. seven b. nine c. fourteen d. eight
19. What are vratas similar to mahāvratas in Yoga philosophy called?
20. a. niyama b. yama c. sādhanā d. prāṇāyāma

**Answers :** 1. b. two 2. c. aṇūvrata 3. c. twelve 4. c. mahāvratas 5. d. Daśaveliyā 6. a. four  
7. b. brhamacarya 8. b. aticāra 9. b. 9 10. yama

**1. Reference texts:**

2. *Jivajīva*
3. *Patanjal Yoga Pradīpa*
4. *Jain Acāra Mīmāṃsā*
5. *Srāvaka sambodha*
6. *Jain Baudha Gita*
7. *Jain Tattvavidhya*
8. *Tattvarthasutra*
9. *Jain dharama eka anusilana*
10. *Dasaveliya*
11. *Vinaya Pitaka*

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## Unit 3: Lesson 10

### Nature of Karma in Jain, Baudha, Yoga and Vedānta.

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study the following topics on the important subject of karma and associated conduct.

- 0 Introduction
- 1.0 Nature of karma
- 2.0 Karma in different philosophies
- 3.0 Baudha philosophy
  - 3.1 Types of karma
  - 3.2 Theory of the results of karma
  - 3.3 Sharing the results of karma
  - 3.4 States of karma
- 4.0 Yoga philosophy
  - 4.1 Nature of karma
  - 4.2 Types of karma
  - 4.3 Results of karma
  - 4.4 States of karma
- 5.0 Vedānta philosophy
  - 5.1 Nature of karma

#### 0.0 Introduction

This multifaceted, varied and conceptual world is with us. But why is it so? We do not know the basic element/ cause for this diversity. When a cause is not directly perceptible, then it is natural to be inquisitive about it. The effects of the world are all perceptible by us directly. But its cause is not so. A number of philosophers tried to present different and new concepts about the cause/s of this diversity. Even at the level of livings being, there is tremendous diversity. This diversity continues even at the levels of same category of livings being, same community and even same family of livings beings, one man is different from the other, his feelings of pain and pleasure are different, his body construction, features all show differences amongst them. Development of consciousness as its manifestation in knowledge is also different. To explain these differences philosophers came up with doctrine of time, nature of the entity, predetermination, God, Karma etc.

Proponents of time claim time as the cause of this diversity while those propagating fate claim predetermination as the cause and so on.

Doctrine of karma originated and was established to explain this diversity of living beings including their bodies, feelings of pain and sorrow etc. In fact efforts to establish the differences in the personalities of different individuals logically is the basis for the origination and development of karma doctrine. Indian philosophies have presented many thoughts about the creation of the universe itself. Jains have crisply and in a lucid manner accepted the doctrine of karma as the basis to explain the diversity existing in the living beings. Bhagavāna Mahāvīra in Bhagavatisutra says that living beings acquire their distinct features / personalities due to the karmas '*kammaṃ ṇaṃ jive ṇo akāmmo, vibhattibhavaṃ pariṇamai*' (B 12/120). Baudha philosophy also accepts karma as the basis of this diversity of living beings '*Karmajaṇ*' 10 ba vaiciyaṇ (Abhidharma Kośa 4/1). Even believers of God have accepted karma doctrine in some form or the other. Hence karma doctrine in some form or the other had been an acceptable explanation by almost all Indian philosophies.

#### 1.0 Nature of Karma:

Popular meaning of karma is activity/tendency. Karma means to do/perform an act or activity itself. Thus all activities performed by body and speech can be said as karma only. Mīmāṃsakas define daily routine and special

activities, performing *yajñas* as Karma. Gītā calls body activities as karma. Even though Baudha considers activities of mind, body and speech as karma; still activities of consciousness are emphasized more as karma. Yoga and Vedānta also accept activity along with an act as karma. In Jain philosophy all activities and even activities of consciousness are called karma. These *bhāva* karmas i.e. psychic activities of mind, body and speech cause fine matter particles (Kārmaṇa Vargaṇās) called *dravya* – karma in Jain philosophy to bond with the soul. Jain Siddhānta Dīpikā says ‘*ātmapara vrattyākṣaṣṭāstatprāyogya pūdagā*’ karma’ i.e. matter particles capable of being transformed into karma due to the activities of soul are karma. Jains say that *kārmaṇa vargaṇās* have the capability to be transformed as karma. In this universe there are clusters (*varagaṇās*) of different types of matter particles. The cluster which is capability of performing similar activities, i.e. storing the action of mind to generate effects later, are called *kārmaṇa vargaṇās* and they can become karma. There are four types of touches in them i.e. cold, hot, smooth and rough. These *kārmaṇa vargaṇās*, each with infinite space points can only generate karma. Besides these no other types of cluster of matter particles has this capability to become karma. Some Indian philosophers have used other meanings of karma also, besides activity.

## 2.0 Karma in different philosophies:

Similar to meaning of karma in Jain tradition, other Indian traditions have used the words like *māyā*, *avidhyā*, *apurva*, *vāsavā*, *āśaya*, *adr̥ṣṭa*, *saṅskāra*, *daiva*, *bhāgya* etc. *Māyā* and *avidhyā* in Vedānta, *Apurva* in Mīmāṃsā, *Adr̥ṣṭa* in Naiyāyika – Vaiśeṣika, *Āśaya* in Sāṅkhya and karma and *vaśanā* in Baudha traditions have been used. The words like *daiva*, *bhāgya*, *pūnya*, *pāpa* etc. have been used generally in all traditions.

In the present lesson we shall try to compare the karma doctrine of Jains with those of Baudha, Yoga and Vedānta.

## 3.0 Baudha philosophy

Both Jains & Baudha do not accept God as the creator of the universe. According to them the basis for the diversity of this universe is karma and the agent of performing karma is the living being; he binds the karma first and then the karma becomes active to yield result to him. This sequence of cause effect continues.

### 3.1 Types of Karma in Baudha philosophy

Basically there are two types of karma in Baudha philosophy namely *cetanā*/conscious and *cetayaitvā* or *cetanā* is mental activity while *cetaitvā* is the result of *cetanā*. *Cetaitvā* is of two types namely bodily and vocal/spoken. In this manner karma are of three types and karma become significant based on cause, nature and origin. On the basis of the cause of karma, body is primary as all activities / karma are based on the body. When we look at the nature then we find speech as the only karma and reject the other two types because speech is the only natural activity out of mind, body and speech. If we see from the origin viewpoint then we find that only mind performs karma as all the karma originate from the mind only. In this way each type of karma become primary in its own right depending on the viewpoint adopted. This three-way classification of karma is considered as oldest. These tendencies of mind, body and speech in Jain philosophy are called yoga. These result in attracting *kārmaṇa vargaṇās* towards soul. When they are bonded with soul, the same are called *dravya karmas*. Knowledge obscuring etc are attributes of different types of *dravya* karmas.

According to Jains, Karma are of two types namely *dravya* and *bhāva*. *Bhāva* karma are the tendencies or activities of the soul and *dravya* karma are the *kārmaṇa vargaṇās* attracted towards soul and getting bonded with it due to *bhāva* karma. Attachment, aversion, delusion etc are termed *bhāva* karma. Like Jains Baudha also consider attachment, aversion and delusion etc as the cause of origination of karma. According to Baudha karma is psychic only while Jains say karma are both psychic as well as matter i.e. *bhāva* and *dravya* karmas respectively. Concept of karma being matter is an innovative proposition by Jains. Two other types of karma are seen in Baudha philosophy namely *vigvapti karma* i.e. expression of mental activity by body and speech and *avigvapti karma* i.e. results generated as auspicious (*kūśala*) and inauspicious (*akūśala*) by *vigvapti* karma. In Viśuddhi-magga, karma is said to be non-concrete while in Abhidharma-Kośa karma is considered as *avigvapati*.

In Baudha philosophy karma is said to by *vigvapti* by considering karma as activity of mind, body and speech.

Both *vigyapti* and *avigyapti* can be auspicious and inauspicious based on the mental thoughts. Concept of *dravya* and *bhāva* karmas of Jains can be compared in a way with *vāsanā* and *avigyapti* to *dravya* karma while *vigyapti* karma can be referred as *bhāva* karma.

### 3.2 Karma *vipāka* or friction of karma.

According to Jains, the results of the karma have to be enjoyed by the agent in one-way or the other. *Kadāṇa kammāṇa ṇatthi mokkha* 'i.e. one cannot dissociate karmas without enjoying their results. But the existence/ bondage (activities and duration of activity) and potency etc. can be changed. States of the karma like *saṅkramaṇ*, *uddhvantā*, *apavartanā*, *udiraṇa* and *upaśamana* point in such changeable karmas.

Baudha have also considered the changeability of karma and they accept both forms i.e. with fixed results and with changeable results. By *niyata-vipāka*, Baudha mean that the results of the karma have to be enjoyed unchanged i.e. as it was destined when the karma originated. Similarly *aniyata-vipāka* means that the results of the karma can be changed for enjoyment. Some Baudha *ācāryas* have further divided these two forms into four each as follows:

#### 3.2.0 *Niyata – Vipāka – karma*

1. *Drṣṭa dharma Vedaniya*: Those karma the results of which have to be enjoyed in this life itself.
2. *Upavaghavevaniya*: Those karma the results of which have to be enjoyed in the next life.
3. *Aparaparyaya Vedniya*: Those karmas, which will definitely yield results to enjoy later on i.e. period not specified.
4. *Aniyata vedaniya kintu Niyata- Vipāka*? Those karmas whose nature can be changed but their enjoyment is essential. This karma is like *saṅkramaṇa* karma of Jains i.e. the nature of the karma at the time of its bondage can be changed at the time of its enjoyed.

#### 3.2.1 *Aniyata – Vipāka – karma*:

- i. *Drṣṭa dharma vedniya*: Those karmas, which will definitely fructify in this life but it is not necessary that the result has to be enjoyed.
- ii. *Apapaghyā Vedaniya*: These karmas, which will fructify in the next life but it is not necessary that the result has to be enjoyed.
- iii. *Aparaparyāya Vedaniya*: Those Karmas, which will have delayed fruition but it is not necessary that the result has to be enjoyed.
- iv. *Aniyata Vedaniya aniyata vipāka*: Those karmas which are indefinite in both their fruition and enjoyment.

Thus the definite and indefinite nature of karmas can be analyzed in Baudha philosophy this way and can be compared to Jain karma doctrine dealing with *Nikācīta* and *Dalīka* Karma. According to Jain philosophy *Nikācīta* karmas are with definite unchanged result while *Dalīka* karmas are not so i.e. can be changed.

### 3.3 Assignment of the results of karma to others:

A worthwhile question arises while discussing the karma doctrine 'Can the results of karma bonded by one person be transferred to someone else or not?' We find differences in opinions of Jain and Baudha philosophy on this issue.

As per Jains, nobody can share the enjoyment of result of someone else's karma. The doer of the karma has to enjoy the results of his deeds and karmas. Uttarādyayan clear states that the grief/ pain of some one cannot be shared by his family/ friends. Only he alone has to enjoy the results. In Bhagavati Sutra, Bhagavāna Mahāvīra says that each living being enjoys the results of its own deeds and not the result of someone else's deeds.

Baudha philosophy, on the other hand, says that someone else can share the results of the deeds of other also. Concept of Bodhi-satva in Baudha philosophy supports this conclusion. Bodhi-satva always shared with others the results of his auspicious karma i.e. *kūśala* karma to be enjoyed by all living beings in the world. Also Baudha philosophy says that only result of auspicious karmas can be shared and not of inauspicious karmas.

Ācārya Narendra Deva, while writing on this subject, says generally the rule is that doer of karma has to enjoy the fruits thereof. But in Pāli-Nikāya mention is made of sharing results of auspicious karma (*Pūṇya-pariṇāmanā*). Thus as per Baudha philosophy one can share the result of his auspicious karmas and not inauspicious.

### 3.4 Cause of the fruition of Karmas.

As per Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika, Śaṅkarācārya and other philosophers the karma are insentient and hence cannot fructify on their own. All-powerful God affects /gives results of karma. But both Jain and Baudha philosophers do not subscribe to this hypothesis. They say that karma are capable of fructifying themselves and do not need any external divine agency. Jain and Baudha both consider karma as subtle and so cannot be a subject of sensual perception. Both Jain and Baudha religious belong to Śramaṇa tradition and hence give importance to karma doctrine.

## 4.0 Yoga Darśana:

### 4.1 Nature of karma

Explanation of karma doctrine in Yoga philosophy is very similar to Jains. According to Yoga philosophy, nescience (*avidhyā*), *asmitā*, *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveśa* are five *kleśa*.

‘*avidhyāsmittārāgadveśābhiniveśā*’ *pañca kleśa*”.

Due to these five *kleśa*, impure mental thoughts originate. These result in traces (*saṃskāras*), which can be meritorious (*dharma*) or de-meritorious (*adharma*) in nature. Jains call *kleśa* as *bhāva* karma, tendencies as *yoga* and *saṃskāras* as *dravya* karma. Yoga Darśana calls *saṃskāras* as *vāsanā*, karma and *apurva* also. Here the function of *kleśa* and karma, like the germinated karma seeds in Jainism, is accepted. Sāṅkhya philosophy also agrees with Yoga philosophy. As per Jains, due to delusion, attachment and aversion, the empirical soul is associated with matter karma from beginningless time. Similarly Sāṅkhya also say that the *viśva* body is created by feelings like attachment, aversion and delusion and the psychic and matter bodies are associated in a cause – effect relationship. Like the Jains talk of gross (*andārīka*), and subtle *kārmaṇa* body, so do Sāṅkhya. Similarly Sāṅkhya consider *liṅga* as *kārmaṇa* body and is different from the gross body. Thus similarities exist in Jain description of *bhāva* karma to *bhāva* of Sāṅkhya, yoga with *vṛtti* and *dravya* karma or *kārmaṇa śarīra* to *liṅga – śarīra*. Jain and Sāṅkhya both do not consider God as the efficient cause in fruition of karma. The difference between Yoga and Jains is the association of *kleśa*, *kṣiptavṛtti* and *saṃskāra* with soul. Yoga say no relationship exists between these and soul and take them as a manifestation of *prakṛti* itself. As per Jains, these are associated with soul, which is going through continuous and eternal transformation.

### 4.2. Types of Karma

Yoga philosophy talks of four types of karma namely *kṛṣṇa*, *śūkla*, *śūkla – Kṛṣṇa* and *aśūklā – kṛṣṇa*. *Śūkla* karma corresponds to *pūṇya* karma while *kṛṣṇa* karma corresponds to *pāpa* karma. In these *kṛṣṇa* karma belongs to ill-souls while *kṛṣṇa – śūkla* karma results from external interactions and the bondage takes place due to insistence and pains caused by others. Karma of those involved in penance, self – study or meditation are *śūkla*. As they are devoid of external interaction they are purely under the influence of mind. Therefore pain induced by other does not cause *kārmika* bondage. Karma of *sanyāsi* without *kleśa* is *aśūklākṛṣṇa*. Due to renunciation the karma are *aśūkla* and *kṛṣṇa* due to their non-indulgence in prohibited activities. In Jain parlance *kṛṣṇa* can be equated to *pāpa* and *śūkla* to *Pūṇya*. Jain karma doctrine, on the other hand says that a person binds his karma according to his mental, physical and vocal activities and tendencies. If the person indulges in auspicious activities, called *Śubha* yoga, in Jainism, then he binds meritorious karmas or *śūkla* as per yoga philosophy. Jains do not agree that a particular category of person will always bind one type of karma, like in Yoga philosophy, always. However Jains do say that a detached person (*vitārāgi*) practicing *vyāpāra* conduct will bind meritorious karmas as long as he practices this type of conduct. He first binds such meritorious karmas, enjoys the results of these the next moment and so no *vāsanā* or *saṃskāras* i.e. traces of the karma are left behind. Hence in a way *Kārmika* bondage of a detached person can be classified as *aśūklākṛṣṇa* of yoga philosophy on the other hand a person following *sāṃprāya* conduct i.e. person with his soul tainted with passions, can bind both meritorious and de-meritorious karmas i.e. *śūkla* and *kṛṣṇa* of yoga philosophy. Jains talk of eight types of karmas i.e. knowledge obscuring (*Jñānā varṇīya*), vision obscuring (*Darśana varṇīya*), deluding (*Mohaniya*) vedaniya (feeling) *Āntarāya* (obstructing) karmas out of these knowledge & vision obscuring, deluding and obstructing karmas are pure *kṛṣṇa* karmas of yoga and are called *ghātiā* karma by Jains.

The remaining four types of karma i.e. *vedanīya*, *āyūṣa nāma* and *gotra* are evolutionary in nature and can be either *śūklā* or *kṛṣṇa*. These four types of karma are called *aghātiā* by Jains.

#### 4.3. Results / effects of karma

As per *Yoga Darśana*, the result of karma can be classified in three categories namely *Jāti*, *āyū* (life span) and *bhoga* (feeling or experiences). *Jāti* is the representation of destinies i.e. human, animal etc. Definite periods of the karma are to be enjoyed in the present life itself, they are then classified as *dr̥ṣṭa karmas*.

Further *Adṛṣṭa Vedāniya* can have all three types of results namely *Jāti*, *āyū* and *Bhoga*. However the *dr̥ṣṭa Vedāniya* can only have *āyū* and *Bhoga* as results. They cannot birth associate with *Jāti*. If we accept birth in *dr̥ṣṭa Vedāniya*, they will then become *adṛṣṭa Vedāniya* also. Further they say that *śūklā* karma results in destruction of *kṛṣṇa* karma without their yielding results.

#### 4.4. State of Karma

Jain talk of 10 states of karma like bondage etc. *Pātāñjala Yoga Darśana* also talks of different states of *kleśas*. *Upādayāya Yaśovijaya* of Jains has compared and contrasted the *bhāva* with five *kleśa*. He considered *avidhyā*, *asmita* etc. *kleśa* as the evolutionary states of the deluding karma (*Mohaniya*). According to *Pātāñjali kleśa* can exist in four states namely under (*udāra*) active, destroyed (*vichituka*) idle and *tami*. *Yaśovijaya* considers the idle state of karma as *abādha kāla* of karma in Jain tradition and *tanū* is subsidence or subsidence can destruction of karmas *Vichinna* to destroyed/opposite of karma and *udāra* to fruition/active state of Jains tradition respectively.

Analysis of karma doctrines of Jains and *Yoga Darśana* we find lot of similarities amongst them. Further serious analysis can through light on many other facts of such similarities.

#### 5.0. Vedānta philosophy

In Vedic tradition, the word karma had been represented and used in many forms. In the texts before *upaniṣads*, karma meant only regular rituals, *yajñas* etc. An extraordinary force called *Apurva* originated by performing *yajñas*. Śaṅkarācārya, this *apurva* accepted by Mīmāṃsakas, has reflected the concept of this subtle entity '*Apurva*' and he has proved that God awards a person based on his karma i.e. results of the karma are given by god and not by karma itself.

#### 5.1 Nature of karma

Analysis of karma doctrine, we feel that none of philosophers object to the concept of *Bhāva* / psychic karma. Further they also agree about the cause of karma being attachment, aversion and delusion. Vedānta talks of nescience (*avidhyā*) or *māyā*/delusion as the cause of karma. According to Advait Vedānta, the primary cause of karma is nescience or ignorance. Nescience of not the nature of *ātmā* but it is the result of false imagination of *Jīva*.

Śaṅkarācārya says that acceptance of nescience as the nature of *ātmā* will result in ignorance becoming never ending, and *Jīva* will never be able to be liberated i.e. he will keep on existing in the bonded state only. Bondage is true only from practical viewpoint. Transcendental truth is that *Jīva* neither gets bonded nor gets liberated. According to Śaṅkarācārya both bondage and liberated are practical representation only. Śaṅkarā's views about nescience are similar to Jain views concerning *bhāva* karma. We can accept the resultant bondage due to nescience as the cause of *dravya karma*.

Vedānta is based on of principle of knowledge (*Jñāna*) and is called Uttara Mīmāṃśa also. They have generally accepted the karma doctrine of Purva Mīmāṃśa. Purva Mīmāṃśa, in turn, is based on the doctrine of karma. Purva Mīmāṃśa calls rituals like *Yajña* as karma. They talk of three main types of karmas namely.

i. *Nitya* Karma i.e. those activities/karma, which have to be performed daily. By not performing them daily one binds the de-meritorious karmas.

ii. *Naimittika* karma i.e. activities/karmas based on events like birth, death etc.

iii. *Kāmya* karma i.e. karma/ activities performed to have / benefit son etc.

Such *Yajña* etc. when performed generates a subtle entity called '*apurva*'. Whatever activity a person performs, all are momentary. Hence by performing them one generates '*apurva*' which is the result of activities like *yajña* etc. Performing karma as per Vedas result in a force / *saṅskārās*, capability or energy etc and Mīmāṃsakas call it *apurva*.

Mīmāṃsākas also agree that the foundation of *apurva* is *ātmā* and like *ātmā*, *āpurvā* also is subtle and non-concrete. According to *Mīmāṃsākas*, the sequence of executing an activity is wishing (*Kāmanā*), performing *yajña* based on wish and finally generation of *apurva*. As per Jains, desire/wish is compared to *bhāva* karma, performing *Yajña* to *yoga* and *apurva* as *dravya* karma. *Mīmāṃsākas* consider *apurva* as non-concrete while Jains consider *dravya* karma as concrete but it is beyond sensual perception like *apurva*.

### 2.3.2 Sharing the results of karma

Sharing the results of karma imply that the results of karma performed by one can be shared by others also. *Vedānta* accept this concept as performing *yajña* for the dead ancestors and other deities is based on this concept. Jains do not accept this concept.

### 2.3.3 Results / fruition of karma are generated.

Results of karmas performed are generated. However the results and accordingly the karmas can be *niyata* and *aniyata Vipāka*. All philosophies believing in karma doctrine accept this. Besides *Cārvāka*, all other Indian philosophies accept this karma doctrine. Without karma doctrine, we cannot even talk of rebirth after death. Therefore there are similarities as well as dissimilarities in the doctrine of karma of each philosophy. The extent of detailed treatise of karma doctrine found in Jain religious texts is not found elsewhere we find a number of extremely detailed texts of Jain Karma doctrine which are conspicuous by their absence elsewhere. A comparative analysis of karma doctrine presents a new perception of karma.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Explain the nature of karma? OR
2. Explain clearly the doctrine of results of karma in different philosophies?

#### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain the meaning of *vipāki* and *avipāki* karma in Buddhist philosophy?
2. Analyze the basic element / cause of karma results?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. According to Jain philosophy karma is?  
a. sentient b. matter c. both d. some sentient and some matter?
2. According to Yoga philosophy the results of karma are..... type?
3. *Jāti* karma in Yoga is similar to which karma in Jain philosophy?  
a. *Nāma* b. *āyusa* c. *antarāya* d. *gotra*
4. *īryāpath* causes bondage of ..... karma only?
5. Activities of a passion tainted person causes bondage ..... karma?
6. In Jain definition *kṛṣṇa* is..... and *śōkla* ..... karma?
7. In Jain philosophy ..... is called *yoga*?
8. In *Abhidharmakośa*, karma is considered as .....
9. In *Naiyāyika* philosophy the word ..... is used for karma?
10. .... particles (*vargaṇa*) only can result in karma ?

#### Answers to short questions

1. c 2. three 3. a 4. merit /punya 5. both merit and demerit 6. merit and demerit 7. tendencies of mind, speech and body 8. *avigvapti* 9. *adṛṣṭa* 10. *kārmaṇa vargaṇā*.

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## Unit 3: Lesson 11

### Nature of *Avidhyā* (nescience) in Jain, Bauddha and Vedānta

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study the following topics.

#### 0.0 Introduction

##### 1.0 *Avidhyā* in Jain philosophy

###### 1.1 *Avidhyā* as mithyātva

###### 1.2 *Avidhyā* as Darśana Mohanīya

##### 2.0 *Avidhyā* in Bauddha philosophy

###### 2.1 Comparative analysis of Jain and Bauddha philosophies

##### 3.0 *Avidhyā* in Vedānta philosophy

###### 3.1.0 Yoga Vāsiṣṭha

###### 3.1.1 Jagata

###### 3.1.2 Jiva

###### 3.1.3 Bandha

###### 3.2 Gauda Pādācārya

###### 3.3 Mandana Misra

###### 3.4 Sankarācārya

###### 3.4.1 Māyā and *Avidhyā*

###### 3.4.2 Vivartavāda

###### 3.4.3 Adhyāsa

###### 3.5 Jain and Vedānta comparative analysis

#### 0.0 Introduction

Jain philosophy is based on the existence of soul. We see Jains accepting the existence of *jīva* and *ajīva* in this universe, which in turn is defined as the place where interaction between these two entities are seen and experienced. Jains further say that the nature of soul (*ātmā*) is knowledge, bliss, eternal and is active, with body (empirical soul), without anybody (pure soul), doer /agent, enjoyer etc. On the other hand *ajīva* is said to be insentient and opposite of *jīva*. Due to *ajīva* being insentient, it is said that to be devoid of consciousness and knowledge, is neither an agent not enjoyer, is existent and concrete etc. etc.

#### 1.0 Nescience in Jain philosophy

Jain philosophy talks of separate existence of soul (*ātmā*) and supreme soul (*paramātmā*). Even though *jīva* and *ajīva* are the two primary types of basic elements existing in the universe, still when the empirical soul becomes free of karma completely, then it is called *paramātmā* or supreme soul. Till *jīva* is bonded with *ajīva*, it cannot attain pure soul state and hence cannot be called *paramātmā*. Hence it is essential for *jīva* to exhibit and attain pure knowledge (nature of *ātmā*) attribute to become *paramātmā*.

When the empirical soul destroys the cover / insulation on its knowledge attribute completely, the supreme knowledge called omniscience in the pure soul is attained. The soul in this state is called omniscient and it knows the true nature of everything existing in this world. Thus we see that cover on the space points of the soul does not allow it to attain its true nature. This obscuring of the knowledge is a hindrance (called *jñānāvarṇīya* karma) in cognizing by soul is a representation of nescience and it is the cause of jiva not cognizing correctly. In Jain philosophy, nescience is described by different names such as attachment, aversion, obsession, attraction, delusion, grief, greed, deceit etc.

All philosophies of India accept the principle of karmika bondage. Jains also accept it completely. When an empirical soul performs some mental, vocal and physical activities with tainted intentions, then it creates some vibrations causing the karmika matter particles getting attracted towards soul and getting bonded with it. This bondage is called karmika bondage. Cause of karmika bondage is influx of karmika particles towards soul. Influx, in turn, is caused by



perverted beliefs, disinterest in vows and religion, laziness, passions and finally activities. Further the causes of bondage are attachment, aversion in the form of nescience. It is thus nescience in the form of knowledge obscuring karma, which does not allow the soul to cognize entities properly. However when the soul is enjoying its nature of consciousness i.e. enjoying its knowledge attribute that is a manifestation of consciousness, then the five causes of influx become either inactive or active at insignificant levels. This results in vibrations caused by the activities only not causing any bondage. Therefore absence of perverted beliefs (called *mithyātva* in Jain philosophy) is an indication of existence of true knowledge. Perverted beliefs therefore is the only cause of one-sided, opposite, doubtful and hankering of knowledge and ignorance.

These perverted beliefs due to the wrong and opposite knowledge, which may be termed as ignorance also, is nescience in Jain philosophy. This nescience in Jain philosophy is described in two following ways.

- i. Wrong knowledge (*kṛjñāna*)
- ii. Lack of knowledge (*ajñāna*)

The first one is called active knowledge (*audayika*) and the second is called subsidence cum destruction (*kṣāyopasāma*) of knowledge. Because the primary focus of Jainism is to attain Mokṣa, therefore it is better to use wrong knowledge only and not lack of knowledge. Not knowing an entity as generally termed as *ajñāna* or lack of knowledge.

Because it happens due to activation of knowledge obscuring karma, it is called *audayika*. Knowledge associated with doubt, opposite and hankering nature is called *ajñāna*.

### 1.1 Nescience in the form of wrong /perverted belief (*mithyātva*).

Generally *mithyātva* is used for both wrong and lack of knowledge in Jain texts. Not having the right knowledge of basic elements (*tattvas*) is called *mithyātva*. *Mithyātva* is also disinterest in gaining true knowledge, objective of life and lack of inquisitiveness about these. Having knowledge based on only one-sided viewpoint is also classified as *mithyātva*. *Mithyātva* alone is not the cause of karmika bondage, even though it is the primary cause yet it is not the only cause. In Jain texts *mithyātva* is said to be beginningless but not infinite as it is with an end for auspicious beings (*bhavya* jiva). We cannot find since when the soul is affected by nescience but we can get rid of it definitely. The word *mŌṭhatā* and *amŌṭhatā* are also used in Jain texts for *avidhyā* and *vidhyā* respectively. Ācārya Kunda Kunda in *śākhāyā sūtra* (*gāthā* 21-22) says 'A person who thinks other sentient beings like wife, son etc and insentient beings like money, house etc and mixed sentient-insentient like village, town etc as his own or him belonging to them in the past or now or in future is not wise (*mŌṭha*). He is ignorant or is with wrong belief'. In this way we can say 'to know right as wrong or wrong as right is not wise and hence is called *mithyātva*'. It is due to *mithyātva* only that one says insentient entity as sentient, perverted teacher a right teacher, vice as virtue and tainted gods as true gods.

In Jain philosophy *mithyātva* is said to be either due to the sermons of others or natural (*naisargika*) / on its own. Perverted views arising due to the activation of deluding (*mohanīya*) karma is said to be natural while the perverted views are formed /acquired due to the sermons of those who themselves are perverted. In both types of perverted views, nescience is present. Hence Jain texts describe the nature of nescience in the form of perverted views in five following ways.

- i. Monism. Every existent entity has infinite attributes. Further every entity has infinite pairs of opposing attributes also. Out of the attributes, we can cognize only a few of them. Hence knowing one or few attributes does not mean complete knowledge of the entity. This limited knowledge of one or few attributes when considered as complete / whole truth is called monism nescience as nescience does not have the capability to express the whole truth.
- ii. Opposing (*viparyaya*). To accept an entity not in its true nature but exactly opposite of that nature is *viparyaya*. For example to believe soul as momentary from modal viewpoint as well as from substance viewpoint also is nescience. Therefore the false knowledge of an entity is *viparyaya*.
- iii. *Vainayiki*: To accept traditional views, customs, beliefs without intellectual pursuit or logic is *vainayiki*. We can say that it encourages blind faith and is ill-founded traditionalism.

- iv. Doubt (*saṁśaya*). State of mind when a person he is not able to decide whether it is a mannequin or a man. Here the person has two views of an attribute of an entity and is undecided about the right one.
- v. Ignorance (*ajñāna*). When a person lacks the capability to distinguish between right-wrong, auspicious-inauspicious, duty- non-duty, he is said to be ignorant. The first four perverted views fall in the domain of knowledge even though the cognition is defective /wrong while ignorance as nescience is the lack of knowledge. Hence it is not possible to practice moral ethics in a state of ignorance.

In this way like nescience in perverted views / *mithyātva*, even though four out of five types are based on knowledge, the person acquires wrong knowledge of the entity, while in the state of ignorance, one cannot select any moral or rational behaviour.

## 1.2 Nescience in the form of *Darśana Mohanīya* / faith deluding.

In Jain philosophy synonym of nescience is delusion also. Delusion obscures the rational and true nature of the soul leading it to the wrong cognition of entities thereby encouraging the soul towards wrong activities /behaviour. Delusion is the cause of all wrong/ perverted views about reality and eternal nature of reality /truth.

The cognition faculty of an individual becomes perverted due to *mithyātva* /delusion /nescience. As a result, the person develops dubious views /beliefs about the fundamental values and truth. He therefore accept these views as fundamental even though they are not so.

Nescience is related to faith deluding karma (out of the eight species of karma). This is so as activation of faith deluding karma does not let the person discriminate between right and wrong. Its state is compared to that of an intoxicated person (drunkard). This karma which causes wrong knowledge (*muṭhatā*) in the soul is called deluding karma. Out of all the karma species, deluding karma (*mohanīya*) is said to be their king, most potent and the main karma. This deluding karma makes the true nature of equanimity and detachment of the soul ineffective. This deluding karma is compared to consuming alcohol which makes the person loose his self control and thus is guided by others. The drunkard looses his sense of right-wrong and gets involved in worldly activities. Nescience also causes such a state of the person.

*Mohanīya* karma is further divided in two types namely *darśana* and *cāritra mohanīya*. Out of these *darśana mohanīya* is called nescience as its activation causes the inactivation of the discriminating capacity of the soul thereby resulting in wrong perception of the basic elements (*tattvas*). *Darśana mohanīya* is further classified in the following three categories:

- i. *Samayaktva mohanīya* i.e. karma which defiles right belief.
- ii. *Mithyatva mohanīya* i.e. which causes wrong belief.
- iii. *Misra mohanīya* i.e. karma that causes indecision in right -wrong beliefs.

## 2.0 Avidhyā in Buddha philosophy

Like all other Indian philosophies, Buddha philosophy also supports the doctrine of *kārmika* bondage. Here also the word karma is used in the form of activities (*kriyā*). We find mention of mental, vocal and physical activities in Buddha literature. They also use the word consciousness.

While endorsing the primacy of the basic elements, they go to the extent of considering karma itself as sentient. Jains on the other hand consider karma as insentient as these are bonded with sentient soul in the same way as dust particles are bonded to the wet body.

Like Jains, Buddhists also accept the bondage of karma with the soul. They consider the existence of some cause for this bondage termed as *sans ā ra* or universe. A person is not able to know the true nature of the universe and hence keeps on wandering (transgressing) in it. There are four basic truths (*ārya satya*) associated with the soul, namely pain, causes of pains, elimination of pain (*mokṣa*) means of attaining *mokṣa*. Realization of the true nature of these four truths results in nirvana. But during its mundane existence in the universe, this soul is entrapped in transgression (*bhava cakra*). There are twelve parts / stages of the causes for this transgression. In the past, present and future lives, these twelve stages sequentially form the causes of transgression which Buddhists call as *Pratityasamutapāda* which is based on the hypothesis that one cause effect relationship causes another sequential similar cause effect

relationship. Hence we can say that Buddhists consider these twelve causes to support their concept of transgression. These are:

Nescience – Traces ( <i>saṃskāra</i> ) -	Past life
Knowledge ( <i>viññāna</i> ) – <i>Nāma rŌpa</i> <i>ṣadāyatana</i> (senses)	Present life
Touch – Feeling – Desire – Material effect ( <i>upādāna</i> )	<i>Bhava</i>
Destiny ( <i>Jāti</i> ) – Old age /death	Future life

Here we find nescience as the first of the twelve causes. Further they imply that nescience as obscured knowledge i.e. incapability of knowing the true nature of transgression as nescience. Nescience means lack of knowledge which in turn means lack of knowledge of the four basic truths. To inquire about soul and momentary pains or pleasures is nescience. Ācārya VasŌ BandhŌ in Abhidhāna Koṣa calls the state of pain in earlier life as nescience. That state of pain of earlier life, under the influence of ignorance, delusion and greed, continues to be the state of pain.

Ācārya BŌddha Ghoṣa in Visudhimagga has clarified that nescience is the cause of our not knowing the truth about the presence of sensual organs, lumps (*skandha*), elements (*dhātu*). In this endless chain of all destinies, lives and under the control of sensory organs, it causes digression of thoughts of the existence/ non-existence of the four basic truths. Therefore it is nescience. Nescience by nature is delusion. Nescience, ignorance, delusion and lack of intuition are all synonyms of the same concept. In a way they do not think nescience as the basic cause of transgressions. In Majjhimanikāya, they say '*āsravesamŌdayā adijjāsamŌdayoti*' i.e. origination of influx causes nescience. Hence influx is the cause of nescience. Therefore nescience cannot be the primary cause of transgression. In other words the cycle of transgression I nescience – influx – nescience – influx —.

The sequence of existence of the twelve steps in Buddhist philosophy is as follows:

*Avidhyā – saṃskāra – viññāna – Nāma rŌpa – ṣadāyatana – sparāśa – vedanā – tṛṣṇā – upādāna – bhava – jāti – jarā – maraṇa – śoka* etc.

In this way the entire series of pains exist. Again influx is the cause of nescience; nescience causes transgression and the universe. Nescience in fact causes the sequence of birth-death—birth ——. In this way Buddhist philosophy considers nescience as the primary cause of bondage and transgression.

Taking a comparative look this definition of nescience is similar to faith deluding karma of Jains. Both philosophies project it in the form of misconception about soul and opposite of true knowledge (*viparyaya*). Both philosophies do not consider nescience without a cause but establish a cause-effect relationship to it. Whereas in Buddhist philosophy nescience and desire /lust (*tṛṣṇā*) are related as cause effect, in Jain philosophy faith deluding and conduct deluding are both related in part of deluding karma itself. Therefore the cause of nescience is desire or conduct deluding. Here they accept the cause effect relation for nescience as we accept a cause effect relation to pain or bondage. Hence cause of pain is nescience. Therefore we generally say that lack of knowledge of four truths is nescience.

## 2.1 Comparison Jain and Buddhist philosophies.

Even though Buddhists do not believe in the existence of soul, yet two of its four main constituents namely Viññānavādi and Śūnyavādi consider nescience as a subject of sensual perception. In Buddhist philosophy, the cause of nescience is to consider wrong as right and vice versa. Based on their hypothesis Pratityasamutapāda, they establish cause effect relationship between nescience and desire i.e. nescience results in desire and desire results in nescience. In Jain philosophy, *mohanīya* karma is bifurcated in two parts namely faith deluding and conduct deluding. They can be compared to knowledge obscuring (i.e. obscuring the object of knowledge) and *kleśāvaraṇa* (obscuring the pain) respectively while Buddhist identify nescience as one of the twelve stages/ causes of transgression. Jains compare nescience to *mithyātva* (perverted views) and faith deluding karma.

We see similarity in Jain and Buddhist views when we see nescience as the basis of influx. Jains also accept *mithyātva* as the cause of influx and *mithyātva* causing the wrong cognition of basic elements (*tattvas*). Similarly Buddhists also call nescience being the cause of influx and results in contradictory knowledge. Nescience is considered as a pain due to its being associated with wrong knowledge and perception. This is explained in the book 'Studies in Jain philosophy by Dr Nath Mal Tatia'.

### 3.0 Nescience in Vedānta.

Vedānta accepts the existence and effects of nescience. They discuss nescience in the form of ignorance, *vivarta*, *māyā*, *adhyāsa* etc and it is the cause of this imaginary universe /world. We shall discuss nescience in Vedānta as follows:

- i. Śaṅkara and prior to Vedānta
- ii. Yoga Vāsiṣṭha and Gauda Pādācārya.

#### 3.1.0 Yoga Vāsiṣṭha

According to Yoga Vāsiṣṭha, this world is momentary, non eternal, illusory. All existents in this world are like the waves in the sea. All human beings under the influence of delusion have to experience pains in this world. Here it appears clearly that Vedānta is influenced by Buddhist philosophy as they also consider this world as a collection of pains only. Hence to be free from these pains is the freedom from delusion or nescience. Yoga Vāsiṣṭha also propagates monistic existence of just one Bṛhma.

##### 3.1.1 Jagata or the world.

According to Yoga Vāsiṣṭha this world is imaginary and is an experience like a dream. This perceptible world in Yoga Vāsiṣṭha (3/1/20) is called as nescience, delusion, *māyā* etc.

*‘Avidhyā saṁsrtirbandho māyā moho mahattama’  
kalpitanīti nāmāni yasya ‘sakaravedibhi’.*

All the entities in this world are momentary due to their being imaginary realities. There is no difference in existence of this world and dream. In the wake state, we develop a feeling of stability of existents while the same is momentary in the dream state. In both the states we develop similar feelings. All living beings are born out of Bṛhma only. This life is the creation of the world by Bṛhma. Like the waves in the sea, infinite worlds get created and then merge in Bṛhma only. During catastrophe only Bṛhma exists and the universe is created again thereafter out of Bṛhma again. In this way Bṛhma himself transforms in different forms of external worldly existences of space, other elements and living beings.

##### 3.1.2 Jīva

The entities, which are alive and sentient are called *jīvas*. Like the waves emerging from the water in motion, these *jīvas* originate from Bṛhma. Soul and body are separate existences. This *jīva* leaves one body and adopts another body and thus continues its transgression cycle. Soul is neither born nor dies. *Kārmika* bondage is of *jīva* only. Bṛhma, from whom *jīva* are created, is free from *kārmika* bondage. *Jīva* is classified in 15 classes and described as of seven types like dream, imaginary, short and long, duration etc etc.

Vedānta talks of just one real existent namely Bṛhma. Both *jīva* and the world are said to be non-real. Cause of this universe and transgression therein is nescience.

*Citta* is called as nescience here ‘*cittameva sakaralāddambarakāriṇīmavidhyā viddhi*’. The *citta* power of Bṛhma appears in the form of *māyā*. We experience the world due to lack of real knowledge. When we acquire knowledge then we end the cycle of transgression and just Bṛhma exists. His nature is real knowledge and bliss. Blissful state of soul is the final objective which *jīva* tries to attain.

##### 3.1.3 Bondage and liberation [Mokṣa]

Having an intense desire for the worldly objects is called bondage. Destruction of all such desires is called liberation /*mokṣa*. So desire is the cause of bondage. *Jīva*, when entrapped in desire, forgets his own nature and develops bondage. The main reason for this bondage is ignorance. By removing ignorance, one develops *citta* with right knowledge and destroys all desires. This state of *citta* devoid of desires is called *mokṣa*. Hence they consider acquisition of true knowledge as the primary way of acquiring *mokṣa*. Lack of knowledge in the form of ignorance is the primary cause of this world /transgression.

### 3.2 Gaudpādācārya

Affected by *māyā*, he has in his book Maṇḍakyakārikā talks of monism [*Advaitvāda*] as follows.

**Anādimāyāyā sŌpto yadaīva' prabŌdhyate**  
*Ajanmanidrawa swapnadvaitai bŌdhyate tadā.*

When a person is awakened from the beginningless sleep under the influence of *māyā*, then he develops the true knowledge of the single basic element and becomes free from birth, death, birth, sleep and dream. He talks of this world as *mithyā* or with false existence. This drama with duality of existence is just *māyā* (deception). From transcendental viewpoint there is just one and not duality or other existence. The entire existence of the universe is just *vivarta* of Brhman only. Experience of the existence of the world is like momentary feeling and is false. Under the influence of *māyā*, this *jīva* develops fictitious feeling of the duality of existence. On destruction of *māyā*, one is left with just one whole, without parts, existing, which is called Brhman. While proving the false existence of all objects in the world, he says:

*svapnamaye yathādr̥ṣṭe gaṇḍharvenagaraṇ yathā*  
*tathā viśvmitaṇ ḍṣṭaṇvedānteṣŌ vicakṣnai” 2/3*

i.e. *māyā* is like a dream. Scholars think of this world like Gaṇḍharva nagra in Vedānta. Hence forgetting the true nature of the soul is *māyā*. Like in a dream we feel all imaginary objects as real, similarly in awakened state all objects perceptible by senses and mind appear as real even though they are unreal. It is only due to *māyā* that one experiences discrimination and differences.

### 3.3 Maṇḍana Mīśra.

He has a unique position in the history of Advaita philosophy. In his book called Brhmasiddhi, he has discussed in details the nature of nescience in four chapters on Brhman, logic (*terka*), *Mṃyoga* and *Siddhi*. While stating nescience as neither real nor unreal, he says: '*nāvidhyā brhmana' svabhāva' vabhava' nārthāntaram nātyantamasati nāpi satī emeveyma vidhyā māyā mithyāvabhāsa etyucyate*'. Brhmasiddhi page 9.

Differences in names and forms indicate that nescience is not just one but many. One nescience associated with every *jīva* is sourced from Brhman. In this way he considers *jīva* as the basis of nescience and Brhman as its source. Non acquisition and wrong acquisition of knowledge are the two types of nescience.

### 3.4.0 Śaṅkarācārya

He, in his philosophical discourses on Advait Vedānta has focused on soul or Brhman. In Advait soul and Brhman is one. Therefore he repeatedly uses this doctrine in Upaniṣads and says:

<i>Ahaṇ Brhmāsmi</i>	Brh. Up. 1/4/10
<i>Ayamātmā Brhma</i>	Brh. Up. 2/5/19
<i>Tattvamasī</i>	Chando 6/8/7
<i>Ekamevādvitīyam</i>	Chando 6/2/2
<i>Sarva khalviden Brhmaṇ</i>	Chando 3/14/1
<i>Neha nānāsti kiṇcana</i>	Brh Up. 4/4/9
<i>Ātmā va edameka evāgra āsita</i>	Esa 2/1/1

Behind such perceptions, Śaṅkara essentially had to establish the same existence of Brhman and *ātmā*. This is possible only when only one real existent is Brhman and the cause of this world. By saying just one as Brhman, he achieves the sound basis of saying 'By knowing one, you know all'. Ācāraṅga also says so '*Je egaṇ jāṇai so savvaṇ jāṇai*'. Advait Vedānta talks of Brhman using adjectives like neither gross nor atom, nor destructible etc. This is the transcendental nature of Brhman. But Brhman tainted with *māyā*, also called *Īśvara*, is the cause of the creation, existence and destruction of the world. His doctrine of one existence only in support of Advait is also known as *Māyāvāda*. The basic tenets of his doctrine are as follows:

- Just one primary element, which is eternal, inert and without any attributes and it is *sat cita ānānda* called Brhman.
- Jīva* and Brhman is one.

- iii. The basic cause for the discrimination between jiva and Brhma or bondage is one i.e. Brhma.
- iv. This perceptible world is the effect of *māyā* and is false.  
 Śaṅkara in Advait Vedānta has called nescience as *māyā*, *vivarta*, *adhyāsa* and the world as its manifestation. Hence he talks of three forms of nescience.

#### 4.1 Māyā and nescience.

Like Brhma and soul, the other part of Vedānta is *māyā* or ignorance known as nescience. Śaṅkara has interchangeably used the words *māyā* and nescience. Whatever we cognize or experience besides Brhma is nescience. Direct *pramāṇa* etc are all the cause of nescience. All objects of knowledge in this universe that are not perceptible cannot be cognized in their true nature due to obscuring of our knowledge. In the *bhāṣya* of Brhmasūtra, he has established nescience *māyā* as the power of *īśvara*. Śaṅkara himself in *Gītā bhāṣya* (9/10) describes *māyā* 'trigūṇatmika avidhyā lakṣaṇaprakṛti' that creates this diverse universe. In Brhmasūtra (1/4/3) *bhāṣya* he has described nescience by different names like *avidhyā*, *avaktavya* (indescribable), *ākāśa* (space), *akṣara* (syllable) and *māyā* etc. The main thrust of all these explanations by him is his first calling *īśvara*, who is associated with *māyā* as the creator of this world. Hence he calls *īśvara* as the source of *māyā* and not Brhma. He has described nescience in many ways. 'tamaso hi prataya' āvaraṇāt makatva ta avidhyā' *Gītā bhāṣya* 13/2. This doctrine of Śaṅkara concerning world as *māyā* supported and substantiated by a number of other *ācāryas* and scholars also. Padhyapāda in Pancapādikā has called *māyā* and nescience as the indescribable energy of nescience. The main thing is that nescience or ignorance is beginningless and conceptual in nature i.e. different than real and unreal. Ācārya Sureśvara in Śaṅkṣepaśāriraka has used the word ignorance for nescience. Vācaspati Miśra has explained nescience in a different form than Śaṅkara. He says that the source of nescience is *jīva* and its subject is Brhma. By accepting *jīva*'s existence as beginningless, it becomes easier to accept *jīva* as the source of nescience.

#### 3.4.2 Vivartavāda.

Vedānta's hypothesis of cause effect relationship is called *Vivartavāda*. Advait Vedānta therefore supports *satkāryavāda* as against *asatkāryavāda* of Naiyāyikas. One should not consider effect before its creation as unreal like Naiyāyikas nor real like Sāṅkhya. Real cause creates an indescribable effect, which is defined as *vivarta*. Similar effect of the material cause is called result / effect while different effect is called *vivarta* e.g. snake is the *vivarta* of rope as its existence is different than that of rope. Here existence of rope is practical while that of snake is imaginary /parent. In this world is *vivarta* or imaginary existence of Brhma. Existence of Brhma is transcendental while that of world is practical /imaginary.

#### 3.4.3 Adhyāsa

If we describe soul as pure, consciousness and free by nature then why do we see /feel bondage, impurity, momentary and lack of knowledge in it? Hence the cause of such feelings or experience of soul is called *adhyāsa* or wrong intuition / belief. To accept non-soul as soul and vice versa is *adhyāsa* and this wrong perception or ignorance is due to nescience. Śaṅkara in Brhmasūtra says 'smṛtirōpa'paratva purva dṛṣṭavabhāsa' i.e. at a place feeling of recollection of prior knowledge is memory. Feeling snake in the rope is *adhyāsa*. This wrong knowledge of snake in the rope is either due to lack of or perverted knowledge. In memory, the object of rope is not in our direct contact, on the basis of our prior knowledge and the attributes of the present entity, we cognize it as something different than it actually is. On imposing the knowledge of snake in the rope we say that the rope is transcendental truth while snake is imaginary. During the state of *adhyāsa*, there is no change in flaws and virtues of the entity e.g. we have the feeling of Brhma in the world but there is no change in the virtues of Brhma nor flaws of the world. We only impose the flaws or virtues in the entity due to ignorance. This ignorance is called *adhyāsa* or nescience or *māyā* or *vivarta*. Therefore Advait considers this world as *vivarta* of Brhma. Brhma is not active like *prakṛti* of Sāṅkhya because snake is the *vivarta* of rope and not its transformation. In this way Vedānta talks of nescience as *māyā* or *vivarta* or *adhyāsa*.

#### 1.3 Comparison of Jain and Vedānta views.

In Jain philosophy we find use of three words namely attachment, aversion and delusion in relation to bondage. Due to these three causes, *jīva* gets bonded with karma and the transgression in the world continues. Attachment, aversion and delusion are said to be the forms of *mithyātva*, which in turn disables *jīva* to acquire true knowledge.

Contradictory knowledge and lack of knowledge on the other hand are due to nescience. Similarly in Vedānta nescience is considered as the basis of obsession /infatuation towards the world and perverted beliefs.

The world evolves and transforms due to the energy of *māyā* resulting in the feeling of existence of the diverse universe. *Māyā* is the basis of this diverse world. Due to nescience i.e. not able to acquire the true knowledge of this universe, *jīva* is bonded to the world. In Vedānta *māyā* is neither real nor unreal. This is so as it cannot be said as unreal due to practical experience as well as not real due to its not being true. Therefore *māyā* or nescience is said as personal obsession /infatuation.

Hence Vedānta calls nescience as *māyā*, *vivarta*, *adhyāsa*. They call this world as *vivarta* of Brhma. Existence of Brhma is transcendental while that of the world is only practical. *Adhyāsa* is said as the feeling of sentient beings as insentient beings or right as wrong. In this way we find that *māyā* is half-truth and not full truth. As per Jains truth can be relative but half-truth can never be relative. Hence ignorance, perverted views, delusion, *māyā*, *vivarta*, *adhyāsa* have been used to describe nescience. We can summarize nescience by using a conciliatory approach amongst Jains, Buddhists and Vedānta philosophies as follows:

A person, due to the obscuring of his soul's knowledge attribute, cannot cognize / feel the true existence of an entity. For this Jains talk of nescience in the form of *mithyātva* and *darśana moha* out of the five causes of karmika bondage. On the basis of their Pratityasamutpaa hypothesis, Buddhists consider out of the twelve causes of transgression/ *bhavacakra*, consider nescience as the main cause of influx. Vedānta considers the world as *māyā*, *vivarta*, *adhyāsa* as the obscuring cover on the soul. Due to this over, the man is not able to acquire true knowledge of the world. Hence all philosophies agree to the role of nescience in form of the other.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Define nescience? Discuss the nature of nescience as per Jain and Vedānta philosophies?

#### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain the meaning of nescience in Buddhist philosophy?
2. Write briefly the synonyms of nescience in Jain philosophy and Śāṅkarācārya?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. Influx is the basis of nescience and nescience is the basis of influx, who makes such statement?
2. Which doctrine is used to explain *bhavacakra* in Buddhist philosophy?
3. What are meanings in which nescience is used in Jain philosophy?
4. In which philosophy soul as non-soul or in any other form is considered as perverted belief?
5. What is the form and nature of universe as per Śāṅkarācārya?
6. '*sarvakhalvidan brhmo*' is from ..... text?
7. In Jain philosophy nescience is related to ..... karma?
8. *Mithyātva* is of ..... types?
9. Liberation is attained on acquiring .....?
10. *Brhmasiddhi* is the text of .....?

#### Reference texts:

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2. *Jain darśana svarupa aur viśalesana* Devendra muni sastri Tarak guru Jain granthalaya Udaipur.
3. *Bauddh darśana Mimāṃsa* Baldeva Upadhyaya chaukhamba Prakashana Varanasi
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## Unit 4: Lesson 12

### ***Anekānta* (multiplicity of viewpoints) Jain, Baudha, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.**

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study the following topics on the important subject of *anekānta*.

#### 0.0 Introduction

##### 1.0 *Anekānta* as discussed in Jain philosophy

##### 2.0 Mīmāṃsā philosophy and *Anekānta*

##### 3.0 Vedānta and the world

###### 3.1 Three types of *kośa*

###### 3.2 Vedānta and *Anekānta*

##### 4.0 Baudha philosophy and *Anekānta*

#### 0.0 Introduction

Inquiry and discussion on the nature and existence of this diverse universe is older than Ṛgveda. This inquiry resulted in different philosophies being developed and established. These can be broadly classified in following five categories

- i. Eternalists (*Nityavāda*)
- ii. Momentary /temporary (*Anityavāda*)
- iii. Transformation and eternal (*Pariṇāmi nitya*)
- iv. Eternal and momentary (*Nitya-anitya* and *ubhayavāda*)
- v. Evolutionary (*Nitya-anityātmakavāda*)

Br̥hamvāda belongs to first group as they consider momentary existence as imaginary. Baudha belongs to second category, as they believe only in momentary nature of existence. Sāṅkhya and Yoga belong to third category, as they believe in eternal transformation of existence. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika belongs to fourth category, as they believe in some basic elements as eternal while others are momentary in nature. Jains belong to the fifth category, as they believe all existents to be eternal and momentary in nature. Philosophical texts of all the above religions and philosophies discuss their viewpoints. In this way we feel that, even before the dawn of philosophical era, different philosophies had started discussion and expression of their own views as well as contradict others.

The philosophical era, i.e. for around 2000 years saw each philosophy support saw each philosophy support and present their own views as well as contradict others using logic. During this period which gave primary to logic, it became essential for each scholar to first give valid arguments and then talk about the nature and basis of the validity (*pramāṇa*) itself, judge their own views based on this validity and make the conclusive remarks supporting their views and other lacking it.

#### 2.0 *Anekānta* hypothesis of Jains

Jains talk of the nature of each entity as with substance as a base and continuously changing modes. Using this definition and their doctrine of *Anekānta*, they have reconciled the monistic views of each philosophy and presented the same in a unique manner. Even though each philosophy has its own unique perception about the nature of entity itself, yet their perceptions have some parts of *Anekānta* as their basics. This is essential else contradiction will arise somehow. The *naya* doctrine of Jains represent each of these viewpoints in some form or the other but they are based on the concept of relativity of all religions /philosophers etc else each viewpoint will become untenable/ invalid. Hence using *Anekānta* only we can reconcile the differences of all philosophies else refuting them is reply to result in the very evolutionary basis of the entity.



To understand the existence and transformations going on the world and universe, Jainācāryas established the doctrine of Anekānta (multiplicity of viewpoints). They say that every entity has infinite attributes and hence they cannot be cognized from single viewpoint only. To know them we need almost infinite viewpoints. The collection of all such views is called *pramāṇa* and one or part of them is called *naya*.

There are two types of *pramāṇa*.

1. *Pratyakṣa* or direct: i.e. cognition by soul directly without the aid of external media like sense organs etc.
2. *Parokṣa* or indirect: i.e. cognition by soul with the aid of external media.

There are seven *nayas*. (Viewpoints)

1. *Naigam* or Figurative: Substance and mode and based on evolutionary nature of the entity.
2. *Samgraha* or Class: Based on substances.
3. *Vyavahāra* or Distributive / practical: Based on modes.
4. *Rjusutra* or Linear/Straight thread : Based on present
5. *Ṣabda* or literal/word based: Based on use of words
6. *Samabhiruda* or Etymological: Based on origin of words
7. *Evaṅbhūta* or Active / determinant: Based on origin of words but present actively.

The first viewpoint looks identicality while the second looks for differences amongst entities. But this world is neither made of identical nor just different entities alone but a combination i.e. identical cum different. Even though we can find Anekānta doctrine in all philosophies yet Jains have used it extensively in their texts. Hence Jain philosophy became popular as Anekāntavādi philosophy. Here we shall review Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Buddhist philosophies in comparison with Jains.

## 2.0 Anekānta and Mīmāṃsā philosophy

The word Mīmāṃsā is based / derived from inquisitiveness. Māhṛṣi Jaimini is the primary commentator on this in Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Mīmāṃsā is further bifurcated as *purva* (prior or earlier) and *uttara* (later). *Purva* Mīmāṃsā focuses on Vedic rituals while *uttar* Mīmāṃsā focuses on Brhma and is famous as Vedānta. Therefore the word Mīmāṃsā is used for *purva* Mīmāṃsā. Even in *purva* Mīmāṃsā we find further subdivisions based on Ācārya Kumārilla Bhatt and Prabhākara. Kumārilla and his followers agreed with the generic and specific attributes, and their owners; identity cum difference and the entity having origination destruction and permanence and hence supported Anekānta. About the nature of the entity, Kumārilla writes:

‘Vardhamānakabhange ca rūcaka’kriyate yada  
tada purvārthina’śoka’pritiścāpyūttarārthina’  
hemārthīnastū mādhyasthyaṅ tasmādvastū trayātmakam  
notpādashitibhanganāmabhāve syānmatitrayam  
na nāśena binā śoko notpādēna binā sūkham  
sthityā binā na mādhyasthyaṅ tena sāmānānityatā’

When a cup of gold is broken to make a necklace of gold, then the person wishes to have or owns the cup feels sorry while the one who wants the necklace feels happy and the person who owns gold remains indifferent or calm. This indicates the three states of existence of an entity. We cannot think of an entity without thinking of origination, existence and decay of the entity. This is so as without destruction of the cup, grief / pain cannot arise and without creation of necklace happiness cannot arise and without the existence / permanence of gold one cannot be indifferent in the entire process. Hence the entity in general becomes eternal. Mīmāṃsakas consider permanent relation between word and the object / entity. They consider the words / sentences in their holy texts with reference to evolutionary entity as *pramāṇa*. This eternal and evolutionary nature of the entity is defined there as *trikālaśunya*. They imply that sentences in Vedas refer only to the eternal *trikālaśunya* state of pure and active entity.

For this description, Anekāntavādis ask ‘If *trikālaśunya* means active but no existence at any time then the non-existence (*abhāva*) will also become a subject of *pramāṇa*. Hence it is not proper to consider this definition from the canons (agama). If this is in the form of an object/entity, then the effect of the activity has to be non-existence

and the entity at the same time. Only then it can become sentence from Vedas. Therefore without accepting the doctrine of Anekānta, it cannot be accepted as a subject of Veda sentence and so be considered as inactive.

How can knowledge become valid or invalid? This is a debatable subject. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika consider both as due to others while Sāṅkhya say it as due to self (on its own) while Mīmāṃsakas say *pramāṇa* on its own / self and *apramāṇa* due to others. Jains say '*tatpramāṇya svata'paratsca*' i.e. validity of *pramāṇa* is by itself while it is being used and by others when it is not in use.

### 3.0 Vedānta and the world.

According to Śaṅkara, the truth/reality is always same i.e. does not change. All entities in this world are going through transformation and do not stay same. So they are not real. In other words only Brh̥ma is real and the world is not so.

Reality is unaffected by time and so it is transcendental truth. There are two forms of non-real namely;

- i. Practical existences of entities with name and form.
- ii. Imaginary existences e.g. snake in the rope.

These tainted objects of the world are real during practical time period but they are limited up to the experience of Brh̥ma. Hence practical entities are not transcendental real. Rope-snake etc appear to be true during the period of their experience by us but due to lat knowledge they become imaginary. Hence imaginary entities are also not transcendental realities. Thus both practical and imaginary entities are not transcendental realities but they are not without a base like a flower in the sky. Hence they are not always unreal. According to Vedānta, knowledge has two types of energies namely i. obscuring and ii. *vikṣepa*. The first form of energy creates intellect of discrimination and this is the cause of *saṁsāra*. Due to this energy the man feels himself to be the doer /agent, enjoyer, unhappy, happy etc. etc. *Ākāśa* originates from the ignorance-tainted consciousness; *ākāśa* results in air-fire-water- earth. These subtle elements result in subtle body and gross elements. Subtle body has seventeen parts namely:

Five sense organs like ear, skin, eyes, taste /tongue, smell; intellect which is the manifestation of affirmative tendencies of *citta*; mind which is the discriminating tendency of *citta*; five actuating sense organs namely speech making, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*.

### 3.1 Three types of koṣa.

Along with the five sense organs and intellect forms *viññāṇakoṣa*. This is the practical jiva. Mind with the five sense organs is called *manomayakoṣa*. Five *vayus* with the five actuating sense organs is called *prāṇamayakoṣa*. *Viññāṇamayakoṣa* is with the knowledge energy. He is the doer/agent. *Manomayakoṣa* is like energy of desire. It is the medium /means. *Prāṇamaya koṣa* is with the energy of action. Combined form of all these *koṣas* is the subtle body.

### 3.3 Vedānta and Anekānta.

Jain philosophy accepted two states of existences namely transcendental and practical. Vedānta accepts three states of existences namely transcendental, practical and imaginary. According to Jain philosophy both sentient and insentient are both transcendental existences. Both are real existences. Jain philosophy accepts the real existence of both sentient and insentient beings. Therefore it is said to be realistic. According to Vedānta only Brh̥ma is transcendental reality. That is only one. The remaining different types of entities are not real. Thus Vedānta does not accept the existence of world different than Brh̥ma. Hence they are said to be idealists.

According to idealists, to consider existence of insentient as different than sentient or Brh̥ma is false belief and to consider Brh̥ma as the transcendental truth is right belief.

The realists say that to consider sentient as insentient and vice versa is false belief. To consider sentient as sentient and insentient as insentient is the true belief.

As Vedānta says that one transcendental existence and many as practical existences only, the same can be said in Anekānta language that substantiality is transcendental and mode or extensions is practical existence. Eternal existence is sentient. Human beings and sub human beings are its extensions. They are not transcendental. Man is not eternal

and so is not transcendental. Man is one of the forms of just one sentient, which originates and then merges in the one sentient. Even after merging or separating from one sentient, man continues to be sentient. Hence it is transcendental.

Absolute viewpoint (*nīśāyanaya*) recognizes transcendental existence while *vyavahāranaya* recognizes practical existence. According to absolute viewpoint, there are two types of existences as the basic elements in the world namely sentient and insentient. It does not accept the modes as the basic elements. Vedānta considers this diversity of existences in the world as practical or imaginary because its definition of basic element of this universe is just one i.e. Brhman. Hence it recognizes existences only from absolute viewpoint. According to Jain philosophy extensions are not false or unreal. There are three parts of the truth / reality namely origination, destruction and permanence.

Permanent is the eternal part of existence while the other two are not. Permanence is one while origination and destruction are many. Permanence is brief while origination and destruction extensions. Permanence is described using transcendental viewpoint and momentaryness by practical viewpoint. Permanence without origination and destruction and vice versa is not found anywhere. Whenever there is permanence, there is origination and creation also simultaneously. Hence origination, destruction and permanence are the three inseparable parts of reality. Vedānta also does not accept separate existences of basic element and its extensions. According to them the basic element and its extensions are omnipresent.

Vedānta considers extensions as false while Jains consider them as momentary / temporary. Momentary state is not considered as transcendental reality and hence Vedānta accepts them as false. However momentary state is not beyond transcendental reality and so Jains consider it momentary and part of truth. There is only difference in language and not their concept or meaning.

What is Syādvāda? Syādvāda is nothing but is a powerful system to uncover the truth hidden under the cover of language. In the language of Syādvāda, no philosophy can either be monist (*advait*) or just dualist (*dvait*) all the time. From the existence viewpoint, this universe is one as there is nothing else except it. Hence it is one. This method of describing an object of knowledge is called class viewpoint in Jainism. However this world cannot be described completely by just one viewpoint only. We cannot say world as imaginary by just calling it as false / *mithyā*. The world is therefore many from this viewpoint. This method of describing extensions is called practical viewpoint in Jainism. The truth can be described by both these viewpoints together. From transcendental viewpoint we focus on the identicalness of entities and then uncover the reality while in practical viewpoint our main emphasis is on differences.

Jains do not always consider substance and mode (base and extension) as one. This is not the only reason for it to be called a proponent of dualism. But it is also a believer of dualism as it considers religions is not that different as their speech or language. This is the heart of Anekānta, which says that we should not just consider speech and written texts but go to the heart, foundation of the religions also.

#### 4.0 Baudha & Anekānta

Baudha consider the existence of universals/ generals as both valid and invalid. They say that knowledge of universal can be both of an eternal as well as momentary entity. Due to nescience associated from beginning-less time, one develops a feeling of sameness in similar momentary existences and hence they appear to be eternal. This knowledge of universals in this way is not *pramāṇa*. They say it is just invalid. Due to our imposition of eternal nature in momentary existence can never be valid (*pramāṇa*). Even though the cognition of universals results in experience of momentary nature of existence still it is invalid. We do not need 'inference' to prove momentary nature of the existences if the knowledge of universals in the momentary existences is valid. The conclusion "Reality" is momentary will make inference useless. However inference becomes valid by creating favourable alternative scenarios of existence. To conclude we can say that Baudha have accepted Anekānta by accepting the validity of favorable partial existence of universals as *pramāṇa* and momentary but eternal entities as invalid.

Similar they consider the knowledge of particulars (*savikalpa*) after the perception of universals (*nirvikalpa*) as perception of universals by nature and knowledge of particulars of gross object only. After perception of universals, the knowledge of particulars like this is yellow or blue etc. is accrued. This knowledge cognizes only the form of the

object only and becomes knowledge of particulars of attributes like colour assigned by some words. By nature all knowledge of universals only is knowledge, be it of universals as cognized directly by us. Dharmakīrti in Nyāya Bindu says. 'Intellect (*citta*) cognizes directly the universals only, be it the knowledge of universals or the particulars in special instances. Hence only knowledge (i.e. discriminatory) is of particulars like blue etc of gross object. Therefore Baudha who accept knowledge of both universals and particulars have accepted the doctrine of Anekāntavāda. How is it possible to accept the discriminatory knowledge of two types without accepting Anekāntavāda?'

Baudha consider the experience of the momentary existence of the feeling of being non violent as valid (*pramāṇa*) and the potency of that moment to achieve heaven as invalid (*apramāṇa*). Giving up violence to become nonviolent or other good acts like donating etc. have the potency to yield heavenly destinies is popular in all religious texts and Baudha consider even this momentary. Whenever a person, out of compassion, donates something, at that moment he experiences directly the pleasure in doing so and later on the feeling that I was compassionate which resulted in contentment and happiness implies existence of non violence in the form of compassion etc and the feeling of happiness is considered as valid also or the knowledge of non violence and donation on its knowledge is momentary, hence due to the direct experience by us of their existence, being knowledge and happiness by nature, it is in those aspects valid (*pramāṇa*). But the potency of non-violence as the cause of heaven its momentary ness cannot be experience directly and hence are not directly valid. Even though we experience the momentary ness and its potency of their potency to yield heaven still absence of the knowledge about these makes them invalid. Thus Baudha have also accepted Anekāntavāda.

Baudha consider entities, which are blue etc. as objects of knowledge due to their color/form attributes. As they are not momentary, they are not considered as objects of knowledge. The entity which due to its form or color etc is object of knowledge yet due to its internal parts and nature which cannot be cognized directly does not become the object of knowledge. In this way considering on entity both as object of knowledge and not is an act of accepting Anekāntavāda.

Baudha consider the experience of dreams as invalid due to its incapability in direct cognition of objects of the dream but the same is considered valid due to their nature. In the dreams, the feelings 'I am rich, I am the king etc' are the knowledge of particulars. This knowledge of particulars like being rich or king, is invalid due to the feeling of bankruptcy in the awake state but they are not invalid in the nature (richness & kingship).

Similarly the feeling of silver on seeing a conch shell is false knowledge of particulars due to inability of producing silver to the person. But the false knowledge was definitely acquired and is experienced. Hence it is valid in its nature. This is clearly acceptance of Anekāntavāda.

A person who develops false knowledge definitely experiences that he has acquired knowledge but he does not realize that it is false. If he realizes that it is false then this false knowledge will become right knowledge or the false knowledge experiences its own knowledge nature but not its falsehood. Hence false/wrong knowledge is partially as knowledge is direct and partially as not knowing falsehood proves the doctrine of Anekānta.

Baudha consider a prior moment as the cause of next moment. If this is not so then being real it will become eternal as not being able to create new mode. Similarly the prior moment being the cause and the next moment being the effect proves the doctrine of Anekānta.

The knowledge of the form of an object knows only that object. Knowledge of universals cannot know a specific object and the principle of concomitance have been accepted by Budha as a basis of *pramāṇa*. According to this rule the knowledge of different colours of a photo will be knowledge of photo itself. Hence knowledge of one picture to be considered of many forms is a proof of Anekānta. According to this rule, knowledge of omniscient Sugata being able to know all objects of the world must be like of one and many forms, like a picture discussed. Hence one knowledge of Sugata as all knowing is to support Anekāntavāda. Baudha consider the universal relationship to be of three types namely existence in the object, example and its non-existence simultaneously. However non-existence and existence in the example is contradictory. This also supports Anekānta doctrine of Baudha.

To conclude, doctrine of momentary-ness of existence of Baudha does not appear logical. In this manner we have presented non Jains philosophies vis-à-vis Anekānta.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Explain the doctrine about the existents/entities in Jain and Vedanta philosophies in the light of *Anekānta*?

### Short notes type questions: minimum 50 words

1. Explain the concepts about the world in different Indian philosophies?
2. Compare and contrast *Anekānta* and Mīmāṃsā philosophy?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. According to Jain philosophy the nature of entity is .....
2. The principal *ācārya* of Mīmāṃsā philosophy is .....
3. Vedānta philosophy accepts.....types of existents?
4. Jain philosophy accepts.....types of existents?
5. In Jain philosophy, the word..... is used for inference etc in their *pramāṇa* discussions?
6. Baudha accept..... like *pramāṇa*?
7. The doctrine of momentary nature of existence in Baudha philosophy is comparable to.....*naya* of Jains?
8. Jain *ācāryas* established..... to cognize and know the existence and diversity of the world and universe?
9. In Vedānta ..... is the cause of bondage?
10. In Jain philosophy the cause for liberation is ..... ?

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2. Jain Darsana Manana aur Mīmāṃsā by Acarya Mahaprajna Publisher Adarsha Sahitya Sangh Churu Rajasthan
3. *Shatdarsana Samuccha* Editor Pt. Mahendra Kumar Sastri Publisher Bharatiya Jnanapitha Delhi

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## Unit 4: Lesson 13

### ***Pramāṇa* (Valid knowledge or organs of valid knowledge) Jain, Baudha, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya**

In the present lesson, the student will systematically study the subject following topics on *Pramāṇa* with reference to different philosophical traditions of India.

#### 0.0 Introduction

##### 1.0 Baudha philosophy Jain philosophy

##### 2.0 Nyāya philosophy

##### 3.0 Mīmāṃsā philosophy

##### 4. Jain philosophy and other philosophies comparison.

#### 0.0 Introduction

We find mention in literature of two types of knowledge namely right and wrong. Right knowledge is that which is free from flaws like doubt, contradictions and hankering. Knowledge with these flaws is called wrong knowledge. Right knowledge is also called *pramā* in literature. The means of acquiring *pramā* is called *pramāṇa* or organs of valid knowledge. '*pramā karaṇam pramāṇa*' is the definition of *pramāṇa* in all Indian philosophies. Teleological meaning of *pramāṇa* is '*pramiyate neya eti pramāṇam*' which is acceptable to all. Still different philosophies have come up with different characteristics of *pramāṇa*. It is but natural inquisitiveness that with common accepted definition of *pramāṇa*, why these differences were propagated by different philosophies? It is obvious as each philosophy has defined *pramā* differently and *pramāṇa* is just the means to cognize them. Every philosophy has also defined right knowledge based on their philosophy differently. Thus differences in the characteristics of *pramāṇa* are bound to arise. Another reason is that the object of knowledge (*prameya*) itself is different for different philosophies. Accordingly to prove important objects of knowledge, they have described different *pramāṇas*. Here we shall discuss characteristics of *pramāṇa* in different philosophies.

#### 1.0 Bauddha religion

They believe in two types of the objects of the knowledge namely universal and particular. On this basis Dignāga has accepted two types of *pramāṇa* namely direct (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anūmāna*). Therefore he gave the characteristics of *pramāṇa* as '*añātārthajñāpakāḥ pramāṇam*' i.e. elimination of ignorance about an unknown object is *pramāṇa*. This implies that knowledge of the unknown only is *pramāṇa*. Dharmakīrti talks of the knowledge of an entity, which is capable of transformation only as *pramāṇa* i.e. an object must be capable of transformation if its knowledge is to be *pramāṇa*. Besides this clarification, he supports Dignāga all through. Manorath Nandi while clarifying this characteristic of *pramāṇa* says 'Use of the term object (*artha*) is to eliminate the validity of the knowledge of two moons etc. i.e. he refutes the validity of knowledge of imaginary objects'. He further says that both Dharmakīrti and Dignāga refer to one and same characteristic of *pramāṇa* as they both are inter related and not independent.

#### 2.0 Nyāya

Gautam of Nyāya did not clearly spell out the characteristics of *pramāṇa*, but his commentator did attempt to clearly spell it out. According to him '*uplabdhisadhanani pramāṇani*' i.e. the method or means of acquiring true knowledge is *pramāṇa*. Udhvotkara supported these views of commentator Vātsīyana. Vācaspati Miśra also supported it by saying '*uplabdhihetu pramāṇam*'. The means (*sādhana*) by which we cognize the true nature of an object is *pramāṇa*. Thus all three i.e. Vācaspati, Udhvotkara and Vātsīyana appear to support this definition only. Jayant Bhatt has added 'free from doubt' also as the characteristic of *pramāṇa* as *arthopalabdhī* refutes memory and indecisiveness but the doubt continues to exist. To exclude doubt he has therefore added the above terms also. Udayana has used the term right experience in place of right knowledge and so called the means of acquiring right knowledge as *pramāṇa*. Bhāva Sarvajña said '*samyaganubhavasadhananam pramāṇam*' i.e. the means or means of having right experience is *pramāṇa*. By using the term *samyag*, he refutes doubt and contradictions and *anubhava*

to refute memory. The term means or *sādhana* shows the difference between *pramāṇa* and *pramā* as well between right knowledge and the knower.

### 3.0 Mīmāṃsā

Kumārila Bhatta in Ślokaṭīkā has indicated the characteristics of *pramāṇa* with reference to the subject being discussed therein. According to him 'the knowledge, which does not become the object of knowledge after its acquisition and its not constrained or dubious by other knowledge is *pramāṇa*. Pārthasārthī further clarified this and wrote 'knowledge of the unknown object which is free from doubt or controversies of any type is *pramāṇa*.' By using the terms 'free from controversies or constraints', he is refuting the knowledge that involves opposite feelings or meanings. By talking of unknown objects, he refutes memory and sequential knowledge as *pramāṇa*.

While analyzing the views of Prabhākara, Śālinātha says '*anubhūtiśca na' pramāṇam*' i.e. experience is *pramāṇa*. The question arises that even doubt is an experience also and hence comes in the category of *pramāṇa*. Clarifying this he says '*rajatam idam*' i.e. it is not but a combination of two types of knowledge. The term '*idam*' denotes experiential and '*rajatam*' denoted memory. Hence it is not *pramāṇa*. The question then arises '*śaṅkha pita*' i.e. the conch shell is yellow is one knowledge. He refutes this also as a person suffering from jaundice will see a white conch shell as yellow also. Hence in practical terms, it is not free from controversies and hence not a *pramāṇa*.

### 4.0 Jain and non-Jain philosophies, a comparison.

Nature of *pramāṇa* had been discussed earlier in details as per Jain philosophy. Here we shall only compare its features with other philosophies. Canonical era was the period of knowledge. During this period we find scanty mentions of *pramāṇa* in the literature of this period. Umā Svāti had compiled the canonical literature in his text Tattvārthasūtra. He defines knowledge as *pramāṇa* itself. Crisp and detailed discussions on *pramāṇa* are seen in the literature of Samantabhadra and Siddha Sena. They both have called knowledge, which results in the experience of both self and non-self as *pramāṇa* i.e. the knowledge that knows itself and the others is *pramāṇa*. Siddha Sena has added '*bādhāvivarjitam*' in the definition of *pramāṇa*, which was in itself a new addition. Akalanka also used this definition but added the term '*anadhigata*'. This again was a new addition to the definition in Jain philosophy. Vidhya Nandi says 'regardless of knowledge being acquired or direct, if it enables in cognition of self and non-self, then it is *pramāṇa*'. Hemacandra removed all adjectives and just said '*samyagartha nirṇaya' pramāṇam*'. In this way we see the growth of *pramāṇa* doctrine in Jain philosophy. Reviewing these developments we see differences emerging on the following points:

- i. What is the cause of the right knowledge? Is it knowledge itself or something else?
- ii. *pramāṇa* being the cognition of self, is it also the cognition of non-self?
- iii. Is acquired knowledge *pramāṇa* or not?
- iv. *pramāṇa* and its results, are they same or different?

Now we shall discuss our points as per different philosophies.

#### 10.0 What is the cause of right knowledge? Knowledge or something else?

Jains consider knowledge as the only cause of right knowledge. Any other cause, besides knowledge, cannot result in right knowledge definitely i.e. right knowledge may or may not occur. Hence Jain philosophers are not in agreement with those philosophers who do not accept knowledge as the definitive cause of right knowledge. For example, consider both cognitive and non-cognitive causes as the means of right knowledge. Naiyāyikas consider contact of the object knowledge with sensor organs as *pramāṇa*. Jains do not agree with this, as contact with the object is not a definite cause of occurrence of right knowledge. Prameya Kamal Mārtanda and Syādvāda Ratnākara discuss in details that contact with the object is not an essential criterion for right knowledge. Yogi, without the contact with the object can have right knowledge about it while in a mirage even with the contact, one does not acquire right knowledge. Old Naiyāyika philosophers like Jayant Bhatt etc say that the right knowledge accrues with the combined existence of knower, action and the contact. In this process, non-cognitive entities like sense organs, mind, light object etc also work along with knowledge. Jains accept these as the ancillary causes of right knowledge but not the primary or only cause. These are not the essential causes of knowledge and so are not considered as *pramāṇa*.

#### 4.2 Does *pramāṇa* illuminate itself (*sva-prakāśaka*) as well as the others (*para-prakāśaka*)?

One of the primary concerns of Philosophy is 'Is knowledge illuminator of itself or the others?' i.e. by knowledge we can cognize the other objects but do we cognize the knowledge itself? Or how do we know that we have acquired the knowledge of the object?

Mīmāṃsāka consider knowledge as the illuminator of others. According to them, knowledge can know objects like pitcher, cloth etc but not itself. To know the knowledge, we need something else. But who is this other? According to Naiyāyikas, there is another knowledge to know the previous knowledge itself and call this other knowledge as '*anuvyavasāya*' or after-cognition. Jains do not agree with this as they argue that even though '*anuvyavasāya*' knows the previous knowledge but how to know '*anuvyavasāya*'. If we continue moving first to second to third and so on to another knowledge, then we end up in a situation of infinite regress. And if one '*anuvyavasāya*' is self illuminator then what is the problem of accepting the first knowledge itself as self-illuminator? We cannot also say that accrual of the knowledge of an object results in the knowledge of '*anuvyavasāya*' as this will also result in a round robin cause effect situation. Therefore we should accept that knowledge illuminates itself also.

Jains consider knowledge as self-illuminator also. For example the lamp illuminates the objects as well as itself also, similarly the knowledge illuminates the objects of knowledge as well as it-self also and it does not depend on others to illuminate itself. Jain philosophy is a believer in the existence of all objects. According to them knowledge is the nature of the soul. The nature of an entity is not dependent on anything else. Generally the object raised is that an entity cannot act on its own e.g. a dancer cannot get on its own shoulders and dance and a sword cannot cut itself similarly knowledge cannot know it-self. Jainācāryas reply and say that our experience itself is *pramāṇa*. Like it is evident that a sword cannot cut it-self or a dancer cannot get on his shoulders and dance, similarly it is known and accepted that the lamp illuminates itself as well as the objects of knowledge. Hence, on the basis of experience also we can agree that knowledge is both self as well as others illuminator. However Jainācāryas have emphasized the 'itself illuminator part' a bit more and so have included it in the definition of *pramāṇa* as well. '*svaparāvabhāśakaḥ jñānaḥ pramāṇam, svaparābhavāśakaḥ yathā pramāṇa bhūvi buddhilakṣaṇaḥ*'

#### 4.3 Is knowledge of an already known object *pramāṇa* or not?

Is the new knowledge of an already known object again *pramāṇa* or not? This discussion also had been very prominent amongst Indian philosophers. Some philosophers accept the hypothesis while the others don't. In this context the question of sequential knowledge also comes into play.

Mīmāṃsāka philosophers accept sequential knowledge as *pramāṇa* while Bauddha philosophers don't. Vācaspati, Śridhar, Jayant Bhatt and Udayan etc have all accepted sequential knowledge as *pramāṇa*. Therefore they have not used the terms '*apurva* or unique' and '*anadhigata*' in the definition of characteristics of *pramāṇa*. Mīmāṃsākas like Kumārila have accepted sequential knowledge as *pramāṇa* but used the terms *apurva* and *anadhigata* in their definitions of *pramāṇa* characteristic. While explaining the term *apurva* they have used the concept of time instants, which according to Pandit Sukh Lāl appears to be an effect of Jain and Bauddha philosophers. On the other hand Śālikanāth has not accepted the concept of time instants but have still accepted sequential knowledge as *pramāṇa* just because the experience generated. It appears Nyāya philosophers influenced him.

Based on the differences in the concept of the knower, the Bauddha philosophers have accepted knowledge both as *pramāṇa* and non-*pramāṇa* as well. While commenting on Hetubindu, Arcata says that the sequential knowledge of a yogi (omniscient) is *pramāṇa* and the same of an ordinary person is non-*pramāṇa*. According to him, the concept of time instants is visible in the knowledge of an omniscient while it is not so in an ordinary person.

There are two schools of thought in Jain philosophy also concerning serial knowledge. Digambar *ācāryas* do not consider it as *pramāṇa* while Śvetāmbara *ācāryas* consider it as *pramāṇa*. Akalaṅka has used the term '*anadhigatārthagrahi*' in defining the characteristics of *pramāṇa*. Other Digambara *ācāryas* while accepting it have used the term *apurva*. The reason for the use of this term by Bauddha and Mīmāṃsāka philosophers is quite clear as Bauddha refute memory and imaginary knowledge as invalid while Mīmāṃsāka refute memory as valid knowledge. But the Jain philosophers kept memory as valid knowledge. Therefore later Digambara *ācāryas* have clarified the terms *apurva* and *anadhigata* as follows: The serial knowledge which does not produce unique knowledge is not *pramāṇa*



and when it does then it is a *pramāṇa*. On the other hand Śvetāmbara *ācāryas* have not used the terms *apurva* and *anadhigata*. According to them the new knowledge of an already known object is *pramāṇa* as it is not in contradiction to the earlier knowledge.

#### 4.4 Are *pramāṇa* and its result different or same?

*Pramāṇa* and its results have also been important topics of discussions amongst the philosophers. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka consider sensory perception as *pramāṇa* and the discriminative state of intellect as its result; then the intermediary contact with the object, knowledge of the universals and particulars as *pramāṇafala* compared to earlier knowledge and *pramāṇa* for the later knowledge to be acquired.

DigNāga of Bauddha tradition considers form of the object as *pramāṇa* and the decision of the object as per its form being the *pramāṇafala*. Dharmakīrti from the same tradition says that knowledge is *pramāṇafala* and the similar form of the objects as *pramāṇa*. Śāntarakṣita in Tattvasaṃgraha reconciles both these views and says 'similar form of the object and its ability to generate to give knowledge of the object and its experience by self as *pramāṇa*'.

Jain logicians Siddha Sena and Samantabhadra have called knowledge as *pramāṇa* and elimination of ignorance as *pramāṇafala*. Later Jainācāryas with some interpretations had accepted this. Instead of elimination of ignorance they have used the term '*svaparavyavasiti*' or the experience of the self and others. Jainācāryas also consider the intermediary results in cognition as relatively *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala*.

Alongwith the discussions of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala*, the question of the identity and differences between them is also to be considered. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka consider *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* as different. They consider *pramāṇa* as an agent (*kāraka*) and the agent acts in an object different from itself. *Pramāṇa* is the cause of *pramā*. Being an agent and the being the result are two different attributes.

On the other hand Bauddha tradition considers *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* as identical or same. According to them both *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* are the attributes of knowledge. As such they are not considered different and so are identical. Based on their doctrine of Anekanta, Jains call *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* as a bit identical as well as a bit different also. *Pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* have a cause and effect relationship and so they are different. However sequential occurrences of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* of the same knowledge prove them to be identical also.

To conclude we can say that characteristics of *pramāṇa* as a means for right knowledge is universally accepted, however the specific description of the object of knowledge have resulted in differences between characteristics of *pramāṇa*.

### Exercises

#### Essay type question:

1. Explain the nature of *pramāṇa* in different philosophies giving a lucid comparison of the same?

#### Short notes type questions: minimum 50 words

1. Explain the views of Jain, Bauddha, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsaka about the knowledge of an already known object as *pramāṇa*?
2. Explain the nature of *pramāṇa* on the basis of Nyāya philosophy?

#### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. Types of knowledge are .....
2. Siddha Sena added the term..... as the characteristics of *pramāṇa*?
3. .... considers the contact with sense organs as *pramāṇa* ?
4. Mīmāṃsakas consider that cognition of an object of knowledge generates an attribute called .....
5. .... philosophy reconciled various discussions about discussions on serial knowledge?
6. .... accept form of the object as *pramāṇa*?
7. Bauddha tradition consider *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇafala* as .....
8. *Pramāṇa* is the ..... of right knowledge?

9. According to Nyāya, knowledge can be cognized by ..... ?  
10. Mīmāṃsākas consider serial knowledge as ..... ?

**Answers to the blank fill n questions:**

1. two 2. *bādhāvivarjitama* 3. Naiyāyika 4. *Jñātatā* 5. Bauddha 6. DigNāga 7. Identical  
8. essential (*sādhakatama*) 9. *arthāpati* 10. *pramāṇa*

**Reference texts:**

1. *Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* by Pt. Sukh Lal Sanghavi. Publisher Saraswati Pustaka Bhandaa Ahmedabad  
2. Growth and development of Jain Nyaya by Acarya Mahaprajna Publisher Adarsha Sahitya Sangh Churu  
3. *Arhati Drsti* by Samani Mangal Prajna  
4. *Bhartiya darsana mein anumana* Dr Brij Narain Sharma  
**Author :** Samani Sharda Prajna

## Unit 4: Lesson 14

### *Anūmāna* (Inference) Jain, Baudha, and Nyāya

Inference is an important type of *pramāṇa*. In this chapter we shall discuss in details about the following topics.

#### 0.0 Introduction

#### 1.0 Nature of inference

##### 1.1 Pratijna or vow

##### 1.2 Hetu or universal relationship

##### 1.3 Udaharana or example

##### 1.4 Upanaya or

##### 1.5 Nigamana or

#### 2.0 Jain philosophy

#### 3.0 Nyāya philosophy

#### 4.0 Bauddha philosophy

#### 0.0 Introduction

While discussing *pramāṇa* we found that all philosophies have accepted the doctrine of *pramāṇa*. But there is a difference of opinion amongst philosophers about the number and types of *pramāṇa*. Cārvākas accept only direct (*pratyakṣa*) *pramāṇa* only. Along with direct, Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika accept inference; Sāṅkhya accept inference and canonical literature; Vaiśeṣika accept inference, words and *upamāna*; Mīmāṃsaka along with these four also accept *arthāpati* and Prabhākar Bhatt accepts *abhāva* (exclusion) also as *pramāṇa*. Jains accept two types of *pramāṇa* namely direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). The *pramāṇa* which does not need any other *pramāṇa* and which is experienced directly is *pratyakṣa* and the other, which needs another *pramāṇa* for its validity, is called *parokṣa*. Jains list memory, comparison, logic, inference and canonical literature under the category of *parokṣa*. Out of these we shall discuss inference in this chapter which has been accepted by almost all philosophies. History of inference is as old as that of the human being itself. In old religious texts we do not find discussions on it but in Vedas we do find a number of examples of inference.

#### 1.0 Nature of inference

*Anūmiti karaṇam anūmāna* 'this definition of inference is acceptable to all Indian philosophies. '*anūmiyate nena eti anūmānam*' is also acceptable as inference to all Indian philosophies. *Anumāna* is made of two words namely *anū* and *māna*. *Anū* is used to denote after while *māna* is used for knowledge. This means that after knowing the universal relationship the knowledge of the object of knowledge is inference. Here the implication is that knowledge acquired after any knowledge is not inference but it is a special type of knowledge. By special type of knowledge is meant *vyāpti* (universal relationship) knowledge. This *vyāpti* can be understood by a prominent example found in Nyāya texts. Seeing repeatedly the coexistence of fire and smoke in the kitchen, the observer concludes that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Hence, based on his prior knowledge, when he observes smoke on a hill in far away forest, he infers that there is fire on the hill. In this example, the object that is cognized is called *sādhya* or object of knowledge like fire. The medium used to cognize *sādhya* is called *sādhana* or middle term or the means e.g. smoke. Universal relationship between *sādhya* or the major term and *sādhana* is called *vyāpti* (concomitance). For example wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Base of the object of knowledge, in this case fire, is called *pakṣa* or the minor term. In this case *pakṣa* is the hill. During the period of inference the *pakṣa* only becomes the object of knowledge. '*parvatovahivmān*' and during the period of concomitance the attribute i.e. fire becomes the object of knowledge. When a person infers himself about the fire on the hill, then the inference is called *svārthānūmāna* or inference for oneself and when the same knowledge is transferred to others then it is called *parārthānūmāna* or inference for others. To express this knowledge to others he has to use certain sentences. These sentences, which are used during inference, are called *avayava* or members of the syllogism. There are differences in opinions about the number of members of syllogism. We are giving below brief description of the five members of syllogism.

### 1.1 *Pratijñā* or the proposition

Scholars consider that Gautam was the first one to talk about it. While defining it in Nyāyasutra, it is said '*sādhyanirdeśa' pratijñā*'. The sentence that is used to describe the object of knowledge is *Pratijñā*. It is merely a suggestion. Owner of the attributes and *pakṣa* are its synonyms. '*pakṣa vacanaṁ pratijñā*' Whatever we have to prove, then the sentence to describe the specific owner of that attribute is *pratijñā* e.g. '*parvato vahivmān*'

### 1.2 *Hetu* or the reason

The sentence used to prove existence of the object of knowledge in the *pakṣa* is called *hetu*. '*parvato vahivmān dhumavattvāt*'. Here smoke is the *hetu*. *Sādhana* is said to be synonym of *hetu*. *Sādhana* is in the form of an entity or object. When it is expressed in speech for other's inference, then it becomes *hetu*.

### 1.3 *Udāharana* or the explanatory example

While defining its nature, Gautam in Nyāyasutra says '*drṣṭānta* or view is in which both material and logical views are expressed and the expression of the *drṣṭānta* is example'. e.g. wherever there is smoke, there is fire; as in the kitchen.

### 1.4 *Upanaya* or the application

Gautam defines the its nature as '*upanaya* is to express in conclusion that the object of knowledge (*sādhya*), with reference to the example, is like that or it is not like that'. According to Jains, confirming the *sādhya* is *upanaya*.

### 1.5 *Nigamana* or the statement o the conclusion

This is the last part of others-inference. Nyayasutra defines it as '*Repeating the vow / Pratijñā along with the hetu is nigamana*'. According to Jains repetition / reconfirmation of the *sādhya* is *nigamana*.

Now we shall review briefly the concept of inference in different philosophies.

## 2.0 Jain philosophy

Nyāyāvatāra, the Jain text of logic gives clear explanation of the nature of inference. The decisive knowledge of the object of knowledge resulting from its '*Avinābhāvi*' or concomitant / universal relationship with the means is inference. Along with this definition, Akalaṅka has given another definition of inference as '*sādhanāt sādhyavijñānamanūmānam*'. Later Jain philosophers accepted this and gave it the prime importance in discussions on inference. The main components of inference are *sādhana* and *sādhya*.

Siddha sena was the first Jain acaryas who considered *pakṣa* or the owner of *sādhya*. According to him, *pakṣa* is the acceptance of the situation that cannot be refuted by direct or other means. Māṇikyanandi says '*during the period of concomitance, the attribute is sādhya while during inference the object with the attribute is the sādhya*'. For example we talk of concomitance as '*wherever there is smoke there is fire*'; the fire is *sādhya*. When we try to infer then '*parvato vahivmān dhumavattvāt*' the owner of the attribute becomes the *sādhya*. In Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā, Hemacandra calls *sisādhyaṣṭa*, *asiddha* and *abādhya* as major terms. Later on he also followed the earlier Jainācāryas.

The second important limb of inference is middle term or reason / *hetu*. Without it we cannot think of inference. Jain philosophers have accepted the only one characteristic of *hetu* called *avinābhāva* or universal relationship / concomitance. They present this in two ways namely: 1. Which does not exist in the absence of the major term and 2. Which always exist with the major term. *Hetu* is valid if these two conditions are met / fulfilled. In Anūyogadwāra we find three types of inference mentioned namely: *purvavaṇ*, *śeṣavaṇ* and *ditṭha-sāhammava*.

- i. *Purvavat* i.e. to infer after seeing / knowing the earlier known middle term.
- ii. *Śeṣavat*. This had been further subdivided in five parts namely work, cause, attribute, member and basis used to infer.
- iii. *Drṣṭa-Sādharmya* (homogeneous or affirmative). This is divided in two parts namely *sāmaṇya* (general) and *viśeṣa* (particulars)
  - a. *Sāmānya*. Seeing an object or many objects, to cognize another object belong to the same class as the object / s seen.

- b. *Viśeṣa* seeing one specific object out of many objects and to infer by comparing its attributes with the object to be inferred.

Inference for self and inference for others was first discussed by Siddha Sena Diwākara.

Briefly we find description of two types of inference in Jain literature namely attainment (*uplabdhi*) and non-attainment (*an-upalabdhi*). Both of these are further sub classified in six parts each namely i. Effect, ii. Cause, iii. Pervading, iv. *Purvacara*, v. *Uttaracara*, vi. *Sahacara*.

- Effect. There is fire because there is smoke. Here smoke is the effect of fire.
- Cause. There is shadow because there is tent erected.
- Pervading. Everything is multidimensional because reality is like that. *Sat* is the reason for being multidimensional object or major term.
- Purvacara*. Star Rohini will shine as star Kratika had already risen / shined.
- Uttaracar*. Bharani had risen/ shined, as Kratika is now rising/ shining.
- Sahacara*. Mango has form as it has taste. The middle term taste is co-existent with form of the mango.

The sentences that are used in inference are called *avayava* or members of syllogism. Jain philosophers have accepted *avayavas* based on the level of the intellectual listeners. If the listener is with exceptional intelligence than one or two members of syllogism will be sufficient and if the listener is with low intelligence level than five at times ten members of syllogism or are used.

### 3.0 Nyāya philosophy.

Gautam in Nyāyasūtra has indicated '*tatpurvakaṁ trividhamanūmānam*' as the characteristic of inference. Still the inquisitiveness remains about the implied meaning of the word *tat*. Vātsyāyana has defined *tat* as 'the word *tat* denotes perception of both attribute and its owner as well as just the attribute'. By using both attribute and its owner, we can confirm or remember the universal relationship between the two. After this, we cognize the attribute and then the cognition of absent /not present entity is called inference. In Nyāyasāra, Bhāsarvajña talks of '*saṃyaka avinābhāva*' and has defined inference as 'inference is the cognition of hidden object of major term using the universal relationship with the middle term.

The essential term of inference is major term. Synonyms of major term are *liṅgi*, *sādhya*, *vyāpaka*, *āpādhya*, *gamyā*, *apratibaddha* etc. Bhāsyakāra Vātsyāyana has indicated two forms of major term namely i. object with the specific attribute and ii. attribute of the specific object. Here attribute is indicative of the major term and object with the attribute as the minor term. In the first minor term, the owner is the indication of existence of the attribute in an entity and attribute is an adjective while in the second minor term, attribute indicates existence while the entity having the attribute is an adjective. It appears that Bhāsyakāra Vātsyāyana prefers the first minor term as indicated in '*parvatovahivmān*'. The word used to prove the existence of the major term in the minor term is called the middle term or *hetu*. Foundation of the sentence used for inference is the middle term. Hence its importance is self-evident. Gautam, on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity of the major term to middle term has classified middle term (*hetu*) as similar (*sādrarśya*) and dissimilar (*asādrarśya*). In this way the middle term can be related to the major term.

Naiyaikas have accepted five to be essential for a middle term for it to be right (*sadhetu*). These are:

- Pakṣatva* or the presence of the middle in the minor term
- Sapakṣatva* the presence of the middle term in the positive instances homogeneous with the proven.
- Vipakṣatva* or non-presence of the middle term in negative instances heterogeneous from the proven.
- Abādhitvaviśayatva* or non-incompatibility with the minor.
- Asatpratipakṣatva* or the absence of counteractive forces.

In the absence of the above five characteristics, the middle term becomes flawed middle term (*hetvābhāsa*) as follows:

- Asiddha* in the absence of *Pakṣatva*.
- Viruddha* in the absence of *Sapakṣatva*

- iii. *Anekāntika* in the absence of *Vipakṣatva*
- iv. *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* in the absence of *Abādhitvaviṣayatva*
- v. *Prakaraṇasma* in the absence of *Asatpratipakṣatva*

The middle term is also of many types. Gautam has given the two types as similar and dissimilar. Udoyatakata has given three types namely:

- i. *Avvayavyatireki* i.e. when the middle term has both positive and negative instances in examples used.
- ii. *Kevalānvayi* or merely positive instances of middle term are found in examples.
- iii. *Kevalavyatireta* or merely negative instances of middle term are found in examples

Maharṣi Gautam just mentioned three types of inference namely *Purvavat*, *Śeṣavat* and *Sāmānyatodraṣṭa*. Nyāya Bhāṣyakāra has defined these as follows:

- i. *Purvavat*: Where the result / effect is inferred from the cause, e.g. on seeing a cloudy sky, we infer rains. Brisk movement of clouds is the cause and on seeing them inference of rains coming is the effect.
- ii. *Śeṣavat*: Where the cause is inferred from the effect, e.g. when we see floods in the river we infer that the fall of heavy rains has taken place already.
- iii. *Sāmānyatodraṣṭa* Independent of cause and effect relationship, when we find a relationship between two entities / events which enables us to infer one from the other, e.g. a man without movement cannot move from one place to another. On seeing sun at two places, we infer that the sun also moves.

Besides these we also find mention of *svārtha* (for self) and *parārtha* (for others) types of inference in Nyāya texts. In *parārtha* inference Naiyāyikas accept five-part syllogism.

#### 4.0 Bauddha religion

They accept two types of *pramāṇa* namely direct and inference. Dignāga defines inference (*anūmāna*) as 'perception of the invisible /unknown object based on its known universal relationship with the known/ visible object'. Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārtika* says 'Inference is cognition of an unknown object based on its relationship to the attributes of a known entity' e.g. knowing a smoky hill to cognize the fire on the hill. Dignāga defines major term as the owner of the specific attribute. *Pramāṇavārtika* and other texts refute the concept of *pakṣa*.

Concerning *hetu*, Dharmakīrti defines *hetu* as '*hetu* is an entity one in which the attribute of the major term exists as its part'. In Bauddha texts, middle term is indicated as with three essential characteristics namely *Pakṣatva* or the presence of the middle in the minor term, *Sapakṣatva* the presence of the middle term in the positive instances homogeneous with the proven and *Vipakṣatva*. If even one of these does not exist in the middle term, then it becomes flawed middle term (*hetvābhāsa*). Dharmakīrti has given three types of middle term namely nature, *Kāryahetu* (function / effect) and non-existence (*anupaladhi*).

**Nature:** An entity whose existence does not expect its existence in any other entity, e.g. this is fire because it is hot.

**Kāryahetu:** that which originated from the major term, e.g. there is fire because here is smoke. Here smoke is the middle term as it originates from fire the major term.

**Anupaladhi:** This is a type of middle term, which helps us infer the non-existence of the entity (major term)

Alongwith the description of *svārtha* (for self) and *parārtha* (for others), the three types of *hetu*, namely *Purvavat*, *Śeṣavat* and *Sāmānyatodraṣṭa* are found in Buddhist texts. Baudhācārya Asanga talks of five types of inference namely *kārya*, *linga*, *svabhāva*, *dharma* and *hetufala*. Dharmakīrti accepts use of middle term and example for people of low intellect while for others just one i.e. middle term is enough.

We have reviewed the doctrine of inference in the three philosophies. We feel that the primary difference between the three is concerning middle term only (*hetu*). We shall now perform a comparative analysis of the middle term in the three philosophies.

Analyzing the definition of *pakṣa* in the three philosophies, we find that only the owner of the attribute is *pakṣa* according to Nyāya and Buddhists. According to Jain philosophers, such entity is *pakṣa* only during the time of inference only and not during the time of concomitance, e.g. the pitcher is non-eternal because it is the object o

knowledge. This is an inference sentence and the pitcher, which is non-eternal. Concomitance is defined like whatever is the object of knowledge is non-eternal. In concomitance, only non-eternal is only considered.

Characteristics of the middle term (*hetu*): Buddhists accept the three characteristics. According to them, *hetu* should be the attribute of *pakṣa*, should exist in the *sapakṣa* and not in the *vipakṣa*. True *hetu* is one with these three characteristics, e.g. this hill has fire because there is smoke in it. Wherever there is smoke there is fire like in kitchen. And wherever there is no smoke there is no fire like the pond. In this inference the hill is *pakṣa*, fire is the major term and with smoke is *hetu* or middle term. Kitchen is *sapakṣa* and the pond is *vipakṣa*. In this inference, smokiness, the middle term exists in the hill, the *pakṣa*, exists in *sapakṣa* i.e. in kitchen also and does not exist in the pond.

Jains say that any entity can be considered as *hetu* if we just take existence of the attribute in the *pakṣa* only as the characteristic of *hetu*; e.g. by taking the world as *pakṣa* and the existence of a black crow in it as *hetu*, we can infer a house as white, e.g. in this world there are white houses because black crows are found in it. But such inference is not right. Hence we conclude that just existence of *hetu* in *pakṣa* is not enough. Similarly just existence in *sapakṣa* and non-existence in *vipakṣa* alone are not enough characteristics of *hetu*; e.g. the sound is non-eternal because it is heard. In this there is nothing *sapakṣa*, just sound has been imagined as *pakṣa* as there is nothing else except sound, which can be heard. Hence to be heard, as *hetu* does not exist in *sapakṣa*, still this *hetu* is acceptable as it proves its major term. If we say here that its non-existence in *vipakṣa* is bound by the universal relationship and so it is acceptable; then universal relationship alone is the primary characteristic of *hetu*.

A middle term even though endowed with all the three characteristics mentioned above but devoid of universal relationship is not the true/right *hetu*, the child in the womb of Maitra's wife is black because he is the son of Maitra, like the other children of Maitra. In this inference 'because he is the son of Maitra' is *hetu* and the child in the womb of Maitra's wife is *pakṣa* and being the son of Maitra is *sapakṣa*, *sapakṣa* are his other brothers as they are also children of Maitra and *vipakṣa* is the children of others (other than Maitra) with fair colored children. In this way even though the three characteristics of *hetu* exist yet it is not enough to prove the major term as there is no universal relationship that whoever is the son of Maitra is black as the child can be of fair complexion also. Hence universal relationship is the true characteristic of *hetu*.

*Hetu*, without the above three characteristics is also able to assist in inferring the major term, e.g. Planet Rohini will shine as planet Kratika has already shone. In this inference there is attribute of *pakṣa* as planet Rohini is *pakṣa* here and its rise/shining in future is the major term. And the shining of Kratika is *hetu*. Shining of Kratika does not exist in the *pakṣa* Rohini. Shining of Kratika is its nature and attribute. In this way even non-existence of *pakṣatva*, *hetu* is the cause for inferring the major term. Hence the three characteristics indicated above are not sufficient to identify a *hetu* as true *hetu* as it results in flawed *hetu* also. Hence universal relationship is the true characteristic of the middle term.

Naiyayikas have given five fold characteristics to the middle term. Out of these, the three have been refuted already. Besides these, there are two more namely *Abādhitvaviśayatva* or non-incompatibility with the minor and *Asatpratipakṣatva* or the absence of counteractive forces. Here *Abādhitvaviśayatva* can be understood by the example of fire is cold as it is a substance like water. In this inference, the coolness of fire is the major term but is contradicted by the direct *pramāṇa* and so it is a contradiction. Example of *Asatpratipakṣatva* is the non-eternity of sound, as eternity does not exist in sound. Someone else says sound is eternal as its non-eternality is not attainable. In this example, the first middle term is contradicted and so is *satpratipakṣa*. A *hetu* that is not contradicted like this is *asatpratipakṣa*.

Jain philosophers are of the opinion that a *hetu* that conforms to these two characteristics will also have to conform to the universal relationship characteristic also. Hence by accepting universal relationship as the primary characteristic of *hetu* is valid. It is said '*Bādhāvinābhāvayorvirodhāt*' i.e. *bādhā* and universal relationship are contradictory or if there is any flaw in a *hetu*, then universal relationship cannot exist and where universal relationship exists, no flaw can exist.

Thus Jains say *hetu* even without three or five characteristics but with universal relationship is the true *hetu* and assist in inferring the major term. These three or five characteristics are mere extensions of universal relationship. Hence we should accept only characteristic of *hetu* and that is 'universal relationship'.

*Hetu* is the cause for the cognition of the major term. What type of *hetu* is that which can become the effect at some place and the cause at others? Which *hetu* and its types is the cause of the cognition of the major term is also a point of discussion amongst philosophers.

Buddhists accept two types of *hetu* namely concomitant (*tādātamyā*) and *tadutpatti* ( ) or nature (*Svabhāva*) and effect (*kārya*). *Tādātamyā* has universal relationship with the nature while *tadutpatti* has with *kārya*. There is no other *hetu* except nature (*Svabhāva*) and effect (*kārya*).

Jains say 'Concomitance means unity of middle and major term.' When there is unity then no differentiation can take place. Thus when we cognize the middle term, the major term is also simultaneously cognized as they are not different. Thus no inference is needed. Besides this, if existence of *tādātamyā* and *tadutpatti* relationship is necessary and considered as universal relationship also; then how the universal relationship between enhancement of the ocean and planet Kratika as middle term and major term can be established as they do not have *tādātamyā* and *tadutpatti* relationship? We infer moon by seeing its shadow in the water but shadow of moon in water is neither the nature of moon in the sky nor its effect. Still the shadow in water of moon is the cause of our inference of the existence of the moon in the sky. Hence besides nature and effect, one cause of cognition is *hetu* also. *Hetu* in the form of the shining of Kratika is neither the nature nor effect of the shining of the planet Rohini but the shining of both has a universal relationship. On this basis we can infer about the shining of Rohini. This is an example of *purvacara hetu*. Hence the statement of Buddhists that universal relationship is defined by *tādātamyā* and *tadutpatti* is refuted. On this basis, the two types of *hetu* i.e. nature and effect are also not correct *purvacara hetu* is also able to assist in inference of the major term.

Naiyāyikas have accepted three types of *hetu* namely *Avyavayvatireki* i.e. when the middle term has both positive and negative instances in examples used, *Kevalānvayi* or merely positive instances of middle term are found in examples and *Kevalavyatireki* or merely negative instances of middle term are found in examples. In these three types, we conclude that the first type i.e. *Avyavayvatireki* has all the five characteristics of *hetu* accepted by them and not in the other two. Hence *hetu* with five characteristics is not all pervading (*avyāpta*). Hence we should consider only characteristic of *hetu*.

A speaker makes his listeners infer about the major term through his speech. This is *parārtha* inference. The words and sentences used are called parts *lavayava*. Philosophers differ on the number of parts.

Buddhists consider the use of *hetu* as just enough. According to them use of *pratijñā* is superfluous.

Jains say 'Use of the *pakṣa* is not necessary is not acceptable to them'. Listeners with low intellect cannot infer the major term without the use of *pratijñā*. For example if some one tries to make his listeners understand the non-eternity of sound. For him he will first say sound is non-eternal first before he starts using other sentences. Similarly like one who acts, is actor and is non-eternal and by being so only action can be non-eternal and not otherwise.

All such sentences are irrelevant to the listeners as he is not able to comprehend the subject of discussion / lecture. Hence to make one understand the specifics of the major term, it is essential to first state the *pratijñā*. If we do not accept this then we may not be able to use the *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* to explain the major term properly.

Naiyāyikas, on the other hand say the essentiality of using all the five parts regardless of the level of intellect of the listener. If even one of the five parts are not used, then the results can be flawed.

Jain philosophers, using *Anekāntika* doctrine, keep the intellect of the listener in mind and accordingly accept use of 1, 2, 3, 4 and all five parts. The need is to ensure the proper understanding of the listeners and hence only essential number of parts is to be used.

To conclude we see the similarities and contradictions of the doctrine of inference in the three philosophies.



## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Explain the comparative nature of the middle term (*hetu*) in the three philosophies?

### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain briefly the five parts (*avayava*)?
2. Explain the types of inference as given in *Anuyogadvara*?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. Characteristics of the middle term as per Jains?
2. How is *avayava* defined?
3. What are the characteristics of inference as per Gautam?
4. What is *hetu* as per Nyāya?
5. Give the names of the characteristics of *hetu* as per Nyāya?
6. Which *hetvābhāsa* results in the absence of *Vipakṣatva*?
7. Which *pramāṇa* are accepted by Bauddha tradition?
8. Name the types of *hetu* as per Dharmakirti.?
9. What is *pakṣa* as Nyāya?
10. Which Jain philosopher first discussed *pakṣa* ?

Answers to the blank fill n questions:

1. universal relationship
2. Sentences used in inference
3. 'tatpurvakan trividhamanumanam'
4. to infer the major term, use of middle term is called *hetu*
5. *Pakṣatva*, *Sapakṣatva*, *Vipakṣatva*, *Abādhitvaviṣayatva*, *Asatpratipakṣatva*
6. *Anekāntika*
7. Direct and inference
8. *svabhava*, *karya* and *anuplabdhi*
9. entity with specific attribute
10. Siddha sena

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## Unit 5: Lesson 15

### ***Dhyāna* (Meditation) Jain, Baudha, and Yoga.**

In this chapter we shall discuss in details about the following topics.

- 0.0 Introduction
- 1.0 Nature of meditation in Jain tradition.
- 2.0 Nature of meditation in Baudha philosophy
- 3.0 Similarities in Jain and Baudha meditation practices.
- 4.0 Dissimilarities in Jain and Baudha meditation practices.
- 5.0 Meditation in Patanjali's *Yoga darśana*.
- 6.0 Similarities in Jain and Yoga meditation.

#### **0.0 Introduction**

Practice of meditation is the practice of attaining the light, the truth about self. Man wants to attain truth about self and he never wants darkness or ignorance. Therefore everybody practices to achieve light of knowledge /wisdom and eliminate darkness of ignorance. As the light transcends in life, the darkness keeps on disappearing.

#### **1.0 Nature of meditation in Jain tradition.**

Meditation is the most important activity in the path of spiritual purification. The word *dhyāna* comes from '*dhyai cintāyām*' i.e. contemplation is meditation. But the meaning of *dhyāna* from the attainable viewpoint is the concentration of thoughts or to focus the tendencies of the mind on a specific object of knowledge or to suppress the wandering tendencies of the mind (*Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1463, '*aṅto mūhūttkāṇaṁ cittasassasasayā havai jñāṇaṁ*'). *Dhyānaśataka* says '*thiramajjhavasāṇaṁ jñāṇaṁ*' i.e. the stable state of the mind is *dhyāna*.

*Tattvārtasūtra* says '*uttamasahāṇasayaikagracintānirodho dhyānamāntamūhūrttāt* verse 9/27' i.e. focused thinking and suppression of the activities of mind, body and speech is meditation. We thus know that in Jain philosophy, meditation does not just talk of mind but it talks of all activities of mind, body and speech. Therefore the suppression or annihilation of the activities of these three i.e. mind, body and speech is meditation. As per *Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1467-1478, the omniscient has only suppression type of meditation while others have both concentration and suppression types both. Even though meditation is related to mind, body and speech, yet it has always been described as related to mind only. This problem was present before Bhadrā Bāhu also.

If meditation includes concentration of the activities of mind, body and speech, then how to relate meditation involving just mind. (*Āvaśyakaniryukti*, verse 1467). Bhadrā Bāhu resolved this issue as follows. 'Our body has three elements namely vat, pitta and kaffa. Out of these three, the dominant element only is discussed. This does not mean that the other two are non-existent. Similarly concentration of mind is meditation is to indicate the principal organ to be concentrated upon. (*Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1468-9). Like the concentration of mind is called mental meditation, similarly the effort and wishing to make the body without any activity /disturbances is called body meditation (*Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1474). Similarly the speech activities are curbed with a determination to do so is called speech meditation. (*Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1476/7). When a mind is busy in concentration of its activities and is associated with similar efforts by body and speech then all three types of meditations occur simultaneously. (*Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1478). Here the mind is primary and body and speech are secondary and hence is called mental meditation. To conclude we can say that activities of mind associated with body and speech are called *bhāvakriyā* or activities of mind and is meditation (*Āvaśyakaniryukti* verse 1486). In meditation, we do not just suppress activities of mind, body and speech but direct them to specific activity. Immediately the question arises that self-study and meditation both involve concentration of mind, then why are they different. In meditation, mind is relaxed while in self-study it is engaged in knowing something. Meditation is the relaxed and enriched state of mind.

In sleep, dream and slumber, no auspicious or inauspicious meditation is possible. Similarly the newborn child or intoxicated, insane and unconscious persons cannot meditate. Meditation does not mean void or non-existence of

mind. Meditation is the process of becoming one with the object of meditation resulting in stable state of mind. (Āvaśyakaniryukti verse 148-3). Meditation is that state of consciousness which is busy just with the object of concentration /meditation i.e. even with external inactivity, it is actively busy with its inner consciousness unhindered. Therefore it is said 'the one who is indifferent to external activities is active in its soul/self. We thus conclude that absence of contemplation is not meditation as is the contemplation on multiple objects. Contemplation of one object is meditation, so activity of mind is meditation which results in its submerging with consciousness. With these definitions it becomes clear that Jainācāryas did not call inactivity of mind or toxic state of mind as meditation.

## 2.0 Nature of meditation in Bauddha tradition.

In Buddhist literature we find the use of *dhyāna* and *samādhi* in place of yoga. Meditation is the heart of Buddhist religion. In Buddhist path of purification, mediation means contemplation on some object (Samantapadika page 145-146), but without practices nothing is possible. Hence practice by mind is also meditation. (Dhyana Sampradaya page 81). To be free from external infatuations is meditation (Dignaga sutra Āva-ve-log page 47).

Before acquiring the light of true knowledge, Tathāgata Buddha tried to suppress breathing. He told his disciple that he wanted to suppress the breathing, therefore I tried to suppress the breathe from nose, ears and mouth but I did not succeed. (Angutara Nikāya 63). Therefore He propagated the eightfold path of purification (*Aṣṭāṅgika mārga*. Sanyktanikāya 5, 10/317-28). In Buddhist yoga, *samādhi* has an important place and to achieve it, meditation has been prescribed. (Dīrghanikāya ½P 28-29).

### 2.1 Baudha Dhyāna yoga

Baudha *bhikṣus* have categorically mentioned two accomplishments for attaining *nirvāṇa*. First relates to the purification of conduct (*śīla viśuddhi* by practicing the right conduct to attain moral purity) and second is purification of mind (*citta viśuddhi* by purifying the mind). Purification of conduct (*śīla viśuddhi*) is found in many Buddhist texts but the *citta viśuddhi* being given orally by the preceptors to their disciples is not found in many. In many chapters of Sutta Piṭaka, Buddha has talked about *samādhi* at many places but this is not well organized. *Viśuddhimagga* by Acārya Buddhaghosha is most authentic, and useful text on this subject. In this, from the Hinayāna viewpoint, *dhyāna* yoga has been described crisply. In Mahāyāna also, yoga has an important place. By giving equal importance to yoga and conduct, Vijñānavādi are known as *Yogācāra*. Their texts Mahāyāna Sūtralankāra and Yogācārabhūmisāstra give ample description of meditation.

#### 2.1.0 Meditation in Hinayāna

To achieve the objective, use is made of meditation. There is a fundamental difference in the basic objectives of both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. In Hinayāna, attaining *nirvāṇa* is the ultimate objective, which can be attained in this life by eliminating the *kleśas* like attachment etc. In this the practice gets ample support from meditation. Without *samādhi*, one cannot overcome the *kāmadhātu* (*vasnāmaya jagata*) and move to *rupadhātu*. *Samādhi* can enable the practitioner to move to *rupadhātu*.

##### 2.1.1 Samādhi in Mahāyāna

The objective in Mahāyāna is different. Here the objective is to attain Buddhata. This is not the work of one lifetime only. In many lives, the practitioner keeps on accumulating the auspicious results and ultimately achieves the true and complete knowledge. Attaining the wisdom is result of all other attainments. Until one is able to activate this wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), one cannot attain Buddhata. To attain this Buddhata, *samādhi* is extremely useful. Similarly to attain *nirvāṇa*, it is essential to pervade the mind (*citta*).

Buddhaghosha has defined *samādhi* as concentration of mind. To concentrate mind and all mental tendencies on one object truly is *samādhi*. The mental state just a moment before concentrating mind on an object *Upcāra samādhi* and to make the mind stable on the object is *samādhi* or *appaṇa* or *arpanā*. Bhagavan Buddha, in his sermons, has said different ways such as *vipaśyanā*, meditation, wisdom, auspicious arguments /logic karmas, knowledge, *dharma*, *śīla* and proper livelihood and *samādhi* to attain *nirvāṇa*. In Dhammapada He say:

*Savve saṅkhārā aniccāti yadā paññāya passati  
Atha nivindati dūkkhe esa maggo viśuddhiyā.*

i.e. when the man looks with wisdom then all the *saṁsakāras* appear to be momentary. Then he becomes free from *kleśas* and his infatuation in the world subsides. This is the path of *viśuddhi*.

*Natthi jñānaṁ apannassa paññā natthi ajñāyato*

*Yamhi jñānaṁ ca paññā ca sa vai nibvānasantike.*

i.e. one without wisdom /intellect cannot meditate and wisdom does not accrue to one without meditation. One who has wisdom and meditation both, *nirvāṇa* is very close to him.

*Prajñā*, *śīla* and *samādhi* help destroy all the impurities and assist in attaining *nirvāṇa*. These are three advices by Buddha. *Śīla* starts the purification practice; *samādhi* does the same in the middle of purification process and *prajñā* during the final stages of purification. *Śīla* overcomes /destroys *apāya* (*durgati* and *vinipāta*), *samādhi* does the same of *kāmadhātu* and *prajñā* does the same of all. A person, who intends to move on the path of attaining *nirvāṇa*, should first observe *śīla*. When *śīla* becomes purer by minimizing wants, contentment, solitariness etc, then the urge to observe *samādhi* starts.

*Samādhi* is the state due to which the mind and mental attributes all focus and become stable on one object without any hankering. *Samādhi* destroys alternatives or hankering and the mind and its activities become one with one object only.

Concentration of the mind in *kāma*, *rūpa* and then *arūpa* is called *laukika samādhi* and the path is called *śamathayāna*. Suppression of obstacles is called *śamatha*. By suppressing the obstacles, one achieves concentration of mind (*citta*). Therefore meaning of *śamatha* is concentration of mind also.

The second path is called *Vipaśyanā* and is called *lokottara samādhi*.

In Buddhist canons, *pudgala* (*jīva*) is an amalgam of *saṁskāras*. It is like a series or sequence (*santāna*). There is no such entity like *ātmā* that is eternal, permanent or active. It is just a combination of five elements namely *rūpa*, *vednā*, *saṁjñā*, *saṁskāra* and *vijñāna*. This amalgam originates and destroys every moment. This sequence of origination and destruction is pain as origination is due to *kleśas* and *kleśas* makes the *santāna* pervert. To eliminate *kleśas*, *prajñā* is most potent. First we should know that soul and soul-ness do not exist, all attributes are momentary. One who sees momentariness in all attributes and associated pains and non-soul, is indeed believer of truth. He has acquired the *vipaśyanā* knowledge. Practitioner of this path is called *ipaśyanāyika*. By acquiring seven *viśuddhis*, one acquires the fruits of *Viśuddhimagga*. These seven *viśuddhis* are:

- |                              |                                   |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| i. <i>Śīla</i>               | ii. <i>Citta</i>                  |
| iii. <i>Drṣṭi</i>            | iv. <i>Kāṅkṣā vitarāṇa</i>        |
| v. <i>Mārgāmārga darśana</i> | vi. <i>Pratipātijñāna darśana</i> |
| vii. <i>Jñāna darśana</i>    |                                   |

### 3.0 Similarities in Jain and Buddhist paths of purification.

*Śvāsaprekṣā* is included in the Buddhist path of purification under *ānāpānasati*. In Jain path of purification, stoppage of the activities of three *guptis* (mind, body and speech) had been given importance while in Buddhist path, complete silence is given importance. The ultimate aim of meditation in Jain path of purification is to be in *śūkladhyāna* and attain detachment, *arhat* and ultimately *siddhatva*. Buddhist path of purification also aims the same i.e. *arhat* and *nirvāṇa*. *Dhyāna*, *Dhāraṇā* and *samādhi* in Jain path and *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* in Buddhist path are the main limbs of their path of purification.

### 3.1 Dissimilarities in Jain and Buddhist paths of purification.

Soul is the basis of Jain philosophy and path of purification. Entire code of conduct is based on the existence of soul. A practitioner performs *Śvāsaprekṣā*, he knows the vibrations of breathe. Similarly *Śariraprekṣā* makes the practitioner feel the vibrations of the body but he is not to be engrossed in the vibrations but move towards their suppression or annihilation. Amongst these vibrations is one non-vibration state and the aim is to experience them. This is not acceptable to Buddhist philosophers, as they do not support the concept of soul and its existence.

Buddha said ‘ Eliminate pain, eliminate the cause of pain and do not get involved in the discussion of soul.’

Buddha told the straight path of eliminating pain. On the other hand, Mahavira said ‘ Do not get engrossed in just the present but go to the root of the matter i.e. the soul’. This is the basic difference in the two doctrines.

Bauddha path of purification includes *ānāpānasati*, *kāyavipaśyanā*, *vednāvipaśyanā*, etc. There is no place for *kumbhaka* and postures *lāsanas* are prohibited. In *vipaśyanā*, *prānāyāma* is not included. The practitioner is asked to practice silence for ten days before starting on the practice. In Jain path of purification, postures, *prānāyāma*, *kāyotsarga*, *prekṣā* and *anuprekṣā* etc. are included. In Bauddha philosophy, meditation is considered mental only (Viśuddhimagga page 141-151). Meditation is not just mental but also speech and of body as per Jains. This is the unique opinion of Jains.

## 5.0 Meditation in Pātañjala Yogadarsana.

Pātañjala Yogadarsana is an important Yoga text of *mahrṣi* Patanjali. *Mahrṣi* Patanjali has kept meditation at the seventh place in his eight-part yoga. While defining meditation, he writes ‘*tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam*’ (3/2). Meditation is the concentration of mind in the object of meditation like the form of the heart. One can concentrate his mind in navel, heart, nose or any other part as per the convenience. In meditation, one sees the object of meditation. Ultimate state of *dhāraṇā* is meditation. During *dhāraṇā* (6<sup>th</sup> part of yoga and just before meditation) mind is concentrated on a body part and achieving the concentration of mind is called meditation. Focus on similar tendencies of mind on same object and elimination of dissimilar tendencies is meditation.

Even though the author and the commentator both have both said *dhāraṇā* of navel center etc as meditation, yet in those places also, one should look at the God existent there as the object of meditation i.e. we should not focus on those centers only but focus on the God existing in those places. Hence in Garuḍapurāṇa, *dhāraṇā* of Brhmalike God in those places is called meditation.

*Prānāyāmaidarsabhiyārvatkālakrato*  
*Sa tāvatkālaparyataḥ mano brahmaṇ dhārayet*

And Śaṅkarācārya says:

*Samaḥ kāyaśirogrivaḥ dhārayannacalaḥ sthira’*  
*Saṃprekṣya nāsikagṛaṃ evaṁ diśaścānavalokayan*

In Gītābhāṣya of this verse ‘*ātmasaṁsthāṇ mana’ kratvā*’ has been used as Bhāgawata-vākya it is said that concentration in soul, as the fore part of the nose etc is meditation. Hence meditation is not concentration on that body part but on the soul as defined in the texts.

During the period of meditation, one is conscious of the three entities namely *citta*, tendencies of the *citta* and object of *cittavritti* called one who is meditating, meditation and the object of meditation respectively. But when, as a result of deep practice, the *citta* is just one with the object of meditation then *saṁādhi* is attained. For example when water is put in the salt, then the salt becomes one with water and appears to be water and not salt. Similarly during meditation, meditation becomes one with the object of meditation and feels like just the object of meditation. If we do not accept the existence of meditation during *saṁādhi*, then the experience of the object of meditation becomes suspect. The *sutrakāra* has emphasized this by using the word ‘*eva*’ i.e. during *saṁādhi*, even though meditation exists yet it is not felt and so appear like non-existent.

If we do not consider the main word (*mātrapada*) in ‘*arthamātranirbhāsam*’ then the meaning of *saṁādhi* would have been merged with meditation as during meditation the presence of the three entities also includes the object of meditation. However when we use the word *mātra* (only), then it reflects just the object of meditation and nothing more is experienced during *saṁādhi*. During meditation experience of the three suggests independence of the three entities and not all three as one. The difference between *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *saṁādhi* is explained by the following. To concentrate the wandering tendencies of mind in the object of meditation for two hours is *dhāraṇā*, to contemplate the object of meditation for twenty-four hours is *dhyāna* and to make *dhyāna* and object of meditation one after twelve days of meditation is *saṁādhi*. This is said so in Skandapurāṇa.

*Dhāraṇā pancanāḍika dhyānaḥ syat ṣaṣṭināḍikam*  
*Dinadvādaśakenaiva saṁādhirabhidhiyate.*

i.e. the state of mind after five *nādis* (approx 2 hours) of meditation is *dhāraṇā*, after 60 *nādis* of contemplation is *dhyāna* and after 12 days of continuous meditation is *samādhi*.

Patanjali has associated meditation with just mind. According to him, the object in which *dhāraṇā* is made, the knowledge about just the object of meditation in that object and that knowledge is free from the knowledge of other objects, is called *dhyāna*. Here the implication is the manifestation of the tendencies of the mind in the same object in each consequent moment and not of any other object. Patanjali talks of concentration and suppression associated with mind only. In *Garūdapūraṇa* also, contemplation on soul and *Brahm* is called *dhyāna*.

## 6.0 Similarity between Jain and Yoga.

In *Yogasutra* we find eight limbs namely *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyahāra*, *dharana*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. In Jain path of purification also, we find *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratisaṅhantā*, *kāyotsarga*, *bhāvanājapa*, *anupreksā*, *dhyāna*, *samādhi* etc.

Patanjali has considered *dhyāna* and *samādhi* as independent, so the concept of meditation did not develop much in it. Jainācāryas considered meditation is its vastness that they did not have to consider *samādhi* as separate from meditation. *Sampragyāta samādhi* in Patanjali is the first stage of *Śūkdadhyāna* in Jainism. Similarly *Asampragyāta samādhi* in Yoga is the later stage of *Śūkdadhyāna* of Jainism. Considering *samādhi* as different from *dhyāna* developed after the Jain path of purification was established. Hence we can conclude that Patanjali does not influence Jain path of purification.

To conclude we can say that Jain, Buddhist and yoga are different traditions and yet they gave due importance to meditation in their path of purification.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Explain the comparative nature of Jain and Yoga traditions of meditation.

### Short notes type questions:

1. Analyze the nature of meditation in Buddhist tradition?
2. What is the nature of meditation in Hīnayāna?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. What is the ultimate objective of Mahāyāna?
2. Who defined *samādhi* as concentration of mind?
3. What is eliminated by *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*?
4. What is the name for Laukika *samādhi*?
5. Who wrote Patanjala *Yogadarśana*?
6. The last stage of *dhāraṇā* is called .....
7. The main element to eliminate pain is .....
8. Concentration of mental tendencies after twelve days is .....
9. In *Dhyānaśāstra*, the ..... state of mind is called *dhyāna*?
10. *Samādhi* is the main element to take the practitioner to .....

### Answers to the blank fill n questions:

1. to attain *Buddhatva*
2. *Buddhaghosh*
3. all impurities
4. *Śamathayāna*
5. *Maharsi Patanjali*
6. *Dhyāna*
7. *Prajñā*
8. Complete *samādhi*
9. *sthira* /stable
10. *rupadhātu*

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5. *Patanjala Yoga dasana.*

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## Unit 5: Lesson 16

### ***Dhyāna ke bheda* (Types of Meditation) Jain, Baudha, and Yoga.**

In this chapter we shall discuss in details about the following topics.

#### 0.0 Introduction

##### 1.0 Types of meditation in Jain tradition.

###### 1.1 Definition of meditation

###### 1.2 Types of meditation in the light of Jain Canons

##### 2.0 Types of meditation in Baudha philosophy

###### 2.1 Definition of samadhi

###### 2.2 Types of meditation

###### 2.3 Types of samadhi

###### 2.4 Comparative analysis of Jain and Baudha meditation practices.

###### 2.5 Differences in philosophical basis

##### 3.0 Types of meditation in Yoga *darśana*.

#### 0.0 Introduction

Existence and importance of meditation in Spiritual Indian traditions had been there since ancient times. No spiritual tradition can support the achievement of the ultimate objective without practice of meditation. This is reason that all Indian traditions have meditation in one form or the other. Maharshi Patanjali in Yoga *darśana* has given the seventh state / part to meditation. Tathāgata Buddha also had considered essential the mental meditation.

#### 1.0 Nature of meditation in Jain tradition.

In Jainism, the tradition of meditation had been in existence since pre-historic times. From historical perspective, we find many references to meditation in Ācārāṅga. In Ācārāṅga, Utrārdhyana and other texts we find scattered references about meditation. Later *ācāryas* have gone to the extent of saying that meditation in the path of purification has the same place as brain in the body. Meditation is the most important activity in the path of spiritual purification.

*Dhyāna* is the only check on the wandering nature of the mind, method of experiencing the truth and to awaken the spiritual discipline. Meditation is a method that can free the mind of human beings from fear, pain, tension and suffocation. Other methods of giving peace are momentary but meditation provides permanent peace of mind as it is the method of realizing the self/soul.

Importance of meditation has been accepted by all religions. *Dhyāna* in Jain philosophy is analogous to *samādhi* in Baudha and Yoga philosophies.

#### 1.1 Definition of *dhyāna* in Jain philosophy

Tattvārtasūtra says '*uttamasahāṇasyaikaagrcintānīrodho dhyānamāntamūhūrttāt* verse 9/27' i.e. focused thinking and suppression of the activities of mind, body and speech is meditation. Dhyanasataka says stable and busy mind is meditation. In Jain Siddhānta Dipikā, Ācārya Tulsī says '*Ekāgre mana' sanniveśanaḥ yoga nirodho vā dhyānam*' i.e. to concentrate the mind on one object and to suppress the activities of mind, body and speech is *dhyāna*. We find detailed discussions in Jain texts about meditation. Jain *āgamas* are the primary source for facts about meditation. Therefore we shall first review the Jain *āgamas* about the nature and types of meditation.

#### 1.2 Types of meditation as per Jain *āgamas*

We do not find as crisp discussions in Jain *āgamas* as in later Jain texts. This is due to the fact that such traditions of writing separately characteristics and types of meditation were not prevalent then. At that time related entities and doctrines were used to explain the types and characteristics of the subject. Hence on the basis of four types of meditation found in *āgamas*, we can infer that concentration of mind on an object was considered as meditation then. In Jain *āgamas* we find clearly the types of meditation, which were used by later *ācāryas* and even today are used to explain the following types of meditation.

Concentrated contemplation is called meditation. On this basis there are four types of meditation namely: *Ārta*, *Raudra*, *Dharmya* and *Śukla*. We can study these in details in Unit 1 lesson 12. Therefore we just mention their names only as the objective of this lesson is to compare them in different philosophies.

## 2.0 Types of meditation in Buddhist philosophy

In Buddhist tradition also, meditation is as important as in Jain tradition as all path of purification, be they Jain or Buddhist etc, cannot be complete without meditation. Hence meditation is the heart of Buddhist philosophy also. As per Buddhists, the primary cause of this transmigration is the wandering tendencies of the mind. Therefore meditation is considered essential to stabilize the wandering nature of mind. As is said 'Practice of the mind is meditation' i.e. to stabilize the mind on any one object, to contemplate on it is meditation. Meditation is used to achieve the desired objective. As the ultimate objectives of both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna are different, like in Hinayāna attaining nirvana by attaining *arhat* state is the primary objective while in Mahāyāna it is to achieve Buddhata. We find use of *dhyāna* and *śamādhi* in Buddhist texts. Clarifying the differences between *dhyāna* and *śamādhi*, Dr Bhag Chand Jain says 'śamādhi is associated with *kūśala* attributes whereas *dhyāna* considers both *kūśala* and *akūśala* attributes' Hence coverage of *dhyāna* is much larger than *śamādhi*. However a detailed analysis will show that both *dhyāna* and *śamādhi* are same.

### 2.1 Definition of śamādhi

*Śamādhi* means concentration or focus. To concentrate all activities of mind on one object is *śamādhi*. In *śamādhi* all alternatives are eliminated and the mind becomes stable on just one object.

### 2.2 Types of meditation

We find five types of meditation in Abhidhamma Piṭaka. But there are only two primary types of meditation namely:

- i. *Rūpāvacaradhyāna* i.e. concrete object of meditation with form,
- ii. *Arūpāvacaradhyāna* i.e. non-concrete object of meditation without any form.

### 2.3 Types of śamādhi

Even though there are many types of *śamādhi*. Discussion about all of them will not lead us to understand the concepts of each clearly. Basically *śamādhi* is classified as of two types namely i. *Laukika* and ii. *Lokottara*.

- i. *Laukika*. Concentration of auspicious activities of mind on *kāma*, *rūpa* and *arūpa* entities. This path of *śamādhi* is called *śamathayāna*.
- ii. *Lokottara*. Concentration of mind associated with *Āryamārga*. It is called *Vipasyanāyāna*.

The first type yields physical and worldly powers while the second is essential for attaining *nirvāṇa*. Without *Vipasyanā*, the practitioner cannot attain *arhat* state.

*Vipasyanā* is a type of special knowledge. When the practitioner acquires the knowledge that all attributes are temporary, with pain and non-soul, then *Vipasyanā* is attained. We are not discussing here *Vipasyanā* or *śamathayāna* as they had been discussed in details in unit 1 lesson 3 paper III already.

## 2.4 Comparative analysis of Jain and Buddha meditation practices.

After studying the types of meditation, we can present, as follows, similarities and dissimilarities of Jain and Buddhist traditions concerning types of meditation.

1. In both traditions, concentration of mind is said to be meditation.
2. Both consider meditation as a means to attain Moksha.
3. Concerning types of meditation, acaryas of both traditions have differences. In Jain texts we find four types of meditation and at places they talk of two types only. Similarly in Buddhist texts we find four types and at other places five types of meditation. Perhaps individual ācāryas had their own opinions but primarily there are two types of meditation in both traditions. In Jain tradition, praśasta and apraśasta and in Buddhist rūpāvacara and arūpāvacara.



4. In both traditions, the definitions become more and more subtle. However some of the subtypes enunciated by Jains are not found in Buddhist texts, e.g. in Jain texts we find āṛta and raudra dhyāna and then with respect to the object of meditation we find pindastha, padastha, rūpastha and rūpātita which are conspicuous by their absence in Buddhist texts. But we find similarities in subtypes of dharma and śūkla dhyāna of Jains and rūpāvacara of Buddhist tradition. Like Dharmadhyana is the first stage of spiritual purification in Jains, in Buddhist tradition also arūpāvacara can be compared to rūpātita of Jains as in both traditions, meditation progresses to the formless object ultimately.

## 2.5 Differences in philosophical basis

Basis of Prekṣādhyaṇa is Jain philosophy and that of Vipāśyanā is Buddhist philosophy. As per Buddhist philosophers, when one acquires the knowledge about temporary nature of reality, pain and non-existent of soul, then Vipāśyanā becomes effective. On the other hand Jains say that the state when one becomes conscious of both permanence and momentary nature of reality then Prekṣā becomes effective. Jains do not accept just momentary nature or reality or just doctrine of pain only. These are the principles that show the differences between Prekṣādhyaṇa and Vipāśyanā.

### 2.5.0 Śvāsaprekṣā

There are some similarities between Prekṣādhyaṇa and Vipāśyanā. Śvāsaprekṣā is one such point. It is there in both traditions but the methods are different. In Vipāśyanā, the emphasis is to see the simple and easy breath while in Śvāsaprekṣā the emphasis is on deep breath. Second difference is of restraint/control of breath in Prekṣā while in Vipāśyanā it is not so.

#### 2.5.1 Postures / āsanās

In Vipāśyanā, postures are prohibited, as they are not acceptable in Buddhist tradition while they were of great importance during Mahāvīra's penance. This is the reason that postures are emphasized in Prekṣādhyaṇa.

#### 2.5.2 Prāṇāyāma

There is no place for them in Vipāśyanā while it is very important in Prekṣādhyaṇa. It is the method to control the life itself. Until we control our prāṇas, we cannot tame the wandering nature of the mind.

#### 2.5.3 Silence

In Vipāśyanā, silence is extremely emphasized while in Prekṣā it is also very important but not that stringent.

#### 2.5.4 Types of Vipāśyanā

There are many types of Vipāśyanā, e.g. ānāpāna satī, kāya, dharma, vednā etc. But at present only two types namely ānāpāna satī i.e. to look at breath in and out and kāya i.e. to look at the body.

#### 2.5.5 Limbs of Prekṣādhyaṇa

It is divided in twelve parts namely Kāyotsarga, Antaryātra, Śvāsaprekṣā, Śarīraprekṣā, Caitanyakenraprekṣā, leśyādhyaṇa, anuprekṣā, vicāraprekṣā, jyotikendraprekṣā. All these are practiced.

##### 2.5.5.0 Caitanyakendraprekṣā

This is the fundamental difference between Vipāśyanā and Prekṣādhyaṇa. It does not exist in Vipāśyanā as there is no such element as soul and so the question of looking at it does not arise. Thus Vipāśyanā cannot provide experience of the self. For this Caitanyakendraprekṣā is essential.

##### 2.5.5.1 Kāyotsarga

Prekṣādhyaṇa is based on kāyotsarga. This is the first stage of meditation. It means releasing the body, restraining the body and the last stage is to leave it. It thus enables the practitioner to acquire knowledge about difference between body and soul.

We don't find the use of the term kāyotsarga in Vipāśyanā. We find the word śavāsana for it in Vipāśyanā. The basic difference between kāyotsarga and śavāsana is that in kāyotsarga is not just idling the body but be conscious about the soul in it at the same time while in śavāsana the main objective is just idling of the body.

In conclusion we can say that Prekṣādhyaṇa is an all encompassing and scientific method. It is not an imitation of any other method of meditation. All its usages are independent.

### 3.0 Types of meditation in Yoga darśana.

Yoga sādhanā had been an important sādhanā in Indian religions and meditation had been an important practice within Yoga sādhanā. Yoga suppresses the tendencies of mind and enhances its concentration on one object. The most potent method of concentrating mind is meditation. Meditation destroys wandering tendencies, instability and unhappiness of mind. Meditation is equally important in both Jain and Yoga philosophies.

Maharshi Patanjali defines meditation as '*tatra pratyayaikatānatā dhyānam*' (3/2). Meditation is the concentration of mind in the object of meditation like the form of the heart. It is essential to stop all wandering tendencies of mind to be able to concentrate. He said "*yogaścittivritti nirodha*" i.e. to stop the wandering tendencies of mind is yoga.

How to stop these wandering tendencies of mind? Before knowing the method it is important to understand the source of such tendencies. Concerning such tendencies, Yogasutra says 'tendencies occur due to engagement in the world. The tendencies are primarily of five types namely: *pramāṇa*, *viparyaya*, *vikalpa*, *nidrā*, *smṛti*. Besides these he also talks of suppressing *kleśas*. *Kleśas* are also given as of five types namely: *avidhyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *abhiniveśa*.

To suppress and annihilate all these, he says '*abhyāsa vairāgyabhyāsan nirodha*' i.e. practice and detachment causes suppression and annihilation of these tendencies. Detachment helps in stopping the wandering of mind in many directions and the practice makes it inward looking. They both help in stopping all engagements of the mind. Meditation alone helps in improving our practice and detachment. In fact to change the mind from engagement (*saviśaya*) to detachment (*nirviśaya*) is the highest state of meditation. He has kept meditation at the seventh place in his yoga practice i.e. *yam*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma*, *pratyahāra*, *dhāranā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi*. He has kept *dhāranā* before *dhyāna* in his eight-limb practice of yoga. It is therefore important to understand the concept of *dhāranā*.

#### 3.1 Dhāranā

To achieve concentration of mind, it is important to focus it on a specific object / point which is called *dhāranā*. The object of *dhāranā* is first gross and it goes on becoming subtler and subtler. In Jain texts we do not find description of *dhāranā* independently even though it is included in discussions on *dhyāna*. The last stage of *dhāranā* is called *dhyāna*.

#### 3.2 Dhyāna

In meditation we look at the object of meditation. In meditation, the period till the object which is used as a support or as object of meditation, is not looked at by mind is called *dhāranā* and when the same is looked at by mind, then it becomes *dhyāna*. This process of meditation slowly progresses towards *samādhi* when the mind becomes totally inactive and consciousness only exists. *Samādhi* is the last stage of Yoga in which without the support object, *dhyāna* and *dhyeya* appear separate.

Yoga darśana talks of two types of *samādhi* namely i. *sampragyāta* and ii. *asampragyāta*.

##### 3.3.1 Sampragyāta samādhi

Based on the objects of meditation, *Sampragyāta samādhi* has been divided in four stages / types. Patanjali in Yoga darśana said '*vitarkavicārānandāsmītarūpānūgamat sampragyāta*' i.e. 1. *Vitarkānūgata*, 2. *Vicārānūgata*, 3. *Ānandānūgata* and 4. *asmitānūgata*.

###### 3.3.1.1 Vitarkānūgata

*Vitarkānūgata samādhi* is experiencing the complete knowledge without doubt, opposition and hankering of the gross objects (like moon, sun, body etc) not known (by inference or actual observation) till now by concentrating the mind on them.

###### 3.3.1.2 Vicārānūgata

When the gross object is experienced correctly, then leaving the attributes like non-eternity associated with its form etc, its feeling in the form of ego, *maḥat*, subtle matter etc stay in the sensual organs. By thinking of them and its unheard special attributes of place, time etc result in experiencing called *vicāra*. When during *samādhi*, one is able to

experience the subtle object, then it is called *savicāra*. In other words *Vicārānūgata samādhi* is the experience by the sense organs of the five gross *bhūta* and the five *tanmātrās* of the gross object without doubt, opposition.

### 3.3.1.3 *Ānandānūgata*

In this the practitioner experiences ego (*ahankāra*). This experience of ego is not like the experience of other subtle objects. This is so as ego is itself the material cause of all subtle objects till *tanmātrās*, the knowledge sense organs. Ego is the result of primacy of *satvagunas* that deliver happiness. Therefore in this state the practitioner experiences happiness (*aham asmi*) beyond subtle and gross objects. This experience of happiness is *Ānandānūgata*.

### 3.3.1.4 *Asmitānūgata*

Mind in the shadow of the consciousness in which ego resides in the form of a seed, i.e. where identity between *pūrūṣa* and mind (*citta*) exists. This state is called *asmitānūgata*. *Asmitā* is the cause of ego and so is subtler than ego. When the concentration of *citta* enhances so much that its own nature starts appearing then that state is called *Asmitānūgata*.

All these four types of *samādhi* are called with support or seed. With support as they all make their object of concentration as support. This support is the seed and so these are called *sabīja*.

## 3.4 *Asampragyāta samādhi*

The state when all the tendencies of *citta* are suppressed or annihilated is called *Asampragyāta samādhi*. While defining *Asampragyāta samādhi* in Yoga darśana, it is said 'virāmapratyavābhyāsapurva' *saṁskāra śeṣo a nya* " i.e. by suppressing all the tendencies, practice to stay in the state of detachment (*para-vairāgya*) results in traces (*saṁskāras*) called *Asampragyāta samādhi*.

The main difference between this and *Sampragyāta samādhi* is the absence of separate existence of *citta* and *pūrūṣa* in *Asampragyāta samādhi* while that is not so in *Sampragyāta samādhi*. *Sampragyāta samādhi* is called *nirbīja* (without seeds) as no seeds of *avidhyā* and *kleśa* exist and are also eliminated.

## 3.5 Similarities of meditation in Jain and yoga philosophies.

In the path of purification, meditation always occupied a very important place. It is the state of our consciousness. Without meditation no spiritual tradition can move forward to attain their ultimate objective. This is the reason that Jain, Bauddha and Yoga philosophies have given due importance to meditation. Jains talk of four types of meditation while Yoga talk of types of *samādhi*. The first two types of meditation in Jainism are undesirable and we do not find any parallel to Dharmadhyāna anywhere else. Hence we are just comparing Śukladhyāna of Jains here. Patanjali talks of *dhyāna* and *samādhi* separately as two entities while in Jainism *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are one.

Elimination or stabilisation of the wandering tendencies of mind is *samādhi*. We find ample mention of *samādhi* in Jain texts but it was never considered separately from meditation. In Jain tradition, *dhāranā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* are all included in meditation only. States of Śukladhyāna are similar to *samādhi*. *Samādhi* had been divided in two states namely *Sampragyāta* and *Asampragyāta*. Based on Hari Bhadrā's Yoga Bundu, Yasovijaya has compared the first two parts of Śukladhyāna i.e. Prathaktva vitarka savicāra and Ekatva vitarka avicāra to *Sampragyāta samādhi* and the other two parts of s.i.e. Sukśmakriya anivṛiti and Samūcchinna kriya apratipāti to *Asampragyāta samādhi*.

*Sampragyāta samādhi* of Patanjali is the first phase of Śukladhyāna of Jains. Similarly *Asampragyāta samādhi* of Patanjali is the second and final stage of Śukladhyāna of Jains. In this way there is similarity in the meditation practice of Jains and Yoga darśana.

In conclusion we can say that all Indian philosophies have accepted the importance of meditation. What is *samādhi* in Buddhist and Yoga traditions is *dhyāna* in Jain tradition. The words *vitarka* and *vicāra* in Śukladhyāna of Jains is found in Yoga and Buddhist traditions also in the same reference. According to Jain texts, *vitarka* means knowledge of the canons and of *vicāra* is discriminatory analysis of the meaning /object. In Yoga tradition, *vitarka* means experience of gross elements and *vicāra* is experience of subtle elements and *tanmātrās*. In Buddhist tradition, *vitarka* means to get stabilized in the object of concentration and of *vikalpa* is to be stable and one with the object of concentration.

In this paper we have very briefly reviewed the types of meditation in the three traditions.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Explain the similarities and dissimilarities in the practice of meditation in Jain and Buddhist traditions ?

### Short notes type questions:

1. What is the nature of meditation in Yoga darśana ?
2. What is the similarity for meditation in Jain and Yoga darśana ?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. The number of types of meditation are .....?
2. According to Buddhist tradition, *samādhi* is of .....types ?
3. According to Yoga darśana tradition, *samādhi* is of .....types ?
4. *Sampragyāta samādhi* in Yoga darśana is .....*samādhi*?
5. *Sampragyāta samādhi* is of .....types?
6. The state in which all mental tendencies are suppressed is called .....?
7. What is the objective of Mahāyāna ?
8. Abhidhamma Piṭaka gives ... types of dhyāna
9. What is contemplation on one object called?
10. What is the meaning of Samādhi ?

### Answers to the blank fill n questions:

1. four 2. two 3. two 4. sabija samādhi 5. four 6. *Asampragyāta samādhi* 7. To attain Buddhata 8. five 9. dhyāna 10. concentration on one object

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**Unit 5: Lesson 17*****Karma, Jñāna Bhakti*(Karma, knowledge and devotion) Jain, Gītā.**

In this chapter we shall discuss in details about the following topics.

**0.0 Introduction****1.0 Meaning of the word karma.****1.1 Two aspects of karma****1.1 Three aspects of karma****1.2 Karmayoga****1.3 Dedication of karma to God****1.4 Nature of selfless karmayogi****1.5 Karmafala****2.0 Doctrine of karma in Jain philosophy****2.1 Bondage of karma****2.2 Types of karma****2.3 States of karma****2.4 Liberation from the results of karma.****3.0 Comparison of Karma doctrines in Gītā and Jain philosophy****4.0 Knowledge****4.1 Nature of knowledge****4.2 Discussion about knowledge****4.3 Objective****4.4 Means of knowledge****4.5 Jñānayoga and Karmayoga****4.6 Nature of the practitioner****4.7 Nature of knowledge in Jain philosophy****4.8 Jñeya or object of knowledge****4.9 Comparison.****5.0 Devotion in Jain tradition and Gītā****5.1 Types of devotion****5.2 Nature of the devotee****5.3 Objective of devotion.****0.0 Introduction**

Śrīmad Bhagvata Gītā is written by Ved Vyāsa. It gives three ways to attain Mokṣa namely i. Karmayoga, ii. Bhaktiyoga, iii. Jñānayoga. Karmayoga is to dedicate all our activities at the alter of the God, to free our self from the ego of being the doer of activities, only to perform activities indicated as Godly and not to expect results of our activities. By doing so, one attains the blessings and company of God, the mind gets purified, peace and tranquility prevails. In this state, the intelligent person while listening to the sermons from the scriptures experiences God attains the ultimate knowledge and ultimately attains liberation.

**1.0 Karma****1.1 Meaning of the word karma**

Element *kran* when joined with the part *manin* gives the word karma (*karman*). *Kṛtya*, *kārya*, *karaṇīya*, *kāryānvayana*, *kartavya*, *vyavasāya* are all synonyms of karma. Gītā calls all activities of the living beings as karma. Bāla Gaṅgādhara Tilaka in Gītā Rahasya writes ‘All physical activities of the living beings are karma definitely

but the intentions and thoughts of all those actions which have not been performed are also karma'. As per Gītā, all unexpressed *prakṛati* and the attributes produced thereof are only possible for all karmas. Due to ignorance and delusion, man considers himself the doer of those karma.

*Prakṛte 'kṛimāṇāni gūṇai' karmāṇi sarvaśa'  
Ahaṅkāra vimūdhātmā karttāhamitti manyate* (Gītā 3.27)

i.e. all karma are the results of the attributes of *prakṛati*, still the one whose mind is deluded with ego, such an ignorant thinks himself to be the doer of karma. In eighteen chapters, five causes of doing karma are given.

*Adhiṣṭhānaḥ tathā karttā karaṇaḥ ca prathagvidham  
Vividhāśca prathakceṣṭā daivaḥ caivātra pañcamam.* (Gītā 18.14)

i.e. *Adhiṣṭhānaḥ* (body/ place), doer, different types of instruments, different types of intentions and God etc are the five types of reasons for karma. By *adhiṣṭhānaḥ* is meant the body that is the medium of expression of different types of wants, desires, pains and pleasures, knowledge etc. The enjoyer of results i.e. the *jīva* is said to be the doer. Different types of words, places and cause are the instruments. Different types of activities concerning air, like breathe in and out are the intentions and the fifth is God.

### 1.1 Two types of karma

Gītākāra presents auspicious and inauspicious as the two types of karmas. Karma associated with expectation of results or infatuated with attachment etc is inauspicious which is the cause of transmigration. Jīva gets pains of birth, old age and death again and again. Another way of defining karma is the expression all prescribed activities without any infatuation. This is Karmayoga in the language of Gītā.

#### 1.2.1 Three types of karma

Gītākāra presents at one place (4.18) three types of karma namely karma, *akarma* and *vikarma*. Activities of mind, body and sense organs; as per the scriptures, memory and sermons is karma. Activities barred by the scripture are called *vikarma*. This karma-*vikarma* like karma is associated with body and sense organs only.

Even though no karma exists in the soul, yet we feel like being the doer of all these activities i.e. considering oneself as the doer of karma. We associate karma with the soul. Actually it is not the doer i.e. it is inactive. Thinking so, to experience lack of karma in the soul is *akarma*.

### 1.3 Karmayoga

Gītākāra has emphasized on karma. One cannot exist even for a moment without performing any karma.

*Nahi kaścitkṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakrat  
Kāryate hrāvaśa' karma sarva' prakṛtijaigunai'* (Gītā 3/5)

i.e. undoubtedly nobody can exist even for a moment without performing any activity as the entire human race, under the influence of attributes generated by *prakṛati* is forced to perform activities.

*Niṣkāma karmayoga* is performing activities as per the scriptures and without expectation of results and delusion. It is also called as *Sāmatvayoga*, *Buddhiyoga*, *Karmayoga*, *Tadārttayoga*, *Madartayoga*, *Matkarma* etc. In the beginning the desire for the results (expectations) are given up and the activity is performed just for the activity sake so that success or failure are taken as both in the same spirit. But the karma is never given up (Gītā 2.47-48, 6.1). By performing *Niṣkāma karmayoga*, the *citta* becomes purer and the practitioner does not consider himself to be independent of the all-pervading world rather consider himself to be one of its part only. Therefore all parts need each other's help (Gītā 3.10). The God is also performing all His activities for the benefit of his world without any expectation. (Gītā 3.23-24) At this moment, the practitioner gives up his selfish mottoes as being anti Godly and starts performing activities for the benefit of the mankind (Gītā 3.20,25). Activities like giving charity to righteous beings, serving the sick, taking care of the poor and downtrodden are all included as a part of such Godly activities. At this time, subtle feelings of self-praise and recognition etc start creeping in the mind of the practitioner which are the cause of bondage of the karma. Therefore karmas are performed like *yajña*. With devotion, the devotee starts performing activities by considering them as Godly only and God uses them for the benefit of the mankind.

## 1.4 Dedating the karma to God

Karma is performed for the God. In the next stage, the practitioner dedicates the karma itself to God rather than expectation of the results /benefits. He rises above attachment and expectation and performs his duties. Bhagavāna Śri Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna:

*Mayi Sarvāṇi karmāṇi saṁsyādhyātmacetasā  
Nirāśūnirmarmo bhutvā yūdhyaśva vigatajvara* (Gītā 3.30)

i.e. O Arjuna! After dedicating all karmas to me (All knowing God), without any expectation, attachment and pains go and fight the war. In this state the God becomes the objective whose service with deep love becomes the lonely objective of life (Gītā 11.55) In this state, the practitioner considers his home, family, wealth, body, mind, intellect and energy and all perceptible things belonging to God and performs all activities just for Him. He does not do anything for selfish reasons. He remembers God while performing each activity. He considers all his activities including earning for the food etc of his family as a service to God. Similarly for the benefit of mankind, he performs *yajña*, charity, penance etc as activities of and for God (Gītā 9.27) as he knows that protecting and serving religion is the dearest and primary service to God. Therefore the God reincarnates Himself again and again. With this dedication all activities of daily life naturally becomes like the worship of God (Gītā 18, 45-46,56).

## 1.5 Nature of the *niṣkāma yogi*.

Practitioner of *Niṣkāma karmayoga* is with a mind in the state of equanimity and believer of God. During this state, feeling of great or small or high and low does not exist in his mind. He considers everybody as a part of God. Therefore he believes in the welfare of all human beings and engages himself in such activities. By performing activities with this intention, he does not get himself attached to wrong activities. With a sense of dedication of all his activities to God, he does not become a part of sinful activities and their results. He feels that the energy to perform activities in him are all due to God (7.12). He is just a tool/ means of performing activities (Gītā 11.33).

## 1.5 Giving up the results of the karma.

Gītā's results of the karma are associated with giving up. Giving up the results of karma or karma without infatuation is *karmayoga*. This giving up of the results of karma is not limited to general karmas but extends even to giving up the attainment of *Mokṣa*. Therefore the last chapter of Gītā is captioned as *Mokṣasaṁnyāsayoga*. At the time of attaining *Mokṣa*, the devotee gives up *Mokṣa* and keeps himself busy in serving the God. In this state the devotee attains supreme devote status.

## 2.0 Doctrine of karma in Jain philosophy

In general karma is meant as activity. However in Jain philosophy, karma is an entity (matter), which due to attachment and aversion tainted activities of *jīva* is associated with it. Even though this karma is matter, still due to the activities of *jīva*, it gets attracted towards *jīva* and gets bonded with it and so it is called karma. Along with attachment and aversion tainted mental, physical or vocal activity of *jīva*, a substance comes towards *jīva* which due to the attachment and aversion associated with *jīva* gets bonded with it. Later on it yields auspicious or inauspicious results. Due to the auspicious and inauspicious activities of soul, the matter, which gets associated with soul, is called matter karma (Jain Siddhānta Dipikā 4.1). Based on the above discussion, the following points emerge:

- Karma is not sentient but is matter.
- All matter particles are not suitable for becoming karma. There is a special category of matter particles called *kārmanā vargāṇa*, which are capable of becoming karma.
- Karma particles are extremely subtle with four matter attributes.
- Kārmanā vargāṇas* only can become karma.
- Karma is an amalgam of infinite atoms.
- Karma is responsible for the obscuring, pain and dependence for the soul.

## 2.1 Karma bondage

*Jīva*, due to its auspicious and inauspicious tendencies, attracts *kārmanā vargāṇa* towards itself and establishes relationship with them. On the space points of the soul, infinite such *kārmanā vargāṇa* get bonded and almost become

one with them. This unison of karmas with the soul is called karma bondage. Concrete matter affects non-concrete soul. Karmas are subtle matter particles with special capabilities associated with soul. Karma bondage is of four types namely: *prakrati*, *pradeśa*, *sthiti* and *anubhāga*. Binding of karma particles with the space points of the soul is called *pradeśabandha*. Storing the nature of the results of karma is *prakratibandha*. The time period for which the karma will keep its association with the soul and the duration of its result yielding is called *sthitibandha*. The intensity of the results of karma is established by the *anubhāgabandha*.

## 2.2 Types of karma

Based on its nature, karma is of eight types namely: *jñānāvarṇīya*, *darśanāvarṇīya*, *mohanīya*, *antrīya*, *vedanīya*, *nāma*, *āyū*, *gotra*. Out of these, the first four i.e. *jñānāvarṇīya*, *darśanāvarṇīya*, *mohanīya*, *antrīya* are called obscuring karmas. Nature of the soul is *Jñāna* and *darśana* and karmas, which obscure these are called *jñānāvarṇīya* and *darśanāvarṇīya* respectively. *Mohanīya* deludes the soul while *antrīya* causes obstacles in the activities of the soul. All obscuring karmas are inauspicious only. To annihilate them, the soul has to make severe efforts all through its existence as empirical soul. As these karma progressively get annihilated, the energy and power of soul keeps on increasing. Complete annihilation of these karmas result in the soul attaining infinite knowledge, intuition, energy and happiness called bliss. The remaining four karmas i.e. *vedanīya*, *nāma*, *āyū*, *gotra* are called as non-obscuring karma. These can be auspicious or inauspicious both. Inauspicious karma results in pain and auspicious results in happiness. The karma, which causes pain and pleasure, is called *vedanīya*. It is of two types namely *sātā* (i.e. yielding happiness) and *asātā* (yielding pain). Complete annihilation of this type of karma results in infinite happiness. *Nāma* karma is responsible for the formation of body and speech of *jīva*. *Gotra* karma determines the family status of the *jīva* while *āyū* determines the life span in the present destiny of *jīva*. Annihilation of *āyū* karma makes soul immortal.

## 2.3 States of karma

Basically there are here states of karma namely: *badhyamāna*, *sattā* and *udayimāna*. When the karmas get bonded with the soul, then they are in the state of *badhyamāna*. Generally the karmas after bondage stay with the soul and do not yield results immediately. This state is called *sattā*. When the karmas become active and start yielding the results, then the state is called *udayimāna*.

## 2.4 Freedom from the results of karma.

As per Jains, the soul has to enjoy the results of the karma bonded. With its own strenuous efforts and awakening, the soul can change the results of the karma. Light of effort suddenly can cause the results to be submerged in the darkness. *Gūpti*, *samiti*, *Parīṣaha jai*, *tapa* and *caritra* etc are said to be mechanism to annihilate the karma. Jain texts talk of these in great details.

## 3.0 Comparison of karma in Jain philosophy and Gītā

- i. The word karma is used almost in the same fashion in both Jain philosophy and Gītā.
- ii. Gītā talks of two types of karma, first the worldly i.e. to act with attachment and aversion and second to act with God in mind and for Him i.e. dedicate all activities to God. The worldly karma cause bondage while Godly result in liberation. Jains do not talk of Godly activities. They consider all activities as cause of karma bondage.
- iii. Gītā is based on the existence of God. God is completely free and independent, all-powerful, creator of the universe and its administrator and destroyer. *Jīva* is responsible only for action even in it God is the inspiration. God yields results for all actions. In Jain philosophy, the responsibility for inspiration and results are not bestowed in God. *Jīva* himself acts under the influence of attachment and aversion and enjoys the results of his actions accordingly.
- iv. According to Jains, liberation is possible only after annihilation of all karmas. But in Gītā, the devotee can attain liberation by performing *Niṣkāma karmayoga* and *madarthakarma*.
- v. Jains consider *Mokṣa* as supreme. But in Gītā, even *Mokṣa* is to be given up to be with the God and in his service.
- vi. Jains have an in-depth description of their karma doctrine, which is not the case in Gītā.
- vii. The main difference is that in Gītā the karma is dedicated to god while in Jainism it is dedicate to the self/soul.
- viii. *Niṣkāma karmayogi* does all his activities with dedication to God. Jains do not accept this concept of God.



#### 4.0 Knowledge.

Gītā talks of two ways to attain *Mokṣa* namely *jñānamārga* and *karmamārga*. Here the word determination is used for *mārga*. Intelligent people consider *jñānamārga* (*jñāna*-determination) and yogis consider *karmamārga* (karma determination) as the way of attaining *Mokṣa* or freedom from pains. Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa says:

*Loke a smin-a dvividhā niṣṭhā pūrā proktā mayānadha*  
*Jñānayogena Sāṅkhyānāḥ Karmayogena yoginām* (Gītā 3.3)

i.e. O listener! In this world I have already said of two types of determinations (means). In these, for Sāṅkhyayogis the means is *jñānayoga* and for yogis it is *karmayoga*.

#### 4.1 Nature of knowledge.

*Jñānayoga* is the existence in God who is truth-knowledge and bliss (*satcittānanda*) after eliminating the ego of being doer of all activities of mind, body and speech. *Jñānayoga* is also called Sāṅkhyayoga, Detachment/ *saṅyāsa* and *jñānaniṣṭhā* –determination.

Gītākāra defines knowledge as:

*Kṣetrajñāḥ cāpi māṇ vidhi sarvakṣetresū bhārata*  
*Kṣetrakṣetrajñayojñānāḥ mataḥ mama* (Gītā 13/2)

i.e. O Arjuna! In all places, I say that you know me as *Jīvātmā*. Knowledge knows the basic elements of *Kṣetra* i.e. *prakṛati* tainted with impurities and *kṣetrajña* i.e. *pūrūṣa*.

#### 4.2 Discussion on object of knowledge.

According to Gītā, 'In Sāṅkhyayoga or *Jñānayoga* a part of the world is experience in the form of supreme wealth called knowledge and bliss, e.g. clouds in a small part of sky.

Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa says:

*Jñeyan yattat pravakṣyāmi yajjñatvāmratamaśnūte.*  
*Anādimatparaḥ brahma na saitanasiducyate* (Gītā 13.12)

i.e. I will talk properly of the entity which is worth knowing and after knowing it, one gets supreme happiness. That eternal Brhma is neither existent nor non-existent but cannot be expressed in words. It pervades the entire universe (*Samamāvṛtya Tiṣṭhati* 13.13). It knows all the subjects of sense organs and yet it is devoid of sense organs. Even though it is free of infatuation, yet it looks after the welfare of all. It is without attributes and yet it enjoys all the attributes. (13.14). It is filled in and out of all living beings. Being subtle, it cannot be cognized by ordinary people (13.15). Even though it is not divisible yet it appears to be divided in all elements and existing in them. This God in the form of Viṣṇu looks after the entire universe, creator in the form of Brhma and destroyer in the form of Rūdra. (13.16). It is the light of supreme light of Brhma. That knowledge is worth knowing and is cognizable from the knowledge of basic element (metaphysics). It exists in a special form in everybody's heart. (13.17). It is never non-existent. Therefore it is called truth, eternal and indestructible. It is infinite and without any limits or boundaries. Mind, intellect, *citta*, ego, looker and seeing, etc is all manifestations of Brhma only.

#### 4.3 Objective

That is like the wealth of knowledge and bliss, Parmātmā, complete happiness, infinite happiness, tranquility, intellect cum bliss, knowledge cum bliss, supreme happiness, eternal happiness, sentience cum happiness and just bliss. It is nothing except bliss. Contemplating like this, the mind gets absorbed in God. At this stage all tendencies and thoughts disappear except being one with God. The intellect becomes one with God. Practicing meditation like this daily, when the practitioner just known one existence of God and the universe, knower, object of knowing and knowing all become one and he becomes one like Brhma himself. He feels blessed and attains liberation after eliminating all his sins.

*Gacchantyapūrāvṛttaḥ jñāna nirdhutakalmaṣā'* (Gītā 5-17)

The intelligent practitioner just sees and feels God all pervading. He feels blessed by being one with Him.

*Madbhakta etadvijñāya madbhāvāyopapadhate.* (13/18)

i.e. the intelligent devotee, after knowing the nature of God, attains it. Knowledge results in supreme peace.

*Jñānaḥ labdhvā paraṁ śāntimacirenādhigacchati* (Gītā 4.39)

#### 4.4 Means of acquiring knowledge

Gītākāra has cited a number of ways of acquiring knowledge. These are described in details in the thirteenth chapter. Gītākāra says:

*Amānitvamadamahitvamahiṁsā kṣāntirājarvam  
ācāryopāsanaḥ śaucaḥ sthairyamāmanigraha*’ (13.7)

i.e. lack of the pride being important, good conduct, *ahiṁsā* (i.e. forgiveness), simplicity (absence of crookedness), dedication to the holy preceptor, cleanliness, stability of mind, restraints on the activities of mind and body are the means of acquiring knowledge. It is important that these attributes are present in the practitioner. Gītākāra further say ‘Lack of infatuation in all enjoyments of this world and heavens, lack of ego, thinking and contemplating on birth, death, sickness, old age, pains and flaws, lack of attachment with the family and others, equanimity and detachment from the worldly things, selfless devotion to god, nature to be pure in solitude, leaning towards acquiring spiritual knowledge, indifference towards people engaged in worldly things are all means to acquire knowledge.

#### 4.5 Jñānayoga and Karmayoga

Gītākāra does not consider *Jñānayoga* and *Karmayoga* separately or different. These are the two methods to achieve the objective and depend on the nature of the practitioner. Arjuna doubts that Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa talks sometimes of *Jñānayoga* and at other times of *Karmayoga*. He says that please tell me only the means that are proper for me. Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa then says ‘Less intelligent people consider these (i.e. *Jñānayoga* and *Karmayoga*) as different while intelligent people can take refuge in any one of them and attain God (Gītā 5-4). The intelligent people through *Jñānayoga* and karmayogi through *Niṣkāmakarma* attain God. Therefore the person who looks at *Jñānayoga* and *Karmayoga* as one and same looks correctly. The underlying intention is that knowledge and karma are both means of attaining the same objective. Even though the means are different yet the objective is same. Therefore both *Jñānayoga* and *Karmayoga* are supreme.

#### 4.6 Nature of the practitioner

Gītā gives details about the right practitioner of *Jñānayoga* and what should be his nature? *Jñānayogi*, while maintains complete control over his mind, neither performing any activity nor asking others to do them, giving up all activities of the body, stabilizes himself in the true nature of God (Gītā 5.13). The intelligent practitioner maintains equanimity between a very learned *brāhmaṇa* or cow, dog, elephant etc. He also maintains equanimity in pains and pleasures. (Gītā 5.20). Giving up infatuation and experiencing purity, he meditates in the nature of God and attains eternal bliss (Gītā 5.21).

#### 4.7 Nature of knowledge in Jain philosophy

Means of knowing or just knowing is knowledge. The method or means by which we acquire true knowledge about an entity is knowledge. Knowledge knows the special attributes of an entity. Hence it is called definitive manifestation (*sākāra upayoga*). In Jain language, discriminatory experience is knowledge. There are five types of knowledge namely, mind based (*mati*), verbal testimony (*śruta*), clairvoyance (*avadhi*), telepathy (*manahpariyaya*) and omniscience (*kevala*). (Tattvārthasutra 1.9)

Knowledge by mind and brain is *matijñāna*. It cognizes the present only. Mind, memory, *sañjñā*, *cintā*, *abhinibodha* are all its synonyms (Tattvārthasutra 1.13). *Mati* is acquired with the aid of sense organs and mind. Out linear grasp, discrimination, judgment and retention of judgment are its stages or types.

With the aid of scriptures, the knowledge gained by mind and sense organs is called *śrutajñāna*. It is acquired with *matijñāna*. *Aṅga Praviṣṭa* and *Aṅga Bāhya* are its two types. *Aṅga Praviṣṭa* has twelve parts while *Aṅga Bāhya* has many types (Tattvārthasutra 1.12). *Matijñāna* is for cognition while *śrutajñāna* is for self and others cognition both. Based on Akṣaraśruta and Anakṣaraśruta, *śrutajñāna* is of 14 other types also (Pravacana Pāṭheya Ac. Tulsi Page 182)

Knowledge acquired with practice and concentration is called clairvoyance. Concentration of mind is required to attain this knowledge. It is of two types namely *Bhava Pratyā* i.e. based on the destiny /birth and *Gūṇapratya* i.e. based on the practice of spiritual purification. The first one occurs in denizens of hell and heaven since birth while the second one is acquired by human and sub-human (animal) beings (Tattvārthasūtra). *Gūṇapratya* is of six types namely *anūgāmi*, *ananūgāmi*, *vardhamāna*, *hiyamāna*, *pratpāti* and *aprapatipāti* (Pra. Pa. Page 189).

Knowledge of the state of the mind based on the *mano varganās* (mind particles) is called telepathy. *Rājumati* and *Vipulamati* are its two types (Tattvārthasūtra 1.24). The knowledge, which results in direct cognition of all concrete and non-concrete objects, is called omniscience. This is super-sensuous. These five types of knowledge are further grouped in two categories namely indirect and direct; the first two are indirect while the last three are direct. The first three types of knowledge can also be of wrong type giving a total of eight types of knowledge in texts.

#### 4.8 Jñeya or object of knowledge.

In Jain philosophy, from practical viewpoint objects of knowledge is the entire universe while from absolute viewpoint it is just pure soul only. The practitioner performs all his activities to know true nature. We can also express it that all his activities are associated to acquire and experience knowledge about his soul. His main objective is to attain the pure soul state. Nature of this pure soul is consciousness, knowledge, without any attachment or blemish, liberated. It cannot be described by speech and cannot be experienced by logic. It is colourless, touch less and formless. It occupies space and is unique. It is without any sex like male, female or neutral.

#### 4.9 Comparison

Both traditions i.e. Jain and Gītā have similarities as well as dissimilarities in their conception of knowledge. Both accept that soul is pure and body as impure and different. However the difference is in Gītā considering knowledge associated with knowing God only while Jains talk of knowledge associated with knowing all objects of this universe.

- According to Gītā, experiencing the existence of God in all objects is knowledge. This is known as *saṅgyāsa* or *Sāṅkhyayoga*. This God is one and different from *Jīvaīma*, pervades the entire universe, eternal, inactive and is omnipotent. Jain philosophy differs completely with this concept. According to them experience of the pure self/soul of the individual is the absolute knowledge. There are infinite souls and is not all pervading or inactive. Jains do not believe in the concept of such God.
- Gītā's object of knowledge is the administrator and destroyer of the universe. Creator of the universe is just He. Jains say that the universe is eternal and there is no one who created it or can destroy it. Jain's pure soul is not the creator or destroyer of the universe.
- Experiencing the God everywhere and then to be one with Him is the ultimate objective of knowledge. Jains talk of experiencing the self/soul and to know achieve its pure soul state is the object of knowledge. Gītā talks of other i.e. God while Jains talk of self and experiencing the same.
- Nature of the practitioner and *jñāmi* is same in both traditions i.e. with equanimity, of stable nature and detached. They are *mūni* and not without selfish motto.
- Both strive to attain bliss and liberation from bondage.

#### 5.0 Devotion (bhakti) in Jain tradition and Gītā

Bhagavad Gītā is the supreme text on devotion. It has detailed description on the nature of devotion. It has undivided devotion in Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa. To offer /devote all activities and mental tendencies to God completely is devotion. Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa himself says:

*Cetasā sarkakarmāṇi mayi sanyasyamatpara'  
Buddhiyoga mūpāśritya maccitta' satata' bhava.* (Gītā 18/57)

i.e. dedicate all your activities to me, make your *citta* stable in me by practicing equanimity. To giving up all other attributes to achieve God is devotion. It annihilates all sin and flaws.

*Sarve dharmān parityajya māmekaṁ śaraṇaṁ vraja  
Ahaṁ tvā sarvapāpebhyo mokṣayiṣyāmi māśuca'.* (Gītā 18/66)

i.e. at one instance the adjective *mayyāsaktamanā* 'has been used of the devotee. This means that infatuation in God is devotion and devotee is with such an infatuated mind. Bhagavāna Nārada in his Bhaktisutra has called complete dedication to the God as *bhakti*. 'Tadārpita a khalācāritā tadvismaraṇe paramavyākulateti' Nārada Bhaktisutra 19. Dedication of mind and intellect to God is *bhakti*. Concerning the characteristics of the devotee, Gītā says:

*Saṁtūṣṭa' satataṁ yogi yatātmā dradha niścaya'  
Mayyarpitamānorbuddhiryo madbhakta'sa me priya'* (Gītā 12/14)

Mahādeva Śaṅkara himself in Pañcatantra says:

*Sarvopādhivinirmuktaṁ tatparatvena nirmalam  
Hṛṣikeṇa hṛṣikeśasevanaṁ bhaktirūcyate* (Naras Pāncarātra)

We find detailed discussions on devotion in Bhāgavata Pūrāṇa (3.29.11-14). Like the uninterrupted flow of Gaṅgā moving towards the sea, similarly just listening to the attributes of God, the tendencies of the mind like the flow of oil, merging in God is called supreme devotion. Such devotees do not even wish for liberation by leaving listening the hymns in praise of God. By devotion, the devotee after eliminating all the delusion (*māyā*) attains the Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the nature of love from where he does not return to this transmigration in the world. *Yaṁprāpya na rivartante taddhāma paramaṁ mama* (Gītā 8.21).

To contemplate In God, to dedicate everything to Him, after knowing His power to be engaged in Him and to feel contented by singing His praise is devotion.

*Maccittā madgata prāṇābodhayanta' parasparam  
Kathayantaśca māṁ nityaṁ tūṅyanti ca ramanti ca* (Gītā 10.9)

By knowing the Godliness of God, influenced by His greatness and singing His praise all the time with full faith in Him is devotion (Gītā 10.8). Acarya Gara writes 'Kathādisvati garga' (Nārada Bhaktisutra 17) i.e. to have affection and oneness in the narration of God's virtues is devotion. Bhāgavata-kāra also has written about the importance of narration (*kathā*) of Bhagavata:

*Tava Kathāmrta taptajivanaṁ kavibhirīditaṁ kalmaṣapaham  
Śravaṇamaṅgalaṁ śṛmadātataṁ bhūvi gūṇanti te bhuridā janā'* (Bh. Pu 10.31.9)

i.e. the nectar of Bhagavat-kātha gives tranquility (*amratattva*) to the human being feeling the fire like pains of the world. The heart feels contented, all the sins are annihilated and auspiciousness prevails.

Devotion is like surrender. Surrendering everything to that supreme holy being is devotion. By surrendering everything to God, the devotee becomes carefree. Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa says:

*Ananyāścintayanto māṁ ye janāḥ paryūpāsate  
Teṣāṁ nityābhīyuktānaṁ yogakṣemaṁ vahāmyaham* (Gītā 9.22)

Bhagavāna says that this unparalleled yoga creates flawless devotion. 'mayi cānanya yogena bhaktiravyabhicārini' (Gītā 13.10).

Thus according to Gītā, devotion is the absolute surrender to Brhman the complete God, to dedicate in His feet, to sing hymns in His praise, contemplation, recollection, service and full faith in His feet. This devotion results in all types of prosperity, supreme happiness, like nectar, love, cleans and giver of relief from all worldly pains.

### 5.1 Types of devotion.

According to Gītā, devotion can be classified in two categories namely *sagūṇa* and *nirgūṇa*. By *sagūṇa* is meant contemplation of different activities and attributes of Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa. The devotee while looking and admiring His idol and facial beauty and getting allured by them starts contemplating and recollection of Him. This is *sagūṇa* devotion. Contemplation on the formless, without attributes and totally independent God is *nirgūṇa* devotion. Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa says:

*Abhyāsayogayuktena cetasā nānyagaminā  
Paramaṁ puruṣaṁ divyaṁ yāti pārthānūcintayan.* (Gītā 8/8)

i.e. O Pārtha! This is rule that the man with continuous practice of yoga in the form of meditation of God and controlling the mind from wandering elsewhere attains the supreme light in the form of God.

## 5.2 Nature of the devotee:

A devotee is a person who is simple minded, healthy and peaceful *citta*, soft heart, complete personality, having control of his sense organs, truthful and unstinted faith in God. Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa in Gītā says:

*Catūrvirdhā bhajante mām janā 'sūkratino arjūna  
ārto jijñāsū rāthārthir jñānī ca bharatvarṣabha.* (Gītā 7.16)

O Arjuna! There are four types of persons who perform well deeds and praise me namely *ārthārthi*, *ārtti*, *jijñāsū* and *jñānī*. This means that types of devotees are indicated here. The devotee who pays and worships for worldly comforts is *ārthārthi*. The one who worships to get relief from some pains or grief is called *ārtti*, e.g. in Mahābharata Draupadi, Uttarā in Bhāgavata Pūrāṇa, Arjūna etc. The one who praises and worships to know truly the nature of God is called *jijñāsū*. The person who becomes one with God with the feeling of *Vāsudeva sarvam* 'is *jñānī*. A devotee like *jñānī* is rare and dearest to me.

*Teṣā 'jñānīnityṣṭkta ekabhaktirviśisyate  
Priyo hi jñānīno a tyartamaha' sa ca mama priya'.* (Gītā 7.17)

i.e. Out of all the four types of devotees, the *jñānī* devotee as he is knower of all the elements in the universe and keeps his mind centered on me all the time is the best and dearest to me. In the 12<sup>th</sup> chapter of Gītā, characteristics of the supreme devotee are given. A person who is free of attachment and aversion in all people, is kind, friendly to all, full of forgiveness, yogi, contented, of firm belief and with his mind focused all the time on God is supreme devotee. He is pure soul, without possessions, free of desire and wants, calm himself and does not cause problems for others, equanimity with friends and foes and full of attributes is supreme. He is the dearest to God. Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa in Gītā says:

*Tūlyanindāstū tirmaṇi santūṣṭo yena kencit  
Aniketa' sthīramatirbhaktimān me priyo nara'.* (Gītā 12.19)

## 5.4 Characteristics of devotion.

Staying at the feet of God is the ultimate objective of devotion. Even after attaining Mokṣa, the devotee leaves the same and wishes to stay at the feet of God to be with Him. Eternal faith and dedication at the feet/ alter of God is the ultimate objective of devotion. In Bhagavata Pūrāṇa He Himself says,

*Na nākapraṣṭhaṇ na ca sārva bhaumaṇ  
Na pārmeṣṭhyaṇ na rasādhipatyam  
Na yoga siddhirapṣṭnatbhavaṇ vā  
Vācchanti yatpādarajahprapannā* (Ba Pu 10.16.37).

i.e. that devotee who accepts the blessings of his feet, he does not wish the kingdom of earth or heavens or netherworld nor the *Brhamapada* (God). He also does not want any super sensual powers and even does not wish to attain Mokṣa that is free of birth and death. The devotee begs pain only as the remembrances of God exists in pain only and so he can have his company therein. Kūṁtī begs from Bhagavāna Śrī Kṛṣṇa:

*Vipada' santū na 'śaśvatatraa jagadgūro  
Bhavato darśanan yatsyādapūnarbhavadarśanam* (Ba Pu 1.8.25)

Supreme peace and happiness and bliss can be achieved from devotion only. Many quotations are famous in this respect.

*Madbhakti' sūkarāmokṣadāyini.  
Bhaktiyogānmukti'  
Bhaktirmokṣāya kevalayam  
Bhaktirekaiva muktidā  
Kevalā bhaktirhi brhmasāyūjyākāriṇi.*

Devotion is the biggest achievement. '*bhaktireva parolābha*' By devotion the practitioner achieves something after which nothing else exists to be achieved. Gītā says:

*Yān labdhvā cāparaṁ lābhaṁ manyate nādhikaṁ tata'*  
*Yasminsthito na dū'kkena gūrūnāpi vicālyate* (Gītā 6/22)

i.e. after attaining the supreme benefit, nothing else remains to be achieved; in that state of supreme devotion to God even the most dreaded event distracts the devotee.

### 3.4 Devotion in Jain tradition.

Ācārāṅga, Sutrakratāṅga etc are old Jain religious texts. We find preliminary discussions about devotion in them where devotion is described as faith / belief. Mahāvīratthū in Sutrakratāṅga is in a way a description of devotion. In here, worship (*stūti*) of Mahāvīra with a number of virtues and their meanings is described. *Stūti* cannot be performed in the absence of devotion. Singing the attributes/qualities of the one who is being worshipped is *stūti*. This is also called *kīrtana* or *bhakti*. *Stotra*, *stūti*, *stva* all fall in the category of *kīrtana* and devotion. In Mahāvīratthū, we see *kīrtana* of the greatness and virtues of Lord along with the benefits to be derived by doing so.

*Soccā ya dhammaṁ arhaṁtabhāsiyaṁ samāhitaṁ aṭṭapaovasūddhaṁ*  
*Taṁ saddahantā ya janā anāhuṁ edāva devāhiva āgamissaṁti* Sutra 1.6.29

i.e. By listening and then developing faith in the sermons about religion as words or sentences or logic by *arahantas*, the listener becomes free of *ayu* karma and attain the state of the kings of heavenly beings. Sarvarthasiddhi also talks on these lines about *bhakti* in the form of faith in sermons of *arahantas* and purifying the mind.

*Arhadācārya bahūsrūta pravacanesū bhāvaviśuddhi yukto anūrāgo bhakti'* (SS 6.24.339.4)

Here love / affection with pure mind is called *bhakti*.  
*Bhāvaviśuddhi yukto anūrāgo bhakti'* (SS 6.24.339.4)

Right belief in the pure soul of the self is *bhakti*. Right belief, the first limb of *ratnatrya* is synonym of *bhakti*. Service, love, surrender, worship, *pūjā arcanā*, *vandana*, purification of mind etc are different forms of *bhakti*.

We find description of *bhakti* along with its benefits in Āvaśyakaniryukti (1110-1111).

*Bhattiḥa jinavarāṇaṁ kṣiṇjaṁti puvva saṁdhiyākammā*  
*Āyariyanamukkāreṇa vijjā maṁtā ya sijaṁti*  
*Bhattiḥa jinavarāṇaṁ paramāe kṣiṇapijjadosāṇaṁ*  
*Ārugga bohilābhaṁ samāhimaraṇaṁ ca pāvaṁti.*

i.e. Devotion of *Jinas* result in weakening and eliminating the bonded karmas. By paying obeisance to acaryas, one attains knowledge and mantras. Again by *bhakti* of *Jinas*, attachment and aversion are eliminated, one attains sickness free health, knowledge and *samādhi*. After destruction of bonded karmas, devotee become one with his soul by chanting its attributes. All wandering tendencies are eliminated and he becomes stable in his own nature and becomes a devotee without any expectations. From absolute viewpoint, contemplating on one's pure soul is *bhakti*. In this there is no worldly desires.

Even though *niskāma bhakti* is the ideal, yet *ācāryas* have also discussed *sakāma bhakti* or devotion with expectation. Many Jain poets have indicated that by devotion to God, one can attain all worldly benefits, like freedom from sickness, freedom from fear etc. Listening, chanting, recollecting or *kirtana* of the name of Bhagavana extinguishes all pains and sufferings.

*Tvatsaṁkathāpi jagatāṁ dūritāni hanti* (Bhaktambar stotra 9).

i.e. your *kathā* destroys all the sins. Ācārya Siddha Sena also talks similarly.

*Āstāmacintyamahimā jina! Sanstavaste,*  
*Nāmāpi pāti bavato bhavato jaganti*  
*Tivrātapopahat pāṇḍjanān nidādhe*  
*Prīṇāti padmasarasa' sarasoa niloa pi* (Kalyāna Mandir 7)

### 3.5 Types of *bhakti*

Jainācārya talk of 12 types of *bhakti*, namely *Siddha*, *Śrūta*, *Cāritra*, *Ācārya*, *Pañcagūrū*, *Tīrthaṅkara*, *Śāntī*, *Samādhi*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Nandīśvara* and *Caitya*.

**3.5.1 Siddha bhakti :** *Siddhas* are free of eight karmas, have eight attributes, have completed all works worth doing, eternally stay in Moksa. By their devotion, in the form of paying obeisance, recollecting and chanting their attributes, contemplate on them, the devotee himself becomes like them. Kunda Kunda was a devotee of *siddhas*. Ācārya Somdeva says that *siddha bhakti* results in attaining *ratnatraya*.

**3.5.2 Śrūta bhakti :** *Śrūta* is the sermons of the holy teacher (*gūrū*), which is memorized. *Śrūta*, *āgama* and *pravacana* are synonyms. There are two types of *Śrūta* based on the type of *gūrū* namely *Aṅga Praviṣṭa* and *Aṅgabāhya*. Their honour, worship and paying respects is *Śrūta bhakti*. Scriptures and their writers are worshiped. Jains have also visualized *ŚrūtaDevi*. *Śrūta bhakti* results in supreme happiness and bliss, delusion is eliminated and the ownership of the world i.e. indifference towards it are attained.

**3.5.3 Cāritra bhakti :** Whatever is practiced or followed, as daily routine is *Cāritra*. In Jain tradition it is accepted as *Samyakcāritra*. Puṇyapāda writes, 'Te intelligent persons desirous of eliminating the bondages of the world, perform activities to avoid bondage of karmas. This is called *Samyakcāritra*. It is of five types namely *Jñānācāra*, *Darśanācāra*, *Tapācāra*, *Vīryācāra* and *Cāritrācāra*. Practice of all these five, devotion and obeisance towards them is *Cāritra bhakti*. To chant importance of *Cāritra* is also *Cāritra bhakti*. Ācārya Somdeva says that *cāritra* with self-restraint and meditation is '*samyaktaratnākara*'. Without this, the most strenuous penance of monks is also useless. *Cāritra bhakti* blesses all wishes of the devotee and both heaven and liberation can be achieved by it.

**3.5.4 Yogi bhakti :** One who practices yoga (eight limb) is called *yogi*. *Yogi* is busy in *samādhi*. To pay obeisance, *vandana*, recite their virtues is *yogi bhakti*. It yields *sūkladhyaṇa* and eliminates worldly pains and sufferings.

**3.5.5 Ācārya bhakti :** *Ācārya* is bestowed with all virtues. His conduct is imitable by others and lecturer of mantras etc and an expert in all scriptures. To have dedication to him, to pay respects and service to him and to recite his virtues is *Ācārya bhakti*. By performing this, the devotee destroys his karmas and can swim across this world of pain.

**3.5.6 Pañcagūrū bhakti :** *Arahaṇta*, *siddha*, *ācāryas*, *upādhyāya* and *sādhu* are the five auspicious beings and *gūrū*. To recite their attributes is *Pañcagūrū bhakti*. It results in achieving the *ratnatraya* and bliss.

**3.5.7 Tīrthaṅkara bhakti :** The one who helps in crossing this world of pains to attain liberation is called *Tīrtha*. Ācāryas have called *Dvādaśāṅga*, *ratnatraya*, soul and four fold congregation as *Tīrtha*. One who builds *Tīrtha* is called *Tīrthaṅkara*. He is the creator of unique path of liberation and has divine voice /sound. To chant *Tīrthaṅkara*'s qualities, sing and *kīrtana*, to surrender to their feet, looking at their idols etc is *Tīrthaṅkara bhakti*. Māntuṅga in *Bhaktāmbara* stotra says:

*Drṣṭvā bhayaṁ bhavati no bhavadāśritānām  
Tvannāma kirtanajalaṁ samayatyāśeṣam.  
Martyā bhavanti makaradhvajatulyarupā  
Tan māntuṅgamavaśā samupaiti lakṣmī'*

Vādīrajsuri in *Ekibhāvastotra* says 'Prabho! By attaining access to your feet, the devotee washes all his sins'

**3.5.8 Śāntī bhakti :** Absence of uneasiness is called peace or *Śāntī*. Devotion dedicated achieve *Śāntī* is *Śāntībhakti*. Ācārya Puṇya Pāda says ' By performing *stuti* at the alter of Jina all obstacles and physical ailments disappear. To worship *Śāntī yantra* is also *Śāntībhakti*.'

**3.5.9 Samādhibhakti :** Giving up all extraneous thoughts and to concentrate mind on an object is *Samādhi*. With and without concentration of mind on an object are the two types of *Samādhi*. To concentrate on a mantra, venerated being or a *gūrū* is *savikalpa samādhi* while concentration the mind on the pure self is *nirvikalpa samādhi*. One who attains *Samādhi* desires death in *Samādhi*. It annihilates karmika bondage and yields liberation.

**3.5.10 *Nirvāṇabhakti*** : To perform *bhakti* of those who have attained liberation is called *Nirvāṇabhakti*. *Pañcakalyāṇakastuti*, pilgrimage to holy places and *Tīrthkṣetrastuti* is *Nirvāṇabhakti*. It yields freedom from karmika bondage.

**3.5.11 *Nandīśwarabhakti*** : To worship natural Jain temples and Jina idols therein located in *Nandīśwara* island is *Nandīśwarabhakti*.

**3.5.12 *Caityabhakti*** : Building memory marks /emblems on the piers of holy persons is called *Caitya*. In olden days trees used to be planted at such places and these were called *caitya* trees. Abhayadevasuri in *Bhagavativṛtti* has called *Jina* idol as *caitya*. Ācārya KundaKunda has called pure soul as *caitya*. In this way performing worship etc of *caitya* tree, temple or *Jina* idol is called *caitya bhakti*.

### 3.6 Nature of the devotee.

Giving up ego, unstinted faith, faith in ones ideal (*upāsya*), and purity of mind are essential prerequisites of a *bhakta*. He is alone (without company), without infatuation and without any worldly desires. He is always busy in the qualities, form and importance of God. He is at peace, simple and straightforward.

### 3.7 Comparison of devotion of Jains and Gītā

We find detailed and comprehensive discussion on devotion in both. There are some similarities and dissimilarities in both. Similarities are being enunciate first:

- Both consider concentration of mind and thoughts in one i.e. the ideal is called devotion.
- Both give due importance to *bhakti*. Both accept that devotion yield freedom from the pains of the world and attainment of eternal happiness.
- Ācāryas of both the traditions have given due importance to and described the importance of their ideals, *kīrtana* of their attributes, listening to their stories, recollecting their alters/ feet, and be with them. In *Gītā*, Arjuna surrenders himself at the feet of his lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa and says:

*Tasmatpranamya pranidhaya kayam  
Prasadye tvamahamīśamidayam  
Piteva pūtrasya sakheva sakhyū'  
Priya 'priyayarharsi deva soṭhūma* (Gītā 11.44)

With all his faculties and mind he becomes one with Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Nalakūbara maṇigrīva bhāgavadgūṇakīrtana in *Bhāgavada Pūrāṇa*, the meaning of life is explained thus:

*Vāṇi gūṇānūkathane sravaṇan kathāyāṇ  
Hastau ca karmastu manastva pādāyorna'  
Smṛtyāṇ śīrastva nivāsajagatpranāme  
Drṣṭi' sūttā ṇ darśanea stū bhattanunām* (Ba Pu 10.10.38)

i.e. O God! I, by placing my entire body at your feet, bowing therein, pray to make you happy. O Deval Like a father of his son, friend of his friend and husband of his beloved wife tolerate the inadequacies and flaws; similarly you also able to tolerate my sins or wrong doings.

God! Our voice keeps on reciting your auspicious attributes, our ears keep on hearing your stories, our hands keep on serving you and our mind stay at your feet all the time. Our forehead stays bent at your feet. The saints are your direct body and we keep on having their *darśanas*. We find in Jain texts also description of the importance of name *kīrtana*. Māntūṅga in *Bhaktāmbara* tota writes:

*Āstān tavastavanamastasamastadoṣaṇ  
Tvatsaṇ kathāpi jagatā ṇ dūritāni hanti  
Dure sahasakirana 'kūrūte prabaiva  
Padmākareṣṭu jalajani vikasamanji* (Bhaktāmbara stotra 9)

- In both traditions, the devotee recites he supremacy of his ideal. Devotees in both traditions describe their ideal as most handsome, king of the universe and have compared him to different ornaments of the world. Almost



similar adjectives for Him have been used in both traditions. The following verses from Gītā and Bhaktāmbara stotra shows such claims.

*Ādityavarṇa tamasa' parastāt* (Gītā 8.9)  
*Paramam* (Gītā 8.3, 8.8, 10.12, 11.9, 11.18)  
*Ādityavarṇamamalan tamasa' parastāt* (Bhaktāmbar stotra 23)  
*Tvāmayayaṅ vibhūmacintyamasaṅkhyamadyaṅ*  
*Bṛhmanamīswara manantamaṅga ketūm*  
*Yogīśvaraṅ vīditayogamanekamekaṅ*  
*Jñānasvarūpamalaṅ pravādanti santa'* (Bhaktāmbar stotra 24)

Śrī Kṛṣṇa in Gītā has called himself like *Jñāna*. '*Jñāna jñānavatāmaham*' (Gītā 10.38).

### 3.8 Dissimilarities

The basic difference in *bhakti* of traditions is that devotion in Gītā is based on existence of God where God is the creator, administrator and destroyer of this universe. To give relief to pains of the worldly beings He reincarnates Himself in different forms. In Jain tradition, devotion is based on the self/soul and they do not accept the activities of God.

## Exercises

### Essay type question:

1. Provide a comparative analysis of the importance of devotion as per Gītā and Jain tradition?

### Short notes type questions:

1. Explain the doctrine of karma on the basis of Gītā ?
2. Analyze the concept of knowledge based on Jain tradition?

### Fill in the blanks based on this lesson

1. What is the basic element (*dhātu*) in the word karma?
2. What is *vikarma*?
3. Who is the doer of *niṣkarma*?
4. How many types of karma are there as per Jain tradition?
5. What is mind-based knowledge (*matijñāna*)?
6. As per Gītā, how many types of devotion can be there?
7. As per Gītā, how many types of devotees can be there?
8. Which is the chapter related to devotion in Sutrakratāṅga?
9. How many types of devotion are given by Jainācāryas?
10. Who is called a Yogi ?

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7. Narad Bhaktisutra
8. Shandilya Bhaktisutra
9. Bhakti Ank Kalyana
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**DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION**



**M.A. JAINOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE  
RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY**

**PAPER-VII  
JAIN RELIGION PHILOSOPHY AND INDIAN  
PHILOSOPHY**

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Edition : 2017

*Printed Copies :150*

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